The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Part 1 of 5: The clock is ticking

I know that in wartime repairs can be carried out, and train services restarted, much quicker than in peacetime.

It would seem possible that the 'undamaged' track might be brought back into use more quickly, however single line working would mean a much less frequent service is possible. However without knowing how the line is signalled there might be more problems running a regular frequency service, especially if the signalling system relies on electrical cable carried across the bridge deck - this would likely be seriously damaged.
1. Thanks for your input on the rail portion of the Kerch Strait bridge.

(a) Below, a sample of Russian propaganda to push their agenda and support the stupid idea that traffic on the bridge has returned to normal. It has not. Only 20 to 40 cars can pass every hour, only and one lane is open. This leads to 480 to 960 cars per day, before it allowed 40k cars per day. Even Russian state media said, “the Crimean authorities have asked residents of the region not to use the [Crimean] bridge unless absolutely necessary... the recommendation is related to the limited capacity of the bridge.”​
(b) This means the intended effect of the attack on the road span of the Kerch Strait bridge to Crimea has been achieved — as a collateral benefit, destruction of a train and this has disrupted regular supplies to Crimea, converting a supply pipeline, to a soda straw — this is shaping operations 101.​

2. In the prior videos, there were debris impacting the rail bridge, after the initial blast on the Kerch Strait bridge to Crimea that caused the fire on the train tracks. There are no indications that any of the tanks of the train exploded. Each tank seems to be intact from the footage I have seen thus far. Therefore, I assume that the damage was caused by the explosion from the other bridge and the burning tanks were responsible for the damage to the rail bridge.
(a) Pretty clear the local authorities working Russian Deputy PM Marat Khusnullin rushed repairs to push the train service to restart. Talk of the alleged danger of "humiliating" the Putin is most often heard from talkers who are hurting from the humiliation of their past cheerleading for Putin. They hope that if western diplomacy rescues Putin from his debacle that started in Crimea, as it will also redeem them from theirs.​
(b) The sure way to avoid nuclear war is for Russia not to start one. If Putin does not do it, nobody in Ukraine or NATO will. The Russians need to learn the American lesson from the Korean War — a nuclear weapon is not to be used, even when Soviet pilots were flying sorties for North Korea and Chinese PLA troops were directly fighting Americans there.​
(c) Going forward, Ukraine will need a mix of forces able to attack the adversary in depth while also preserving their own mobility, for the next stage of battle. The sure way to end the occupation of Crimea is for Russia to withdraw from all of Ukraine. The war is all of Russia's making. The war stops when Russia stops it.​
(d) The Russians need to learn the American lesson from the Vietnam War, an American withdrawal from Vietnam did not destroy America. Likewise, the withdrawal of the Russian invasion force from Crimea will not destroy Russia.​

3. The smart ones in Crimea are getting out before they are in HIMARS range. They also restarted a ferry service — the Russians had a plan B for damage to the Kerch Strait bridge to Crimea and executed it — they will need luck to keep lines of communications with Russia open, going forward. The Russians will keep sucking at the logistics soda straw called the Kerch Strait bridge.
 
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vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
Yes, looks like two rail lines adjacent each other. May be similar situation to the road way where one is less damaged than the other. Regardless the disruption effects will remain real, given this is a bottleneck any damage or partial closure will still have real effects.
View attachment 49719
The steel rails themselves can be replaced rather quickly and are not the issue. Even if there is little blast damage to the RC span, the potential of heat damage is non-trivial. The span might require complete removal and replacement in normal circumstances.

Thats a really good pic you posted. I just realized seeing it that there are 3 spans on the vehicle side that need replacing. That will take some time to work out.
 

Rob c

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
There is an interesting story on MSN in which an Ukrainian official is claiming that waring factions of the Russian State carried out the sabotage of the bridge.
Ukraine claims warring leaders of Russia's security factions were behind Crimea bridge blast
Whether this is a genuine understanding by the Ukrainians or an attempt by them to sow dissention among the ranks in the RU government circles and have everyone looking at everyone else with suspicion I don't know. But if they get some traction on the story it could cause Putin a lot of trouble.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update. Sep 26th-30th

Kherson-Nikolaev-Krivoy Rog-Odessa.

Russian VDV apparently took out a Ukrainian armored vehicles in relatively close quarters, Kherson region.


Russian Izd 305 LMUR hitting a Ukrainian BMP (?) on a pontoon crossing. I believe this is one of the crossings across the Ingulets. Please note that while this footage looks impressive, and rightly so, the munition in question remains quite scarce in the Russian arsenal. If Russia could generally conduct strikes in this manner, rather then the rocket lobbing shown in the Misc. section below, this would be a very different war.


Russian Shahed-136 strikes against alleged Ukrainian military storage in Zatoka, Odessa region. A reminder, the Shahed, while technically a loitering munition, has no camera. This means that unlike Russia's own Lancet and Kub, it requires external target spotting otherwise being restricted to hitting stationary targets. Russia has mostly opted for the latter, likely due to poor recon capabilities.


More Russian Shahed-136 strikes, Odessa region.


Russian strikes on Nikolaev, including the new Shahed-136s. Targets include apparently a power grid substation and a shipbuilding factory. Note Ukraine is currently using many industrial facilities for armored vehicle repair.


Russian TOS-1 fires near Nikolaev.


Destroyed Ukrainian vehicles, Kherson region. We see a M-80, a Kipri MRAP, a Husky TSV, and a YPR-765. There is a stark contrast between efforts in Kherson and Kharkov.


A destroyed M-113 with KIAs near Kherson. Warning footage of corpses.


Russia has hit the Krivoy Rog airport. Presumably they believed it was being used for some sort of military purpose.


Russian pontoon crossing in Kherson got hit. 1 person killed 4 wounded reported. Two civilian trucks apparently got damaged. The casualties appear civilian in nature, so the target was probably the crossing itself.


Reportedly the Antonov bridge got hit too.


Strikes on Kherson in general continue.


Lithuanian-supplied M-113s in Kherson region.


Zaporozhye-Dnepropetrovsk.

Russian ATGM strike against an alleged Ukrainian LP/OP. The building damage is serious. I suspect this is either a thermobaric or HE-FRAG warhead. Both have been reported before.


Russian strikes against targets in Zaporozhye. Disruptions of electricity were reported.


Russian strikes on Dnepropetrovsk. Targets unclear but the Shahed-136 was involved.


Destroyed YPR-765 in Zaporozhye region, Nesteryanka. Allegedly a failed Ukrainian counter-attack. Note, Ukrainian forces have been launching costly probing attacks across many areas. Most fail. Some find a weak spot that is then exploited.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Oskol Front.

Russian Su-34 trying to hit a Ukrainian crossing across the Oskol near Liman.


Russian missile strikes on Kharkov, issues with electricity are being reported. I'm going to start including strikes on and around the Kharkov area under the Oskol front category, since that's the rear support area for the Ukrainian effort here. I'll start grouping strikes in Sumy together with other activity in northern Ukraine.


Russian artillery fires near Torskoe, before the fall of Liman.


Two Russian T-90As stuck in a swamp after a counter-attack attempt near Kupyansk.


A Ukrainian Bars-8MMK SP mortar destroyed in Kamenka near Izyum.


A Ukrainian MT-LB hit an anti-tank mine in Kharkov region. What's interesting is the paint on it. I suspect it's a captured Russian MT-LB being used by Ukrainian forces after quickly painting over Russian tactical markings.


A destroyed T-64BV near Izyum, allegedly Ukrainian.


Ukrainian Gepard have shown up in Kharkov region.


Russian infantry near Liman, from before the fall. They say they're from Smolensk. Note the uniforms, these are likely BARS or irregulars.


Interesting footage, a clearly Ukrainian T-80U is towing a D-20. However I think both the cannon and the tank are formerly Russian. This is allegedly north of Liman, before the fall.


LDNR Front.

An interesting episode, of a single fighter from the DNR 11th Rgt engaging multiple Ukrainian infantry and forcing them back with grenades.


Shellings of Donetsk continue. Reportedly one was a HARM missile, shot down.


Russian strike on Slavyansk. The target is unclear, possible a suspected staging area.


HARM fragments were found in Kramatorsk. Note, this town is under Ukrainian control and some distance from the front line. A technical malfunction is the likeliest explanation in my opinion.


A Ukrainian strike hit the water canal administration building in Lisichansk.


Residential buildings in Rubezhnoe, LNR area, got hit, allegedly by M-777s.


We have reports of Wagner fighters entering Otradovka and Zaytsevo. This is part of a continuing push to encircle Artemovsk/Bakhmut. The snails-pace movement is partially explained by the fact that only Wagner fighters appear to be involved.


Allegedly Russian BARS-18 assaulting a Ukrainian checkpoint on the Lisichansk-Bakhmut road. Fragments of this video were shown before. The checkpoint gets hit an MBT.


DNR 100th Bde hitting Ukrainian trenches near Nevelskoe.


DNR 11th Rgt UAV-directed mortar fires near Avdeevka.


LNR 4th Bde hits something (allegedly a Ukrainian BMP) on the move. I can't really make out the target.


Russian Msta-S fires near Mar'inka.


Russian BTR-82As firing near Mar'inka.


Allegedly a Ukrainian MBT getting hit by a Krasnopol' shell.


Opytnoe village, apparently Kaskad taking out an allegedly Ukrainian mortar position.


Russian 120mm mortar and artillery fires, Opytnoe.


A quadcopter strike in Opytnoe. Given how much attention it's getting, it's likely a target for a push.


A Ukrainian position near Ugledar getting hit.


Kaskad, DNR, hitting Ukrainian trucks with munitions.


A destroyed Russian assault group with 1 MBT, two IFVs, and an MT-LB hit. Reportedly near soledar.


Russian 2S7M and 2S4s near Avdeevka.


Russian reservists are undergoing training in the Donbass. It's not immediately obvious why here, but possibly the shortage of training facilities in Russia is to blame.


Newly built Russian housing complex in Mariupol'. Note this is the same one being shown again.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Russia.

Spontaneous protests broke out in Dagestan against the mobilization. Given that this happened some time ago and we haven't heard anything since, they appear to have stopped.


Russian volunteers heading to the front from Bashkiriya. Note the difference. There are mobilized personnel that would rather flee the country, and others who aren't even called up that are volunteering. Of course the proportions are not immediately clear, but it's a significant divide.


Mobilization efforts continue across Russia. Some are reportedly going to local military academies. Possibly they will be used to train enlisted in addition to officers. Possibly these are reservist officers being activated.


Russia has set up a draft point near Verkhniy Lars, the border checkpoint where many Russians are leaving the country to go to Georgia. However people not subject to mobilization are still able to leave. Considering this might not be the last mobilization wave Russia does, many might be leaving in anticipation of future issues.


Form Sep 21st to 27th 98k Russians have entered Kazakhstan.


West MD, training of mobilized personnel.


Russia is using civilian instructors to train mobilized personnel. This is a logic step, especially considering the scale of the mobilization and the shortage of regular instructors.


Russian military trains, 2 full of engineering equipment (one is coming from Irkutsk and has a newish BTR-82A meaning these aren't activated supplies, it's a line unit), 1 with artillery, 1 with what look like new Buk-M3s, and 1 with either EW or a command element of some sort heading to the front.


A Russian troop train on the Crimea bridge. Note the BTS ARVs. These are pulled out from storage for sure. Shortage of ARVs is one of the weak points of Russian armored units.


Putin has publicly acknowledged mistakes made during the mobilization and stated that people who were drafted illegally or improperly will be sent home.


Misc.

Destruction of a Russian EW system by allegedly a Ukrainian BTR-4 (can't really tell what's firing). This likely occurred during the retreat in Kharkov region.


Allegedly a burning Ukrainian Su-24M going down, somewhere in the south.


Russian VDV artillery strikes in the South, possibly Kherson.


Russian Su-25 lobbing missiles, location and context unclear.


A Ukrainian M-270 in action, location and context unclear.


Russian Tor-M2 and Pantsyr intercept targets, location and context unclear. The Pantsyr is allegedly engaging a Ukrainian UAV.


A downed Russian Su-25, location and context unclear. There were reports of at least one being lost on the Oskol front relatively recently. This could be that one.


Several destroyed T-72B3s biathlon models with the panoramic sight. Location and context unclear, but these are rare vehicles.


Another destroyed Ukrainian Husky TSV, location unclear, allegedly Donbass.


Russian Tigr-M SpN got hit by a 120mm mortar shell that failed to explode.


Russian Su-25SM damaged by allegedly a bird strike.


There is a photo going around of what appears to be a Ukrainian soldier boiling the meat off of a human skull. Information about this is lacking so far. On the one hand it's not implausible that some particular not right in the head individual tries something like this with a dead body. On the other hand it could very well be a Russian fake.


Footage of Russia's BARS-17 that reportedly stole a Ukrainian BTR. Evidence is of course lacking. However what's interesting is that we're seeing BARS, Wagner, and irregulars more and more.


Ukrainian soldiers training. Note they're carrying M-16 style rifles, and the helos are some of the Mi-17s the US supplied, originally meant for Afghanistan.


A Russian 2B9 automatic mortar mounted on an MT-LB as an improvised SP mortar. The 2B9 is a good system, and it would make sense to make an SP-mortar based around it, however...


A column of recently supplied Ukrainian XA-185s.


An interesting Ukrainian modification merging an MT-12 anti-tank gun with an MT-LB chassis. My only concern is the low protection level of the chassis, but it's of course better protected then the exposed gun by itself.


Some shots of SOBR Almaz, from Yakutia, in Ukraine.


Another shot of the Chekan armored truck used by Wagner fighters. I suspect there's more then one of them active in Ukraine.


Brand new Russian Tayfun-VDVs are heading to the front. These are 4X4 Tayfun MRAPs with 30mm auto-cannon turrets.


A very interesting Ukrainian 2S3. It's clearly formerly Russian, and features a massive roof camouflage rig, likely designed to protect from UAV observation.


NATO/EU.

Minor note, I've stopped covering the large packages of US military aid here because they are getting mentioned and discussed before I even get to them. This is in no way an attempt to ignore them.

HE ERFB RA/BB 155mm shells spotted in Ukraine.


T-72M1s entering Ukraine on trailers.


Latvian (formerly Austrian) M-109A5Os have arrived in Ukraine.


It appears Ukraine has received it's first TOWs. This ATGM was up until recently notably absent from this conflict.


A train full of Polish BMP-1s was spotted near Kaliningrad. Possibly more military aid for Ukraine.


A Ukrainian Pinzgauer up-armored truck knocked out. Location and context unclear. I think this is the first time we've spotted these in Ukraine.


Ukraine has reportedly received 6 more Gepards, bringing their total number up to 30.


An Italian G550 AEW was spotted flying along the Belorussian border. It's a newcomer to this.

 

Rob c

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
1665376410952.png
The photo of the underside of the bridge on This photo that appears in both twitter and MSN news makes a strong case for the truck exploding being the cause of the bridge collapse due to a lack of scorching on the structure under the bridge. Certainly makes my earlier theory look like rubbish.

As it is said that the truck came from the RU side of the bridge, it leaves a big question mark as to who did it and how was it achieved from that side of the bridge. The big question for me is, how did they put together the truck and a large amount of explosives in the RU, which would have taken a significant period of time and organization then travel to the bridge from were nobody knows, without RU intelligence or the police getting wind of it.The question is were did all the ingredients come from?
 
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ngatimozart

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Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Video of alleged Russian conscripted soldiers complaining about their situation.

If true it's a real shambles. There are also unconfirmed reports that the VDV are embedding Spetsnaz with ordinary infantry units in an attempt to increase combat discipline and some basic skills. If this is indeed the case then it isn't the most advantageous use of Spetsnaz and negates their overall lethality and ability to move quickly. However given the that now the basic Russian grunt is lacking even basic infantry skills, it appears that the VDV has no choice.

Ukrainian tractors are out hunting again.

It appears someone in Moscow had taken to setting fire to cars in a display of their disapproval of the war. Apparently he wasn't any good at escape and evasion.

Ukrainian T-72 tank with infantry aboard hits mine and infantry respond to ambush.
 

ngatimozart

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Verified Defense Pro
ISW Updates.
These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
October 8, 10:30 pm ET

Full article
: Institute for the Study of War

The pdf can be downloaded here.

Main Points.

  • A large-scale explosion seriously damaged the Kerch Strait Bridge that links occupied Crimea with Russia.
  • The Kremlin named the Russian Commander of the Aerospace Forces, Army General Sergey Surovikin, the new commander of the Russian operation in Ukraine, and this appointment has generated positive feedback within the nationalist community.
  • Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in Kharkiv and Luhansk Oblasts.
  • Russian forces continued establishing defensive positions in northern Kherson Oblast.
  • Russian forces continued to attack settlements around Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and west of Donetsk City.
  • Ukrainian forces reportedly continued to shoot down Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones.
  • Russian federal subjects are facing financial challenges in funding mobilization.
  • Russian and occupation administration officials continued measures to remove Ukrainian children from their homes in Russian-occupied territories.


Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

A large-scale explosion damaged the Kerch Strait Bridge that links occupied Crimea with Russia on October 8.
Maxar satellite imagery shows that the explosion collapsed one lane of the road bridge and damaged the nearby railway track.[1] The Russian Investigative Committee stated that a truck exploded on the bridge and ignited seven fuel tanks on the railroad.[2] A small fraction of Russian milbloggers speculated that Ukrainian saboteurs used a boat to detonate the bridge from the sea, though there is no visible evidence for such a conclusion.[3] The Kremlin refrained from accusing Ukraine of sabotage or attack, echoing similar restraint following the sinking of the cruiser Moskva and the Ukrainian strike on Saky airfield in Crimea.[4] Ukraine did not claim responsibility for the incident, but The New York Times reported that an unnamed senior Ukrainian official stated that Ukrainian intelligence participated in the explosion.[5] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov noted that the Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a government commission composed of government officials, security services, and the Ministry of Emergency Situations to investigate the ”emergency.”[6]

The explosion will not permanently disrupt critical Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Crimea, but its aftermath is likely to increase friction in Russian logistics for some time. The road bridge appears at least partially operational, and the railroad bridge did not suffer significant structural damage according to Russian reports that generally seem plausible based on the available video evidence. Russian footage shows people walking on the damaged road bridge and a train moving on the railroad bridge.[7] The Head of occupied Crimea Sergey Aksyonov claimed that the remaining lane of the road bridge opened to cars and buses after a rigorous security check, but that trucks must move by ferry.[8] The collapsed lane of the road bridge will restrict Russian military movements until it is repaired, forcing some Russian forces to rely on the ferry connection for some time. Russian forces will likely still be able to transport heavy military equipment via the railroad. Russian officials will likely intensify security checks on all vehicles crossing the bridge, however, adding delays to the movement of Russian military equipment, personnel, and supplies to Crimea. Putin has already signed a decree strengthening the security protocol on the bridge under the supervision of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).[9]

The Kremlin is likely continuing to frame the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) as the scapegoat for the Kerch Bridge explosion and other Russian military failures to deflect the blame from Putin. The Russian MoD has not issued an official statement regarding the incident as of this publication.[10] Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that the Russian Presidential Administration sent out a guide to Russian mass media on the appropriate way to downplay the severity of the damage to the bridge, and it is possible that the Kremlin has ordered the Russian MoD to remain quiet regarding the situation.[11] Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov stated that Russia must initiate a strike campaign on critical Ukrainian infrastructure instead of listening to Russian MoD promises.[12]

Some nationalist voices noted that Putin and his close circle are failing to immediately address the attack on the symbolic bridge, voicing direct criticism of Putin for the first time. A milblogger warned that if Putin fails to undertake retaliatory actions it “will be mistaken for the weakness of the president himself.”[13] Another milblogger noted that it is hypocritical for the Kremlin to call on Russians to rally behind Putin if he is unable to comment on significant events such as the Moskva sinking, prisoner exchanges including Azovstal fighters, or the collapse of the Kharkiv frontline.[14] Others criticized the silence of Russian Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev regarding the explosion, given that Medvedev had made several statements defining any attacks on the Kerch Bridge as a violation of Russian ”red lines.”[15] Russian milbloggers and propagandists alike called on the Kremlin to resume strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure and notably did not make any calls for Russia to use tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine.

Ukrainian and Russian sources claimed that the Kremlin targeted some higher military command figures following the Kerch Bridge explosion, but these reports remain unverified as of this publication. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that the Kremlin detained, arrested, and blocked unspecified military officials and ordered the units of the elite Dzerzhinsky Separate Operation Purpose Division to enter Moscow on October 8.[16] Milbloggers who favor the Wagner Group claimed that the Kremlin has replaced Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Chief of General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov supposedly with Tula Governor Alexey Dyumin and the deputy commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Lieutenant General Alexander Matovnikov, respectfully.[17] ISW cannot independently verify either of these reports at this time.

The Kremlin named the Russian Commander of the Aerospace Forces, Army General Sergey Surovikin, the new commander of the Russian operation in Ukraine, and this appointment has generated positive feedback within the nationalist community. Sorovikin previously commanded the “southern” group of forces in Ukraine and was reportedly responsible for the capture of Lysychansk in July.[18] Milbloggers shared their excitement regarding Surovikin’s appointment, noting that Surovikin has the “tough” character necessary to regain the initiative in Ukraine.[19] Wagner financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin extravagantly praised Surovikin because he “got into a tank and rushed to save” the Soviet Union during the 1991 coup attempt in Moscow.[20] Prigozhin’s interview further confirmed reports of a fissure between pro-war and “liberal” factions within the Kremlin, which ISW will consider in more detail in subsequent reports.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
ISW Updates.
These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
October 9, 9:35 pm ET Part One

Full article
: Institute for the Study of War

The pdf can be downloaded here.

This campaign assessment special edition focuses on Russian domestic responses to the Kerch Strait Bridge explosion on October 9 and changes within the Russian chain of command. Ukrainian forces continued to make advances towards Svatove-Kreminna highway on October 9. Those developments are summarized briefly and will be covered in more detail tomorrow.

Key inflection in ongoing military operations on October 9:

  • Ukrainian forces continued to advance east of the Oskil Rver in the direction of Luhansk Oblast and have entered Stel’makhivka (about 18km west of Svatove).[27] Russian forces launched unsuccessful assaults on Burdaka on the Kharkiv Oblast-Russian border, and Terny northeast of Lyman.[28]
  • Russian sources reported that Russian forces attempted to attack in the direction of Ternovi Pody (approximately 30km northwest of Kherson City)[29] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces continued to target newly liberated settlements in northern Kherson Oblast with artillery, MLRS, and aviation.[30]
  • Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces repelled over 30 attacks in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka areas.[31] Russian forces launched an unsuccessful assault southwest of Donetsk City.[32]
  • Russian forces targeted residential areas of Zaporizhzhia City with cruise missiles.[33]
  • A Russian milblogger accused North Ossetia and Vladikavkaz of failing to fulfill mobilization orders due to carelessness and the personal interests of regional officials.[34]
  • Ukrainian sources reported that Russian occupation authorities are moving their families from Kherson Oblast to Crimea, and from Starobilsk to Luhansk City.[35]








Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
 
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ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
ISW Updates.
These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
October 9, 9:35 pm ET Part Two

Full article
: Institute for the Study of War

The pdf can be downloaded here.

The attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge, coupled with recent Russian military failures and partial mobilization, is generating direct criticism of Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin from the Russian pro-war nationalist community.


Milbloggers’ dissatisfaction with Putin’s inability to enforce his own “red lines” is rooted in his failure to properly establish information conditions prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Putin had defined red lines as NATO expansion and the delivery of strategic weapons systems including nuclear-capable systems to Ukraine prior to the invasion but he has not publicly adjusted these “red lines” since the invasion began.[6] Milbloggers have thus latched onto Medvedev’s declared “red lines,” which Putin has not publicly affirmed let alone enforced--facts that have only further disappointed them. The Kremlin has left room for confusion regarding its own vision for the war from the outset, a fact that may threaten its continuing support among people for whom the most extreme and grandiose objectives resonate.

Other Russian nationalists, propagandists, and proxy officials are blaming security services and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), a phenomenon that can undermine Putin’s regime in the long term. Komsomolkaya Pravda journalist and Russian reserve Colonel Viktor Baranets put responsibility for the explosion on the Kerch Strait Bridge on Russian security services, whom he called “traitors.”[7] Baranets’ statements prompted a wave of criticism from milbloggers, with some even accusing him of advocating for censorship among milbloggers and being affiliated with foreign agents.[8] Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov openly accused the Russian MoD of only releasing useless statements instead of actually regaining the initiative on the battlefield.[9] The Kremlin may be doubling down on the known milblogger distaste for the Russian MoD to use its military leadership as a scapegoat for its military failures.

The perception of the trajectory of the war and of Ukrainian capabilities is changing as well, and Russians are undergoing a rude awakening. Russian sources have recognized that the Ukrainian southern counter-offensive poses a significant threat to Russian forces across southern Ukraine.[10] This recognition is a significant deviation from the previous narrative presented by propagandists, milbloggers, and the Russian MoD for months that Ukrainian counter-offensives in Kherson Oblast were impossible or had failed.[11] Russian sources are shifting their alibis to claim that Ukrainians would not be successful without NATO’s direct involvement, advancing the narrative that Russia is fighting against the powerful Western bloc rather than lowly Ukraine.[12] It is unclear how such excuses are affecting domestic audiences from the information available in open source, but sudden departures from months-long declarations of Ukraine’s inability to advance in the south may prompt some concern among the Russian public that is already preoccupied with mobilization fears.

Russian voices within the information space demand that the Russian military retaliate for the Kerch Strait Bridge explosion by regaining the initiative on the battlefield and resuming the missile campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure. Solovyov cited Vladimir Lenin’s statement that “war must be waged for real or it must not be waged at all” and called for a massive campaign of strikes on Ukrainian critical infrastructure.[13] Milbloggers and proxy officials echoed Solovyov‘s statements, noting their fears of a repeated attack on the Crimean Bridge.[14]

It is becoming more evident that Russian voices in the information space are increasingly aware that the war is not going well, attacking the Kremlin’s strategy of silence and calling for Putin’s public involvement in the war. One milblogger even noted that this is the time for “radical, rapid, and urgent change” in Russia.[15] It is unclear if Putin will be able to fully satisfy these demands for change. Putin may attempt to address or deflect these critiques during his meeting with the Russian Security Council scheduled for October 10.[16] The framing within the information space of an urgent need for change within the Kremlin may pose threats to Putin when he is unable to make the changes necessary to alter the trajectory of the war in a meaningful way.

Putin is continuing to shuffle his senior military commanders, likely to deflect blame from himself and to regenerate enthusiasm in the extremist pro-war community. The Kremlin announced that Army General Sergei Surovikin has assumed command of the entire “special military operation,” as Putin refers to his ongoing invasion of Ukraine, on October 8.[17] The Russian pro-war, nationalist community cheered this announcement. A Telegram channel affiliated with the Wagner Group private military company controlled by Yevgeniy Prigozhin speculated that more changes would follow. The channel claimed that the Kremlin was also planning to replace Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valeriy Gerasimov in the coming week as a result of the Kerch Bridge incident.[18] It added, offering no evidence, that Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin would replace Shoigu and that Deputy Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant General Alexander Matovnikov would replace Gerasimov.

The Russian pro-war nationalist community greeted Surovikin’s appointment with irrational enthusiasm. Some milbloggers appeared to see Surovikin’s elevation as evidence that Putin was finally creating a unified headquarters to control the entire military operation and that Surovikin might have more power even than the Chief of the Russian General Staff.[19] These comments portray Surovikin’s appointment as a continuation of what they see as Putin’s loss of confidence in the Russian MoD and General Staff and turn toward the more total and brutal style of command and war they prefer. These reactions are odd considering that Surovikin is a conventional Russian general officer who has reportedly been commanding Russian operations in southern Ukraine since July.[20] He has hardly covered himself with glory in that role, as Russian forces there gained no meaningful ground and, in fact, suffered major losses in western Kherson under his command.

The pro-war community is relying on a belief that Surovikin’s reputed “toughness” will suffice to change the trajectory of the war. One milblogger praised Surovikin as a leader who takes decisive action—"heads can fly off shoulders instantly” in his command, and he “does not stand on ceremony with stupid commanders.”[21] Other milbloggers also praised Surovikin’s toughness.[22] The notion that Surovikin is “tougher” than his predecessor, Army General Alexander Dvornikov, or any of the other senior Russian commanders is bizarre. Dvornikov, like Surovikin and all the other Russian military district commanders, served in senior roles in Syria where they fought with extreme brutality. Dvornikov became known as “the butcher of Syria” for the viciousness with which Russian forces under his command waged war.[23] Milbloggers had also celebrated Dvornikov’s reported appointment as the commander of Russian troops in Ukraine in a similar manner, a fact they appear to have forgotten.[24] Any restraints on the brutality with which Russian troops have fought in Ukraine have resulted either from Putin’s decisions or inherent limitations in Russian capabilities—not from any tenderness on the part of Russian generals previously in command.

The “toughness” the pro-war community so loves, moreover, is a Soviet-era personality trait resulting from the brutalization of Soviet citizens and especially military personnel. It engenders fear in subordinates of the sort that inhibits honest reporting of problems or failures, encourages lying and blame-deflection, and produces the kind of robotic approach to executing orders that has contributed to Russian failures in Ukraine thus far. If Surovikin is indeed an even more toxic leader than his predecessors, he will only make Russia’s military problems more acute.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
ISW Updates.
These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
October 9, 9:35 pm ET Part Three.

Full article
: Institute for the Study of War

The pdf can be downloaded here.

Prigozhin gave interviews that appear to confirm Western and Russian insider reports of fragmentation of the Kremlin and potential purges. Prigozhin offered a paean to Surovikin in his response to the announcement.[25] He recalled that Surovikin had jumped in his tank and “rushed to save his country” during the August Coup in 1991. That coup occurred when a group of hardliners sought to seize power from Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and stop him from taking the next step in breaking up the Soviet Union. Protestors took to the streets in Moscow in support of Gorbachev and his policies, and Surovikin sought to suppress them. Units under his command at the time killed three civilians.[26] Prigozhin noted that Surovikin had been right in 1991 in his efforts to preserve the Soviet Union and that Prigozhin himself had been on the wrong side along with others deluded by the promises of the West. Prigozhin added that many who had also been deluded have failed to see the light as he has done, noting darkly that those who destroyed the Soviet Union are still alive and well in Russia today.

Putin cannot do the one thing his hardline constituency demands—win the war. Shuffling senior commanders will not fix the systemic problems that have hamstrung Russian operations, logistics, defense industry, and mobilization from the outset of the invasion. Scapegoats can deflect criticism from Putin only for a time, and the appearance of direct criticism of Putin’s leadership among his most devoted hardline constituency is likely a harbinger of future dissatisfaction in that quarter.

Escalation, either conventional or nuclear, cannot solve Putin’s problems. If Russian forces are able to expand their attacks against Ukrainian population centers or critical infrastructure, or if Putin is willing to use tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine, he can only hope thereby to stop the Ukrainian counter-offensives for a time. Such attacks will not allow his forces to conquer Ukraine and achieve the objectives that extreme pro-war Russian nationalists demand. They may well trigger Western responses that Russian hardliners would see as validating their arguments—but at the cost of devastating Russia’s remaining military power and ability to achieve anything of real value. What could happen if Putin loses the support of the constituency most committed to his vision? It is hard to say.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Air raid sirens have gone off in Kyiv and several loud explosions have been heard.

No kidding. It appears other cities were targeted as well. In Kiev one of the targets appears to be the SBU building. There are reports of impacts in other cities, but so far no footage.

Kiev.


Dnepropetrovsk.


EDIT:

A building in Zaporzhye collapse, allegedly after a failed SAM launch. However even if these were SAMs (and there's no evidence) they were firing at something. It looks like Zaporozhye got hit too.


Dnepropetrovks, more footage.


And reports of Ivano-Frankovsk getting hit, power outages in L'vov, Khmel'nitskaya, L'vov, Kiev and Zhitomyr regions. In some it's not the whole regions, just some outages.


EDIT2: I suspect we will see more coming in over the next hours.

More footage from strikes in Kiev.


Strikes landing in L'vov.


And internet disruptions across Ukraine.

 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Russian strikes continue throughout Ukraine. The targets appear to be primarily energy infrastructure targets, a bigger version of what took place after the Ukrainian counter-attack. A list of targets so far includes;

Kiev: Kiev TES-3, TES-5, Substation 110 Vokzalnaya, Darnitskaya TES
Rovno: Substaion Rovno 330 kV (overloaded other substations and caused blackouts)
Khmelnitskiy; Substation Khmelnitskaya 330/110 kV (overloaded other substations and caused blackouts)
Ternopol': Substation Ternopol' 330/110/35 kV (overloaded other substations and caused blackouts)
Sumy: Substation 330 kV Konotop (caused blackouts across the region)
Kharkov: power, water, and internet/cell service down across the city, the subway is dead, unclear what actually got hit, but likely multiple targets, just no confirmation due to lack of power.
Krivoy Rog: Krivorozhskaya TES
Zhitomyr: Substation Zhitomyr 330/110 kV
L'vov: L'vovskaya TES-1
Ivano-Frankovsk: Byrshtynskaya TES
Vinnitsa: train delays reported, possibly a strike against some rail substations but no info so far


A map of the major strikes so far. Please note this is incomplete, and additional strikes are on-going.


Kiev.

A bridge getting hit.


The business center 101 tower got hit which houses some Ukrainian government offices and the Samsung office.


The SBU building got hit.


TES-6 got hit and burns.


TES-5 apparently got hit too.


Fires burn in Kiev.


What appears to be a trail from an air defense missile failing and hitting the ground in Kiev.


Fuel shortages are reported in Kiev. Note we've seen some fuel shortages after major strikes before.


L'vov.

The L'vovskaya TES burns.


More strikes in L'vov.


Dnepropetrovsk.

Strikes across the city and suburbs.


Ukrtelecom building in Dnepropetrovsk after a strike.


Krivoy Rog.

Strikes landing, some are Shahed-136s.


The Krivorozhskaya TES was one of the targets.


Kremenchug.

Strikes landing in Kremenchug.


Misc.

Russian Kalibr launches, likely what was used against targets in L'vov and western Ukraine.


Shahed-136 over Ukraine.


Kh-101s over Chernigov.


Reportedly launches came from as far away as Astrakhan'.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Overall this is probably the largest waves of strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure targets. However Ukraine is a large country and powerplants and substations are large targets of which there are many. If the goal is to permanently degrade this infrastructure, many more strikes will be needed, both against additional targets and more strikes against current targets. Knocking out enough powerplants and bridges could significant slow down the flow of supplies and reinforcements though certainly not stop it completely. It's an open question whether Russia has the munitions to do this, and if there's anything Ukraine can do about it. Right now Ukraine's GBAD is hiding and operating in an ambush manner. This keeps it relatively safe, after the initial destruction of quite a few SAMs, but limits its effectiveness. Bolder use of SAMs could offer better rates of interception but also would be riskier, and it's plausible one of the goals is to draw out Ukrainian GBAD into the open. More modern GBAD is incoming including NASAMS, Iris-T, and Gepards (the latter likely being destined for the front line) so this could change the balance. This could push Russia towards more aggressive SEAD/DEAD operations, tapping it's Tu-214Rs, A-50Us, and Il-22PPs. However effectiveness is far from assured.

Realistically I don't know if this can change the situation on the battlefield. It certainly won't alter it quickly. Russia's real problem is poor C4ISR and lack of troops, particularly trained infantry. The former could be partially remedied by a steady stream of Iranian (or potentialy Chinese) UAVs, as well as an increased in domestic production. The latter could be remedied by the ongoing mobilization. Emphasis on could. There is a third factor and it has to do with the performance of Russian military planners on every level, from btln command to MD HQs. Without a significant improvement in Russian officer quality and performance the first two factors could very well not be sufficient. Russia has accumulated significant combat experience, not all of it negative (the 8th Army in particular did relatively well). If Russia can leverage this experience and get quality performance out of it's newly forming units this might be enogh. The reason I'm bringing all of this up is that these strikes give the appearance of a departure from the previous way Russia has been fighting, and it coincides with the appointment of General Surovikin as Russia's supreme commander for the war in Ukraine. However the real determining factors will have little to do with these strikes.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
Apart from whether any launches were conducted from Backfires; the question is whether Russia has the needed stocks to sustain attacks such as these. I'm assuming that since the war started factories have been manufacturing reloads.

Given that the Ukrainians lack the ability to intercept long range missiles such as Kalibre will there be calls for the transfer of Patriot or similar systems?
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
The reason I'm bringing all of this up is that these strikes give the appearance of a departure from the previous way Russia has been fighting
Indeed I was under the impression that the strikes were at random targets; intended to cause casualties and sap morale in actuality they are targeted at specific targets. I wonder if these were actually planned way before the bridge attack or are indeed a form of retaliation.

The Shahed strikes are puzzling in that some appeared to have been on civilian targets [based on Ukrainian and other reports] but others on strictly military targets.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Indeed I was under the impression that the strikes were at random targets; intended to cause casualties and sap morale in actuality they are targeted at specific targets. I wonder if these were actually planned way before the bridge attack or are indeed a form of retaliation.

The Shahed strikes are puzzling in that some appeared to have been on civilian targets [based on Ukrainian and other reports] but others on strictly military targets.
The targets appear to be primarily power infrastructure, with a symbolic strike against a newer bridge built in Kiev, and some government offices, presumably the organizations Russia blames for the Crimean Bridge attack.

EDIT: Some sources claim data centers were also targetted.
 
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vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
Apart from whether any launches were conducted from Backfires; the question is whether Russia has the needed stocks to sustain attacks such as these. I'm assuming that since the war started factories have been manufacturing reloads.

Given that the Ukrainians lack the ability to intercept long range missiles such as Kalibre will there be calls for the transfer of Patriot or similar systems?
There is too much Ukraine, and not enough anti missile systems in the world to adequately defend that much area. Others have pointed out the training cycle on a Patriot is long and involved. UKR is going to just have to grin and bear most of the attacks.
 
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