The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Do we have evidence that large numbers of RU contractural soldiers who are not permanently maimed are being released at the end of their initial contracts ?
Only indirect evidence. When Russia stop-lossed contracts in 2022 and extended new contracts to the end of the war in 2023 it led to grumbling and people talking on the internet. We do have anecdotal evidence from social media of Russian soldiers going home after the end of their 6 month contract with money and medals. We don't have any grumbling about the 6-month contracts being stop-lossed, and recently I encountered a couple of examples of soldiers from 1-year contracts going home. So unfortunately there are no good statistics that I'm aware of. I will try to dig something up though.

And many dont.
The point is the math doesn't line up. Hence the need for some explanation.


The RU tank production (new + refurb) estimates are all over the map. Once thing I would be curious to know is whether or not RU is building new T-90 hulls, or at this time, using refurbed T-72 hulls with T-90 turrets.
They are building some new hulls. A T-90M has a new hull or a T-90A hull. I'm not aware of any T-72s with T-90 turrets.
 

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
Remember, they're also releasing people at the end of their 6 month obligations and iirc even the one-year contracts are being released at the end of their time. So they have to replace the churn.
There is evidence (see earlier post) that contracts are automatically extended for the duration ("stop loss"). Given the awful casualty rates to date I am skeptical that most/any soldiers (outside of those maimed) are released on time of their original contracts. Other than what I presented earlier, I havnt found hard statistical data.

A quick search claims typical RU service life (sign a contract to time of death) is 4.5 months.


https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarVideoReport/comments/16pcfqy
There's also the fact that more forces doesn't necessarily mean faster advances in this war. It will be in the next update, but it appears one of the things happening is multiple Russian small cross-border entries across many sections of the international border that were previously quiet for years. In other words part of the explanation might be that the extra forces are going into expanding the fighting to more areas.
I can certainly believe that RU is piling up more forces to open up new fronts. The Sumy area became a hotspot last year, albeit with almost no success.

I cannot believe that RU permanent losses are 30K/month. Its too much. So I think RU definitely building up reserves. Somewhere. Or, they could be back-filling those units that were consumed in previous fighting, such as the strategic rocket forces, or Navy.
 

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
Look at what vikingatespam wrote. He's talking about permanent losses. The 30 000 a month figure includes WIA. Many of those recover.
The rule of thumb for conventional warfare (QJM) is that for every KIA there are 4 WIA. Of the WIA 1/4 are maimed and out of service. 1/4 of the wounded return very quickly ("its just a flesh wound") and the other return to duty over 60 days.

This doesnt include POW, but that cant really be predicted.
 

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
And many dont.
My dude, we get it. We are all sick of the RU armed forces being herded like cattle to early graves, just so Putin can pat himself on the back. The damage done to the RU military and economy will have negative repercussions for decades.

However, unless the KIA:WIA ratios are skewing far from 20th century conventional warfare data, the likely answer is that RU is accumulating forces faster than UKR is killing them off.

We will have to see after the war is done what the K:W ratios are. While it is tempting to believe the stories of piss-poor RU medical care leading to excessive mortality, it is too convenient to take as fact without further evidence.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Following some of the earlier posts I made, here's some materials on Ukrainsk. The town fell to Russian forces in iirc September of 2024. Today the town is relatively far behind front lines though still within range of drones and longer range artillery systems. The town took relatively little damage, falling in just 5 days, though relatively little doesn't mean little. The city does have many damaged buildings, just fewer actual ruins. Today the town still has no water, and only limited power, with allegedly power lines under construction now to connect them back to the grid. There are still graves in the yards from the fighting, and the main road has a new sign warning drivers to watch for UAV-placed mines. Today the town has reportedly 250-300 people left, out of ~10 000. Residents do mention receiving Russian pensions for retirees and humanitarian aid to be able to live, and Russian passports. Heating is being done by wood-fire and coal-fire stoves. There are multiple generators allowing people to charge their phones, and there is cell service in the town. There are also reportedly 8 stores open in the town and even one cafe. Lastly, the next-door town of Gornyak has a twice-a-week bus to Donetsk. I was only able to find one good piece on the town, from last November, and one video from April of last year. I suspect the name of the town is part of the issue, being obscured by search results about Ukraine as a country, rather than the specific town.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
There is evidence (see earlier post) that contracts are automatically extended for the duration ("stop loss"). Given the awful casualty rates to date I am skeptical that most/any soldiers (outside of those maimed) are released on time of their original contracts. Other than what I presented earlier, I havnt found hard statistical data.
So there's some evidence of the opposite. Here's a Russian cop that had apparently a reservist contract with a BARS unit, went to war, and has since returned home and gone back to working as a cop.


Here's a man who was actually granted early release from his service contract, to go home to his newly born triplets. It's unclear what kind of contract he had.


Here's a Russian sniper who spent 3 months in the war zone, no info on total contract length, but who has been released home.


Here's a service member that returned home to civilian life after 6 months. Details are lacking, but the "medical services" mentioned are an eye exam and a sponsored vacation package. Given that they omit any mention of rehabilitation or physical therapy, it doesn't appear he was wounded.


Here's a Russian article talking about the challenges of readjusting to civilian life after serving in the SMO (the war). It specifically mentions that some return after their contract ends.


An this article from June of last year claims 137 000 returned from the front back to civilian life.


Making more difficult to say anything for sure is the fact that there are many different kinds of contracts. For example there are still some quasi-mercenary outfits but contracted by the MoD operating in the war. There are BARS units with reservist contracts. There are straight volunteer formations that tend to get paid by the Russian state and "count as" veterans but technically weren't in the military as such, there are Rosgvardia (National Guard) units that rotate in and out of the war zone, and there are straight MoD contracts which come in multiple varieties, including 6, 12, month, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 year. Mobilized personnel are often released from service if they have a serious injury, even if they fully recover eventually. I suspect the same applies for many contract personnel. Also people exchanged as POWs are often released from further service obligation, though neither of those last two categories are prevented from re-enlisting as far as I know.

A quick search claims typical RU service life (sign a contract to time of death) is 4.5 months.


https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarVideoReport/comments/16pcfqy
So that business insider piece, which sounds like it's based on some good data, is specifically referring to mobilized personnel. I'm pretty sure they're talking about Russia's partial mobilization done in the fall of '22. And the piece is 2.5 years old. I suspect the pattern has shifted since then. The nature of the fighting certainly has. Unfortunately this doesn't even mean we can conclude their number is wrong, it might still be accurate. It's just not reliable for current trends.

I can certainly believe that RU is piling up more forces to open up new fronts. The Sumy area became a hotspot last year, albeit with almost no success.
They've done quite a few spots over the past ~month where they either re-opened hostilities after a long pause or entered in a new location. All of them are very small, but there's ~5 spots where they've done this, in addition to the continuing efforts around Melovoe and Volchansk. At this point they're not yet on their way to a continuous buffer zone even in Kharkov region, but it's not out of the question by year's end.

I cannot believe that RU permanent losses are 30K/month. Its too much. So I think RU definitely building up reserves. Somewhere. Or, they could be back-filling those units that were consumed in previous fighting, such as the strategic rocket forces, or Navy.
Well some new units are also being formed in the ground forces, and some units are being expanded. Marine Bdes are becoming divisions, though in some cases they had already ballooned to that size and it's merely a matter of changing the label to match the substance.
 
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