She is completely under water now with my limited knowledge I just can't see her being brought back to service.
Royal Norwegian Navy (RNoN) News and Discussion
- Thread starter Systems Adict
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John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Agree, she’s done. Frigate vendors will be on their to Norway. The goods news for Norway is the wide selection of available designs to replace her.
Or they just go to Navantia and ask them to build the same again.
By commercial standards, she's a total constructive loss - however, politically, it might be more palatable to repair (as in, replace virtually everything except the contents of the bilges) the ship as opposed to go and ask for money to build a new frigate.
Redlands18
Well-Known Member
Or just stay with 4 Frigates and only have 0 or 1 in reserve
There is that, they certainly didn't appear to be working them hard when they had five so staying at four would just eliminate the parts hulk they seemed to keep on the books.
Ideally, don't bother repairing it. spend the money on a spares supply deal and get the remainder worked up.
Right now we need Putin to do some sabre rattling on the Norwegian coast line to get some impetus up.
Particularly interesting article on ASPI
Norwegian frigate sinking has far-reaching implications | The Strategist
AIS was off, tanker was well lit and moving a 7kts, and the watch was being changed which may have added to the confusion
There are it seems some issues with watertightness, either by design, implementation or by practice.
If one of the positives to come out of this is better operations and serious look at survivability (even in peacetime) then hopefully they are significant positive lessons to learn. I would have thought a frigate like this would have survived such a collision without sinking, or at least have been rescued and refloated given it was beached and near port and facilities.
Norwegian frigate sinking has far-reaching implications | The Strategist
AIS was off, tanker was well lit and moving a 7kts, and the watch was being changed which may have added to the confusion
There are it seems some issues with watertightness, either by design, implementation or by practice.
If one of the positives to come out of this is better operations and serious look at survivability (even in peacetime) then hopefully they are significant positive lessons to learn. I would have thought a frigate like this would have survived such a collision without sinking, or at least have been rescued and refloated given it was beached and near port and facilities.
Nothing is ever strait forward in such disasters and they are usually the result of a chain of errors.
The Board of Inquiry is bound to ask a few simple questions at the beginning of their proceedings; first, why was the ship proceeding at 17 kts in such busy and confined waters, why wasn’t VHF Ch 16 being monitored by watchkeepers and why was the watch being handed over under these circumstances? Why wasn’t the CO or the Navigating Officer on the bridge?
This is, or should be standard practice. Any or all of these measures would have proven crucial.
The most worrying fact to emerge was the progressive flooding.
Long shaft lines are not new nor uncommon in lightly constructed fighting ships and all bulkhead penetrations carry some risk but there are well known engineering practises which mitigate that risk.
I would certainly be assessing our DDG’s but I see no reason to believe that the design is deficient. Better minds than mine have produced these designs which have been further assessed by our own engineers, there’s not a lot of variables when you poke a shaft through a bulkhead, it’s all been done before, many times.
I would suspect that human error is responsible in every circumstance of this disaster.
I do agree entirely with Sam Bateman’s closing remarks about modern bridge training. Bridges have become more complex and bridge watchkeepers have many gadgets to play with and distract them from the basics, mark 1 eyeball, pelorus bearings, monitor commercial traffic on #16.
Bateman had extensive experience on RAN bridges and did not specialise so seamanship was always his number one aim. University degrees (less time watchkeeping at sea), shorter bridge time once qualified, and quick progression to warfare roles detract from warchkeeping experience and the effects should be closely monitored in all navies.
The Board of Inquiry is bound to ask a few simple questions at the beginning of their proceedings; first, why was the ship proceeding at 17 kts in such busy and confined waters, why wasn’t VHF Ch 16 being monitored by watchkeepers and why was the watch being handed over under these circumstances? Why wasn’t the CO or the Navigating Officer on the bridge?
This is, or should be standard practice. Any or all of these measures would have proven crucial.
The most worrying fact to emerge was the progressive flooding.
Long shaft lines are not new nor uncommon in lightly constructed fighting ships and all bulkhead penetrations carry some risk but there are well known engineering practises which mitigate that risk.
I would certainly be assessing our DDG’s but I see no reason to believe that the design is deficient. Better minds than mine have produced these designs which have been further assessed by our own engineers, there’s not a lot of variables when you poke a shaft through a bulkhead, it’s all been done before, many times.
I would suspect that human error is responsible in every circumstance of this disaster.
I do agree entirely with Sam Bateman’s closing remarks about modern bridge training. Bridges have become more complex and bridge watchkeepers have many gadgets to play with and distract them from the basics, mark 1 eyeball, pelorus bearings, monitor commercial traffic on #16.
Bateman had extensive experience on RAN bridges and did not specialise so seamanship was always his number one aim. University degrees (less time watchkeeping at sea), shorter bridge time once qualified, and quick progression to warfare roles detract from warchkeeping experience and the effects should be closely monitored in all navies.
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Nice post. Well thought out and structured.
This is a BZ (well done) for a good quality post and does not imply that I agree or disagree with the contents.
Oh definately.
Bridge training seems key, avoiding collisions should be the primary aim rather than designing an sinkable ship. I think you are absolutely correct when you say the human factor maybe the the key recurring issue. Don't know what was the issues with the Mk1 eyeballs are, ultimately it must come down to experience and training. Even still the commerical ship was frantically trying to alert the crew via radio in most of these cases, so it seems the commerical ships were certainly quite active in their attempts.
On modern military ships do they have any watch keepers out in the elements or are they all enclosed?
Not sure about modern practice but in my day lookouts were posted on the bridge wings changed each 30 mins or hour depending on weather.
I acknowledge that it’s very easy to lose sight of other ships nav lights against a background of port/city lights but that does not excuse the failure to monitor VHF #16 and AIS when in close proximity to other ships or in busy circumstances, it’s the International Safety and Calling channel, akin to International Aeronautical Guard for aircraft.
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I had a read thru this link (below), which contains a link to the actual prelim report
CDR Salamander: To Distributed Lethality & Battlemindedness, We Need Robustness
(...& here's the page that the report is on)
Investigation of marine accident, collision outside the Sture Oil Terminal in Hjeltefjorden, Norway | aibn
This incident has led me to recall some conversations during the design and initial fabrication of the Hobarts. Basically there were a lot of experienced Aussie, Brit and US ship builders asking why Navantia had designed things in certain ways, why was the material so thin, why the reliance on corrugated bulkheads in some spaces instead of thicker material, why were the plate sections cruciform instead of offset when welded.
The FFG-7 was regarded as a lightly built, throw away after use platform, but in many ways was a more robust and survivable basic design than the F-100. In comparison to a Burke, Type 23 or Type 26, the F-100, and its derivatives, are light weights structurally speaking.
The RAN selection of the Type 26 is looking smarter and smarter.
The FFG-7 was regarded as a lightly built, throw away after use platform, but in many ways was a more robust and survivable basic design than the F-100. In comparison to a Burke, Type 23 or Type 26, the F-100, and its derivatives, are light weights structurally speaking.
The RAN selection of the Type 26 is looking smarter and smarter.
I hope that they addressed those issues before they committed to building them.
If not what are the prospects of rectifying those issues ... not good I expect.
Dont know you could have went with a proven design
I am not a naval architect and did not have access to the specific design data, but I do know one of the reasons for the build delays was the amount of data that was red penned and sent back to Navantia for alteration. Also the BIW personnel on the build, and outside experts who came in later noted that the build quality was amongst the best they had seen.
t68
Well-Known Member
Sorry BIW pers?
t68
Well-Known Member
Ahh got it, I didn't even know they were involved.