Interesting article and worth posting, but I am not sure I agree with everything and the direction. I can see this is written for Canadians, but I feel compelled to give some Australian input, although I am sure my views aren't universal.
Subs aren't late. The deal isn't late either. Really we should have had a proper competition back in 2010 or earlier. That isn't local industry fault, or anything to do with the current select/deal process. It was always going to take significant time to work out a deal for 12 of the largest and most powerful conventional subs in the world, and wrangle a technology, build and price across France, Australia, US and the UK, on a conventional version of a sub who nuclear version isn't even in the water yet. It isn't a off the plan, kit shed we are building.
Australia local cost increases are mostly due to stop start construction between projects, the UK has had the same issue and as does Canada. Having to rebuild an entire industry every cycle because government can't or won't commit to sustainable cycles is again, a political problem. If the US decided to build all 12 carriers at 12 different shipyards at once and then not order any more for the next 50 years, they too would have an unsustainable ship building industry.
j.collins said:
" Australia will have to grapple with an Indo-Pacific region proliferating with relatively cheaper but lethal anti-ship missiles. In this context, money spent on surface combatants may be perhaps better spent on other capabilities."
Hold on. Those proliferations are mostly in the same Pacific waters as Canada. In fact, Canada is in fact more exposed and has no buffer states nearby between it and those proliferating anti-ship missiles. It is a pet annoyance of mine that Australia is somehow in an extremely risky and exposed situation, while Canada is apart and has nothing to do with what is happening in the Pacific. Australia isn't intercepting hostile aircraft in its own airspace.
j.collins said:
Canada, sitting securely atop the North American continent, enjoys a near-certain American security guarantee and rarely sees defence issues arise as a major domestic policy challenge. This can help account for Ottawa’s laggard-like approach to both military funding and equipment replacement. In contrast, Australia is an island nation dependent on maritime trade and located in a more insecure part of the world, where a naval build-up among competing regional powers is a fact of life…
Really? The competing regional powers are China and the US, hardly alone in our region. The currently hottest tensions are China/Japan/Koreas, which is closer to Canada than it is Australia. While Australia is an "island nation" we are continental in size, disruption to maritime trade to Australia would require a WW2/global war type event. Australia isn't worried about the Naval build up between Tonga and Fiji.
As I recall, for example, Canada did participate in InterFET. So how does that fit into Canadian logic?
I would think with the recent presidential decrees about withdrawing nuclear umbrellas, disbanding NATO and the US's internal priorities, economically being overtaken and fighting on multiple fronts, broken trade, tariff war with the US/Canada those unshakable guarantees are looking a bit hollow. As Canada isn't interested in independent or even action without the US (say with other NATO partners) how they intend to implement any independent policy? This seems to be a very limiting view and a real mis-understanding of the Australia-US alliance.
j.collins said:
Neither country has a historical parallel for such an undertaking and notably, the NSP has singled out Canada as a country for Australia to learn lessons from.
Sort of. Not singled, one of many.
http://www.defence.gov.au/NavalShipBuilding/Plan/Docs/NavalShipbuildingPlan.pdf
NSP said:
6.16Depending on the forthcoming selections for the offshore patrol vessels, Australia may develop deeper naval shipbuilding cooperation with Germany or the Netherlands. Canada and Australia also share many similar attributes and both have defence forces of similar size. There are likely to be expanded opportunities to exchange information and lessons learned in the area of naval shipbuilding.
Canada is basically used as a tale of woe. 6.8, 6.9 talks about learning with France and defence to defence links, workforce planning, developing tech. 6.10, 6.11 talks about learning from the US and further developing with them. 6.12 talks about Spain. 6.13 talks about NZ. 6.14 talks about UK. 6.15 talks about Italy. Compare the language used in those other sections about workforces, sustainable building, fleet design and contrast that with what Australia intends to learn from Canada. The NSS is a very interesting case study, but not for success.
I am also amazed that the view regarding Collins class was based on Australia's experience of the Oberon class, and completely forgets Canada operated the same Oberons.
j.collins said:
Despite being the younger of the two countries’ shipbuilding strategies, the NSP has already encountered problems and criticisms, key of which was a 2018 report by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO… The report characterized the NSP as an “extreme risk”.
Sure the NSP is heavily reviewed. However, it again implies the NSS is superior despite it being older. It also goes on to critise the sustainment of the program.
j.collins said:
In Australia, the Navantia yard in Spain was hired in 2016 to build two supply ships rather than risk building them at home.
Conveniently not referenced. We didn't build the AOR because they were too risky to build locally, we don't have a operating yard free, setup to build ships of that size.
j.collins said:
nor is it clear that domestic industry will have access to the design information required for upgrading the combat and sensor systems, thereby repeating the problems of the Collins class.
That is BS. The surface ships will all use a combination the 9lv and or Aegis. As such we can integrate every single weapon and sensor we want in the console we need. Good luck Canada integrating CEC and/or SM-3, Hawklink without Aegis. I see it as a risk on the Canadian surface build they they are just plodding along with their existing setup. The subs will use the combat system from the American subs, but integrated with US/UK/French/Australian systems and sensors. That is not an issue and is not the problem with the Collins class. The US combat system is what fixed the Collins class system issues.
Also the delays in the AWD weren't just industry fault, the politicians deliberately slowed the program and increased cost deliberately. Which is why generally the AWD doesn't come under heavy criticism regarding delivery, and cost.
j.collins said:
Others have pointed out that Australia’s domestic steel industry lacks the capacity to produce the 1,800 tonnes of steel needed for each submarine, further contributing to cost escalation
BS.
The riddle of steel | The Strategist
ASPI said:
But even if it isn’t a lot of money, maybe it’s a lot of Australia’s steel production? Australia
ranks only 23rd in global steel production, but that’s still 5.3 million tonnes in 2018, ranging from around
390,000 to 490,000 tonnes per month.
So 2,000 tonnes is only around one-seventh of the Australian steel industry’s daily production.
Again the claims regarding regionalism regarding Williamstown are pretty flakey. It effectively shut down in 2015, 2 years before the NSP. Before the LHD you have to go back to 2006 to find the last Australian navy ship work.
I am also critical of the implication that the NSP should build more Austal aluminium ships instead of surface combatants or Subs. While Australia has costed and planed 9 surface combatants, we already have 3 DDGs, and 8 frigate upgrades. 6 subs. 2 lhd 1 lsd. 2 AOR (near JSS). An icebreaker. Then outside of navy, we have the Land400 and army upgrades, and the F-35 and F-18E/F, E7, P8's, c27 and other projects flying. While not ideal, it would seem to be way ahead of Canada which seems completely deadlocked into inaction.
Given the audience of this paper, Canadians, I doubt this paper will come under much criticism.
I also find it cute that the NSS and the NSP are still in their early stages. The NSS is what? 9 years old at this point and has delivered how many shipsTo many Australians the Canadian experience is one to learn to avoid. Its right up there with Indian procurement and build processes. Canadian communication comes across as smug and condescending. There seems to be little critical internal review, extremely limited external understanding.
It is not that we aren't able to take criticism, but it should be informed and accurate. There is plenty to have a go at. The sheer fucking around on the sub replacement for one, the fact that it took until 2017 to get a NSP, the cluster of the AWD project on multiple levels and the blame games. Yes, the interstate rivalry, the WA mafia. The succession of ministers. The not going with the 4th AWD, instead of the opv thing and shifting everything around.
But these are my views, as an armchair warmer.
I've deleted them for you
