John Fedup
The Bunker Group
The RR spec PDF mentions 36-40 MW but an * suggests more on a case by case basis. In any event, this GT has some significant installations, QE class, Zumwalt class, and is the specified choice for all T-26 variants.
Royal Canadian Navy Discussions and updates
- Thread starter stephen weist
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I am not a naval engineer but with the weights creeping up is the installed power enough to keep up with a Carrier Strike Group? I see installed power of 40MW on the Turbine, and 12MW on the Gensets for something along the lines of 52MW total output. The Type 45's look to have a similar output but something like a Flight I Arleigh Burke is closer to 75MW.
Good question. However, it's a CODELOG arrangement, so one or the other (Diesels, or GT) but not both.
This is the best article I've found on the T26 propulsion: Powering the stealthy submarine hunter – Type 26 frigate propulsion system in focus.
If the MT30s can deliver more than 40MW, than there is a good possibility the ship could reach speeds of 30 knots. 45MW for example, would be 60,000 HP. Depends on a lot of factors, such as the efficiency of the hull/propellers, and loss through the gearbox, but that's a fair bit of power. Even at 40MW, that's 53,333 HP.
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John Fedup
The Bunker Group
A crude estimate of power requirements for a displacement hull to reach maximum hull speed is 5 hp per ton of displacement based on the square root of the LWL times 1.34. The CSC displacement may be close to 8,000 tons. However, special hull shaping can provide increased speed/fuel savings (bulbous bows for example). Details on the T-26 hull special enhancements wouldn’t be in the public domain. As the RCN has often provided frigates for USN CBGs, I would think the necessary speed requirements would be a requirement for the CSC.
Weights of warships are always subjective & CSC/T26/Hunter will be no different. WEIGHT effects the distance the ship can travel, more than the top speed element.
For instance, when LCS was on paper they wanted a ship that could travel from San Diego to Hawaii, without refuelling, while maintaining a 'specific' speed. By the time the 1st ship hit the water, returned from testing & had some of the structural elements 'fixed' (due to the hull form degrading because of the effects of speed thru water on aluminium), the 'fix' had added something like between 15 & 30 tonnes to the overall weight of the ship. This compounded by other design & equipment issues, meant that once the Naval architects / boffins had used their slide rules to calculate everything, it was apparent that the LCS would run out of fuel, before she ever reached port.
The hull form design (physical shape), balance fore to aft (whether the ship is tail heavy/bow light,), affects the 'portion' of the hull in the water, elements causing drag in the water (including the hull coating itself), can contribute to a vessel being technically limited to being able to reach speeds over 25 Kts
While CBG's like to keep a 'top speed, it is usually closer to 20 Kts, to accommodate 'slower vessels', such a fuel tankers & logistics support ships. Power generation is also to do with the equipment used on the hull for weapons, etc., so an overall electrical load of the platform to power radars / trackers & communications systems drive up the 'need' for larger MW engines. Building in 'future-proofing' to do this (i.e. to accommodate directed energy weapons / rail guns), means it is better to have so 'spare in the tank', so to speak. Finally, as ships age the do inevitably get heavier (layers of paint /additional cabling/pipework/ducting systems, etc., etc, all add up), so building in 'reserve' to account for this, is always a good thing.
SA
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The New Canadian Surface Combatant
A next generation combat ship to support and protect the men and women of the Royal Canadian Navy.
thenewcsc.ca
Looks like the CSC team is putting the full court press towards the program with the upcoming report coming from the Parliamentary Budget Officer. Lots of interesting tidbits in the website. They are leaning very heavily on the fact that the ship is a more modern design than its contemporaries and that it has a significant portion of Canadian content.
We don't have a Parliamentary Budget Office here,which IMHO is a very good thing. It's one less way for Treasury to get its claws into the system.The New Canadian Surface Combatant
A next generation combat ship to support and protect the men and women of the Royal Canadian Navy.
Looks like the CSC team is putting the full court press towards the program with the upcoming report coming from the Parliamentary Budget Officer. Lots of interesting tidbits in the website. They are leaning very heavily on the fact that the ship is a more modern design than its contemporaries and that it has a significant portion of Canadian content.
I mean we haven’t had a budget here in Canada in 18 months, so take it for what it is worth.
Black Jack Shellac
Active Member
The PBO is an independent watch dog, created to keep an eye on government spending. It has no real power to change government spending, it just advises the government, and the public, on government spending.
PBO
On another note, the 40 MW power of the MT30 turbine is the guaranteed power by Rolls Royce from -40C to +37.8C. It may be able to generate more power, but I don't think redlining your engine is a good operating strategy.
A few tidbits on the MT30 in the linked paper. Remarks on Trent 30 Gas Turbine
PBO
On another note, the 40 MW power of the MT30 turbine is the guaranteed power by Rolls Royce from -40C to +37.8C. It may be able to generate more power, but I don't think redlining your engine is a good operating strategy.
A few tidbits on the MT30 in the linked paper. Remarks on Trent 30 Gas Turbine
Video of the latest converted interim icebreaker (CCGS Jean Goodwill):
The first of the series (CCGS Molly Cool) has been in service since 2018, but has just re-entered the drydock at Davie for some additional conversion work. The third of this series (CCGS Vincent Massey ) will be available in 2021. These ships will bridge the gap until the arrival of the two Polar class ships, and the 6 Program Icebreakers. More on those future vessels here: https://icebreakercentre.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/NIC_final_final_ENG.pdf.
More on the interim icebreakers here: Canadian Coast Guard’s latest icebreakers
The first of the series (CCGS Molly Cool) has been in service since 2018, but has just re-entered the drydock at Davie for some additional conversion work. The third of this series (CCGS Vincent Massey ) will be available in 2021. These ships will bridge the gap until the arrival of the two Polar class ships, and the 6 Program Icebreakers. More on those future vessels here: https://icebreakercentre.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/NIC_final_final_ENG.pdf.
More on the interim icebreakers here: Canadian Coast Guard’s latest icebreakers
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CSC digital design tool is now live: BAE Systems opens first Visualization Suite for Canadian Surface Combatant
Pic of an RCAF SAR CH-149 Cormorant (EH101) hovering near HMCS Harry DeWolf (courtesy the RCAF twitter feed). It is my understanding that even though the AOPV can hangar a CH-148 Cyclone, the slightly larger Cormorant can land on the deck for refueling, but will not fit in the hangar.
Attachments
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
I would have thought the CH-148 was a bit larger than the CH-149, will have to dig around for the specs which I used to have on another computer.
Yes, the CH-149 is both longer and taller (and heavier) than the CH-148. But most importantly the CH-149 version of the EH101 does not have folding rotors.
CH-149: CH-149 Cormorant | Aircraft | Royal Canadian Air Force
CH-148: CH-148 Cyclone | Aircraft | Royal Canadian Air Force
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John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Oh, no folding rotors on our CH-149s, that is indeed a show-stopper. I wonder if that was a Chrétien requirement to keep them off naval vessels?
They are doing that in aviation now. Believe Boeing Saab are doing it with the T-7A.
Apparently there was "furious back-room lobbying" by various players in the defense industry against choosing the SPY-7 for the CSC as it's still in development and not off-the-shelf. Among the concerns is how much work/cost is needed to marinize it given most of the development to date has been for land-based BMD applications. The article makes a comparison with the development of the CH-148 Cyclone but with Spain and possibly now Japan building SPY-7 warships, Canada isn't going it alone this time and I don't think the risk is as high. In particular, the F-110 schedule is ahead of the CSC so it's Spain that's going to feel the most pressure to get it working. I guess we'll never find out which radar competitors were fighting for the CSC contract, but DND is confident that the SPY-7 is the "latest generation radar, with capability that surpasses other units fielded today," so I guess it's good that the government held fast and signed the SPY-7 contract despite the lobbying and despite Covid budget pressures.
Update on HMCS Harry DeWolf: Royal Canadian Navy Harry DeWolf OPV trials new capabilities at sea - Naval News
Black Jack Shellac
Active Member
A couple of new articles on the CSC:
Billions in trouble: How the crown jewel of Canada’s shipbuilding strategy became a possible financial disaster waiting in the wings
launching_the_canadian_surface_combatant_project
The first is a bit of a hit piece by David Pugliese where he seems to forget much of the procurement process he himself reported on. Especially concerning the lack of intellectual property transfers offered by the FREMM group being one of the major reasons for the rejection of that offer. Not to mention that it was a non-conforming bid and any acceptance would have brought on multiple lawsuits from the conforming bidders.
The second is a bit long winded but somewhat interesting read. Some of it is trying to explain why it is difficult to get good estimates of costs etc. I would suggest that the article is partially correct in the explanation, while also somewhat excusing the procurement process Canada goes through (as flawed as it is). So it may be a bit self serving. However, it was written by Ian Mack (Rear-Admiral Retired), so I will certainly give him the benefit of the doubt.
Billions in trouble: How the crown jewel of Canada’s shipbuilding strategy became a possible financial disaster waiting in the wings
launching_the_canadian_surface_combatant_project
The first is a bit of a hit piece by David Pugliese where he seems to forget much of the procurement process he himself reported on. Especially concerning the lack of intellectual property transfers offered by the FREMM group being one of the major reasons for the rejection of that offer. Not to mention that it was a non-conforming bid and any acceptance would have brought on multiple lawsuits from the conforming bidders.
The second is a bit long winded but somewhat interesting read. Some of it is trying to explain why it is difficult to get good estimates of costs etc. I would suggest that the article is partially correct in the explanation, while also somewhat excusing the procurement process Canada goes through (as flawed as it is). So it may be a bit self serving. However, it was written by Ian Mack (Rear-Admiral Retired), so I will certainly give him the benefit of the doubt.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
@Black Jack Shellac, there was another article in the Ottawa Citizen about $24,000 semi automatic 7.62 mm rifles for the army. If true, it does give concern about big programs going sideways.