Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[Stampede]

As of today we only have 3types of hull made in Australia
Arafuras, evolved and guardian
If you fight the next war with what you have not what you wish for,
Could any of the aforementioned missiles be retrofitted to those hulls ?
Time is quickening

Welcome aboard

"If you fight the next war with what you have not what you wish for"

A pertinent question, currently without a tangible and timely response regarding our fleet today and within the near future.

Our fleet today will look just the same in a decades time with the addition of the Lurssen designed OPV 80 for the Patrol / MCM and Survey roles.
Collectively this range of vessels will be an improvement on what they replace and in like numbers.
They are not currently not fitted out to fight anything more than angry penguins.

Are they an opportunity or are they just the wrong vessel, time will tell.

As others have advised, the up-arming of the new smaller vessels currently in construction has been well thrashed out.

Particularly regarding the new OPV's, this subject has gained much debate both here on DT and in many other media outlets.

In 2021 it's without an answer; but your question still stands, "in the next war you fight with what you have and not with what you wish for!"

The government has acknowledged the Geo/ political challenges of the near future in the now not so recent Defence Strategic Review.
Certainly some good action on bringing forward and enhancing our options of deterrence with new missile technology across the three services.
Our version of anti access / area denial.
This is a prudent and timely investment to achieve some respectable military deterrence against any large threat.

Paradoxically no short term maritime solutions.
The dramatic dumping of the Attack Class for a new nuclear submarine looks impressive to some, but without much detail, at this stage it appears a future capability so far off as to be irrelevant today and the decade ahead.
Same situation for the Hunter Class.
No new capability realistically till the mid 30's with maybe 3 to 4 vessels available in two decades time.
Again they are irrelevant today and the decade ahead

So again your question still stands, in the next war you fight with what you have and not with what you wish for!

Maybe government and Navy need to dramatically reevaluate the current shipbuilding projects.
What is been built does not mirror the concerns they acknowledge in the the time frame expressed.


Perplexed S

 

[Todjaeger]

Welcome aboard

"If you fight the next war with what you have not what you wish for"

A pertinent question, currently without a tangible and timely response regarding our fleet today and within the near future.

Our fleet today will look just the same in a decades time with the addition of the Lurssen designed OPV 80 for the Patrol / MCM and Survey roles.
Collectively this range of vessels will be an improvement on what they replace and in like numbers.
They are not currently not fitted out to fight anything more than angry penguins.

Are they an opportunity or are they just the wrong vessel, time will tell.

As others have advised, the up-arming of the new smaller vessels currently in construction has been well thrashed out.

Particularly regarding the new OPV's, this subject has gained much debate both here on DT and in many other media outlets.

In 2021 it's without an answer; but your question still stands, "in the next war you fight with what you have and not with what you wish for!"

The government has acknowledged the Geo/ political challenges of the near future in the now not so recent Defence Strategic Review.
Certainly some good action on bringing forward and enhancing our options of deterrence with new missile technology across the three services.
Our version of anti access / area denial.
This is a prudent and timely investment to achieve some respectable military deterrence against any large threat.

Paradoxically no short term maritime solutions.
The dramatic dumping of the Attack Class for a new nuclear submarine looks impressive to some, but without much detail, at this stage it appears a future capability so far off as to be irrelevant today and the decade ahead.
Same situation for the Hunter Class.
No new capability realistically till the mid 30's with maybe 3 to 4 vessels available in two decades time.
Again they are irrelevant today and the decade ahead

So again your question still stands, in the next war you fight with what you have and not with what you wish for!

Maybe government and Navy need to dramatically reevaluate the current shipbuilding projects.
What is been built does not mirror the concerns they acknowledge in the the time frame expressed.


Perplexed S

A significant part of the issue is that force structure planning (just the planning mind you, not the execution of any such plan) takes a fair bit of time to develop. When one adds in the resulting build programmes, then one it talking about efforts over the course of years. An unfortunate potential downside to this is that a threat, new and unforeseen or expected but further into the future, could emerge more rapidly than plans can be developed or changed. This appears to be what has happened with the ADF and thus the RAN.

If it turns out that the ADF and/or the RAN need more/improved combat capabilities within the next five years, or additional combat vessels and systems, then the programmes to establish or expand such capabilities would likely have had to had started at least five years ago, and for some possibly more like ten to 15 years ago.

For those who seem to keep losing sight of the time which can be required (which seems to be a recurring issue), look at parts of the SEA 4000 timeline, which led to the Hobart-class DDG. The conception of what became SEA 4000 started after the 2000 DWP. Raytheon Australia won a contract for Combat System - System Engineer back in April of 2005 for part of what became the Hobart-class CMS, two years prior to the final vessel design competition ending with a contract being awarded. The lead ship, HMAS Hobart was itself not commissioned until Sept 2017, nearly 12.5 years after Raytheon Australia was awarded that system engineer contract as an early part of SEA 4000, and about 17 years after the idea was conceived. It is an unfortunate reality that these things take time.

 

[Stampede]

A significant part of the issue is that force structure planning (just the planning mind you, not the execution of any such plan) takes a fair bit of time to develop. When one adds in the resulting build programmes, then one it talking about efforts over the course of years. An unfortunate potential downside to this is that a threat, new and unforeseen or expected but further into the future, could emerge more rapidly than plans can be developed or changed. This appears to be what has happened with the ADF and thus the RAN.

If it turns out that the ADF and/or the RAN need more/improved combat capabilities within the next five years, or additional combat vessels and systems, then the programmes to establish or expand such capabilities would likely have had to had started at least five years ago, and for some possibly more like ten to 15 years ago.

For those who seem to keep losing sight of the time which can be required (which seems to be a recurring issue), look at parts of the SEA 4000 timeline, which led to the Hobart-class DDG. The conception of what became SEA 4000 started after the 2000 DWP. Raytheon Australia won a contract for Combat System - System Engineer back in April of 2005 for part of what became the Hobart-class CMS, two years prior to the final vessel design competition ending with a contract being awarded. The lead ship, HMAS Hobart was itself not commissioned until Sept 2017, nearly 12.5 years after Raytheon Australia was awarded that system engineer contract as an early part of SEA 4000, and about 17 years after the idea was conceived. It is an unfortunate reality that these things take time.

Acknowledge and agree with what your saying.

That said, does it mean we stay with things as is, or do we investigate all options going forward.

I find it difficult to believe that greater maritime capacity, however modest, could not but achieved over and above what we have planned to build or buy.

Money does not seem to be the problem, just vision.

Not a dig at anyone on DT, but perceptions of threat ( Less than a decade ) don't seemed to be mirrored in action regarding our short term maritime response options.


Regards S

 

[Depot Dog]

Hi Everyone

Watching Sub Brief today, the second half of the video he answers the question on how long it takes to train RAN on nuclear boats. He breaks it down to OJT and training schools.

Maybe the speculation of an early 2030 sub is possible. Providing other factors align.

Regards
DD

 

[Todjaeger]

Acknowledge and agree with what your saying.

That said, does it mean we stay with things as is, or do we investigate all options going forward.

I find it difficult to believe that greater maritime capacity, however modest, could not but achieved over and above what we have planned to build or buy.

Money does not seem to be the problem, just vision.

Not a dig at anyone on DT, but perceptions of threat ( Less than a decade ) don't seemed to be mirrored in action regarding our short term maritime response options.


Regards S

I disagree, the problem IMO is not a lack of either money or vision, but time. If one wants to really consider 'vision' as a problem, then one really needs to consider what the vision was over a decade ago.

Certainly, look at what potential options are and whether or not they would be both possible and viable. However, one also needs to keep in mind that if one is really considering a timeframe <five years, that is really a good deal shorter than the procurement cycle for new kit. Again going back to the Hobart-class destroyer programme, it was approximately five years between selection of the Navantia entry and the lead ship being laid down. Heck, there is a lag, often measured in years, for long lead time items. IIRC the time between ordering the Aegis CMS and SPY-1 arrays and their being delivered for installation is often three or more years.

What the above essentially boils down to, is that not only gov't, the ADF and RAN already have plans drawn up and ready to be executed (down to already having designs and what kit is to be included) but the other critical factors like workspaces, a work force, and then the future crews, would all also need to be in place when and where needed.

Again, time is an issue because it can take a number of years for new personnel to get trained up to some of the levels which would be required in order to be part of a shipyard workforce or ship's crew. That can be rushed to a degree if there was a major international conflict which was sufficient to trigger a national mobilization, but otherwise things would need to have been started five or ten years ago if not more, in order to be ready five years from now. Posts which require senior officers and ratings, those with 15+ years of experience, cannot just be trained up in a few years.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Remembering the Hobart class isn't an ideal situation.

The Air Warfare Destroyer program

10 November 2014 PDF version [275KB] David Watt Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security Section Executive summary The Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) program will deliver three Hobart Class AWDs and support systems to the Navy under an alliance-based contracting arr

www.aph.gov.au

In response to the advice received concerning the problems with construction, the Minister for Defence and the Minister for Defence Materiel announced that some of the further construction work scheduled for completion by BAE Systems would be moved to other shipyards, including to ASC in Adelaide (seven blocks) , Forgacs in Newcastle (four blocks) and a Navantia facility in Spain (five blocks). This left BAE with two blocks. The joint media release noted that this change was likely to lead to delays in the completion of the AWDs ‘by up to 12 months’ (for each vessel)

During September 2012 the Minister for Defence announced that there would be a further delay in the completion of all the AWDs, with 18 months between the keel-laying of each vessel (in a modern ship keel-laying is actually the point at which the first modular blocks are joined together). This delay will mean that the last of these vessels (which will be commissioned as HMAS Sydney) will not be complete until March 2019. This rescheduling also had the effect of saving the Government about $100 million in the near term (by pushing the expenditure ‘to the right’):

Many parts of the Hobart build were spaced out and not designed to meet an immediate need. Many of the issues were semi-related to restarting construction, which we are likely to experience anyway, perhaps at hopefully lower levels. Selection to commission was not designed to be quick. It was also our first Aegis modern destroyer.

Some long lead items might be fairly platform agnostic. Aegis, 9LV consoles, CEAFAR, some subsystems may not hold up construction as they tend to be replaceable such as engines, mech services, etc.

 

[Todjaeger]

Remembering the Hobart class isn't an ideal situation.

The Air Warfare Destroyer program

10 November 2014 PDF version [275KB] David Watt Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security Section Executive summary The Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) program will deliver three Hobart Class AWDs and support systems to the Navy under an alliance-based contracting arr

www.aph.gov.au

Many parts of the Hobart build were spaced out and not designed to meet an immediate need. Many of the issues were semi-related to restarting construction, which we are likely to experience anyway, perhaps at hopefully lower levels. Selection to commission was not designed to be quick. It was also our first Aegis modern destroyer.

Some long lead items might be fairly platform agnostic. Aegis, 9LV consoles, CEAFAR, some subsystems may not hold up construction as they tend to be replaceable such as engines, mech services, etc.

I tend to refer back to the SEA 4000 project timeline, not so much for various completion dates, but for when certain planning, contracting and work start dates because they can provide a rough framework for how long various activities can take, prior to actual construction of a modern naval vessel commences. Again, if the threat is expected to materialize within a five year time frame, then making suggestions that new warships should be ordered and built become increasingly unrealistic when one realizes that it can take ~six years to go from the concept of a new RAN warship class, to actually signing the contract which orders a specific new warship class/design to enter RAN service.

An interesting though exercise, which would also illustrate some of the issues with both time and industrial capacity, is to consider the following idea.

Imagine for a moment that the decision was made to have future Arafura-class OPV's kitted out with an appropriately sized array of CEAFAR radar panels instead of the currently planned search radars. Assuming that all required design changes to fit the radar panels had already been completed, how long would it take for CEA Technologies to be able to begin making deliveries of the panels? I do not expect an answer, but I would imagine that such build-to-order systems would have some lead times, assuming that the manufacturer already has all the subcomponents on hand. Given some of the chip shortages, it is also quite possible that there could be further lags due to needing to receive subcomponent deliveries.

 

[ddxx]

Some interesting quotes from BAE Systems Australia Managing Director on the Hunter Class program in this recent article

• “(the delay in steel cut date) gives us a much higher level of certainty on the delivery of the ships and more potential to compress the schedule over the three ships of Batch One. It’s going a bit slower to go fast.”

• "the hull of the Australian design was being slightly broadened from its original 20.8m beam along most of its 149.9m length to meet weight and growth margins, but with less than 0-01 change in its hydrodynamics."

• “And that includes everything from future weapons to more strike capability. And that analysis will really inform the ability of the commonwealth and navy to decide what they want on Ship One, Batch One, and on Batches Two and Three.” (In regards to the upcoming finalisation of design, which will inform capability margins)

With a LSW of 8,200 tonnes, and a expected FLD in excess of 10,000 tonnes, I can't possibly see how it'll have the 2018 design bid's 32 MK-41 cells.

32 is a number never included in any public Defence release. The number came from the bid, well before the Strategic Update, well before the desire to load SM-6 alongside SM-2 and ESSM, and well before the intended acquisition of long range strike capabilities such as TLAM and LRASM.

I'd be willing to bet there will be more from ship one. And for context, a Flight IIA Burke has a LSW of 7,190 tonnes.

 

[Stampede]

I disagree, the problem IMO is not a lack of either money or vision, but time. If one wants to really consider 'vision' as a problem, then one really needs to consider what the vision was over a decade ago.

Certainly, look at what potential options are and whether or not they would be both possible and viable. However, one also needs to keep in mind that if one is really considering a timeframe <five years, that is really a good deal shorter than the procurement cycle for new kit. Again going back to the Hobart-class destroyer programme, it was approximately five years between selection of the Navantia entry and the lead ship being laid down. Heck, there is a lag, often measured in years, for long lead time items. IIRC the time between ordering the Aegis CMS and SPY-1 arrays and their being delivered for installation is often three or more years.

What the above essentially boils down to, is that not only gov't, the ADF and RAN already have plans drawn up and ready to be executed (down to already having designs and what kit is to be included) but the other critical factors like workspaces, a work force, and then the future crews, would all also need to be in place when and where needed.

Again, time is an issue because it can take a number of years for new personnel to get trained up to some of the levels which would be required in order to be part of a shipyard workforce or ship's crew. That can be rushed to a degree if there was a major international conflict which was sufficient to trigger a national mobilization, but otherwise things would need to have been started five or ten years ago if not more, in order to be ready five years from now. Posts which require senior officers and ratings, those with 15+ years of experience, cannot just be trained up in a few years.

Thanks for your post

I do agree to a lack of vision a decade ago.
Navy has always needed a middle tier vessel in between a patrol boat and a destroyer.
We were seriously looking at this in the 90's.
Transfield had a good looking design around the 80m mark that together with the Sea sprite helicopter would been a most useful package.
More an armed corvette than a OPV, it could both do the constabulary stuff and also provide military options below that of a destroyer.

The similar sized 80 m Arafura class look impressive compared to the smaller patrol boat generations, but at the end of the day they are a wasted opportunity.

I do share some of your concerns re time and the realistic ability to train and build ships and crew.
I differ in that I see opportunity in what we are currently building.

Two classes of vessel of similar design and sub systems should be achievable within the decade.
One as is and the other slightly larger to accommodate more "stuff"

We are already budgeting and training crew for these ships.
Some extra bodies for the larger class of vessel to work the " extra Stuff " should not be problematic.

Not building destroyers or aircraft carriers, just working the balancing act of time and reality of expectation.

The wasted opportunity is not yet built and still has scope to grow even if it is not quite what we really want.


Regards S

 

[hauritz]

Once the Hunters are delivered Australia will perhaps be the only major navy in the world not to operate tier two warships, and of course numbers still count. I don't think the Ararfuras could effectively fill that role but it is something that I think would need to be addressed when the Arafura comes up for replacement.

 

[John Newman]

Some interesting quotes from BAE Systems Australia Managing Director on the Hunter Class program in this recent article

• “(the delay in steel cut date) gives us a much higher level of certainty on the delivery of the ships and more potential to compress the schedule over the three ships of Batch One. It’s going a bit slower to go fast.”

• "the hull of the Australian design was being slightly broadened from its original 20.8m beam along most of its 149.9m length to meet weight and growth margins, but with less than 0-01 change in its hydrodynamics."

• “And that includes everything from future weapons to more strike capability. And that analysis will really inform the ability of the commonwealth and navy to decide what they want on Ship One, Batch One, and on Batches Two and Three.” (In regards to the upcoming finalisation of design, which will inform capability margins)

With a LSW of 8,200 tonnes, and a expected FLD in excess of 10,000 tonnes, I can't possibly see how it'll have the 2018 design bid's 32 MK-41 cells.

32 is a number never included in any public Defence release. The number came from the bid, well before the Strategic Update, well before the desire to load SM-6 alongside SM-2 and ESSM, and well before the intended acquisition of long range strike capabilities such as TLAM and LRASM.

I'd be willing to bet there will be more from ship one. And for context, a Flight IIA Burke has a LSW of 7,190 tonnes.

The article above, published in The Australian, is based on this article from the ADM website:

Future Frigate in focus - Australian Defence Magazine

Navy’s Hunter frigate program has been in the news of late, particularly with regard to construction delays and growth margin concerns. Julian Kerr spoke with Managing Director of BAE Systems Maritime...

www.australiandefence.com.au

The ADM article is a bit more detailed.

 

[Geddy]

Can someone enlighten me where the 32 VLS figure for the Hunter class comes from?

 

[ngatimozart]

Yes - I’ve read that one too. The extra depth beyond the key points is rather minimal - a result of the bizarre comms stranglehold the current gov desires over defence. Not for security, but for politics.

Actually it's Peter Dutton who has instituted the comms blackout right across Defence and the ADF. He's been pretty strict about it and he instituted as soon as he started the job.

 

[Git_Kraken]

With a LSW of 8,200 tonnes, and a expected FLD in excess of 10,000 tonnes, I can't possibly see how it'll have the 2018 design bid's 32 MK-41 cells.

32 is a number never included in any public Defence release. The number came from the bid, well before the Strategic Update, well before the desire to load SM-6 alongside SM-2 and ESSM, and well before the intended acquisition of long range strike capabilities such as TLAM and LRASM.

I'd be willing to bet there will be more from ship one. And for context, a Flight IIA Burke has a LSW of 7,190 tonnes.

The tonnage difference is right there in the article.

CEAFAR 2 is a hugely capable radar but with that comes challenges; it is a very power-consumptive radar. So, the power dynamics onboard the ship are much more complex than its direct peers. The radar is heavier than the UK equivalent and when we put weight up high, it has a corresponding effect on ballast and seakeeping.

To do some assumption math(s): A Burke's radar is placed on 01 Deck. A Hunter's radar is placed well above 01 Deck. The corresponding effect on ballast (wasted tonnage) is going to be a multiple of at least 4. A radar system of 200 tons (cooling liquids/systems, superstructure, direct radar equipment) therefore corresponds to 800 tons of ballast. Suddenly that 7190 becomes 7990 (assuming the weight of the radar is the same). That's very close to the 8200 ton listed in the article.

When the US designed the Burkes it was with a heavy radar in mind so when you look at their mast structure it's very efficient and light, as they didn't need to fight for radar space, as the radar is located in the superstructure of the ship.

And of course, Burkes were never designed for crew comfort and have no mission flex space. The liveable space for the crew likely has an impact on weapons and other equipment.

 

[spoz]

Can someone enlighten me where the 32 VLS figure for the Hunter class comes from?

Model exhibited by BAE at Pacific 2019 naval conference.

 

[seaspear]

Without going into grounds that some would consider blasphemy, should the increase of air assets capable of operating in conjunction with naval assets be considered as a quicker solution?
An increase in Poseidon type aircraft armed with long-range missiles backed up by refueling KC-30A (only 6 )and aircraft like Wedgetail and triton could possibly be more quickly available to procure and deploy than angst over fitting missile loads on ships

 

[hauritz]

Without going into grounds that some would consider blasphemy, should the increase of air assets capable of operating in conjunction with naval assets be considered as a quicker solution?
An increase in Poseidon type aircraft armed with long-range missiles backed up by refueling KC-30A (only 6 )and aircraft like Wedgetail and triton could possibly be more quickly available to procure and deploy than angst over fitting missile loads on ships

I have always been a platform agnostic so I don't consider it blasphemous at all. We need fast solutions. Apparently money has been left sitting on the table as a result of delays in both the frigate and submarine programs. If that money goes to the air force instead of the navy I am all for it.

The Poseidon program is proceeding smoothly and on budget. Additional aircraft could at least partly fill the capability gap that will exist because of delays in the afore mentioned programs. It is a capability that could be delivered relatively quickly. Plans to expand the tanker fleet were foreshadowed in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update. I would definitely bring that forward not just for the Poseidon but also to extend the range of the F-35s and Hornets.

 

[ddxx]

The tonnage difference is right there in the article.

To do some assumption math(s): A Burke's radar is placed on 01 Deck. A Hunter's radar is placed well above 01 Deck. The corresponding effect on ballast (wasted tonnage) is going to be a multiple of at least 4. A radar system of 200 tons (cooling liquids/systems, superstructure, direct radar equipment) therefore corresponds to 800 tons of ballast. Suddenly that 7190 becomes 7990 (assuming the weight of the radar is the same). That's very close to the 8200 ton listed in the article.

When the US designed the Burkes it was with a heavy radar in mind so when you look at their mast structure it's very efficient and light, as they didn't need to fight for radar space, as the radar is located in the superstructure of the ship.

And of course, Burkes were never designed for crew comfort and have no mission flex space. The liveable space for the crew likely has an impact on weapons and other equipment.

Given CEAFAR was a known weight I don't think it could possibly be solely responsible for the substantial change in displacement. The comparison to the Burke LSW was more about highlighting that it would be bizarre if Hunter was unable to accommodate a larger number of cells post these changes.

I just can't see the logic in building a 10,000+ tonne surface combatant with the latest version of AEGIS, and a super capable radar to then only fit 32 cells - and that's before we even consider the strategic context, planned weapon acquisitions, and establishing sovereign missile manufacturing.

The balancing act of fitting SM-6/SM-2/ESSM in useful quantities alone would potentially be difficult, and you'd essentially be ruling out loading any of the planned future weapons such as TLAM.

It just wouldn't make sense IMO, but neither does classifying the Hunter Class as a frigate ...

 

[StingrayOZ]

An increase in Poseidon type aircraft armed with long-range missiles backed up by refueling KC-30A (only 6 )and aircraft like Wedgetail and triton could possibly be more quickly available to procure and deploy than angst over fitting missile loads on ships

IMO additional P8's is entirely appropriate. We never did replace 1 for 1 with the active orions, and never acquired the max number we originally earmarked. Not even growth, just sustaining our existing levels. Going to 14 or 16 P8s would help particularly given we are short on ships and submarines during the next decade. An Anzac with a P8 overhead is probably what we will need going forward, for that kind of coverage we probably should look at expansion of the P8 fleet. Even as the hunters come in, we would then still be looking for strong P8 coverage.

Given CEAFAR was a known weight I don't think it could possibly be solely responsible for the substantial change in displacement. The comparison to the Burke LSW was more about highlighting that it would be bizarre if Hunter was unable to accommodate a larger number of cells post these changes.

RAN has ambitious targets for range, power, fuel, cooling of both crew and machinery. Its not just the radar.

As for final fitout, we don't know. We do know the hunters will be very large, probably the largest "frigate" in the world. Probably with the largest and most powerful radar and the most capable combat system. For the RAN standardising on these items makes building, training and logistics easier.

 

[Todjaeger]

I get that, But at the same time I don't think we need to be limited by a near 20 year project, and intend future projects get completed in the same timeframe. The FFG and Anzacs were completed much quicker overall as I recall.

Anzac design was signed off/selected in 1989, and HMAS Anzac was laid down 1993, launched in 1994 and commissioned 1996. With a ship coming basically every year after that. Its still a 10 year program, and for a smaller, simpler ship.

The New Surface Combatant project, which was to replace the RAN's River-class DE's was started some time prior to 1985, with the end result ultimately becoming the RAN's ANZAC-class FFH's. While the MEKO 200 design which became the ANZAC-class frigate was selected in 1989, the project which led to that selection had been running for at least four years. For the Hobart-class, that project initiated some time after the release of the 2000 DWP, with final selection being made in 2007. Once the selections had been made and contracts awarded, the lead Hobart-class DDG was laid down ~5 years after selection, vs. ~4 years for the lead ANZAC-class FFH. Basically it took a similar amount of time to get things started.

For any new/additional warship construction for the RAN, we would be in the project phases which exist prior to a selection getting made and/or contractors awarded. These phases can take several years as it takes time to identify what the capability needs are, and what designs could meet those capability needs.

This reality is why I tend to rain on other people's parades when unrealistic suggestions are proffered regarding additional naval construction. If the expected demand for new/additional warships is only ~five years away, and two significant programme milestones each of which can take ~five years have to be passed... Then one is suggesting that a decade of work be carried out in half the time. This would also require a number of other elements cooperating, like the suppliers for needed subsystems, etc. space avail in a shipyard, and so on.