Royal Australian Air Force [RAAF] News, Discussions and Updates

[Volkodav]

I should point out I love bombers, especially state of the art ones. The engineering that goes into them is incredible, they are often years in advance of tactical types.

In the same order, I love battleships and battle cruisers, I love the beautifully impressive fast destroyers and cruisers, ludicrously fast attack boats etc. But I also realise, that interms of cost verses capability they just make no sense for Australia, and often make no sense for anyone at all.

 

[Julian 82]

In times of peace governments start buying long range supposedly multirole aircraft to replace tactical airpower, ground and sea forces. When the shooting starts tactical airpower comes to the fore as governments scramble to rebuild their withered land and sea power.

Without airpower land and sea forces are at a serious, perhaps fatal disadvantage. Without land or sea power, you have handed those domains to the enemy.

Combined arms and joint operations are the name of the game, if a capability delivers little or nothing to the joint capability there needs to be some very special, game changing, justification in investing in it.

In 1974 Cyclone Tracy hit Darwin and multiple RAN, Army and RAAF elements deployed to assist. This included warships and army combat units, but no bombers. Same happens over and over again, floods bushfires, earthquakes, tidal waves, civil unrest, terrorism, invasion. The use of bombers is the exception, not the rule, submarines probably get more use and at least have a peace time role and a joint function that can't be provided by anything else.

Some people think heavy armour is a nich capability, as I and others claim bombers to be. Again it's different, at its heart, heavy armour is combined arms, it's what enables the other arms to do their job.

The best that can be said for a small force of bombers, is that if all the stars align and they know where their targets are, they may be able to damage, attrite, or destroy them before they can harm our other capabilities, or more to the point, slightly before our other capabilities do the same thing.

Before inflight refueling you needed big aircraft to carry heavy loads and reach strategic distances, even then single seat fighters, not to forget light strike bombers were achieving similar ranges in the last couple of years of the war. Mustang, Mosquito anyone?

Early nuclear weapons needed big aircraft to carry them, but by the late 50s tactical fighters were doing just fine.

Here's an alternative, let's add the $28 billion plus, to acquiring hypersonic strike missiles. Have army mobile launchers, Navy submarine and surface ship launchers and look see if we could launch them from P-8, C-17, or perhaps even KC-30.

Hypersonic strike missiles are hideously expensive and not reusable. In a global war there would literally be tens of thousands of targets to service. We and the US will run out of cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles well before even a fraction of those targets are destroyed. The USAF embarked on the B-21 bomber program because long range bombers remain the most cost effective way to deliver strikes on targets at long range. As VLO aircraft with extensive onboard ECM they will be able to get in closer and hit a target with shorter range and much cheaper guided weapons. Moreover, they can fly back reload and do it again the next day, and the next and so on.

B-21 bombers will be used in support of sea and ground forces taking out missile launchers, airfields, ships in port and at sea, deploying sea mines near enemy ports and points of transit and performing long range ISR allowing the navy and army greater freedom to manoeuvre. It needs to viewed in the context in what it brings to joint fight. It is not a single service mission.

 

[seaspear]

With regards to the early R.A.F obsession with the bomber would they not have been influenced by Billy Mitchell and his demonstration in the sinking of a battleship? Certainly Mitchell had a similar fixation on the dominance of the bomber in warfare
General William “Billy” Mitchell and the Sinking of the Ostfriesland: A Consideration | National Air and Space Museum
William Mitchell: An Amazing, Yet Flawed Air Theorist > Air University (AU) > Wild Blue Yonder (af.edu)

 

[Julian 82]

Again, @Todjaeger is 100% correct (mods, can I get a macro to write that pls?). B-1s are not a feasible option.



Without nuclear weapons, bombers have never deterred anyone.

They didn't stop the Germans fighting in 1942-1945. They didn't stop the Japanese fighting in the same period. They didn't stop the Chinese crossing the Yalu in 1950. The millions of tonnes of bombs dropped on the VC and NVA didn't deter or stop them. The mass of allied airpower didn't stop the Taliban in 2021. It didn't deter Belgrade from genocide. It didn't deter tribes making attacks throughout the Middle East in 1925 when it was British policy to use air power to respond.

Only once has air power been successful at deterring a significant threat. And that was Berlin in 1948. And there wasn't a single pointy grey thing there - bomber or fighter. You want air power that can achieve operationally and strategically significant results without needing Navy or Army support? Spend every cent you find to fund B-21s on building and buying more C-17s**.

**yes, I know, production line is closed.

Strategic bombing did play a decisive role in defeating Germany. It ripped out the heart of Germany’s industrial capacity and its railway infrastructure and tied up large numbers of the Luftwaffe in home defence (in circumstances where the fighters and 88s would have been much more useful on the eastern front). Germany was struggling to replenish losses in tanks, trucks and aircraft and it could not get enough fuel to where it was needed. In late 1944 and 1945 the Wehrmacht was quite literally relying on horse drawn carts to deliver logistics to its troops because it did not have enough trucks or fuel.

Conversely, Germany’s lack of heavy long range bombers meant it had no way of stopping the production of military equipment by the Soviets after they moved their factories beyond the Urals. The outcome on the eastern front may have been different had Germany had the means (early on) to take the fight to Russia’s industrial infrastructure.

 

[SteveR]

Again, @Todjaeger is 100% correct (mods, can I get a macro to write that pls?). B-1s are not a feasible option.



Without nuclear weapons, bombers have never deterred anyone.

The millions of tonnes of bombs dropped on the VC and NVA didn't deter or stop them.

With respect, Linebacker 2 bombing of North Vietnan in 72/73, along with the mining of Haiphong harbour, finally took the consequences of North Vietnamese attacks on South Vietnam home - and drove the North to the Paris Peace Accords. Yes, the huge amount of bombs dropped tactically in South Vietnam did little except wipe out 2 NVA divisions at Khe San and prevent another Dien Bien Phu. Nixon got it right to take the war to the aggressor's homeland as Sherman did at Atlanta and then his March to the Sea. Trouble is Nixon was about to face Watergate fallout and Congress cut back support to the South Vietnamese just as the Soviets and Chicoms were increasing their support to the North.

Also, the bombing campaign in Desert Storm so demoralised the Iraqi Army that it turned and fled rather being pinned by the initial allied land attacks in 1991 while the Allied forces circled around them inside Kuwait. That is why at least one division of the Republican Guard escaped and why Sadam Hussien survived.

 

[Todjaeger]

Strategic bombing did play a decisive role in defeating Germany. It ripped out the heart of Germany’s industrial capacity and its railway infrastructure and tied up large numbers of the Luftwaffe in home defence (in circumstances where the fighters and 88s would have been much more useful on the eastern front). Germany was struggling to replenish losses in tanks, trucks and aircraft and it could not get enough fuel to where it was needed. In late 1944 and 1945 the Wehrmacht was quite literally relying on horse drawn carts to deliver logistics to its troops because it did not have enough trucks or fuel.

Conversely, Germany’s lack of heavy long range bombers meant it had no way of stopping the production of military equipment by the Soviets after they moved their factories beyond the Urals. The outcome on the eastern front may have been different had Germany had the means (early on) to take the fight to Russia’s industrial infrastructure.

Several inferences seem to be getting drawn while missing part of a larger picture.

Yes, large-scale bombing certainly had a negative impact upon Germany, and the UK for that matter. However, the first 1,000 plane raid, Operation Millennium, was launched at the end of May, 1942 by the RAF. This raid, and many hundreds of other raids afterwards, were not sufficient to knock Germany out of the fight and at best reduced some of the war material as well as industrial capacity to make replacements. German capacity to make war continued despite years of strategic bombing.

Secondly, yes, horse-drawn wagons and carriages were widely used by German forces during WWII, but this was for a couple of reasons. One of the first is that Germany did not completely motorize the army prior to starting WWII and as the war progressed chose to use available industrial capacity for purposes other than building sufficient trucks to retire horses from service. Secondly, and also part of why Germany never built enough trucks, was that Germany lacked large petroleum reserves, which was part of why Germany launched Operation Barbarossa so that Soviet oil reserves could be seized and exploited.

The third and final point, is that a major factor in WWII was that it became a war of both attrition and production, with the Allies possessing major factories in places that the Axis powers just could not reach. In fact, even if the Luftwaffe had a long-ranged heavy bomber equal to the B-29 Superfortress, it would not have been able to bomb targets in many of the industrial areas of North America, the distance was just too great.

 

[Volkodav]

Hypersonic strike missiles are hideously expensive and not reusable. As Takao pointed out there may be some targets that justify their use but not many. In a global war there would literally be tens of thousands of targets to service. We and the US will run out of cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles well before even a fraction of those targets are destroyed. The USAF embarked on the B-21 bomber program because long range bombers remain the most cost effective way to deliver strikes on targets at long range. As VLO aircraft with extensive onboard ECM they will be able to get in closer and hit a target with shorter range and much cheaper guided weapons.

Bombers will be used in support of sea and ground forces taking out missile launchers, airfields, ships in port and at sea etc allowing the navy and army greater freedom to manoeuvre.

The assumption is the B-21 will survive to return and reload. The assumption is the B-21 will be able to complete its mission using "cheap" ordinance. The assumption is a small force of B-21s will be capable of achieving their missions. The assumption is the B-21 will be an unstoppable, persistent, silver bullet.

The reality is the B-21 will likely become just another platform using expensive stand off weapons, that no one is willing to deploy with out the support of a full strike package because the risks out weigh the benefits.

Strike missiles these days are rounds of ordinance, the crew, the overheads associated with the capability, are primarily those of the launch platform. What that platform does when it is not firing the missiles? Answer everything else these sort of platforms already do.

 

[buffy9]

Strategic bombing did play a decisive role in defeating Germany. It ripped out the heart of Germany’s industrial capacity and its railway infrastructure and tied up large numbers of the Luftwaffe in home defence (in circumstances where the fighters and 88s would have been much more useful on the eastern front). Germany was struggling to replenish losses in tanks, trucks and aircraft and it could not get enough fuel to where it was needed. In late 1944 and 1945 the Wehrmacht was quite literally relying on horse drawn carts to deliver logistics to its troops because it did not have enough trucks or fuel.

Conversely, Germany’s lack of heavy long range bombers meant it had no way of stopping the production of military equipment by the Soviets after they moved their factories beyond the Urals. The outcome on the eastern front may have been different had Germany had the means (early on) to take the fight to Russia’s industrial infrastructure.

There is a good recent analysis of strategic bombing by Perun and how effective it is, based largely on a United States Strategic Bombing Survey summary report. Both conclude that whilst strategic bombing has some effect, it is not itself a decisive act that removes the enemy's ability to sustain itself. In Germany's case in WW2, excess capacity and resilience was generally high and attacks - after delivering shock effect and usually weeks of lost production - could often be absorbed. I suspect China will be similar, with the planned B-52J/K and B-21 fleet (both coming into force in the 2030s and 2040s) probably having to still rely on standoff in order to survive China's air defence network (the B-21 is intended to penetrate this network, which is a plan/assumption more than it is a reality).

Rushing into China to cripple its industry isn't a cost effective way of deterrence. They will adapt to being bombed and in all likelihood the squadron of B-21 we send will suffer, as did our bomber aircrews over Germany. It is perhaps better that China's energy imports be cut off in the event of a war - tankers in the Indian Ocean aren't as easily covered, they happen to pass through the 'immediate region' and doesn't require enormous investment in bombers on top of everything else.

 

[ddxx]

Re the B-21, I think it's worth remembering that only three countries in the world operate intercontinental bombers ...

Wouldn't being able to provide an ARG with persistent organic air cover and support in transit and on station be of a far more pressing priority?

Without which, no LHD let alone an ARG will be leaving port if transiting to anywhere that isn't right on our doorstep.
Imagine just how many squadrons and tankers would be required just to sustain air cover and support even over the Eastern Solomons.

Source
Source

 

[Rob c]

Yes, large-scale bombing certainly had a negative impact upon Germany, and the UK for that matter. However, the first 1,000 plane raid, Operation Millennium, was launched at the end of May, 1942 by the RAF. This raid, and many hundreds of other raids afterwards, were not sufficient to knock Germany out of the fight and at best reduced some of the war material as well as industrial capacity to make replacements. German capacity to make war continued despite years of strategic bombing.

I would add to this, that it did tie up significant resources, repairing damage to industry and huge resources in anti aircraft defence and night fighters, plus the use of scarce fuel weaponry and manpower that were badly needed else were. However the campaign also used up huge resources and manpower on the allied side. I think it will be forever debatable which side of the conflict made any profit or gain out of the hole campaign. From the British point of view I think it all started because there was very little else they could do to prosecute the war against Germany and built from there.

 

[swerve]

Attack

Several inferences seem to be getting drawn while missing part of a larger picture.

Yes, large-scale bombing certainly had a negative impact upon Germany, and the UK for that matter. However, the first 1,000 plane raid, Operation Millennium, was launched at the end of May, 1942 by the RAF. This raid, and many hundreds of other raids afterwards, were not sufficient to knock Germany out of the fight and at best reduced some of the war material as well as industrial capacity to make replacements. German capacity to make war continued despite years of strategic bombing.

Secondly, yes, horse-drawn wagons and carriages were widely used by German forces during WWII, but this was for a couple of reasons. One of the first is that Germany did not completely motorize the army prior to starting WWII and as the war progressed chose to use available industrial capacity for purposes other than building sufficient trucks to retire horses from service. Secondly, and also part of why Germany never built enough trucks, was that Germany lacked large petroleum reserves, which was part of why Germany launched Operation Barbarossa so that Soviet oil reserves could be seized and exploited.

The third and final point, is that a major factor in WWII was that it became a war of both attrition and production, with the Allies possessing major factories in places that the Axis powers just could not reach. In fact, even if the Luftwaffe had a long-ranged heavy bomber equal to the B-29 Superfortress, it would not have been able to bomb targets in many of the industrial areas of North America, the distance was just too great.

The RAF bombed Germany not just because of the wildly optimistic pre-war estimates of the efficacy of bombing. There was also the problem the UK had in taking the war to Germany.

The convoy war in the Atlantic had to be won (absolutely had to: the alternative was catastrophic), & it is arguable (& I believe) that it was originally not allocated enough resources, but it was defensive, & had no direct impact on Germany.

The war in North Africa was a relative sideshow. It occupied a fairly small proportion of the Axis war effort, & that wasn't likely to change much, because geography.

There was considerable pressure to do something directly against Germany, but how? An invasion of any German-occupied territory was impractical. Bombing was the only way to hit back. Whether that justified the industrial resources devoted to it or not . . . well, that's complicated.

Eventually, it was effective, taking up a million German men, tens of thousands of guns (many of them heavy) & a large part of the Luftwaffe's resources (all those radars & so on gobbled up a lot of Germany's electronics production) to counter, & having a big impact on German industrial production. Maybe it could have been better targeted (I can't help wondering if more focus on fuel & transport might have had more effect) & maybe some of the effort devoted to it could have been better spent (e.g. on Coastal Command - my favourite), but it was effective. It's hard to see where all of that effort could usefully have been redeployed to. Physical resources & geography impose some limits.

 

[Volkodav]

I would add to this, that it did tie up significant resources, repairing damage to industry and huge resources in anti aircraft defence and night fighters, plus the use of scarce fuel weaponry and manpower that were badly needed else were. However the campaign also used up huge resources and manpower on the allied side. I think it will be forever debatable which side of the conflict made any profit or gain out of the hole campaign. From the British point of view I think it all started because there was very little else they could do to prosecute the war against Germany and built from there.

In its simplest terms, each squadron of heavy bombers literally tied up the resources that could have been used for a wing of Mosquitoes / Beaufighers or a group of Spitfires.

The British army was being equipped with Centaurs and Cavaliers, instead of Cromwell's, because of a shortage of RR Meteors (tank engine version of RR Merlin). British (as well as NZ and South African) infantry units were being converted to armour because of a manpower shortage. This resulted in increased loses of tanks as the was insufficient infantry to properly conduct combined arms operations.

At a time when the battle of the Atlantic was near being lost, the transfer of just two squadrons of heavy bombers to Coastal Command was estimated to have been sufficient to break the back of the Uboat offensive and get the convoys through. It was that close but Harris was allowed to deny the request.

The RN slowed down the completion and delivery of major warships, desperately needed in the Far East and Pacific, due to manpower shortages.

Over 20000 Australians, trained under the Empire Air Training Scheme, served with Bomber Command in WWII. In terms of combat effectiveness it can be argued the far smaller numbers in the Desert Air Force and Coastal Command, had a much greater impact on the outcome of the war. Then there was the under strength, poorly equipped tactical Airpower the RAAF employed against Japan in 42, 43, that was literally the difference between wining and losing.

Vietnam has been mentioned, everyone thinks of the B-52, but possibly the most important platform was the F-105. There are many arguments as to its mismanagement, i.e. the Thuds should have been allowed to attack ports, marshaling yards, air bases etc. instead of bridges while being shot down by missiles and Migs that could have been destroyed at those ports, marshaling yards and airbases. But it stands, fighter bombers did more than bombers, and could have been even more effective if employed properly as they have been since, in interdiction, defence suppression, and CAS.

 

[Wombat000]

i don’t think RAAF has any scope for anything like strategic bombing.
it just doesn’t have the weight or depth for it.

suggestions of B-21 for RAAF, as I see it, only really have utility as a potential stealthy long range heavy weapons delivery platform in the anti-maritime and perhaps deeper tactical strike; correct?

I guess the maritime strike role may have some wider strategic deterrent effect?

im also presuming that their basing will need to be significantly protected and more resilient to receiving proactive disabling strikes themselves.

 

[MickB]

There is a good recent analysis of strategic bombing by Perun and how effective it is, based largely on a United States Strategic Bombing Survey summary report. Both conclude that whilst strategic bombing has some effect, it is not itself a decisive act that removes the enemy's ability to sustain itself. In Germany's case in WW2, excess capacity and resilience was generally high and attacks - after delivering shock effect and usually weeks of lost production - could often be absorbed. I suspect China will be similar, with the planned B-52J/K and B-21 fleet (both coming into force in the 2030s and 2040s) probably having to still rely on standoff in order to survive China's air defence network (the B-21 is intended to penetrate this network, which is a plan/assumption more than it is a reality).

Rushing into China to cripple its industry isn't a cost effective way of deterrence. They will adapt to being bombed and in all likelihood the squadron of B-21 we send will suffer, as did our bomber aircrews over Germany. It is perhaps better that China's energy imports be cut off in the event of a war - tankers and pipelines in the Indian Ocean aren't as easily covered, they happen to pass through the 'immediate region' and doesn't require enormous investment in bombers on top of everything else.

In my opinion Perun should be required viewing, not only for the way he approaches each subject from mutiple directions, but also the way he carefully states what is know and what is a best guess based on sometimes incomplete information.

A lesson many Jurnos and comentaters need to learn.

 

[Rob c]

The British army was being equipped with Centaurs and Cavaliers, instead of Cromwell's, because of a shortage of RR Meteors (tank engine version of RR Merlin). British (as well as NZ and South African) infantry units were being converted to armour because of a manpower shortage. This resulted in increased loses of tanks as the was insufficient infantry to properly conduct combined arms operations.

This was not entirely due to the aircraft using all the engines, as the tank engines were usually made from the blocks of earlier merlin's or parts that did not reach aircraft standards and parts which did not need to be of aircraft standard were made of steel instead of aluminon, cast pistons replaced forged pistons etc. by 1944 production had moved to Rover and stayed there until the 1960's There was also a lot of politics involve between all the companies involved. Also the yanks wanted the pom's to use one of their engines. Once you get competing factors involve in politics, everything slows down dramatically.

Rolls-Royce Meteor - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

What is said in this article lines up with what I had read in books previously.

 

[Volkodav]

This was not entirely due to the aircraft using all the engines, as the tank engines were usually made from the blocks of earlier merlin's or parts that did not reach aircraft standards and parts which did not need to be of aircraft standard were made of steel instead of aluminon, cast pistons replaced forged pistons etc. by 1944 production had moved to Rover and stayed there until the 1960's There was also a lot of politics involve between all the companies involved. Also the yanks wanted the pom's to use one of their engines. Once you get competing factors involve in politics, everything slows down dramatically.

Rolls-Royce Meteor - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

What is said in this article lines up with what I had read in books previously.

It's a question of opportunity cost. If your resources are being used for one thing, they are not available for another.

This is the thing that comes up over and over again with the RAFs night bombing campaign, what could those resources have been used for instead.

Now 75-80 years later, here we are again, let's buy bombers instead of everything else.

 

[John Fedup]

Attack

The RAF bombed Germany not just because of the wildly optimistic pre-war estimates of the efficacy of bombing. There was also the problem the UK had in taking the war to Germany.

The convoy war in the Atlantic had to be won (absolutely had to: the alternative was catastrophic), & it is arguable (& I believe) that it was originally not allocated enough resources, but it was defensive, & had no direct impact on Germany.

The war in North Africa was a relative sideshow. It occupied a fairly small proportion of the Axis war effort, & that wasn't likely to change much, because geography.

There was considerable pressure to do something directly against Germany, but how? An invasion of any German-occupied territory was impractical. Bombing was the only way to hit back. Whether that justified the industrial resources devoted to it or not . . . well, that's complicated.

Eventually, it was effective, taking up a million German men, tens of thousands of guns (many of them heavy) & a large part of the Luftwaffe's resources (all those radars & so on gobbled up a lot of Germany's electronics production) to counter, & having a big impact on German industrial production. Maybe it could have been better targeted (I can't help wondering if more focus on fuel & transport might have had more effect) & maybe some of the effort devoted to it could have been better spent (e.g. on Coastal Command - my favourite), but it was effective. It's hard to see where all of that effort could usefully have been redeployed to. Physical resources & geography impose some limits.

North Africa was a side show more or less as long as the Suez Canal remained safe. Losing it would have been huge compared to the fall of Singapore.

 

[Rob c]

It's a question of opportunity cost. If your resources are being used for one thing, they are not available for another.

This is the thing that comes up over and over again with the RAFs night bombing campaign, what could those resources have been used for instead.

Now 75-80 years later, here we are again, let's buy bombers instead of everything else.

I agree that the resources that were used in the bombing campaign were excessive and some of it could have been used better else were. However it did tie up significant German resources which also could have been used else were to the allied disadvantage. I think that they had the balance wrong, but the question is seldom asked " what would have Germany achieved" if it had not happened? As for Meteor production, as they were basically using rejected or old parts and cheap substitutes, I think it would have had little impact.

 

[Bob53]

Without disagreeing with your comment @Volkadav…but this one …..

In 1974 Cyclone Tracy hit Darwin and multiple RAN, Army and RAAF elements deployed to assist. This included warships and army combat units, but no bombers.

How many Mirages or F111 would of been deployed?

 

[Volkodav]

Without disagreeing with your comment @Volkadav…but this one …..

In 1974 Cyclone Tracy hit Darwin and multiple RAN, Army and RAAF elements deployed to assist. This included warships and army combat units, but no bombers.

How many Mirages or F111 would of been deployed?

The point I was trying to make is army and navy combat units re role and deploy in support of the population without delay, RAAF combat units don't. A bomber is only a bomber, a fighter is a fighter, but can do some of what a bomber can do. Pretty much every other unit in the ADF however can be used for multiple roles, including fighting fires and building flood levies.