I believe that's a revisionist view of ASW adhered to after the demise of CVS 21. During the 60's and 70's when the whole RAN was focused on "hunter killer" ASW TG it was a mini air/sea/subsea battle construct although limited by rather more rudimentary sensors and communications.
That loss, Melbourne, had a deep and enduring effect on RAN planning and doctrine and those who got out, like me, because of the loss, saw it coming.
The era of a single unit frigate navy had begun!
Thanks I was waiting for you to chip in as I am reluctant to say too much knowing that I could easily screw up my second hand and received knowledge, not having lived it as you have.
Please add or correct as required.
ASW is extremely complex and difficult and requires far more than a frigate with a towed array carrying a single helicopter with a dipping sonar. In fact the ideal is multiple helicopters, working in concert, prosecuting each contact, something a single frigate with a single helicopter can not do. The primary idea behind the Hyugas and Izumos is to simultaneously launch several helicopters to prosecute each contact and while the QEs with be escorted by Type 23s, and eventually 26s, their organic F-35B, Merlin HM2 and ASaC5 will contribute far more to task force defence and strike power than any number of escorts.
In ASW each helicopter with a dipping sonar on station was seen as a substitute for an ASW escort in the screen, so basically roughly each three helicopters in the TF (whether flown from the carrier, or an escort) was equivalent to a single purpose ASW escort. What this means is a simple TF of a carrier with several ASW helicopters (not to forget its command and control facilities), an AWD and one or two ASW oriented GP frigates, would be far more effective in ASW than an AWD and twice, or even three times as many frigates (at greater cost than the carrier).
In the future it is foreseeable that long range ASW and surveillance assets, whether manned or unmanned, able to replace some or even all of the capabilities once provided by the likes of the Tracker Viking and possibly even Hawkeye, will be developed. These assets will likely be capable of operating from carriers but extremely unlikely, even if they are STOVL or VSTOL, of flying from a frigate, meaning you could have the entire RAN skimmer force at sea and still have less coverage than a small TF of and AWD, one or two frigates and a small carrier.
What needs to be worked out is how many frigates are needed for independent operations outside of task forces. This will obviously be less than in the past because the OPVs will be capable of replacing them on their border protection taskings and possibly even on some of their global deployments, i.e. lower threat counter piracy and UN sanction policing. Then it will need to be determined how many will be needed to screen a carrier in conjunction with each AWD, the excess number then becomes the amount of money available for the carrier / carriers and any required extra helicopters.
) and fit the with common systems to the new frigates, including perhaps surplus ASMD or FFGUP gear. They could initially operate existing ADF helicopter types, then expand into UAVs, UCAVs, tiltrotors etc. or even F-35s.
