Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[gf0012-aust]

The Canberras, interesting enough are not just LHDs either, being fitted, like Bill and Ben before them, as high end command and control platforms with a modified frigate combat system, less the VLS and phased array radar.

they are primarily flag and floating extensions of HQJOC, so their C4I fitout is way ahead of the Spanish legacy vessels

These are very capable joint platforms whose most impressive capabilities are the unseen ones that have nothing to do with the troops, vehicles and helicopters they carry.

this.

something that even the defence specialised media seem to be oblivious of.
my proj used to have observor status at their meetings. bit of an eye opener really

 

[rockitten]

they are primarily flag and floating extensions of HQJOC, so their C4I fitout is way ahead of the Spanish legacy vessels

this.

something that even the defence specialised media seem to be oblivious of.
my proj used to have observor status at their meetings. bit of an eye opener really

Probably a bit of comparing orange and apple, but, GF, in your POV, if RAN can only afford one option, a single light carrier or taking the 3 Kidds (the extra one as spare), which one is a better option?

 

[gf0012-aust]

Probably a bit of comparing orange and apple, but, GF, in your POV, if RAN can only afford one option, a single light carrier or taking the 3 Kidds (the extra one as spare), which one is a better option?

its about what capability are you prepared to lose on what you need to fill.

the carrier will end up costing more in associated costs let alone organic costs in absolute terms, in a warfighting situation it needs the protection of a task force and that will cost far more over time than 3 x DDG's

the broader question is around why get a carrier anyway when the regional threats get factored in

again, in absolute terms there is far better bang for buck out of securing water real estate, SLOCS and disproportionate latent offensive capability in acquiring subs

in the end its about force balance against your likely threat scenarios

 

[ASSAIL]

A majority is monopoly money, going from one goverment dept to another, just a book profit.

You need to go to the ASC website and check the annual report and you'll find a few far more significant matters than the accounting net profit.

For example, the company is required to report to the govt. annually as to the projected cash shortfall required to complete the AWD annual work and this had fallen from $30m in 2012/13 to $2.7m in 2015/16.
Further, the cost improvement on "cost per percentage completed is 38% on ship 2 over ship 1 and 30% on ship 3 over ship2.
And, lost time from injuries are down 10% from last year and lost time requiring medical treatment are down16%

Finally, although there's much more in the report, there is a $12 million overdraft facility and a $30 million Line of Credit available to the company and neither has been or has needed to be used.

These are the positives which show improvement much more than a simple line profit. And by the way, the company also paid over $12 mil in company tax!

The best is last. Sophie Mirrabella is no longer a director.

 

[Volkodav]

You need to go to the ASC website and check the annual report and you'll find a few far more significant matters than the accounting net profit.

For example, the company is required to report to the govt. annually as to the projected cash shortfall required to complete the AWD annual work and this had fallen from $30m in 2012/13 to $2.7m in 2015/16.
Further, the cost improvement on "cost per percentage completed is 38% on ship 2 over ship 1 and 30% on ship 3 over ship2.
And, lost time from injuries are down 10% from last year and lost time requiring medical treatment are down16%

Finally, although there's much more in the report, there is a $12 million overdraft facility and a $30 million Line of Credit available to the company and neither has been or has needed to be used.

These are the positives which show improvement much more than a simple line profit. And by the way, the company also paid over $12 mil in company tax!

The best is last. Sophie Mirrabella is no longer a director.

Very true, and thank god Sophie has gone (working for Gina Rinehart now I believe). Every now and then the government loosens the reins on ASC and allows it to behave as a private concern, efficiency improves, it becomes profitable and delivers value for money.

A lot of the improvement on AWD can be traced back to the hard work by a lot of people since the issues with suppliers and design data arose (and not insignificantly the financial screws of Labor's failed attempt at a surplus came off). A highly successful Lean Six Sigma program was rolled out making real savings and efficiency improvements. Many short comings with suppliers and design data were overcome with an application of resources which cost more than the budget allowed but fixed the problems and permitted the improvements down the track.

Interestingly there were two distinct schools of thought on how the project should be run, initially it was the "lets build to print and trust everyone else to do what they claim they can do" who had sway over the "we need to be proactive, assist suppliers and check the quality and conformance of all contracted and procured work / items". The commercial assumption was that we were building and existing design and tapping into an existing supply chain and any non conformance could be managed commercially, including legal action for breach of contract. Subject matter experts where even told to stop assisting contractors as it may give them a way out when they screwed up and we mightn't be able to claim against them. When suppliers and contractors started screwing up the measures that could be taken against them were nothing compared to the delays and flow on cost effects their non conformance caused and it became rapidly apparent that it would have been better to have proactively assisted them and prevent the non conformance from occurring at all, or at least be able to identify and address it faster.

Basically they tried to run AWD like your regular outsourced project, build to print, buy everything from the cheapest contractor / supplier who claimed to be compliant, minimise your overheads and thereby in house capability. Basically the complete opposite of ANZAC where we aimed to not just do as much locally as possible but to completely understand and control as much as possible about building the ships. Which worked better?

 

[ASSAIL]

Many short comings with suppliers and design data were overcome with an application of resources which cost more than the budget allowed but fixed the problems and permitted the improvements down the track.

Interestingly there is an histogram in the annual report comparing cost and delay from various sources. The winner by a factor of about 5 is "design deficiencies" from all sources.

 

[Volkodav]

its about what capability are you prepared to lose on what you need to fill.

the carrier will end up costing more in associated costs let alone organic costs in absolute terms, in a warfighting situation it needs the protection of a task force and that will cost far more over time than 3 x DDG's

the broader question is around why get a carrier anyway when the regional threats get factored in

again, in absolute terms there is far better bang for buck out of securing water real estate, SLOCS and disproportionate latent offensive capability in acquiring subs

in the end its about force balance against your likely threat scenarios

The thing is though modern naval warfare relies on multiple networked platforms so except for flag showing, border protection and low intensity multinational security missions, our ships do operate in task forces. In fact our acquisition of almost defenceless LHDs requires our use of task forces to guarantee their security in all but the most benign circumstances, one of the justifications for acquiring the AWDs was the need to protect the LHDs (and other ships) when deployed on anything other than a friendly visit or HADR.

The thing is the aircraft, even if only helicopters and perhaps UAVs, operated by even a small carrier contribute significantly to any task force they belong to, they are far from a passive element. Add Harriers or F-35B and possibly AEW and you have exponentially increased the reach of the task force you need to have (even without a carrier). A carrier provides an outer layer defence for the taskforce and a long range surveillance and strike capability. Instead of several escorts in the taskforce you can have a couple, instead of two high end helicopters per escort you can have one and maybe a smaller multirole type or a couple of rotary UCAVs, with most of the TFs helos being on the carrier and that vessels facilities being available for deeper level maintenance for the ship flight helicopters.

You still have submarines, they are a vital element of maritime doctrine, you still have the increased numbers planned. You still need your AWDs and some high end ASW escorts (something we have been short of) but then, if you decide to have a small carrier, you pay for it by reducing frigate numbers. This, incidentally is precisely what happened to get the LHDs and planned extra subs, planned surface combatant numbers and capabilities were reduced.

 

[Volkodav]

Interestingly there is an histogram in the annual report comparing cost and delay from various sources. The winner by a factor of about 5 is "design deficiencies" from all sources.

Ah huh, just imagine how it feels to have completed and certified a section including the RHIB mountings, cranes and railings then an updated drawing arrives that required the completed work to be stripped and redone WTF! This happened throughout the project, pipe segments in particular were shocking for it, even when the quality issues from suppliers were sorted (often by pulling the work back in house), you would install, test and certify a segment, all good and then in come a new data pack and out it comes. Not good for a ship that was meant to be built to print.

 

[rockitten]

Ah huh, just imagine how it feels to have completed and certified a section including the RHIB mountings, cranes and railings then an updated drawing arrives that required the completed work to be stripped and redone WTF! This happened throughout the project, pipe segments in particular were shocking for it, even when the quality issues from suppliers were sorted (often by pulling the work back in house), you would install, test and certify a segment, all good and then in come a new data pack and out it comes. Not good for a ship that was meant to be built to print.

I wonder why the project manager didn't info the yard to hang-on/slow down the work on that section when a design (complete) update was underway.......

 

[t68]

You need to go to the ASC website and check the annual report and you'll find a few far more significant matters than the accounting net profit.

For example, the company is required to report to the govt. annually as to the projected cash shortfall required to complete the AWD annual work and this had fallen from $30m in 2012/13 to $2.7m in 2015/16.
Further, the cost improvement on "cost per percentage completed is 38% on ship 2 over ship 1 and 30% on ship 3 over ship2.
And, lost time from injuries are down 10% from last year and lost time requiring medical treatment are down16%

Finally, although there's much more in the report, there is a $12 million overdraft facility and a $30 million Line of Credit available to the company and neither has been or has needed to be used.

These are the positives which show improvement much more than a simple line profit. And by the way, the company also paid over $12 mil in company tax!

The best is last. Sophie Mirrabella is no longer a director.

Don't get me wrong, I'm not disparaging the hard work the company is doing working to private costing and reporting and such. But at the end of the day it's goverment owned with the book keeping done in such away to increase the book value for a possabile sell off, beside the submarine side of the house how long do you think it would last without a goverment leg up, don't think we can sustain two large warship build yards unless something drastically changes.

 

[gf0012-aust]

The thing is though modern naval warfare relies on multiple networked platforms so except for flag showing, border protection and low intensity multinational security missions, our ships do operate in task forces. In fact our acquisition of almost defenceless LHDs requires our use of task forces to guarantee their security in all but the most benign circumstances, one of the justifications for acquiring the AWDs was the need to protect the LHDs (and other ships) when deployed on anything other than a friendly visit or HADR.

The thing is the aircraft, even if only helicopters and perhaps UAVs, operated by even a small carrier contribute significantly to any task force they belong to, they are far from a passive element. Add Harriers or F-35B and possibly AEW and you have exponentially increased the reach of the task force you need to have (even without a carrier). A carrier provides an outer layer defence for the taskforce and a long range surveillance and strike capability. Instead of several escorts in the taskforce you can have a couple, instead of two high end helicopters per escort you can have one and maybe a smaller multirole type or a couple of rotary UCAVs, with most of the TFs helos being on the carrier and that vessels facilities being available for deeper level maintenance for the ship flight helicopters.

You still have submarines, they are a vital element of maritime doctrine, you still have the increased numbers planned. You still need your AWDs and some high end ASW escorts (something we have been short of) but then, if you decide to have a small carrier, you pay for it by reducing frigate numbers. This, incidentally is precisely what happened to get the LHDs and planned extra subs, planned surface combatant numbers and capabilities were reduced.

I'm not averse to carriers though - I have a soft spot for them as dad served on Terrible and Sydney.

But in overall force structure and development terms, bearing in mind our likely partners, and bearing mind the emerged mindset of all govts to give carriage to big ticket items "quickly" where they are whole of govt assets - then the phatships are far more useful than a carrier - and in cost effective terms, far more attractive

an australian carrier won't deter an aggressor choking our sealanes, its a single easy target of appeal. a sub OTOH causes absolute disruption as soon as your enemy doesn't know where they are - and then there are the tactical and ISR benefits etc etc.....

sometimes there's a tendency to get caught up in the symbolism and sheer front page grunt appeal of big platforms - to the detriment of coherent force development

 

[t68]

I agree with the point that submarines force red forces to use more assets to conter a threat that may or may not be there, but unfortunately project that power that Volk is alluding to, we saw that in the Falklands with the sinking of Genral Belgrano, and forcing the carrier to port. They also knew argentine submarines were lurking as well which caused the UK to reevaluate how the carriers where positioned. The force needs to be balanced for an overall capabilty.

Do we really need the 9th ASW Frigate or would we be better served with a multi role ASW light carrier?, and does that carrier give a better force structure with the extra enablers it is able to carry?

 

[Volkodav]

I wonder why the project manager didn't info the yard to hang-on/slow down the work on that section when a design (complete) update was underway.......

Because the yard was part of the AWD Alliance and the designer was a contractor, the didn't know and couldn't have known. You get design data, including an approved set of drawings from the designer and you build to them because they are meant to be correct and up to date, there is literally no way to tell if they are going to be changed.

How would you do it? Sit on your hands and do nothing incase it is wrong or gets changed? When you build to print you build to the approved design data you have been provided by the designer, it as simple as that. When there are obvious problems or even something doesn't look right you can ask questions, but when you get drawing to build to that have nothing wrong with them that's what you build to and hope it doesn't get changed after. It is the designers job to design and the shipbuilders job to build, simple as that, the ship builder can question the design data when it appears to have problems but when there is nothing wrong with it and there is no advice from the designer that is is likely to change how can the shipbuilder justify not building to it and not following the schedule?

 

[ASSAIL]

Ah huh, just imagine how it feels to have completed and certified a section including the RHIB mountings, cranes and railings then an updated drawing arrives that required the completed work to be stripped and redone WTF! This happened throughout the project, pipe segments in particular were shocking for it, even when the quality issues from suppliers were sorted (often by pulling the work back in house), you would install, test and certify a segment, all good and then in come a new data pack and out it comes. Not good for a ship that was meant to be built to print.

Because the yard was part of the AWD Alliance and the designer was a contractor, the didn't know and couldn't have known. You get design data, including an approved set of drawings from the designer and you build to them because they are meant to be correct and up to date, there is literally no way to tell if they are going to be changed.

How would you do it? Sit on your hands and do nothing incase it is wrong or gets changed? When you build to print you build to the approved design data you have been provided by the designer, it as simple as that. When there are obvious problems or even something doesn't look right you can ask questions, but when you get drawing to build to that have nothing wrong with them that's what you build to and hope it doesn't get changed after. It is the designers job to design and the shipbuilders job to build, simple as that, the ship builder can question the design data when it appears to have problems but when there is nothing wrong with it and there is no advice from the designer that is is likely to change how can the shipbuilder justify not building to it and not following the schedule?

This is the blindingly obvious problem with buying a design which has not been completed or buying from a prime which has never exported a design. All the glitches in Navantias F100 would have been known in their yards although might not have been adequately documented. Add to this the alterations required by the RAN and you end up with some parts of the build which have never been completed before.
Of the 3 possible contenders for SEA 5000, Navantias iteration will be a combination of old and new if they decide to change the propulsion method, if they leave it as per the AWD it may be below optimum as an ASW platform but the risks and costs are known.
The Finncantieri FREMM is MOTS, mainly but we then need to establish a liaison with the Italians and risk repeating the Navantia saga
And then there's BAE. If we start building in 2020 or thereabouts there will be hope that the first RN ship is nearing completion and any design shortfalls will be sorted. So which do we choose? All have benefits and pitfalls and there's no clear winner.
However IMHO the Navantia model should get the go ahead because the benefits of having common PMS and damage control equipment across the fleet far outweigh any perceived modernity of the other designs and thus it allows absolute flexibility in easily moving personnel from one ship to another without expensive retraining.
During the Type 12 CFA DDG era, men were streamed to serve in one or the other and at times that caused problems. Engineers, weapons users and sensor operators were all using different equipment and frankly that was insane from a personnel management point of view.

Finally the familiarity of shipbuilders with the Navantia systems will be critical to risk and cost.
I hope common sense prevails.

 

[hauritz]

I agree with the point that submarines force red forces to use more assets to conter a threat that may or may not be there, but unfortunately project that power that Volk is alluding to, we saw that in the Falklands with the sinking of Genral Belgrano, and forcing the carrier to port. They also knew argentine submarines were lurking as well which caused the UK to reevaluate how the carriers where positioned. The force needs to be balanced for an overall capabilty.

Do we really need the 9th ASW Frigate or would we be better served with a multi role ASW light carrier?, and does that carrier give a better force structure with the extra enablers it is able to carry?

I have always liked the idea of a helicopter carrier. Something akin to the Japanese Hyūga-class.

A force mix of one or two helicopter carriers and a number of smaller general purpose frigates could be a better option than the current planned 9 ASW frigates.

 

[pussertas]

Huntington Ingalls Canberra Office

From "The Australian" 1st Nov, 2016

Huntington Ingalls are to open an office in Canberra to 'help guide' the RAN's ship building programme.


Chris

 

[vonnoobie]

Do we really need the 9th ASW Frigate or would we be better served with a multi role ASW light carrier?, and does that carrier give a better force structure with the extra enablers it is able to carry?

In the ASW role a light carrier might perform the role better but some things to consider.

- Would we be well enough off with 11 major surface combatants instead of 12?

- Do we have enough ASW helo's to fully utilize the capability of a dedicated ASW carrier?

- Is it beyond the realm of possibility to retain the 12 major surface combatants and utilize the LHD's as needed in an ASW role?

I dont see our ASW helicopter fleet being large while at the same time we already have too few major's.

I have always liked the idea of a helicopter carrier. Something akin to the Japanese Hyūga-class.

A force mix of one or two helicopter carriers and a number of smaller general purpose frigates could be a better option than the current planned 9 ASW frigates.

The difference is Japan's naval concerns are far more narrowed in the essence they have to watch a far more limited amount of water allowing for ASW carriers to operate there effectively. Australia has to operate from the horn of Africa to the South China Sea and further.. 1 or 2 ASW carriers will not be a useful force for an area of that size. The Hyuga is a great ship with a lot of quality for the role is serves but in Australia's case we need quantity too and an ASW carrier won't deliver that for us.


We have too much ocean that we routinely operate from for one or two ASW carriers to be of any real effect while at the same time lacking the needed ASW helo's to fulfill such a ships true capability.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Do we really need the 9th ASW Frigate or would we be better served with a multi role ASW light carrier?, and does that carrier give a better force structure with the extra enablers it is able to carry?

over time the phatships will also pick up an ASW role

 

[alexsa]

I have always liked the idea of a helicopter carrier. Something akin to the Japanese Hyūga-class.

A force mix of one or two helicopter carriers and a number of smaller general purpose frigates could be a better option than the current planned 9 ASW frigates.

Sorry why. You still need to escort the carriers ..... and other vessels such as the LHD which may not be in the same task force. Ideally a proportion of the escorts should be ASW capable yet you are proposing less ships, which are less capable with less growth margin and less ASW capability???

With the proliferation of submarines in the region you have lost me there. If anything I would proposing that the OPV design have the ability to tow a tail and deploy AUSV for sub hunting in modular form and the ability to take a basic self defense kit (SeaRAM would be nice but not cheat) in order to supplement the ASW capability of the MFU's

We have a better rotary carriage capacity now than we have ever done in the past with two LHD, an LSD-A, one tanker and all surface combatants being helo capable. This will only improve with the new AOR and the new frigates (all of which are duel helo capable).... have we still only have 24 ASW hunting helicopters. I don't see the benefit in two more helicopter carriers.

 

[gf0012-aust]

I agree with the point that submarines force red forces to use more assets to conter a threat that may or may not be there, but unfortunately project that power that Volk is alluding to, we saw that in the Falklands with the sinking of Genral Belgrano, and forcing the carrier to port. They also knew argentine submarines were lurking as well which caused the UK to reevaluate how the carriers where positioned. The force needs to be balanced for an overall capabilty.

I saw a piece at work the other day WRT to a flag officer in their sub fleet development area

he reinforced that the US was amping up disparate sub to sub training because the most effective ASW weapon is another sub

its been said before, but its worth raising again as ASW across the board has deteriorated post cold war peace divident cycle.

the good thing about those who can project as near peers come up poorly in the analysis. the chinese are a generation behind in ASW - and their sub forces have a loooong way to go before they become a persistent threat