Naval Ship & Submarine Propulsion Systems

[Todjaeger]

You are essentially confusing doctrine with capability – the latter does not always follow the former. Take the F-35 as an example, AFAIK the original program requirements for AIR-6000 did not include VLO, EODAS and the AIM-9X BII combination, but you dont think the RAAF is now building doctrine around these capabilities? That VLO has no bearing on how the RAAF will employ the F-35 because it wasn't originally part of the AIR-6000 program requirements or RAAF fighter CONOPS in the mid 2000s?

Any coherent concept of operations is about how people can reliably leverage the technology at their disposal to achieve tactical, operational and thus strategic outcomes. IF the Shortfin Barracuda offers capabilities the Type 216 does not the RAN will alter its doctrine accordingly. We are not in the luxurious position – if any nation is – of bending technological tools to our doctrinal objectives. Everything is constrained by the technological environment it inhabits.

Blitzkrieg and Deep Battle did not drive the technological development of armor – they were doctrinal responses to technological development. Thus, claiming a platforms capabilities are irrelevant to how the user will employ it on doctrinal grounds mistakes what doctrine is and what it does.

Additional comment here because I realized I had failed to cover something previously.

The CONOPS will (or at least, should) drive the capability requirements the RAN has for the current contracting and design phases. For instance, a RAN requirement might be for the future sub to be able to transit for 150 hours @4 kts, while maintaining the required systems operating, and NN amount of reserve charge. It is certainly possible that if the design and systems integration is good enough then that required performance metric could not just be met, but exceeded, i.e. 170 hours @4 kts, or 150 hours @5 kts, etc. Or there might be a requirement for a certain number of VLS cells for AShM and/or LACM. Or chambers for the delivery & recovery of specwarries, and so on.

What is important to remember is that DCNS should not include capabilities and features that the RAN does not indicate it wants/needs. A dozen cell VLS does the RAN no good aboard a submarine, if the RAN wants/needs that volume and displacement for additional bunkerage and battery cells, because of the RAN sub CONOPS.

 

[gf0012-aust]

The CONOPS will (or at least, should) drive the capability requirements the RAN has for the current contracting and design phases.

they certainly do - the CONOPs are considered in conjunction with the combat capability scenarios - and there are literally dozens of CCS's for something like a sub

that level of analysis wasn't done at the CEP stage as the sub exists as a broad concept - not as a technical solution with defined capabilities and preferred tech sets.

its the next 12-18months that are important.

ie promises to keep etc...

 

[hypernova]

Additional comment here because I realized I had failed to cover something previously.

The CONOPS will (or at least, should) drive the capability requirements the RAN has for the current contracting and design phases. For instance, a RAN requirement might be for the future sub to be able to transit for 150 hours @4 kts, while maintaining the required systems operating, and NN amount of reserve charge. It is certainly possible that if the design and systems integration is good enough then that required performance metric could not just be met, but exceeded, i.e. 170 hours @4 kts, or 150 hours @5 kts, etc. Or there might be a requirement for a certain number of VLS cells for AShM and/or LACM. Or chambers for the delivery & recovery of specwarries, and so on.

But this is the wider point you're missing, those doctrinal requirements are limited by the wider technological environment. You don't think the RAN wouldn't want half a million hours at 30 knots within stringent signature parameters? Of course they would. They would want starships if they were available and affordable. All of this is a minimum, not a maximum, set of requirements, and doctrine will evolve as the technology does. You are looking at the whole thing backwards.

What is important to remember is that DCNS should not include capabilities and features that the RAN does not indicate it wants/needs. A dozen cell VLS does the RAN no good aboard a submarine, if the RAN wants/needs that volume and displacement for additional bunkerage and battery cells, because of the RAN sub CONOPS.

Again, this is another example of what I'm talking about - current doctrine deals with current capabilities in a current threat environment. Just the simple addition of LRASM into the ADF blows that reasoning out of the water. Now you need those VLS cells because the technological development of a low signature ASCM with a 500nm range has driven changes in your doctrine - towards A2/AD - but your submarine lacks a VLS because the people who drove the design parameters were stuck in the last doctrinal paradigm.... :tomato

 

[gf0012-aust]

Again, this is another example of what I'm talking about - current doctrine deals with current capabilities in a current threat environment. Just the simple addition of LRASM into the ADF blows that reasoning out of the water. Now you need those VLS cells because the technological development of a low signature ASCM with a 500nm range has driven changes in your doctrine - towards A2/AD - but your submarine lacks a VLS because the people who drove the design parameters were stuck in the last doctrinal paradigm.... :tomato

not necessarily so - eg the Combat capability Scenarios deal with "odd" engagement events.

eg set a platform range ring around the boat, then set range rings around different weapons sets - even ones that don't exist.

so when you do the platform assessment against a proposed design you can do a comparison against all the primes solutions.

the CCS's are about a range of threats and how a force will or can react under different profiles

I've done that as a contractor on a sub for a navy that was less technically sophisticated than RAN. It was also on a French sub

 

[ngatimozart]

I’m not sure I even want to touch this. Apart from the earbashing people have had from mods in this thread regarding making claims about performance of a submarine which hasn’t even had the power plant selected – I’m not sure how that level of analysis is allowed to go unchecked – you have made no account for improved energy density improvements or AIP (seems like you have just attacked a pump jet to a Collins) not to mention the confusion of operational and tactical mobility and a totally unsupported tactical picture. Seriously, if people have an issue with DCNS making claims about Shorftin Barracuda capability I don’t know what to do with this level of speculation.

For your information the Mods and the Blue Tags are Defence Professionals and some of them here are aware of more material than they can mention in public fora. All of us are well versed in our own fields and as I have already stated we cannot comment adequately on everything that people think should be commented on because of security requirements. We will not break those restrictions under any circumstances for anyone.

The second point that I want to make is that whilst robust debate is good, robustness does not equate to being combative on here. So dial it back and respect others views. They just may have access to material that you and I don't.

Regard this as a friendly reminder of the rules that we expect to be followed. I do mean ALL THE RULES too so I strongly suggest that you reacquaint yourself with them.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Again, this is another example of what I'm talking about - current doctrine deals with current capabilities in a current threat environment. Just the simple addition of LRASM into the ADF blows that reasoning out of the water. Now you need those VLS cells because the technological development of a low signature ASCM with a 500nm range has driven changes in your doctrine - towards A2/AD - but your submarine lacks a VLS because the people who drove the design parameters were stuck in the last doctrinal paradigm.... :tomato

I might add some further clarity to the tender and evaluation process

There will be baseline requirements that all vendors must meet.

so if the contract requirements state that the boat must have nn range at nn knots in the pacific ocean, and that the weapons fit must be xx combat system and yy towed arrays - then they all must meet the minimum requirement

however - all platform and capability submissions allow the vendor to submit anything alternative or over and above the mandated requirement if they can argue and establish clear benefit to the requirements.

now if they don't meet the mandated reqs then they are non compliant and out of the running

if they address the mandated reqs and come back to the CoA with a proposal that says

"you use xx to meet a range requirement to destroy nn target under zz conditions - we believe that you can meet this objective by using ww weapon system because its more efficient and here are the numbers and arguments to support the claims. we can either add or replace the preferred weapons system for the following impacts upon cost, capability and through life support costs - and we will bear the burden of development"

so at no stage is any prime stopped from adding in or submitting alternative or additional capability - but they must meet the mandated reqs first or be non compliant and lose out altogether

the primes see the CONOPs as part of their information pack - so they know what is driving the mandated reqs - they can add their own input as to whether those CONOPs can be addressed or achieved in a superior manner

 

[Todjaeger]

This is why I brought up AIR-6000 – which you ignored: VLO was not a fundamental requirement for the tender process. It is essentially an additional technological capability the F-35A provides the ADF, which can be leveraged to produce those enhanced tactical, operational and thus strategic outcomes. ADF doctrine in the mid-2000s literally had nothing to do with it – doctrine is plastic to technological developments. What this means is your whole conception of doctrine is completely backwards. Any user of a new platform will not simply state a list of things it wants a new platform to do for the next 20 years and ignore any additional technological advantage the platform provides – write a concept of operations document and then ignore the platform’s actual capability. That idea is just plain silly. There are a million historical examples: Look at the relationship between the second offset and AirLand battle if you don’t like the Germans.

I deliberately ignored AIR6000, because IMO that is an apples to oranges comparison. There are features included in the F-35 variants because other F-35 programme partners wanted them. The AIR6000 programme might not have had LO or VLO as a capability requirement, but look at the existing and pending new fighter aircraft programmes around the world. Which programmes can/will meet the RAAF requirements for now and into the future? What will the initial acquisition and ongoing operational/support costs be? What about future developments and upgrades? Etc. etc. In the case of the F-35 programme, other features required by other customers lead to the RAAF selection having additional capabilities (requiring new CONOPS be developed to properly utilize them) not initially part of AIR6000. In the case of SEA1000, this is a development programme for a sub for the RAN. The final design might have capabilities of interest to a few other conventional sub operators whom Australia might be willing to share with (Canada and perhaps Norway), but why would Australia pay for the development of design capabilities which do not fit with how the RAN operates subs now, or expects to in the future?

Now, pugachev's cobra, that old chestnut. This gets to the heart of the matter: if an additional capability a certain technology provides cannot be reasonably leveraged to achieve those achieve tactical, operational and strategic outcomes, doctrine will essentially ignore it. I completely agree. However, IF DCNS is able to provide a transit speed of 14 knots, is it equivalent to pugachev's cobra, only useful at air shows??? If you believe that, then you need to be introduced to the concept of operational – and potentially strategic – mobility.

The unanswered elephant of a question in the room, is whether or not a 14 kts sustained transit speed for the future sub is worth the presumably extra power cost to achieve, from the perspective of the RAN. Now if the RAN has a choice of say, 8 kts sustained transit, or 14 kts sustained transit, both for the same duration, radiating noise, and level of power consumption, then a 14 kts sustained transit would clearly be a better choice IMO. However, the suggestion has been made earlier in this thread that the energy consumption for doubling the propulsion speed cubes the rate of energy consumption. I will touch on this further in the point below.

I’m not sure I even want to touch this. Apart from the earbashing people have had from mods in this thread regarding making claims about performance of a submarine which hasn’t even had the power plant selected – I’m not sure how that level of analysis is allowed to go unchecked – you have made no account for improved energy density improvements or AIP (seems like you have just attacked a pump jet to a Collins) not to mention the confusion of operational and tactical mobility and a totally unsupported tactical picture. Seriously, if people have an issue with DCNS making claims about Shorftin Barracuda capability I don’t know what to do with this level of speculation.

Actually, I have not. The impression I have gotten (again, not a marine engineer) is that from a power consumption perspective, a pumpjet is not as energy efficient as a conventional prop. Which means the very rough, back of a napkin calculations I did would be even less accurate. If the formula of double the speed, cube the power requirement is correct, then to run a Collins-class sub at 16 kts for one hour should consume approximately the same amount of power as a Collins-class sub would, transiting at 4 kts for 64 hours, excluding the base/hotel load.

The point I have been attempting to raise and get across, is that without some commentary from the RAN, we have no way of knowing whether or not the RAN subs would operated at sustained transit speeds of 14 kts. We do not know what else the RAN wants or needs to do with the power which will be available aboard the future sub. If everything else (and I mean, everything) is the same, then a higher transit speed would be advantageous. However, at some point, range/persistence become more important than sustained speed. Lacking either a time or distance factor for the sustained 14 kts, and/or what other implications sustaining such a speed would have means that it's relative value is unknown.

The ANZAC-class FFH can be looked at as an example, with a published range of 6,000 n miles @18 kts, and a max speed listed at 27 kts. I would suspect that a speed higher than 18 kts can be sustained by an FFH, however I would also expect that the rate of fuel consumption would increase greater than the speed. No idea if the numbers are accurate (and not important since this is just to illustrate what I mean) but a sustained speed of perhaps 20 kts might decrease the range down to 5,000 n miles for instance.

Maybe, maybe not. But the wider point isn’t “yay DCNS’: there is much more to all of this than simply who’s widget is better or whop seems to be the more reliable partner. The geostrategic impactions of SEA 1000 are hardly insignificant, neither is the impact on Australian industry or wider defence capability. These issues are every bit as important as the design of the boat or where it comes from.

Yes, but these elements are also independent of the design of the boat or it's origin. The Oz industrial and defence impact from SEA1000 would occur no matter what, as long as SEA1000 actually occurs.

Please note, when I have used a formula or listed a published or calculated speed, I freely admit I do not know the exact, accurate number. In fact, for the publicly available numbers, I strongly suspect they are deliberately inaccurate. Due to the points I have been attempting to make, the specific number values are less important than consideration for how changing one number would impact other numbers.

 

[aussienscale]

I have no doubt of your experience in the industry, and I’m not questioning your expertise -but just FYI not only the members with blue tags are active in the strategic space.

Just wondering what your background is ? Not asking for direct specifics.

Myself, having been involved on both sides of the shed so to speak, have seen over the years on this site the difference of opinion, for lack of a better word, on many such matters as are being discussed. An insight on your background and industry knowledge will give others the ability to understand where you are coming from ?

An example is the current back and forth on Conops V Capability V Doctrine V Prime claims etc

This is not coming from an SA pov, but rather to try and cool things down here so we can discuss the subject at hand

Cheers

Just so you and others know, happy to list my experience

8 years in the RAN in communications, last few years working at Defence Security Branch, and other certain buildings within Russell Offices.

After that, I worked for PM&C for a bit over a year as the Assistant Departmental Security Officer, I then moved on to a few years back at Defence at Russell working in communications for a looser term in several other buildings that shall remain nameless

If anyone would like to know more specifics on my relevant experience in the roles i have had just ask, happy to explain where I can on the relevance to the discussion

 

[gf0012-aust]

Does it matter that much, do bilateral relations between nations rely solely on defense industrial co-operation? Japanese officials released a statement containing the same "deeply regrettable" phrase when they lost out on a (quite scandalous) Indonesian high speed rail project. IMO, it's textbook diplomacy.

its textbook politeness

however, in the last 3 months Sth Korea and Singapore have expressed some discontent at the way that contracts have been managed - some of this does directly tie into some prev head of state handshakes.

there has been some noise made in some of the higher level diplomatic publications, but they never hit the mainstream

I think Chris Johnson is the only journo in the mainstream media who has raised the issue to date in a specific manner

 

[Todjaeger]

Again, this is another example of what I'm talking about - current doctrine deals with current capabilities in a current threat environment. Just the simple addition of LRASM into the ADF blows that reasoning out of the water. Now you need those VLS cells because the technological development of a low signature ASCM with a 500nm range has driven changes in your doctrine - towards A2/AD - but your submarine lacks a VLS because the people who drove the design parameters were stuck in the last doctrinal paradigm.... :tomato

Or that space/displacement was needed for something else, which was deemed of greater value to the RAN/ADF/CoA.

One must remember that the current and future submarines are part of the whole battlesystem that Australia has, and is further developing. I listed the inclusion or exclusion of VLS as it is a good and easy example to use. However, it remains an open question which parts of the ADF are to be tasked with long-range standoff strike missions in the future. Is that to be an Army mission (very unlikely IMO)? Or despite Kopp, would the RAAF use F/A-18F's, F-35A's, and potentially even P-8A's? Perhaps the RAN would be tasked with the role, and might use surface vessels or subs as the launch platform. Even if one of the sub's roles (apart from the standards like ISR, ASW, etc.) was for long-ranged strike, the RAN might opt for tube-launched missiles vs. dedicated VLS. Especially if the space a VLS would occupy could be used for something else of value/importance.

Given that the RAN is not going for an SSN like the Barracuda-, Virginia-, or Astute-classes, any design the RAN gets is not likely to have all the real estate, power storage, and power generation capacity it would need, for every possible role, capability, or piece of kit it might find useful aboard the future submarine. This is where the current and future role requirements need to be considered so that an appropriate fitout can be settled upon. The role requirements themselves are dictated by where the ADF/CoA, as well as the RAN, needs to fit the subs into the overall capability.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Or that space/displacement was needed for something else, which was deemed of greater value to the RAN/ADF/CoA.

yep. when it was realised that AIP was not adding to operational capability, in Collins that space became black curtain real estate

 

[Todjaeger]

yep. when it was realised that AIP was not adding to operational capability, in Collins that space became black curtain real estate

Black curtain, huh? Funny, the Wizard of Oz was behind a green curtain.

Side note, have there been any significant AIP developments which would justify a second look? I have the suspicion with Japan apparently abandoning the tech for Li-Ion batteries that the answer is, 'no.' Insufficient energy density and/or generation rates for the required displacement/volume.

 

[John Newman]

For your information the Mods and the Blue Tags are Defence Professionals and some of them here are aware of more material than they can mention in public fora. All of us are well versed in our own fields and as I have already stated we cannot comment adequately on everything that people think should be commented on because of security requirements. We will not break those restrictions under any circumstances for anyone.

The second point that I want to make is that whilst robust debate is good, robustness does not equate to being combative on here. So dial it back and respect others views. They just may have access to material that you and I don't.

Regard this as a friendly reminder of the rules that we expect to be followed. I do mean ALL THE RULES too so I strongly suggest that you reacquaint yourself with them.

Would have to agree 100% with my friend and fellow contributor NG.

The Def Pros, Blue and Red, know more and have forgotten more, than most of us have put together, and clearly have limitations of what they can and can't say in open forums.

Again, as NG has stated, nothing wrong with robust debate, but there is a line, and as a Senior Member (not a Red or Blue), it appears to me too that line is being crossed a bit too much at the moment.

It may pay some of the newer contributors to actually spend some time and go back through the many many pages of the RAN thread and understand why the Red and Blue say and do what they do, or don't say.

Anyway, DT is here for all of us to enjoy, learn and contribute, don't abuse what is probably (in my opinion), the best defence discussion site.

Cheers,

 

[gf0012-aust]

Black curtain, huh? Funny, the Wizard of Oz was behind a green curtain.

Side note, have there been any significant AIP developments which would justify a second look? I have the suspicion with Japan apparently abandoning the tech for Li-Ion batteries that the answer is, 'no.' Insufficient energy density and/or generation rates for the required displacement/volume.

I am expecting a scorpene hybrid solution to be proposed... so I would think that MESMA gets offered up

we gain an extra internal 2 feet/60cm due to the RANs requirements, so that eases some/any real estate issues.

ie DE + gensets + AIP + bunkerage + ballast balancing system + gearing + pumpjet drivetrain replacing the nuke + gearing + genset + pumpjet drivetrain

 

[rockitten]

Something as expected, it won't surprise me if the SB will have more IP issues in accessing USN research data in the future too.

Nocookies | The Australian

Scientific research with Japan at risk after submarine deal

A key research project involving Australian and Japanese defence scientists is hanging in the balance after Japan missed out on the $50 billion submarine contract.

In mid-2014, former defence* minister David Johnston signed an agreement with Japan for joint research between Australian and Japanese defence scientists on hydro*dynamics, or the way water flows over and around the hull of a vessel such as a submarine.

The goal is to ensure as smooth and silent a path as possible for the submarine, free from the gurgling of swirling water that can expose it to detection.

The agreement was reached at a time when former prime minister Tony Abbott had asked his counterpart, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, to consider having his country build a fleet of new submarines for the navy.

Seeing the massive submarine project as an opportunity to extend Japan’s strategic relationship with Australia, Mr Abe responded by expending considerable per*son*al domestic political capital persuading Japan’s parliament to accept a new interpretation of Japan’s pacifist constitution.

The two prime ministers agreed to develop a framework for co-operation on defence equipment and technology more broadly, and the hydrodynamics study was a key part of that.

Senator Johnston has hailed the agreement to deepen bilateral defence science and technology co-operation with Japan as “an important milestone”.

Once the decision was made to go with a French design, and conscious of the potential damage Japan’s failure to win the submarine contract could do to Mr Abe’s reputation at home, Malcolm Turnbull telephoned the Japanese leader to explain the outcome of Australia’s competitive evalua*tion process.

As well, Defence Minister Marise Payne and Foreign Minister Julie Bishop telephoned their opposite numbers in Japan. At this stage, it appears that Australia does not plan to send a minister to Japan to further discuss the issues.

Work on the joint hydro*dynamics study began late last year. That study and co-operative regional roles maintaining the new Joint Strike Fighter were considered by Australia to be strong elements of a closer security relationship with Japan.

If Japan had won the contest to become the design partner for Australia’s new submarine, all the information gathered by the scientist*s from both nations would have been fed into the project to contribute to a very stealthy submarine. Any technological advances to emerge would have *ulti*mately been used in sub*marines for both nations’ navies.

The Australian was told by offic*ials in Tokyo some time ago that if Japan did not win the submarine design contest, it was hard to envisage their country allowing the benefits of research its scientists carried out finding its way into a French or German boat.

 

[John Fedup]

There was lots of guessing as to which option would win. In the event some kind of show stopper arises during the next 6-18 months with the French bid, does the second best option become the prime? What happens if option J or G develops some new technology in the interim that is really a breakthrough but they were third? Would a new bid be considered? Considering the political capital invested, I am going to guess option J placed second.

 

[vonnoobie]

There was lots of guessing as to which option would win. In the event some kind of show stopper arises during the next 6-18 months with the French bid, does the second best option become the prime? What happens if option J or G develops some new technology in the interim that is really a breakthrough but they were third? Would a new bid be considered? Considering the political capital invested, I am going to guess option J placed second.

The only kind of show stopper that will result in us going with one of the other option's in the contract not having favorable terms.

If the contract goes ahead then I don't see any breakthrough tech being an issue, If it's really that great and available to us we would likely try and incorporate it if feasible into the SB-A1 hull.

 

[aussienscale]

The only kind of show stopper that will result in us going with one of the other option's in the contract not having favorable terms.

If the contract goes ahead then I don't see any breakthrough tech being an issue, If it's really that great and available to us we would likely try and incorporate it if feasible into the SB-A1 hull.

Not a biggie guys, but if we could get the terminology right

It is the Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A, if that is what DCNS are calling it, so shall we, until the class has been named. Just keeps everyone on the same page, I have already seen a few different names out and about and the media is the biggest offender

A couple of interesting points now that DCNS have finally updated their website

"The Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A

The Australian Future Submarine Program calls for a regionally superior submarine. The requirements call for a new submarine, not one that is in existence today.

The Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A, designed by DCNS specifically for the Royal Australian Navy, will be the recipient of France’s most sensitive and protected submarine technology and will be the most lethal conventional submarine ever contemplated.

Pump jet propulsion means the Shortfin Barracuda can move more quietly than submarines with obsolete propeller technology. In a confrontation between two otherwise identical submarines, the one with pump jet propulsion always has the tactical advantage.

The sonar suite performance provided by Thales will be the best available ever for a submarine this size."

http://dcnsgroup.com.au/what-we-do/sea-1000/

Cheers

 

[Krogh]

I have a, perhaps, OT question on subm. propulsion.

From what I can gather on this thread, the J-option had a diesel-electric and batteries configuration. That appears to me as slightly old tech.

The germans use diesel-electric and batteries and this fuel cell technology. In many ways, I would suspect fuel cells are ideal for subs in that it's vibrationless, operates at "normal" temperatures and pressures has decent efficiency etc.

Then I gather that the Full cells of the U212 provide some 450HP. Not a lot. So my question is, whats the problem? why not add in more? e.g. replace the diesel?, are the cells taking up to much space?

thanks.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Pump jet propulsion means the Shortfin Barracuda can move more quietly than submarines with obsolete propeller technology. In a confrontation between two otherwise identical submarines, the one with pump jet propulsion always has the tactical advantage.

my contracting negotiation, policy secretariat hat and media liiason training days came back straight away.....

the only direct comparison is nuke pump to nuke prop - we can't compare DE pump and DE prop as none exist. The only DE pump ever built was a russian kilo - and that was docked and abandoned 8-10 years ago. ie an unsuccessful mule

It goes back to what some of us have been trying to painfully but politely hilight - nuke pump drivetrains behave like an electric motor, immediate torque, and almost digital controlled thrust - and its sustained thrust and manouvre due to the nuke drivetrain.

you don't get that with DE pumps - that is the harsh engineering reality. some might not like it and think that its now a technical trivia to be assumed is deliverable - but we are actually looking at being a development customer - not a delivery customer with this tech

its a false comparison.

and as I said repeatedly ad-nauseum. its a greenfields development which the french statement reinforces.