China would take Taiwan in an hour, the only reason that they do not is because the UN would approve sanctions that would prevent China from benefitting from the takeover.
Japan, Koreas, China and Taiwan regional issues
- Thread starter Chino
- Start date
Musashi_kenshin
Active Member
That is complete drivel, not least because it would take longer than an hour for Chinese troops to arrive and disembark on Taiwanese beaches, let alone defeat the Taiwanese military. I can't think of any modern war that was over in just an hour.
China can veto any sanctions on the UN Security Council.
Honestly, are you here to troll or have you just been fed Chinese propaganda from birth?
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John Fedup
The Bunker Group
WRT to Chinese interactions with its neighbours, I would love to be a fly on the wall listening to Vietnam and Russian defence planners regarding China. Long term, Russia will have very similar concerns about China, Vietnam already has.
Russia And Japan Are Still At War — At Least On Paper
Japan's prime minister will be in Moscow Tuesday, amid speculation that Russia and Japan might be about to sign a peace treaty. The two countries have still not officially ended World War II.
www.npr.org
Well, ban me, please, I just signed up and checked out this forum today and have no intention to stay anyway.
Mod edit: Member banned at own request, following Warnings on posting behavior by other members of the Mod team.
-Preceptor
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What Troops have to arrive, the missiles would land and render the country militarily vulnerable in under 1 minute after launch. Every military target would be destroyed along with the civilian population. The factories would be spared naturally.
Remember the chinese do not value life in any way
This isn't the 1940's
Mod edit: Submit proof of claims made or retract them.
-Preceptor
Proof not all missiles China has are nukes, and a hyoersonic missile travels at 1.7 miles per second, since Taiwan is 50 miles from China the missiles would arrive in about 30 seconds. Is there proof that this could not happen?
If the chinese valued life would they have welded people in their own apartments to die of covid or starve to death?
+Yingji-62+Peoples+Liberation+Army+Navy+export+pakistan+coastal+defence+missile+system+china+chinese+(1+(2).jpg)
+Yingji-62+Peoples+Liberation+Army+Navy+export+pakistan+coastal+defence+missile+system+china+chinese+(4).jpg)
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Temp ban implemented while the Mod team discusses the poster's behavior. For the general membership, a requirement of proof from a member of the Mod team is to be taken seriously, and including a bunch of images of PRC missile systems does NOT prove that the PRC has the capability to achieve the claim of;
Further, stating that the Chinese do not value life in anyway, and then adding a claim that people were welded into their own apartments to die would be considered both derogatory and additional claims made without proof. The Mod team will discuss and made a decision.
-Preceptor
Now for something completely different.
If possession is 9/10 of the law, as Kenshin has stated, then those islands which China has built military bases on are now Chinese territory, regardless of the legality of their presence. Yet the US is still sailing ships through them using the principle of Freedom of Navigation (FON). An example from April 2020
Which takes precedence? Possession or international recognition? It seems to me that international recognition is more important than possession.
I am thinking back to the Falklands as well as Gibraltar. Argentina seized the Falklands in '82 but the international community denounced the move. Now, both the Falklands and Gibraltar are recognized as British overseas territories though other countries can rightfully claim the land as historically theirs. However, it is because the international community recognizes them as British that Argentine and Spanish efforts to reclaim those lands are essentially stalled. To my mind, the international community hasn't made up its mind on the various islands being disputed by Japan, China, and Taiwan. But that doesn't make possession the go-to rule for deciding which islands belong to whom. So, I would disagree with Kenshin about the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai islands being rightfully Japanese because Japan controls them. That sort of thinking is what led to colonialism and imperialism - another issue Japan hasn't properly confronted (in my opinion).
If possession is 9/10 of the law, as Kenshin has stated, then those islands which China has built military bases on are now Chinese territory, regardless of the legality of their presence. Yet the US is still sailing ships through them using the principle of Freedom of Navigation (FON). An example from April 2020
Which takes precedence? Possession or international recognition? It seems to me that international recognition is more important than possession.
I am thinking back to the Falklands as well as Gibraltar. Argentina seized the Falklands in '82 but the international community denounced the move. Now, both the Falklands and Gibraltar are recognized as British overseas territories though other countries can rightfully claim the land as historically theirs. However, it is because the international community recognizes them as British that Argentine and Spanish efforts to reclaim those lands are essentially stalled. To my mind, the international community hasn't made up its mind on the various islands being disputed by Japan, China, and Taiwan. But that doesn't make possession the go-to rule for deciding which islands belong to whom. So, I would disagree with Kenshin about the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai islands being rightfully Japanese because Japan controls them. That sort of thinking is what led to colonialism and imperialism - another issue Japan hasn't properly confronted (in my opinion).
Best argument is naturally agreement with party you are arguing with, that validate your claims(like border demarcation).
In cases you stated it's actual power that takes precedence.
International recognition by itself is one tool that force decision of dispute without actual agreement among contenders. Unless both parties agree that such recognition can be an arbiter in dispute.
I would say short of power, legal arguments(past agreements, or right of self determination vs territorial integrity where applicable) hold more water.
Then historical precedents, in absence of legal claim.
If legal arguments can't be made, then power(military, economical, diplomatic(international recognition is extension of this)) will determine who will have territory.
So because international community is not always neutral it can be seen as another kind of power projection. As possession of territory is.
Standalone here is UNSC resolutions, especially under article 7. In essence it's threat of force that most powerful countries will not object, even support.
I think it will stay this way, till majority of world turn to liberal(human rights and democratic) values(most likely, as human rights endorsed by UN), or other universal value system.
Sandhi Yudha
Well-Known Member
Begin next year France and the UK will join a Japanese-American naval exercise. The exact location is unclear yet, but the combined amphibious drills will take place around Japan's remote Islands in May 2021.
www.navalnews.com
So, the upgrade of 22 out of 144 F-16A/B Block 20 will be finished end this month. Under the Peace Phoenix Rising programme, which was launched in 2016 and is being carried out by Lockheed Martin and Taiwan’s Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation (AIDC), about 140 F-16A/Bs are to be upgraded to the F-16V configuration by the end of 2023.
In august 2019, Taiwan ordered also 66 new F-16V Block 70.
Japan, USA and France set for Combined Amphibious Exercise - Naval News
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), the U.S. Navy, and the French Navy (Marine Nationale) will take part in combined amphibious drills in Japan's remote Islands in May 2021.
www.navalnews.com
So, the upgrade of 22 out of 144 F-16A/B Block 20 will be finished end this month. Under the Peace Phoenix Rising programme, which was launched in 2016 and is being carried out by Lockheed Martin and Taiwan’s Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation (AIDC), about 140 F-16A/Bs are to be upgraded to the F-16V configuration by the end of 2023.
In august 2019, Taiwan ordered also 66 new F-16V Block 70.
Taiwan aiming to complete upgrade of 22 F-16A/B fighters by end of 2020
Taiwan’s plan to complete the upgrade of 22 Republic of China Air Force (RoCAF) F-16A/B multirole fighter aircraft to the latest F-16V configuration by the end of 2020...
www.janes.com
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Sandhi Yudha
Well-Known Member
At least 80 plots of land near sensitive sites have been sold to Chinese and South Korean companies in the past decade and transactions are on the rise, according this article:
amp.scmp.com
"We do not believe it can be a coincidence’, says official within the Cabinet Secretariat."
Embassies often become an (ELINT) center for collecting military information from the host-country. But building multiple embassies close to military bases and installations in one country is too obvious, so it seems that they try to solve it with company offices and factories.
Japan suspicious as Chinese firms buy land near military bases
‘We do not believe it can be a coincidence’, says Japanese official.
amp.scmp.com
"We do not believe it can be a coincidence’, says official within the Cabinet Secretariat."
Embassies often become an (ELINT) center for collecting military information from the host-country. But building multiple embassies close to military bases and installations in one country is too obvious, so it seems that they try to solve it with company offices and factories.
Musashi_kenshin
Active Member
Japan to drop fiscal 2021 budget plan for F-15 modification
Due to ballooning costs, Japan has decided not to include spending in the next budget for upgrading F-15 fighter jets to carry long-range cruise missiles.
www.japantimes.co.jp
Not very significant news as Japan is already producing the extended range ASM-3 for the F-2s and purchasing the JSM for the F-35s. Still I'm sure that the JASDF would like to have LRASMs as well.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
WRT China, many nations should not only worry about properties adjacent to military facilities but also next to key high technology industries. Chinese spying is just as aggressive on commercial entities as well.At least 80 plots of land near sensitive sites have been sold to Chinese and South Korean companies in the past decade and transactions are on the rise, according this article:
Japan suspicious as Chinese firms buy land near military bases
‘We do not believe it can be a coincidence’, says Japanese official.
"We do not believe it can be a coincidence’, says official within the Cabinet Secretariat."
Embassies often become an (ELINT) center for collecting military information from the host-country. But building multiple embassies close to military bases and installations in one country is too obvious, so it seems that they try to solve it with company offices and factories.
PLAN LHD Update from naval News
www.navalnews.com
Number three is on the way.
Five to follow.
Regards S
China's Third Type 075 LHD Taking Shape in Shanghai - Naval News
Photos by Chinese ship spotters show that China's third amphibious assault ship, a Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) known as Type 075, is at an advanced stage of construction and will be ready for launch in early 2021.
www.navalnews.com
Number three is on the way.
Five to follow.
Regards S
Musashi_kenshin
Active Member
I would have thought it's fairly obvious. China is gearing up for an invasion of Taiwan. Xi painted the CCP into a corner with his 2049 deadline for restoring the nation (or however he put it), and I think he'll want Taiwan secured long before then as he's aiming to be bigger than Mao. Therefore Taiwan has to be occupied well in advance of his potential retirement. He won't risk his successor taking credit for it.
I disagree. Xi only wants to have the option of invasion — to prevent a Taiwanese declaration of independence (as a country).
The “1992 consensus,” a term former Mainland Affairs Council chairman Su Chi (蘇起) in 2006 admitted making up in 2000, refers to a tacit understanding between the KMT and the Chinese government that both sides of the Taiwan Strait acknowledge there is “One—China,” with each side having its own interpretation of what “China” means. President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) administration’s refusal to recognize the consensus is tantamount to unilaterally abolishing the accord, former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) said.
On 7 Nov 2015, Ma Ying-jeou, President of the Republic of China, and Xi Jinping (習近平), General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and President of the People's Republic of China met in Singapore and came to an understanding. If Taiwan honours the 1992 consensus or the 2015 understanding arrived at in Singapore, there is ZERO chance of war or invasion.
1. Having said the above, we also need to be aware that:
(a) from a JMSDF and US Navy’s 7th Fleet joint operations perspective, Taiwan is the keystone of any attempt at China's naval containment; and
(b) lose Taiwan to a Chinese invasion (however unlikely it is at the moment), both JMSDF and the US Navy lose the ability to keep the PLA(N) hemmed up against their own coast line. Lose Taiwan, and both the JMSDF and the US Navy’s 7th Fleet, lose control of their SLOCs. While it is easy to say that lose Taiwan, and Japan loses the extended island chain defense system that protects its home waters; who is to say that Taiwan is on Japan’s side on the longer term? Especially given the extensive Taiwanese business interests in the mainland; and the intense activity of Chinese agents there.
2. Japanese and American admirals understand the importance of the 1st island chain.
(a) In the case of Japan, they have always understood the importance of Taiwan’s geography (to their defence).
(b) I suspect this is why the Imperial Japanese Navy insisted upon Taiwan's annexation in 1895, and it is why Taiwan contingencies have been an important part of the Japan Self Defense Force's thinking since the 1950s. Naval war planners understand—even if most Japanese civilians do not.
(c) The loss of Taiwan would give the Chinese incredible leverage over Japan.
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Musashi_kenshin
Active Member
I wish that were the case, but for the following reasons I think that's too optimistic a view:
- As noted above, Xi has effectively set the deadline for an invasion (2049). That anniversary has been hyped so much the CCP will find it hard to explain to its own people how China can be considered rejuvinated with Taiwan still separate.
- China has previously said that Taiwan putting off unification for "too long" will lead to an invasion. With the importance of the 2049 anniversary, taking no action by then will suggest to Taipei that China will never invade, so long as they're not so stupid as to change the constitution or make a UDI. That would be a huge concession and one that currently there's no reason to believe the CCP would make.
- China's military has continued to grow since 1996. The time to make a UDI would have been 15-20 years ago. Doing so at some point in the future would make no sense unless it was clear an invasion was imminent or underway.
- There's no reason to believe Taipei will declare independence in a way that will provoke an invasion. Why? Because President Tsai has already said numerous times that Taiwan is independent, and Beijing has not done anything in response. The DPP is smart enough to realise that there's nothing to be gained by crossing China's obvious red line. They can assert their independence from the PRC in order to keep unofficial ties with major countries (bar China) and raise international awareness, yet not formally dispense with the idea that Taiwan is part of "a" China.
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@Musashi_kenshin, I don’t understand why you buy into this Taiwanese DPP bullshit. If the Taiwanese want to provoke a war, they can fight it by themselves. The 1992 consensus is an agreement on how the 2 sides can disagree. But no, the DPP have to trash talk, without investing in actual military capability.
...continued from above:
3. Objectively speaking, anyone with a basic knowledge of geo-politics and understand international relations issues as a diplomat of substance, like Antony Blinken or Bilahari Kausikan (as a former diplomat), would know that Taiwan is at fault — due to the toxic domestic politics occurring there. Taiwanese political trash talking against China has real world consequences. If the Taiwanese want to trash talk, I say talk only after building 8 submarines, not before. Trash talk after the 66 F-16Vs have been delivered, not before.
4. Antony Blinken, U.S. President-elect Joe Biden's pick for secretary of state, a former director of the Taipei Office of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) knows that:
Edit: Points 5 to 9 added to provide a naval context, to prevent this from becoming an off-topic sea blind discussion (and to help readers understand the often unspoken Japanese Navalists’ collective concerns and the Chinese reaction to such thinking by their investments in the PLA(N)’s fleet of ships and their rapid growth of the amphibious capability of the PLA Marine Corps).
5. If the now-still-unthinkable were to occur and Taiwan and China enter into direct armed conflict, Northeast Asian SLOCs security would not be the only exploitable vulnerability of the JMSDF, the ROK Navy and the US Navy’s 7th Fleet, combined. Taiwan would then be the perfect basis for the PLA(N) and the 20,000 strong PLA Marine Corps to island-hop through the Japanese controlled Ryukyu island chain – which is much closer to Taipei and Shanghai than to Tokyo – and quickly reach Okinawa or beyond. Given that Japan only has a 3,000 strong Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, it wouldn’t be excessive to consider a Chinese takeover of Taiwan or the Ryukyu island chain an existential national security threat to Japan.
6. As Ian Easton explains: PLA intentions and plans for a conquered Taiwan are made plain in an internal document, The Japanese Air Self Defense Force, a handbook studied by mid-career officers at the PLA Air Force Command College in Beijing. The stated purpose of the text is to help Chinese pilots and staff officers understand the strengths and weaknesses of their Japanese adversaries. Buried amidst hundreds of pages of detailed maps, target coordinates, organizational charts, weapons data, and jet fighter images are the following lines:
8. In times of peace there is little to stop Chinese naval and air forces from crossing out into the Pacific as they wish, but in times of war things will be different. The Japanese:
Over time, these Japanese A2AD deployments would to keep the PLA(N) bottled within the 1st island chain will not only grow but serve as lilly-pads to push Japanese A2AD forces into dispersal locations to evade the waves of Chinese missile salvos. Given this scenario, it would be difficult to imagine a significant number of Chinese commerce raiders slipping out to prey on Japanese shipping outside the Taiwan Strait as long as they have to slip between hostile Japanese and Taiwanese island bastions.
9. The traditional Chinese strategy of engaging Japan while at the same time working to undermine its control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands has hit a wall. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi sought to present a friendly and proactive face during his 24 Nov 2020 visit, but in Japan the visit will be mostly remembered for the controversy at the joint press conference — after which Japan’s Foreign Minister Motegi had to forcefully denounce the offending Chinese remarks in front of the Diet and to emphasize how clear he had made the Japanese position on the issue. The Japanese press, for its part, was happy to emphasize the incident without providing context or analysis of Wang’s exact remarks. The current atmosphere in Tokyo leaves little space for a nuanced and moderate debate on policy toward China. Instead, calls to adopt more drastic measures to defend the disputed islands are becoming more urgent. If the relationship continues on its current trajectory, hopes for a successful state visit by President Xi Jinping, which were reasonably high one year ago, will grow ever more faint.
10. A real Chinese attempt to solve the Taiwan issue by force remains unlikely till after 2049. President Xi currently has a lot on his plate, especially in the wake of the coronavirus outbreak, a rise in diplomatic acrimony between China, and the U.S, India, and Australia, has taken centre stage in Asia. Further afield, European Union member states are also heading towards adopting a tougher attitude on the strategic challenge that China’s growing assertiveness represents. The PLA is also well aware of the fact that invading and controlling Taiwan are two different things entirely.
...continued from above:
3. Objectively speaking, anyone with a basic knowledge of geo-politics and understand international relations issues as a diplomat of substance, like Antony Blinken or Bilahari Kausikan (as a former diplomat), would know that Taiwan is at fault — due to the toxic domestic politics occurring there. Taiwanese political trash talking against China has real world consequences. If the Taiwanese want to trash talk, I say talk only after building 8 submarines, not before. Trash talk after the 66 F-16Vs have been delivered, not before.
4. Antony Blinken, U.S. President-elect Joe Biden's pick for secretary of state, a former director of the Taipei Office of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) knows that:
(a) Taiwan is at fault and needs to dial it down; and
(b) pressure point Taiwan is a useful tool of leverage for the US to get cooperation from China — after 20 Jan 2021, I fully expect Biden’s team to privately tell President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) to dial it back.
Edit: Points 5 to 9 added to provide a naval context, to prevent this from becoming an off-topic sea blind discussion (and to help readers understand the often unspoken Japanese Navalists’ collective concerns and the Chinese reaction to such thinking by their investments in the PLA(N)’s fleet of ships and their rapid growth of the amphibious capability of the PLA Marine Corps).
5. If the now-still-unthinkable were to occur and Taiwan and China enter into direct armed conflict, Northeast Asian SLOCs security would not be the only exploitable vulnerability of the JMSDF, the ROK Navy and the US Navy’s 7th Fleet, combined. Taiwan would then be the perfect basis for the PLA(N) and the 20,000 strong PLA Marine Corps to island-hop through the Japanese controlled Ryukyu island chain – which is much closer to Taipei and Shanghai than to Tokyo – and quickly reach Okinawa or beyond. Given that Japan only has a 3,000 strong Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, it wouldn’t be excessive to consider a Chinese takeover of Taiwan or the Ryukyu island chain an existential national security threat to Japan.
6. As Ian Easton explains: PLA intentions and plans for a conquered Taiwan are made plain in an internal document, The Japanese Air Self Defense Force, a handbook studied by mid-career officers at the PLA Air Force Command College in Beijing. The stated purpose of the text is to help Chinese pilots and staff officers understand the strengths and weaknesses of their Japanese adversaries. Buried amidst hundreds of pages of detailed maps, target coordinates, organizational charts, weapons data, and jet fighter images are the following lines:
As soon as Taiwan is reunified with Mainland China, Japan's maritime lines of communication will fall completely within the striking ranges of China's fighters and bombers...Our analysis shows that, by using blockades, if we can reduce Japan's raw imports by 15-20%, it will be a heavy blow to Japan's economy. After imports have been reduced by 30%, Japan's economic activity and war-making potential will be basically destroyed. After imports have been reduced by 50%, even if they use rationing to limit consumption, Japan's national economy and war-making potential will collapse entirely...blockades can cause sea shipments to decrease and can even create a famine within the Japanese islands.
7. But the problem posed by Chinese control of Taiwan is not really limited to the shipping that passes through the Taiwan and Luzon Straits. American naval war planners understand the importance of the "1st Island Chain," a group of islands that keeps the PLA Navy and PLA Air Force hemmed into the East and South China Seas; and these islands include the Philippines Archipelago, Taiwan, the Japanese Archipelago, and the Ryukyu Islands.8. In times of peace there is little to stop Chinese naval and air forces from crossing out into the Pacific as they wish, but in times of war things will be different. The Japanese:
(a) have been quietly stocking these islands close to Taiwan with anti-ship and anti-air missile units — which includes the upgraded Type 12 surface-to-ship guided missiles (that are truck mounted) whose range will be extended from 200 km to 900 km (with the final goal of 1,500 km). According to media reports, a Kawasaki P-1 MPA equipped with 4 air-based Type-12 missiles (it can carry up to 8 missiles) made its first test flight from a JMSDF Air Facility Atsugi on 10 Feb 2020. The improved air-launched variant of the latest Type 12 anti-ship missile;
(b) have decided in 2017 to acquire the 280km range Norwegian JSM (for its 147 F35A/Bs) and the 560 km range AGM-158B JASSM and AGM-158C LRASM for its 98 upgraded F-15Js; and
(c) in Dec 2020, decided to spend 33.5 billion yen (US$322 million) to develop Japanese stand-off missiles, due to the significant improvements in other countries' early warning and control capabilities. Further, MHI was awarded a 8.9 billion yen (US$85 million) contract for the the development of the improved ASM-3 to be carried on the F-2. The development of the improved ASM-3 (above Mach 3) will continue even after the ASM-3A goes into mass production. Thus the ASM-3A is considered to be a stop-gap solution to counter China’s naval threats; and the development of the improved ASM-3 will be carried out from FY2020 to FY2025. Taku Otsuka, head of the LDP's National Defense Division, told reporters that the possibility of Japan using the missiles to strike an enemy base is a separate issue.
Over time, these Japanese A2AD deployments would to keep the PLA(N) bottled within the 1st island chain will not only grow but serve as lilly-pads to push Japanese A2AD forces into dispersal locations to evade the waves of Chinese missile salvos. Given this scenario, it would be difficult to imagine a significant number of Chinese commerce raiders slipping out to prey on Japanese shipping outside the Taiwan Strait as long as they have to slip between hostile Japanese and Taiwanese island bastions.
9. The traditional Chinese strategy of engaging Japan while at the same time working to undermine its control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands has hit a wall. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi sought to present a friendly and proactive face during his 24 Nov 2020 visit, but in Japan the visit will be mostly remembered for the controversy at the joint press conference — after which Japan’s Foreign Minister Motegi had to forcefully denounce the offending Chinese remarks in front of the Diet and to emphasize how clear he had made the Japanese position on the issue. The Japanese press, for its part, was happy to emphasize the incident without providing context or analysis of Wang’s exact remarks. The current atmosphere in Tokyo leaves little space for a nuanced and moderate debate on policy toward China. Instead, calls to adopt more drastic measures to defend the disputed islands are becoming more urgent. If the relationship continues on its current trajectory, hopes for a successful state visit by President Xi Jinping, which were reasonably high one year ago, will grow ever more faint.
10. A real Chinese attempt to solve the Taiwan issue by force remains unlikely till after 2049. President Xi currently has a lot on his plate, especially in the wake of the coronavirus outbreak, a rise in diplomatic acrimony between China, and the U.S, India, and Australia, has taken centre stage in Asia. Further afield, European Union member states are also heading towards adopting a tougher attitude on the strategic challenge that China’s growing assertiveness represents. The PLA is also well aware of the fact that invading and controlling Taiwan are two different things entirely.
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Musashi_kenshin
Active Member
What bullshit are you talking about? That there is an effective deadline for an invasion of Taiwan whatever Taipei does? This isn't controversial.
Even a few years ago pro-Beijing newspapers like the SCMP were saying Xi would invade before he resigns. Obviously that's not definitive, but I have seen no credible publications suggest that China will not invade even after 2049 provided there is no UDI or change to the ROC's territorial boundaries in the constitution. If you've seen some credible articles saying China will not invade, I would like to see them because I must have missed them.
That's sort of the point. If they wanted to provoke a war they could - but they have no reason to.
In 1992 Taiwan was not a democracy. The first free and fair election was in 1996. So the Taiwanese government cannot be bound by "agreements" made when it was controlled via a one-party state.
Also the 1992 "consensus" was not agreed between the PRC and Taiwan at the government level. It was allegedly concluded by the ROC's then negotiator in Hong Kong. However, Su Chi admitted in 2006 that he made the term up to try to defuse matters. In reality there was no agreement. Even if Su Chi had reached a tentative agreement with Beijing's representative at the time, he had to get it ratified by the ROC government - which never happened. Lee Teng-hui was President in 1992 and he disputed that the 1992 consensus was genuine.
Dial what back? What specific actions has she taken that are "bad"?
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You cannot cherry pick your facts — You can pretend all you want but you know how unreasonable DPP’s starting point is — no past agreement Taiwan is a party to is valid, if DPP disagrees. Only DPP assholes cannot accept that there are different ways to interpret things with regard to the One China policy — a policy that even chickensh!t hawks in America adhere to (i.e. an agreement to disagree).
1. Taiwan is not a member of the UN and did so by choice. Having made that choice, it is not recognised as a country by the US. It is not also recognised as a country by the UK. More importantly, all members of the P5 in the security council do not recognise Taiwan as a country; and she does not have diplomatic recognition by even any non-perm member of the security council.
2. Taiwan is not a member of any regional association of countries and has no prospect of joining any regional association. Therefore, she is not recognised, as a country, by any G20 member or lesser organisation of countries. Taiwan does not have the normal rights of a country at the UN, as it is not able to vote at the General Assembly.
Edit: 3(c) onwards added for clarity.
3. Is there a DPP and KMT consensus that Taiwan must stand with Japan, if Japan is attacked by China? The Taiwanese are very good a calculating what is to their advantage; but cannot conceptualise bearing a burden for an ally or a potential ally — which is why I disapprove of DPP’s current attempt at leading Taiwan down the road of brinksmanship to make China an enemy (due to domestic politics). Thanks to:
(a) behind the scenes move to support Taiwan, the island is able to get some indirect rights in the past. That support will disappear at some time in the near future as the DPP supporters are like the <M - delete> crowds at <T - delete> rallies — hostile and stupid;
(b) behind the scenes Japanese support, Taiwan can attempt to build its 8 submarines; and
(c) Taiwan’s hyper-partisan political and media environment, Taiwanese leaders' misguided defence priorities can make a perverse sort of sense. The Taiwanese are isolated on the international stage, not officially recognized by any of their most critical economic and defense partners, and constantly subjected to a crippling Chinese propaganda campaign designed to undermine public confidence in Taiwan’s diplomatic standing and military strength. As a result, any international incident—anything that could be seen to diminish Taiwan’s position in the world—is an opportunity to score political points against the party in power.
4. Consider Taiwan’s competition with China for official diplomatic recognition. Whether small countries officially recognize Taiwan has no material effect on the country’s economy or security. The impact is psychological and political. When El Salvador severed ties with Taipei in 2018 and transferred recognition to Beijing, a spokesperson for the Kuomintang (KMT), the main opposition party in Taiwan, accused the ruling Democratic Progressive Party of cultivating disaster: “The DPP must take full responsibility for Taiwan’s isolation and apologize to our people,” the spokesperson thundered. “I would like to personally ask Tsai Ing-wen: Just where is it you are leading the Republic of China to?”
5. To deter China, Taiwan in 2017 adopted an asymmetrical defense strategy known as the Overall Defense Concept (ODC).
(a) The concept focuses on using asymmetric conventional capabilities optimized to resist a PLA invasion, with a 1st phase focused on littoral combat (100 km from Taiwan’s shores) and a 2nd phase focused on fighting on the beaches. It emphasizes the role of smart mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, mobile air defense, and the ability to employ lethal fire on the limited number of potential landing zones over traditional military platforms.
(b) The ODC calls on the military to increase investments in key capabilities including mobility, deception, camouflage, concealment, jamming, redundancy, rapid repair, and reconstitution. But this approach faces constraints imposed by limited resources, lack of public support, and interservice politics on Taiwan.
(c) Problems also persist in Taiwan’s defense efforts, including challenges in shifting to an all-volunteer military and in the readiness of its reserve force. Taiwan’s reserves receive as little as 5 days of training every 2 years, after 4 months of initial active-duty training prior to entering the reserves, and thus cannot make any contribution to deterring a Chinese attack.
(d) If you spend any time studying Taiwan defence procurement priorities, you quickly realize something has gone wrong. American defence experts agree on a rough picture of what the Taiwanese military needs to do if they want to deter a Chinese invasion force. They will have disagreements on the margins—some will be for that weapons system here, or against that one there—but the big picture is always the same.
(e) Throughout it all, American analysts are insistent that Taiwan's defense is not hopeless. If Taiwan is willing to move beyond token efforts of spending a pitiful 2.3% of GDP on its military, it can be saved. But and it’s a giant BUT, the Taiwanese are not interested in investing in their own credible defence.
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