Indonesian Aero News

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Challenging cognitive dissonance and denial — Part 3

9. In the face of Great Power competition in the South China Sea, increased air force cooperation and training between Indonesia and Singapore (eg. Ex Elang Indopura — using fighters; and Ex Camar Indopura — using MPAs), provides backbone to ASEAN when faced with external pressure from Chinese incursions in Indonesia’s EEZ waters north of the Natuna Islands.

10. In the area of international military cooperation to enhance deterrence against external pressure, both the TNI AU and the RSAF, as small air forces, have benefitted from the schooling and support by the USAF with regard to developing the appropriate fighter CONOPS for air warfare.

(a) As an example of this helping hand by the USAF — from June 14 - 25, 2021, six Japan based USAF F-16CMs of the 13th Fighter Squadron flew into Sam Ratulangi International Airport for Exercise Cope West 2021— to train with the TNI AU’s Viper pilots, in Manado, North Sulawesi, Indonesia.​

(b) On missions over the South China Sea, USAF F-16CMs based in Japan (from either the 13th or 14th Fighter squadron) are each armed with 5 beyond-visual-range AIM-120C-7 and a single AIM-9. Under the belly, each F-16CM was fitted with an AN/ALQ-184 electronic countermeasures self-protection pod. From the missile load-out, pretty clear that the game plan for the F-16CM is to shoot the AIM-120C-7 way before the merge. Unlike normal Vipers, USAF F-16CMs are also equipped with the AN/ASQ-213 HARM Targeting System, to enable the use of HARM anti-radiation missiles, should the need arise.​

(c) The instructor pilots for the 34 TNI AU F-16s in Aviation Squadron 3 in in Madiun, East Java, and Aviation Squadron 16 in Pekanbaru, Riau have adopted some of RSAF’s F-16 training methodology by cross attendance of courses and the use of our aircraft simulators, including multi-aircraft simulators to train.​

(d) Assuming that the TNI AU’s 34 F-16s, flying 3 sorties per day, use 6 missiles per day, the total number of missiles fired in the 1st day of war is 204 air-to-air missiles. Which is why I recommend that Indonesia buys 250 to 500 missiles with any fighter purchase. This will ensure a few days of supply in missiles as a base level stocking for a troubled peace scenario, to address China’s liminal warfare strategy in the waters north of the Natuna Islands.​
its just the policy in the last decades to order pathetic small amounts of missiles. For both the Sukhois as the F-16s. So just forget about ordering large quantities of French missiles.
11. In an all out war scenario (that does not apply to the PLA(N) and PLAAF threat presented north of the Natuna Islands), for 34 fighters to survive 7 days of war (assuming each fires 6 missiles per day), Indonesia needs to buy 1,428 missiles, which makes it obvious that the TNI AU will not be funded to acquire this amount of missiles. That is why my recommendation is for the TNI AU to acquire a base level of missiles stocks is so low (i.e. less than 1/3 of the war stocks needed). Indonesian fanboys should take note of this point.

12. Further, in modern fighter CONOPS, no pilot fights alone. He needs support from his wingman and other assets, which is why the RSAF not only invests in multi-aircraft simulators but also send all pilots for its 60 F-16C/Ds and 40 F-15SGs (at some point on their career) to Red Flag to train with the USAF on large force employment. To spread out defence spending, the RSAF has been progressively stocking up on American and Israeli missiles and JDAMs over many years through multiple purchase orders.

[F-16Vs are] likely going to be the second choice unless Prabowo becomes hampered by the budgetary realities coming in from the Ministry of Finance.
13. Buying 36 Dassault Rafale, instead of the F-16V, will mean that Indonesia will have acquire a new flight simulator and to send some future instructor pilots to France for training and they will need to take some basic French classes.
(a) To enhance deterrence and increase interoperability with the Armée de l'Air et de l'Espace, the TNI AU should place a follow-up order of 4 more Dassault Rafales within 2 years of the first order. This way the French will be incentivised to fly to Indonesia to conduct joint training with the TNI AU, as skills and TTP transfer is crucial to developing a naval strike capability.​
(b) Capable of firing the Exocet MM40 Block 3 (used by the TNI AL), the two Dassault Rafale squadrons (if acquired) will be excellent for the anti-shipping role. IIRC the Dassault Rafale also has the option of using the Scorpion Helmet Mounted Integrated Targeting system, at an extra cost — where the TNI AU can by clever buying give an incentive to the French to improve its capability to accept in more munitions — such as integrating Aim-9X to the type — so that in desperate times, TNI AU missile inventory can be used on French made fighters.​

14. Even as a second choice, the TNI AU should get at least 6 to 14 more F-16Vs, to top up the fighters in the two squadrons (to form full squadrons of 20 to 24 aircraft) — to increase the existing fleet of 34 to between 40 to 48 aircraft. Indonesia badly needs more single engine fighters to make up for a lack of fighters. The TNI AU should give an incentive to the Lockheed Martin to improve the F-16Vs capability to accept in more munitions — such as integrating the MICA NG (that will be service with the TNI AL) to the American fighter — so that in desperate times, TNI AU and TNI AL missile inventory can be used on American made fighters. The F-16 has 71 air-to-air victories and two air-to-air losses — there is some dispute on the kill ratio but it’s also pretty overwhelming.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Challenging cognitive dissonance and denial — Part 4

15. In contrast to the stupidity in the procurement journey of the Qatar Air Force, my efficiency oriented proposed increase in modern fighter numbers for Indonesia to 88 (i.e. 48 F-16s and 40 Dassault Rafale in four squadrons as a small air force), will quickly enhance deterrence and increase interoperability with advanced air forces.

16. Just because the F-15 has 108 air-to-air victories and no air-to-air losses, it does not mean the TNI AU can replicate this kill ratio by buying the same platform. In addition, let me share two points:

One, without AWACS, TNI AU fighters will go into every fight with inferior situational awareness compared to the fighters from the PLAAF and PLA(N); which means the number of fighters in a squadron matter (as significant attrition is expected). But before AWACS, the TNI AU needs to acquire a pair of A330MRTT to extend the range of Indonesian fighters, to cater for many troubled peace scenarios. If Indonesia is not logical in planning, the TNI AU can lose to the PLAAF 88:0.​

Two, the disparity of power between the PLAAF and the TNI AU makes it urgent to build resilience from Chinese air attack, at the 4 airbases hosting these squadrons, which would include:​

(i) plans to operate on alternate runways after the air base is bombed;​
(ii) hardening of the primary and alternate munitions bunkers to take direct hits from 500 pound bombs;​
(iii) planning for continued air operations after the control tower is destroyed; and​
(iv) investing and stocking up on rapid runway repair kits,​
rather than just thinking of buying a few of this and some of that approach to fighter procurement like Qatar.​
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Challenging cognitive dissonance and denial — Part 5

17. Since the last standoff in Indonesia’s EEZ waters north of the Natuna Islands in 2016, Indonesia has been increasing its defence spending, but not to the extent that it has deterred China from causing much more problems in the South China Sea.

18. By improving ties with China, Indonesia’s political leaders remain hopeful that such temporary upturn in economic relations means they don’t have to be serious on building military power — Indonesia’s short sighted elites think that they can spread the wealth of their planned arms buys with loans that mortgage the future of their country’s independence by incoherence.
(a) By being corrupt in orientation, Indonesia’s elites like Prabowo Subianto, as Defense Minister, and Prof. Mahfud MD, as Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, are ensuring that Indonesia will lose to China’s liminal warfare strategy. Fortunately, China has strong record of sticking to agreements with ASEAN or its neighbours in a manner that is to China’s advantage. Just ask the 20 Indian soldiers killed and 76 injured (who by agreement with PLA did not carry weapons or shoot) who were injured or clubbed to death by the PLA at the border on 15 Jun 2020, as part of China’s liminal warfare strategy.​
(b) In today’s troubled peace environment (and this also applies to all ASEAN countries that haven’t been so heavily involved in the South China Sea disputes), NATO, the European Union, Australia, Singapore, UK and NZ (as part of the FPDA), and Latin American countries part of the CTTP (collectively referred to as as the “Observers”), are free to sit back, watch Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, as claimants of EEZ rights in the South China Sea, struggle against China.​
(c) The Observers can use this struggle to identify strengths and weaknesses in Indonesia’s approach to providing leadership for ASEAN’s claimants of EEZ rights, and in future come up with concepts to enable them to improve and build capabilities that would counteract China’s liminal warfare strategy. One of the points that Dr. David Kilcullen makes about the Chinese dragon is that:​

“We are dealing with an adversary that has dramatically broadened its definition of warfare beyond what we consider to be war. In fact, what they do in practice is to mobilize multiple dimensions of national power that are way beyond our traditional military domains. Even if we could conceive a lot of what the Chinese are doing as warlike, it is not clear that the Ministry of Defense of any Western country would be in charge of the response. We need to think carefully about reconceptualizing what we mean by war.”​

Two, it is only a matter of time before Indonesia gets to directly experience what the Chinese dragon does to Japan and Taiwan, on a regular basis, to escalate tensions below the threshold of war as part of their liminal warfare strategy as described by Dr. David Kilcullen, who is an expert on Indonesia. As he notes, America’s adversaries like China and Iran are adapting, to how the coalition fought the 1991 Gulf War. It showed everybody how not to fight the US. The next big event was the 2003 invasion of Iraq that showed everybody that an adversary can fight the US and that they can succeed but the adversary needs to use a completely different model, as explained in Dr. David Kilcullen’s new book: “Liminal and conceptual envelopment: warfare in the age of dragons.”​
Three, as further evidence of such mistake made by ASEAN (and ASEAN’s leader, Indonesia) — the Chinese defense minister Wei Fenghe says Beijing will not bend when it comes to Taiwan, the South China Sea, and other “core interests;” and they expect ASEAN and by default Indonesia to bend.​
 
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Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
Making rational choices in fighter procurement — Part 1

2. As others have explained, Indonesia can’t afford in any significant numbers a twin engine fleet — be it a Dassault Rafale or the F-15EX. The transition to a single type will not occur.



6. If they are serious about air power and sortie generation, Indonesia should buy more F-16Vs and place an order for 66 F-16Vs like Taiwan, along with an order for 250 to 500 missiles…

(a) Without 500 to 1,000 missiles in the inventory, the TNI AU can’t decide to fight a PLA(N) task group — even if they decide to ram TNI AL ships as part of their escalation plans...​
(b) The best weapons are useless unless you have ISR to see the target from a far. Without the DB-110 recce pod (which the Taiwanese and UAE have), a TNI AU commander can’t move towards a more persistent ISR capability (through increased on-station time, and real-time image exploitation) to monitor Chinese bases and PLA(N) destroyers in the South China Sea, just out of range of their anti-air missiles.​
According to your favourite Oracle on Twitter, it is unlikely that Indonesia will withdraw from the KF-X program.

So, imagine a twin engine-fleet of F-15EX, KF-X, Rafale and Su-27/-30....besides the Hawks, F-16s and T-50s.
Perfect for airshows! But less perfect for daily patrols and operations.

Challenging cognitive dissonance and denial — Part 5

17. Since the last standoff in Indonesia’s EEZ waters north of the Natuna Islands in 2016, Indonesia has been increasing its defence spending, but not to the extent that it has deterred China from causing much more problems in the South China Sea.
It was actually in Dec 2019 - Feb 2020, just at the beginning of the pandemic that this happened. It showed us that our armed forces really need modernisation and improvement. And it also shows us that the current andministration did almost nothing to achieve this. And still Luhut, one of the people behind the deterioration of TNI, acting like China's little doggy, talking about friendship and that they do not have bad intentions, and denying the existence of the huge gap between the equipment of Indonesia's navy and coastguard and the chinese ones.

18. By improving ties with China, Indonesia’s political leaders remain hopeful that such temporary upturn in economic relations means they don’t have to be serious on building military power…
(a) …Indonesia’s elites like Prabowo Subianto, as Defense Minister, and Prof. Mahfud MD, as Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, are ensuring that Indonesia will lose to China’s liminal warfare strategy…​
(b) …​
(c) …One of the points that Dr. David Kilcullen makes about the Chinese dragon is that:​

“We are dealing with an adversary that has dramatically broadened its definition of warfare beyond what we consider to be war. In fact, what they do in practice is to mobilize multiple dimensions of national power that are way beyond our traditional military domains. Even if we could conceive a lot of what the Chinese are doing as warlike, it is not clear that the Ministry of Defense of any Western country would be in charge of the response. We need to think carefully about reconceptualizing what we mean by war.”​

Two, it is only a matter of time before Indonesia gets to directly experience what the Chinese dragon does to Japan and Taiwan, on a regular basis, to escalate tensions below the threshold of war as part of their liminal warfare strategy as described by Dr. David Kilcullen, who is an expert on Indonesia. As he notes, America’s adversaries like China and Iran are adapting, to how the coalition fought the 1991 Gulf War. It showed everybody how not to fight the US. The next big event was the 2003 invasion of Iraq that showed everybody that an adversary can fight the US and that they can succeed but the adversary needs to use a completely different model, as explained in Dr. David Kilcullen’s new book: “Liminal and conceptual envelopment: warfare in the age of dragons.”​
Exactly the way Duterte thinks.

Almost all defence equipment ordered during this administration does not only lack any firepower or deterrence, but it is also not really useable to patrol the North Natuna Sea.

During the standoff it was also clear that patrolboats of 40 meters, 28 meters and smaller ones are not suitable in the open waters north of Natuna (already pointed out by Ananda).

The NASAMS is a good air defence system, but with only 36 AIM-120C-7 AMRAAMS in TNI-AU's inventory, its not even enough to arm the 33 F-16s with two missiles each. And yes, empty launchers are useless.

So, what OPSSG already said, and what's already obvious for many years, TNI-AU needs more missiles.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Challenging cognitive dissonance and denial — Part 6

19. For countries (like UAE, Korea and Singapore), military effectiveness to enhance deterrence is the process by which a country’s armed forces:
(a) convert financial resources into efficient weapons procurement;​
(b) thereafter train with the weapons procured to generate the large number of sorties needed each day of war; and​
(c) use this training to develop doctrine and tactics that convert the fighters bought into fighting power to secure air superiority.​

A fully effective military is one that derives maximum combat power from the resources available from the treasury and politically from support by key allies or partners. Without the correct coalition CONOPS, it is impossible for the TNI AU to secure air superiority. In the 1991 Gulf War, the USAF deployed 249 F-16s and this type alone generated 13,087 sorties (more than any other aircraft type out of the 109,876 sorties flown).

20. In the case of:
(a) Korea, as a large air force that operates approximately 740 aircraft, their ability at a doctrinal and tactics level to inter-operate with the Americans is of paramount importance to deter war with North Korea;​
(b) UAE, as a medium to large air force that operates approximately 538 fixed wing and rotorcraft, their ability at a doctrinal and tactics level to inter-operate with the Americans, the French and other GCC countries is of paramount importance to deter war with Iran; and​
(c) Singapore, as a small air force that operates less than 220 fixed wing and rotorcraft plus UAVs, our ability to inter-operate with the Americans and the Australians at a doctrinal and tactics level is growing in importance, to manage the troubled peace we have with the idiotic Malaysian politicians (that are silly enough, in 2018 to 2019, to send a boat intrude into our Tuas port waters) and secure the peace we desire in the South China Sea, along with other FPDA countries.​

21. Different from conducting great ‘air shows’ by token air forces like that of Malaysia, true military effectiveness for the capable Singaporean, Emirati, and Korean air forces, that range from small to large, incorporates logistics efficiency and sortie generation ability — that is why:
(a) Singapore acquired 2 squadrons of F-15SGs and 3 squadrons of F-16C/Ds;​
(b) UAE acquired 4 squadrons of Desert Falcons and 4 squadrons of Mirage 2000; and​
(c) Korea acquired 3 squadrons of Slam Eagles and 9 squadrons of F-16s,​
to provide the backbone to support the fighting fists. According to Dr Olli Pekka Soursa, in his presentation to the TNI AU, buying the aircraft only represents 1/3 of the true costs of operating a fighter type. The other 2/3s come from operating that fighter type for 20 to 30 years (which will include a MLU). That is why the efficient Koreans buy 1 F-15K (a twin engine fighter) for every 3 F-16s (a single engine fighter) — at a 1:3 ratio of twins vs singles. The UAE that is better funded than that of Indonesia is even more extreme in managing for efficiency. Their fighter fleet is 100% single engine fighter types. Any procurement today will affect tomorrow’s sustainment for the TNI AU, so the country must choose well. Don’t buy what Indonesia’s treasury can’t allocate enough annual funds for the next 30 years to train and sustain.

22. The goal of effectiveness in generating air power (via the backbone’s sortie generation capability) is the develop the ability to inflict damage on a larger enemy force; while limiting the damage that can be inflicted in return (via air base hardening and investing in a multi-layer SAM system to enable continued sortie generation).

23. The other factors for the TNI AU to consider in their quest to develop their air power, are as follows:

One, tactical and operational efficiency, labelled as the ‘modern system’ by Stephen Biddle in his book “Military Power”, has become the most popular explanation for military and combat effectiveness. The main trend in military effectiveness scholarship is expanding on and refining Biddle’s argument that military forces like the PLAAF that are well-trained in the modern system of military tactics and operations are likely to be highly effective fighting forces.​
Two, the PLA watched Gulf War 1 with horror as the Iraqi Air Force was efficiently and effectively destroyed by coalition air power led by the USAF; and the Chinese have changed significantly to ensure that the PLAAF can likewise achieve coalition air power standards of military effectiveness demonstrated in 1991. Chinese focus on: (i) tactical; and (ii) operational, efficiency means that the TNI AU, as a small to medium air force, facing off against the large PLAAF need to consider these two efficiency factors and take them into account. Therefore, the TNI AU needs to focus on tactical and operational efficiency via logistics coherence. Only by rationalising the number of fighter types Indonesia operates can the country achieve logistics coherence.​
Three, often times, a very efficient air force is one that operates 3 to 9 squadrons of the same type and you can see that characteristic in F-16 operators like UAE (80 Desert Falcons), Korea (180 in total — 30 F-16Cs, 10 F-16Ds, 95 KF-16Cs and 45 KF-16Ds), and Singapore (60 upgraded to F-16Vs). An efficient air force is one that operates two or more squadrons of the same type and an inefficient air force is one that operates only 1 squadron of a type, like Malaysia (eg 8 F-18Ds and 18 Su-30MKMs). An very inefficient air force is one that operates 1/2 a squadron of 8 of the same type. Being inefficient means not enough spares to maintain high availability rates of above 85% — Singapore’s fleet of 60 F-16C/Ds has 7 spare engines. How may spare engines does each Malaysian or Indonesian squadron or half squadron maintain?​
 
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Ananda

The Bunker Group
23. The other factors for the TNI AU to consider in their quest to develop their air power, are as follows:

…​
… often times, a very efficient air force is one that operates 3 to 9 squadrons of the same type and you can see that characteristic in F-16 operators like UAE (80 Desert Falcons), Korea (180 in total — 30 F-16Cs, 10 F-16Ds, 95 KF-16Cs and 45 KF-16Ds), and Singapore (60 upgraded to F-16Vs). An efficient air force is one that operates two or more squadrons of the same type and an inefficient air force is one that operates only 1 squadron of a type, like Malaysia (eg 8 F-18Ds and 18 Su-30MKMs). An very inefficient air force is one that operates 1/2 a squadron of 8 of the same type. Being inefficient means not enough spares to maintain high availability rates of above 85% — Singapore’s fleet of 60 F-16C/Ds has 7 spare engines.​
I believe I put a video in this thread, on workshop being done by TNI-AU training center during their anniversary. One of the speaker more or less put it as you have wrote above. Perhaps this's why LM still continue doing hard lobby, since they know they have support from inside TNI-AU.

However the force that wants Rafale is quite big. French now doing all effort to gain this deal and Submarine deal as they unexpectedly getting cut from their own partner Italy/Fincantieri.
The question remains if the internal force within MinDef that wants F-15EX, can be reasons to take F-16V or upgrade F-16. Some rumours talking that LM offering quantity with upgrade Block 30/40 toward V version. Just like the previous deal of Block 25 upgrade toward blk 52.

There's big chess game being played, but one of the reasoning behind that, as there are players in MinDef and TNI-AU also in Finance that wants to have the most efficient fleet within finite budget that can be allocated.

If they can offer 32-48 block 40 being upgrade to V (as previous Obama's offer to SBY for 24 block 25 upgrade to blk 52), then perhaps it's better. After all it's Bidden administration know, perhaps they will offer more or less similar deals as Obama offer.

That potentially can bring 60-80 F-16, and if they add it with 36 Rafale, that will be enough for at least toward end of decade. Prabowo's also wants the fastest way to revive TNI-AU fleet, perhaps that's what can be done.

The plan also talk for sufficient stocks of armament. Will see how they're progressing. Just as I have mentioned before, this's the game between Political Ego, and Sanity Check. Somehow I still see the middle ground will be taken. Too much base only on logic, something that not historically shown in Indonesia politics. The grey middle ground usually that will be taken.
 
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Ananda

The Bunker Group
Do you still have the video by any chance? I'm curious about it.
I forget which post I put it. I believe I got that from you tube. It's from official TNI-AU sites. Hope they still keep the link open, sometimes they pull down some video after certain time.


It's full video from this International workshop. One of the International speaker talk about the need for efficient fleet make up. Which I forget where to put it, or even the link still work. Perhaps if you looking on Kris FB there're still have it. If not mistaken they are also put the link there.


Ahh the link still there in you tube. Try to see the session from Dr Olli Pekka (6:xx:xx minutes). He's from Nanyang.
@OPSSG just realise something your initial similar with Dr Olli Pekka Soursa. Are you him ?
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Challenging cognitive dissonance and denial — Part 7

24. For the TNI AU, as a small to medium air force, to modernise, it’s not about buying 6 or 7 types of fighters and LCAs. Rather, for effective modernisation to occur, the TNI AU needs to:

(a) be efficient at sortie generation; and also inter-operate with key allies and partners — including: (i) arming your 34 F-16s with 204 missiles; (ii) grow the Viper fleet a little; and (iii) acquire 2 tankers for TNI AU to be proficient in air-to-air refuelling;​

(b) realise that it is not the largest, best equipped, information-technology-rich militaries that invariably wins. If not there is no hope and the TNI AU, as a small to medium air force, should surrender to the much larger PLAAF, as they are better equipped. This approach overlooks the importance of: (i) using the correct CONOPS for large force employment along with allies and partners; or (ii) the correct use of appropriate doctrine and tactics (by which materiel is actually used); and​

(c) think about how large force employment interacts with materiel to produce real combat outcomes — it is not the platform that confers capability but having a system that works: (i) Stephen Biddle argues that force employment is central to modern war, becoming increasingly important; and (ii) I think the TNI AU needs to think along these lines, like the way the Emiratis, the Koreans and the Singaporeans have done.​

25. In AirPower 101 that we wrote years ago, the forum established a minimum standard for discussions to help new members realise that the future is in co-operative battlespace managers which can run primary or hand-off where appropriate — that is why the TNI AU and TNI AL cannot afford to fight alone but have to gear up in coalition with other more capable air forces and navies in the region.
(a) This means American, Australian, French, Japanese and Singaporean fighters and naval vessels, like destroyers and frigates will work with support from AWACs, MPAs, tankers and so on.​
(b) Current AESA equipped 4.5 gen and 5th gen fighters like F-2s, F-15Js, F-15SGs, F-15EXs, F-16Vs, F-18E/Fs, F-22s, F-35As, F-35Bs, F-35Cs, Growlers and Dassault Rafale will not fight by themselves, in fact, they will work with EW and space based assets to provide advanced ISR, and communications capabilities (though there are some issues that need to be worked out).​
(c) Even the French wants support from the Japanese and vice versa, when operating in troubled waters in the Indo-Pacific. From the point of view of the RAN, US Navy and JMSDF, in the near future AEGIS and its cooperative engagement capability can take incoming data from off-board sources, be it from other AEGIS destroyers, E-2Ds, P-8As and fighters to fire at targets the ship's own radar cannot see. Likewise the TNI AL cannot afford to be seen as going in it alone patrols against the PLA(N) (as the world’s largest navy by gross tonnage).​
(d) Control of the air, control of the electromagnetic spectrum and effective use of LO platforms sets the stage for additional aerial operations, and it also sets the conditions for naval or ground forces to operate to their full combat potential without substantial interruption of their scheme of maneuver from enemy air attacks and attacks using the electromagnetic spectrum.​

P.S. I am not Dr Olli Pekka Soursa. Thanks for mistaking me for him.
 
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Ananda

The Bunker Group
:D sorry about that. It's just your initial similar with his initial. Anyway, that's why I put, if some in TNI-AU brass lines already involve him in their workshop. My presumptions are some of them already inline with his findings and conclusions.

However they also include speaker from French that showing off Rafale. Just shown how big the force that back Rafale deals.
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group

Jane's put article on Aerial Tanker procurement. This based on Information that 'Finance' people already put official agreement for acquisition of 2 MRTT class Tanker. The choice shown general requirement for capabilities of both Boom and Drouge methods.

This already been speculate for some time. This is also not clear whether the option for 2 other (as MinDef documents talk of 2+2 tanker program), already in the pipe line or not. Based on the article seems not yet. GMF involvement also being discussed with Airbus. How far the involvement whether only in MRO or MRO+Installation is not clear yet.

The budget seems indicating enough for 2 new airframe. However Garuda also own (not lease) 4 A330-200 that being 'rumours' going to be replace by 4 A330-800 neo that Airbus already put as part of order. With Garuda dire financial performance, it's not 'imposible' those 4 A330-200 they own being sold to Government as part of additional fund needed to boost the book.

Well that's my own speculation. However probable from financial point of view. It will reduce the foreign credit need, while in same time give additional fund to help Garuda stay afloat.
 
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Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
| "Among the matters that were explored in the study were life cycle costs, local capabilities in maintaining the airframes, compatibility of refuelling methods with the TNI-AU's fleet of aircraft, and inter-operability with existing and future TNI-AU assets.

As part of its findings, the TNI-AU and GMF AeroAsia recommend that the new tankers be equipped with both the probe-and-drogue and flying boom aerial refuelling methods, Janes has learnt. "|


This is actually too logic for a recommendation.
With only one aerial refuelling method, halve of the jetfighterfleet can not be refuelled. But the fact that Ministry of Finance (MoF) has granted approval for the acquisition of two aerial refuelling tankers is a good sign.

Like Ananda already said, i also wonder if the A330-200 aircrafts, maybe just the two first, will be used from Garuda for modification instead of brandnew ones. Like most other airlines, Garuda Indonesia is also in heavy weather.


With cutting in some international flights, those A330-200s can be retired earlier, and if im not wrong the first A332s are delivered around 2010, much later than the first batch of A333 just before the Krismon in 1998. So the amount of flighthours should be acceptable.

There were plans to remove the CRJ1000 from the fleet, but until now they are still flying.

But for me its quite sure that the A330 MRTT will be chosen. There is almost no reason to not to choose the A330 MRTT, specially because the KC-46 program is still full of technical problems and cost overruns.

 
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Ananda

The Bunker Group
im not wrong the first A332s are delivered around 2010, much later than the first batch of A333 just before the Krismon in 1998. So the amount of flighthours should be acceptable.
While flight hours due matter, however flight hours calculation on using ex passenger airliners for Freighter business is quite different. That's why quite significant population of older ex passenger airliners like A340-200, 767, 747-300/400 with more two/three decades flight hours, still being use with high utilisation on freighter business.

MRTT in the end not much different with Freighter variance of Airliners. Thus eventough most Garuda's A330-200 fleet still relatively younger then their A330-300 fleet, but even those 300 come from 90's still can be use for freighter conversion. However so far MRTT mostly use 200 version rather than 300.
 

Arji

Member
Not sure where I should put this, but it seems that we're only getting a fraction of the proposed budget for 2020-2024.

"Jokowi Cuma Anggarkan Rp298 T Buat Belanja Militer"

So it's around USD 20,7 Bi for all 3 branches. Most of it is of course, comes from foreign loan as stated in the article. As a military enthusiast I guess it's kind of disappointing, but as a citizen I'm kind of relief in a way they don't lean too much on defense spending especially with this whole pandemic situation.
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group
it's around USD 20,7 Bi for all 3 branches.
That USD 20+ bio is something that actually being talk by Finance Minister before this some 'insiders'/'agent' leak that draft for USD 120+ bio. In fact in the video that I put the link still on International workshop done during TNI-AU anniversary, they also talk around those numbers.

Do they really believe that this 'new' budget can really be sustainable ? They are good in paper, but in reality on annual disbursement that's another matter
That's why I put this on one of my previous posts. That number eventough being talk for up to 2044 program, is very hard to be disburse all in this term. They will jump our sovereign debt ratio, during economics recovery time. With this, it's mean the 'finance' people want to maintain all ratio more or less in similar level. Including most important sovereign debt ratio. They want to save the book, because that's what can provide Investors confidences toward the economy.

They don't want to inject additional capital for Flag Carrier Garuda (for example), because it's not going to be sustainable. So, it's not surprising they want to maintain the ratio. It's surprising if they go with that plan of disbursement USD 120+ bio in one term. Thus
'finance' logic in the end still matter.

Just remembered one of (ex) poster in here that 'redicule' my post in which I argue that in the end 'finance' people that matter more than those defense 'insiders'. Well it's not just in MinDef, but in all ministries. Their plan in the end has to get through 'finance' people scrutinized, before they can agree to release the money or getting new loans.

Still USD 20+bio for this term if it's executable, means significant procurement Projects. If TNI-AU got USD 8bio, TNI-AL got USD 8bio, and TNI-AD rest USD 4bio, TNI-AU still can get that Rafale and MRTT. However nothing else. This means no AEWC, No additional GCI and no theater air defense missile.

They still can get those if they go with F-16V plus some refurbished F-16 blk40 as I heard rumours offer by LM. If that happens, poor Dasault. They got cut 3 times by US after Mirage IIIe, and Mirage 2000.

Well will see what happens, after all in Indonesia anything can change.
 
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Ananda

The Bunker Group
It all depends on the internal push for 'Rafale' in MinDef. The 'finance' people only give the maximum line of credit they can take during this term. They also make sure that all packages including, thus no additional credit being ask in this term.

If those 'powerful' urges for Rafale can't be reason by TNI-AU brass, then they will have to be satisfied with Rafale plus some cargo airplanes like MRTT and C-130J. Perhaps 36 Rafale plus 2 MRTT and 5 C-130J still can be covered, all depends on how far Dasault deal can be reach.

More than that, unless they (TNI-AU) got 60% of the budget, not more than that they can procured. So far the talk that I got is 40% AF, 40% Navy, 20% Army. That Army portion also include some special procurement that usually done by MinDef. The Navy I'm sure not going to relinquish their portion. They have Frigates and Submarines plus additional special purpose ships (like Submarine rescue) that need to be covered.

Well unless somehow the 'finance' people wants to give more foreign credit line budget (which means they're gambling with sovereign book position), I don't see TNI-AU can afford those AEWC, GCI and area defense missile as they have talk before, if Rafale still the choices. At least in this term.
 

Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
Not sure where I should put this, but it seems that we're only getting a fraction of the proposed budget for 2020-2024.

"Jokowi Cuma Anggarkan Rp298 T Buat Belanja Militer"

So it's around USD 20,7 Bi for all 3 branches. Most of it is of course, comes from foreign loan as stated in the article. As a military enthusiast I guess it's kind of disappointing, but as a citizen I'm kind of relief in a way they don't lean too much on defense spending especially with this whole pandemic situation.
$20,7 billion for all three branches, that means $6,9 billion spread evenly, $1,38 for each year.

Hopefully thats enough for the 6 FREMM and 2 second hand Maestrale frigates (the Italian version costed €600 million each in 2014). But maybe a batch of 3 submarines will be not possible, maybe not even a submarine rescue ship.

For TNI-AU that is hopefully enough for 2-4 A330 MRTT aircrafts and 36 Rafales. Who knows, maybe even a squadron of 15-20 second hand F-16s.

For TNI-AD...will their dream of the MV-22B come true?
 
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