The following article is from Aviation Week & Space Technology. Sep 3, 2001.
Australian Training Yields Top-Notch Fighter Pilots
WILLIAM B. SCOTT/RAAF BASE WILLIAMTOWN, AUSTRALIA
High standards, intense training and a steady diet of practice are the secrets to RAAF fighter pilots' success in the air. The Royal Australian Air Force has developed a high-standard training regimen that ensures its F/A-18 pilots consistently fare very well during simulated air combat engagements against their allied counterparts.
As a result, the RAAF's reputation for fielding excellent fighter pilots has sparked a recurring question among humbled mock opponents for years: What are the Australians doing differently?
Testimony from U.S., U.K. and other fighter crews seems to support the RAAF's reputation. A U.S. Navy officer who flew F-14s in several multinational exercises throughout the Pacific said, "It was easy to find the Aussies--look behind you. Those guys were always on your tail."
In a report submitted to Pacific Air Force headquarters, a U.S. Air Force pilot who recently returned from a 2.5-year exchange tour as an instructor at the RAAF's Fighter School gave high marks to the Australian training program. Later, in a pithy e-mail message--which, to his chagrin, was immediately circulated around the globe--he gave flying buddies a glowing account of his experience down under.
"The RAAF has avoided the political-correctness wave . . . and has retained a culture that emphasizes war-fighting over politics. It was interesting to watch the [RAAF] absolutely pummel visiting U.S. fighter squadrons . . . . These bumpkins from down under treat us the way the North Vietnamese Air Force treated us 35 years ago--they are kicking our platinum [tails] with 20-mm. gunshots from 2,000 ft. back, like the Red Baron," he wrote.
Australia transforms newly winged airmen into dual-role F/A-18 pilots at its Fighter School, which is located on RAAF Base Williamtown near the continent's eastern coast. Since 1985, when the RAAF started flying its 75 Hornets, F/A-18 training has been handled by No. 2 Operational Conversion Unit, commonly known as 2OCU Sqdn.
Sixteen years later, the small air force still has an inventory of 71 A- and B-model Hornets. A three-phase upgrade program and a separate structural refurbishment effort is modernizing the fleet and extending its operational life to about 2012-16, senior officers here said (see p. 96). After the upgrade, RAAF aircraft will be roughly equivalent to a U.S. Navy F/A-18C.
The 2OCU training squadron runs several courses, but its primary role is to graduate a "D-Category" fighter pilot proficient in both air-to-air and air-to-surface tactics. About 70 hr. of flight time during the 23-week F/A-18 conversion course will produce a pilot having basic fighter skills, including formation, instrument and night flying. Typically, 37 sorties are dedicated to air-to-air training, another 22 are air-to-surface--including maritime attack--and the final four or five are live-fire missions with high-explosives. The latter require deploying to a range near Townsville, a fighter base about 850 mi. north of Williamtown. Throughout the course, students also "fly" eight air-to-air and 12 air-to-surface missions in a ground simulator.
The squadron's 14 instructors (including USAF and Canadian Air Force exchange pilots) train two classes of 6-10 students each year. Of the unit's 18 Hornets, 10-12 are two-seat F/A-18B versions. Some of those "duals are shared with operational squadrons at times," said Sqdn. Ldr. Alan Clements, an instructor and the 2OCU executive officer. During peak flying periods, the unit can generate 25-30 F/A-18 sorties per day, but a normal daily schedule will produce 15-20 flights. About 3,000 hr. are flown each year.
"By comparison, an operational unit will fly 2,500-3,000 hr. a year," Clements said. "We fly more hours than an operational squadron, [because] we graduate dual-role pilots qualified in both air-to-air and air-to-surface."
However, those flight hours are hard on 2OCU's aircraft, particularly the two-seaters. "When you only have about eight dual-seat aircraft on the flightline at once, they're pretty precious commodities," said Wing Cdr. William Henman, a former 2OCU commanding officer now attending the USAF Air War College. "They spend a lot of time at high angles-of-attack and pulling gs, so our [B-models] are getting tired. Our per-flight-hour stress accrual is quite high; some of the duals are fleet-leaders in fatigue."
This editor spent three days at 2OCU, talking to students, commanders and instructors, flying on a 2-versus-1 air combat maneuvering (ACM) training mission, and looking for a "magic something" that might explain why RAAF pilots consistently either beat or at least humble their air-to-air opponents. Surprisingly, I found 2OCU instructors reluctant to claim they might be superior combat pilots. Humility is hardly a trait associated with a fighter jock, who typically firmly believes he is the best pilot on Earth--a conviction that's essential for survival. No pilot here denied the RAAF's hard-won reputation, though, and acknowledgments were carefully phrased.
"I think we have a cost-effective training program that produces a qualified combat fighter and strike pilot in a relatively short time," said Air Commo. Paul F. Devine, commander of RAAF's Tactical Fighter Group. "And I think we do pretty well against world[-class] standards--as good as anybody else, and better than some. The RAAF holds to high standards--in selection and training--to ensure a high-quality pilot product."
"We've done fairly well during multinational exercises," Henman echoed. "When we've fought our Hornets against U.S. Air Force units, we've compared very favorably. But we get a lot of practice here, and I believe we get more opportunities than U.S. operators of the Hornet. The Navy and Marine Corps, just due to their operations tempo and deployments, don't have the luxury of spending [considerable] time on the core skills like we do. And I can't overemphasize that we benefit greatly from our exchange programs with the U.S. Navy and Air Force. We take a lot of lessons they learn during foreign deployments and [actual] operations, then modify our tactics."
ONE NOTEWORTHY TRAINING DIFFERENTIATOR I observed is the degree of regimentation and flexibility. U.S. pilots normally are restricted from "pushing the envelope"--mainly for safety reasons and to ensure consistency of training throughout a large force--but I detected a difference in attitude and freedom to explore new concepts, as well.
"I think we do have a different ethos in training at the squadron level, and that makes us effective in the air-to-air [arena]," said Sqdn. Ldr. Phil Eldridge, a 2OCU instructor who also heads the Fighter Combat Instructor course--which is the RAAF equivalent of the U.S. Navy's "Top Gun" and USAF's Weapon School (see p. 94). "We don't highly regiment our 'bandit' (aggressor) presentations. That's a big difference from other air forces, I think.
"We often allow very wild, aggressive maneuvering of our 'bandits' during air-to-air flows. I don't think that's very representative of what we'll see if we go to war . . . but training to the extreme is very challenging," Eldridge explained. "We take the gloves off and tell guys, 'You're cleared weird.' When you're fighting someone who's 'cleared weird,' you know that every time you try to lock [an enemy] on radar, they're going to split into singles, or one's going to drop 20,000 ft. of altitude, or turn into the [Doppler radar's] 'notch,' or dispense chaff. You work real hard to get them--and that takes you out of your 'safe' area; you peak with a [higher] level of skills. Your reactions become very fast. You're quick to manipulate the radar and its employment--and that's one of our strong points, I think. This forces you to think faster, while reinforcing a lot of basic skills."
He and other pilots here attributed the RAAF's air combat success to aggressive training, a focus on countering complex enemy maneuvers or "presentations," and a concentration on short-range radar tactics. Another subtle but important factor is the RAAF's emphasis on air combat skill-building rather than procedure-following. Squadrons make sure pilots develop good situational awareness, targeting techniques and defensive skills, rather than rote by-the-numbers maneuvers, Eldridge noted.
SOME MAY DISPUTE THE RAAF'S EMPHASIS on close-in fighter tactics, noting that modern air combat tactics have moved toward beyond-visual-range (BVR) engagements and away from "dogfighting." However, most nations' rules of engagement (ROE) dictate a potential enemy aircraft must be visually identified before firing a long-range missile.
"You really don't want to be in a visual arena anymore," Henman agreed. "The focus should be on weapons systems and rules of engagement that allow you to employ those weapons BVR. Why have a long-range Amraam if you're forced to get in close enough to see the other guy's tail flash? But, until we have different ROEs, or enough systems to get a positive ID at BVR, we're going to have to get into that visual arena. Then, all the skills we teach are required to come out of the battle alive."
He noted that, historically, every time a new missile seeker has been developed, an effective countermeasure to it is close behind, negating some advantage of BVR systems. In contrast, that limitation disappears in a close-in fight where a short-range gun or cannon is effective. "You can't jam a bullet," one pilot said.
"In the end, if you can pull your airplane to a [position of] leading the other guy, and he gets big in your windscreen, you're going to scare him. If you build a fighter that has no gun or no [short-range] missile capability, I think you're a bit foolish," Henman declared. Consequently, much of the 2OCU training program is dedicated to developing skills necessary for visual engagements.
Another effective RAAF pilot-building technique is "block training," where a squadron will fly exclusively air-to-air or air-to-surface missions for up to four weeks. "If everybody in the squadron is flying four-ship [air engagements] every day--talking, briefing, flying and debriefing nothing but four-ships--it gets us to a higher skill level," Eldridge said. "It's particularly effective for junior pilots; they can focus on just one set of procedures associated with air-to-air. Then we might go to a four-week block of air-to-surface training. [Next,] we'll probably fly an exercise that combines air-to-air and air-to-surface."
Henman, Clements and Eldridge were quick to also point out the RAAF's shortcomings in preparing for modern coalition warfare. "The one thing we really lack is exposure to large-force [air combat] packages and integrating with specialized force-multipliers, such as AWACS and electronic warfare platforms," Clements said. "We don't get to see a lot of these. And, as a relatively small defense-oriented force, we're not able to provide those on our own."
In recent years, though, RAAF units have deployed overseas and taken part in a Cope Thunder exercise in Alaska and Canada's Maple Flag, providing valuable exposure to large-force operations.
It appeared to me that the RAAF's air combat training program is closely aligned with those of the U.S., U.K. and other Western air forces, but is distinguished by subtle, perhaps important differentiators. The Australians are uncompromising in setting high training standards, and are adamant about flying a lot of hours to hone and sustain perishable skills. Those standards have come under scrutiny recently, since the RAAF is having a tough time recruiting and retaining enough pilots in its three operational F/A-18 squadrons. A relatively small national population, an airline hiring spree, and competing career opportunities during the last five years have led to a shortage of line pilots and 2OCU instructors.
"WE'RE UNDER PRESSURE AT 2OCU TO GET MORE people through the [conversion] program," Henman said. "If we take in nine students and consistently only graduate five, we have to question whether we're being too elitist. 2OCU has always been absolutely uncompromising about our graduation requirements, and that gives us a high-quality pilot. If we backed off our training standards, and don't put people through the difficult [regimen] we do now, we will graduate more pilots. I assure you, though, if the squadrons start losing airplanes, it will be traced back to training, and we'll be right back to our [stringent] requirements."
Ultimately, the winner of an air-to-air engagement comes down to small advantages in technique, skill and speed of thought--all elements honed through practice. Therein may lie the biggest differentiator, some pilots here believe. The RAAF dual-role fighter pilot trains for fewer types of missions than USAF, for example, becomes proficient with a smaller array of air-to-ground weapons, and--thanks to being a smaller force--can train with a keener focus.
"The RAAF flies more air-to-air sorties in a given time than U.S. crews do--not like our air force, which has to deploy a lot and fly around over Bosnia or Iraq, losing its edge," said Maj. Dan Spires, a USAF exchange officer serving as an instructor at 2OCU. "Here, they train to be flexible and to fit into coalition forces [by] adopting others' warfighting tactics and procedures."
That winning-edge "magic" factor remains somewhat of a mystery, even to RAAF pilots. "The consensus of U.S. Navy, USAF and Marine Corps exchange pilots is that the Cat-D pilot 2OCU graduates tends to be at a higher proficiency level than U.S. conversion graduates in a particular fighter type," Clements said. "That may be due to good screening or intense training or something else. We're not real sure what makes our graduates slightly more proficient."
