Defence of Taiwan

koxinga

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I am not sure how valid is this observation, but it bears discussion


To stop the landing, it would make sense to mine the beaches, and use mobile response forces to flood troops when needed. I would also pre-sight the beaches and pound it from afar (an equally complicated task now given PLA's increasing effective killchain) rather than try to do WWI style trenches.

I supposed they were inspired by the Urkrainians and their sandbags in Odessa but they need to decide what works for them and what does not. PLA is not exactly the Black Sea Fleet and they have been specifically training for an opposed landing for years.


Although largely for propoganda purposes, observations of PLA training exercises have more or less identified PLA amphib landing doctrine and shows that they are keenly aware of the need to eliminate shore based threats with a combination of artillery bombardment and landing heavy armour as part of the initial wave.

 

OPSSG

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Part 4 of 4: Pelosi to visit Taiwan on 2-3 Aug 2022

10. Since the Sunflower Movement the political center has shifted to a pro-Taiwan position that does not accept that Taiwan is a part of China.
(a) This has moved the DPP into the power position, put the KMT on the margins, and the TPP trying to come up with a clear stance of its own, prior to the 2024 Presidential Election in Taiwan (where Tsai’s VP William Lai Ching-te is the front runner). In the past, Lai has referred to himself as a “pro-independence worker” for Taiwan.​
(b) Most Americans supporting Pelosi’s visit don’t even know about ‘The Gray Rhino’ in the room this time. As Tsai’s successor, VP William Lai Ching-te, is likely to want to force China’s hand & declare independence, once Tsai steps down at the next election. A gray rhino is a 2-ton animal, with a scary horn that is charging at us. It’s a metaphor for the things that go wrong that is actually avoidable.​
(c) Long run consequences for Taiwan is important. Pelosi raised China-Taiwan tensions at a time when tension is already excessive. She damaged Xi Jinping when he is ensuring his third term and is under attack for being weak on Taiwan. This forces him to take especially strong ongoing measures. She raised the baseline for future military signaling, which to show seriousness will now have to start with exercises completely surrounding Taiwan and likely blockading it.​
(d) We should take note what Bonnie Glaser wrote: “The actions that China is taking now are intended to drastically shift the status quo in BJ's favor. Think 2012 Senkakus and 2015-16 South China Sea. Many will look back on this visit and say that Taiwan paid too high a price.”​
(e) What Pelosi didn't do was to strengthen Taiwan or US support for Taiwan in any way. Trump, Pompeo and Biden already pushed that support to a point that jeopardized the 1979 understanding which is the foundation of Taiwan's enjoyment of peace, prosperity and democracy. The coming period of tension to the 2024 Presidential Election in Taiwan may be bumpy. It will be important for American and Chinese officials to remain in direct contact; and for each side to exercise discipline, so as to focus on preserving peace and stability in Taiwan Strait.​

I am not sure how valid is this observation, but it bears discussion
11. Clearly, from the pictures released, Taiwan’s annual "Han Kuang" exercise has staged PR displays that is devoid of military logic (or tactics). Given the Pelosi visit, it is expected that the exercise just prior to her visit have a stronger than usual PR focus. But no competent army would be silly enough to build a trench under a bridge span, with pretty sand bags for walls (when a wood frame to prevent collapse in heavy rains is more practical). The silly thing is having it located only about hundred metres from the beach.

12. As expected, Beijing unleashed a number of measures to punish Taiwan as a result of the trip. The scale and range of these retaliations are bigger than before but as many experts point out, they are not really new tactics. The Taiwanese themselves were rather calm about the Pelosi visit, and how this reflects how Taiwanese perspectives were often neglected regarding trip. While the Taiwanese appreciate the support and solidarity from a high-level official like Pelosi, they also have concerns about the level and extent of China’s retaliation, in this Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis.

13. As others have noted, Friedman is right about how stupid a move this is. There is no rational reason for it and it harms Taiwan. It really is a comment on the extreme political dysfunction in the US and the fundamental American failure to understand China. Not sure how true but a commentator reported that Pelosi said she will only not go to Taiwan if Biden publicly discourages her and she can blame him.

14. As much as I pity Taiwan, it’s pretty impressive that China, within hours of the Pelosi visit has used every element of DIME to express displeasure:
(a) Diplomacy — Not only has China has lodged a demarche to the US White House National Security Council and the Department of State on US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, China’s MFA has coordinated responses with other countries like Pakistan, North Korea and even Lesotho.​
(b) Information — China’s MFA statement says Pelosi's visit "in any form and for any reason is an escalation of official exchanges between the U.S. and Taiwan and a major political provocation." There is also an active disinformation campaign and cyber attacks.​
(c) Military — The Chinese:​
(i) say the PLA will "launch a series of targeted military operations to counter" the actions of the U.S. and the DPP authorities, 16 minutes after Pelosi landed in Taipei;​
(ii) scale of exercises are so large and in so many areas that Taiwan port authorities asked ships to find alternative routes and avoid areas of China's announced drills around the island. Commenting on the six exclusion zones, M. Taylor Fravel said: “It’s quite clear they’re going to be simulating how they might blockade Taiwan in the future." Scale and depth reflect the fact the PLA is today a much more modern, capable organisation with the capacity to project power further out; and​
(iii) flew 27 PLA military aircraft into Taiwan's ADIZ and they crossed over the median line of the Taiwan Strait. These were comprised of 16x Su-30 and 6x J-11. To put this in perspective, when Sen. Tammy Duckworth visited in May and met with President Tsai the PLA launched a 50-sortie incursion. This is a new normal, as China's gray zone tool kit gets a workout.​
The silver lining is that Beijing’s overreaction to Pelosi’s visit might result in Taiwan and other countries, like Australia, Canada, and Japan accelerating their own plans to reduce their dependence on China; and​
(d) Economics — Chinese customs suspended imports of Taiwanese citrus fruits, chilled white scallops and frozen mackerel, extending the list of banned items to more than 1,000 products as cross-Strait relations have deteriorated in recent years. Chinese mainland will halt natural sand exports to Taiwan — sand is critical for concrete, critical for the construction industry, a critical political support base for the DPP. Ditto for some of the agricultural export bans.​
15. The Korea Times says officials in Seoul are all too wary and nervous over the timing of Pelosi's visit.

"Amid the deepening U.S.-China rivalry, China has threatened military actions and it could invoke a U.S. response in kind, which would eventually affect South Korea, because of the South's alliance with the U.S.," director of the U.S.-China Policy Institute at Ajou University Kim Heung-kyu was cited as saying in the publication.​
16. Far too many American think tanks make theoretical assessments justifying the need for high levels of spending for military deterrence but show no awareness of the need for American political reassurance, to China, as well.

(a) Stable US-China relations are vital for regional peace and prosperity. But I have given up hope that the US and China can work out a modus vivendi, exercise self-restraint and refrain from actions that will further escalate tensions. The Pelosi visit was not just a re-run of Newt Gingrich's visit a generation earlier, which occurred during an entirely different relationship between the two countries. Pelosi’s political stunt that took a dangerous situation and made it more dangerous.​

(b) Thanks to Nancy Pelosi, the prior Team Biden, attempt at a guard-rails strategy for China is firmly thrown into the dustbin of history. She is seen as so toxic, the President of South Korea, will only take a call with her and refuses to meet her, as he is on ‘holiday,’ in Seoul. Keeping in mind that part of President Yoon's policy platform when he ran for president was to strengthen ties with the US.​
(c) Taiwanese troops on 3 Aug 2022 fired flares at 2 Chinese UAVs which penetrated Kinmen County's airspace, marking the first time PLA UAVs have appeared over the county.​
 
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OPSSG

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Part 1 of 2: How intimidation & a naval blockade of Taiwan might work

1. The surge in PLA(N) ships and PLAAF aircraft, and their aggressive posture, is full of potential for incidents with US and Taiwanese forces. Recent behaviour of PLA towards Australian and US aircraft and vessels provides a baseline for their approach.

2. China did the same in the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis; if the pattern repeats, there will be other missile launches prior to the 2024 election in Taiwan. Soon we will see idiots that equate China & Taiwan with Russia & Ukraine, and say that in the latter war occurred due to inadequate deterrence, and then stupidly advocate making Taiwan into a security ally. This is a recipe for war. Idiots think this way because they are oblivious to the prior assurances the US has made to China regarding Taiwan, ignorant of the understanding reached that made Sino-US normalization possible in 1972.

3. The Global Times, a state-run nationalist tabloid, quoted an anonymous Chinese military expert describing the drills as a “new beginning” for PLA activities around Taiwan, which would “regularly take place on Taiwan’s doorstep.”
(a) Beijing will now use Pelosi’s visit to further other objectives, expanding and normalizing its military and paramilitary presence in the Taiwan Strait, including on the Taiwan side.​
(b) Change the status quo using a crisis, just as in 2012 Senkaku crisis. Only with wisdom, can armed conflict be avoided but the chicken-hawks in the GOP and the Democratic Party, are collectively, too stupid to forge a path forward.​

4. Taiwan is continously under multiple wide spread Cyber Attacks that include banking systems, & DDOS attacks on Ministerial, Presidential and defence websites. Even road signs and signs in "7/11" shops are reading anti-American Slogans in Simplified Chinese (when Taiwan uses the traditional character set).

5. Countries who reaffirmed 'one China' policy amid the crisis over Taiwan following US House speaker Pelosi's visit include:
  • Russia
  • Iran
  • Pakistan
  • North Korea
  • Belarus
  • Cuba
  • Cambodia
  • Thailand
  • Myanmar's Junta govt
Also according to Nikkei Asia, some of the "suspensions" only come into force in 2027.

So I have to question as to how much of a negative impact these latest Chinese trade restrictions will have.
6. I see coordinated activity across a range of tools of statecraft by China — so I don’t think you are correct in this case.

(a) Some of these trade restrictions are even more thoughtful than others and the economic sanctions seem tailored well to target DPP constituencies.
(b) The PLA will use this opportunity iron out issues with its joint command and control. They are decades behind the west in these kinds of operations. But inadvertent military escalation as PLA demonstrate their thinking on a naval blockade of Taiwan, is a concern; with the exacerbation of security dilemma dynamics guaranteed.​
 
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Musashi_kenshin

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I see coordinated activity across a range of tools of statecraft by China — so I don’t think you are correct in this case.
I was quoting Nikkei Asia, which I think is accepted as a reliable source. Nikkei could be wrong, of course, but I think it's reasonable to refer to their articles.

(a) Some of these trade restrictions are even more thoughtful than others and the economic sanctions seem tailored well to target DPP constituencies.
Assuming that the sanctions come into force immediately/shortly, I expect that the Taiwanese government will hand out subsidies to cover the losses or help sell them in other markets, whether domestic or foreign. So I doubt they will have much political effect (I think it was accepted the KMT were likely to win a majority in the local elections in any event).
 
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OPSSG

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Part 2 of 2: How intimidation & a naval blockade of Taiwan might work

7. China’s Ambassador Qin Gang cites four main reasons for PLA exercises:
  • Taiwan moving toward independence
  • Tsai steadily de-Sinicizing the island
  • US treats Taiwan as a sovereign state through visits & arms sales
  • US uses Taiwan as a strategic pawn in containment
8. Correctly understood, the Pelosi trip does not alter the US “one China” policy that acknowledges but does not endorse or support Beijing’s position.
(a) The trip & reactions underscores an adjustment to the dual deterrence approach (often couched as “strategic ambiguity”) the US takes in handling cross strait relations. The point is to create enough uncertainty about US involvement in any Taiwan strait crisis such that both Beijing and Taipei would think twice about acting provocatively.​
(b) In the Indo-Pacific, the US Navy faces a 3-to-1 numerical disadvantage in fleet size compared to China’s navy. The disadvantage is expected to grow to 9-to-1 within 3 years, and there is no credible plan in place to change those odds in the next 20 years.​
(c) With Taipei’s moderation under the Tsai administration, it seems that Washington currently sees the provocation as coming from Beijing & the Americans are shifting the implementation of its longstanding policies accordingly.​
(d) These, of course, come on top of PRC military activity near Japan (including in conjunction with Russia) & in the East China Sea, continuing militarization of artificial features China occupies in the South China Sea, in what the US, Australia, & Canada allege are unsafe and unprofessional conduct by Chinese military craft.​

I was quoting Nikkei Asia, which I think is accepted as a reliable source. Nikkei could be wrong, of course, but I think it's reasonable to refer to their articles.
9. Thanks for the clarification — as I see it, the sanctions are done with precision. Given that I am not sure too, I said ‘I don’t think you are correct.’ It’s a debatable point, until more facts are known about the latest round of sanctions.

10. The PLA’s latest operational concept is target-centric warfare, which has been under development since at least 2011. It appears to be a further refinement of the noncontact warfare model primarily oriented toward the joint integration of PLA(N), PLAAF and PLA ground forces.

11. PLA’s general concept behind target-centric warfare is that by employing ISR sensors and target analysis, for commanders can identify—and subsequently aim to destroy—the most critical targets in an enemy’s combat system. Unlike Taiwan, with the F-35B, the RSAF is not only more resilient to runway denial, via missile & bomb attacks, it’s 4 services are fluent at multi-domain coalition Ops, as RIMPAC 2022, Exercise Red Flag – Alaska 2022, Ex Tiger Balm 2022 & Ex Garuda Shield 2022 demonstrate (where the TNI AL, USN & RSN took part in a series of exercises in the waters around Riau Islands, Batam & Singkep).

12. To address the PLA’s target centric warfare, ultimately, the Taiwan’s MND will have to move from a tri-service construct & think of itself as a quad-service. Once a Digital & Intelligence Service (DIS) gains more traction with the other more powerful service chiefs, it would enable Taiwan to better respond to grey zone or phase zero activities of hostile nations and concurrently be more resilient to PLA’s targeted attacked on Taiwan’s C4SIR nodes.
 
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Musashi_kenshin

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Taiwan's government proposed a record defense budget for 2023 on Thursday, as its military remains keen to develop conventional weapons despite growing domestic and U.S. calls to focus on asymmetrical warfare.

The proposed budget of NT$523.4 billion ($17.3 billion) is a 14.9% increase from this year's total allocation. The figure includes NT$108.3 for new advanced combat jets and programs for elevating sea and air combat capability. The total budget would reach NT$586.3 billion if another special fund is included.

The budget now goes for approval to the Legislative Yuan, which begins a new session next month.
I don't have information on precisely what the new money is going to be spent on, but the budget increase is encouraging nonetheless, especially when you take into account the additional funds from the special budget.


President Joe Biden's administration and U.S. lawmakers stress their ongoing support for the government in Taipei, and there are items in the approval pipeline for Taiwan that could be announced in the coming weeks or months.

But the focus will be on sustaining Taiwan's current military systems and fulfilling existing orders - rather than offering new capabilities more likely to inflame already red-hot tensions with China, said three sources, who requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the issue.

"I think there will be an attempt to push stuff to Taiwan, and not just weapons. Supplies, should there – God forbid – be an embargo. More munitions. Lower-level stuff," one source close to political-level talks on U.S.-Taiwan arms sales said.
It also looks like the US may be helping Taiwan build its stockpiles later this year, which would be very sensible.
 

OPSSG

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Part 1 of 3: Problems faced by Kinmen Defence Command & others in ROC Army

1. Kinmen's defense command confirmed on 24 Aug 2022 (Wed) that the rock-throwing incident occurred on 16 Aug 2022 (Tues, a week ago), noting that it involved a civilian drone. @PaulHuangReport is correct in his assessment on the shambolic response. Given that the most sophisticated Taiwanese response to these drone intrusions is throwing rocks, I am certain that:

(i) the troops on guard duty are not properly supported by Taiwan’s MND in making a threat assessment or with real sensors;​
(ii) Taiwan needs to rewrite their ROEs, & train their troops to use EOF procedures (eg. SAF troops in their POI module are taught EOF & have online training/tests on EOF steps before they are deployed to Changi Airport, Sembawang Wharves, or Jurong Island); &​
(iii) Taiwan needs to give confidence in their troops (to shoot), with live-fire component (as part of the POI module’s training). For the SAF, troops deployed will report & if need be shoot. What the Taiwanese MND is doing to support its troops is bullsh!t & the DPP knows it.​

2. For the SAF, POI training is a training module (& not complicated compared to urban warfare or helimobile ops), for conscripts. In a mobilisation exercise for 8k, every battalion deployed is trained on their ROE shoot - should they face suicide bombers. Likewise, the armed response teams on motorcycles & fast response cars of the Singapore Police are trained in the same way — to ensure no hesitation, in a justified shoot. Typically, they drive the car/motorcycle into the range to maintain currency on EOF procedures.
 
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Musashi_kenshin

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(iii) Taiwan needs to give confidence in their troops (to shoot), with live-fire component (as part of the POI module’s training). For the SAF, troops deployed will report & if need be shoot. What the Taiwanese MND is doing to support its troops is bullsh!t & the DPP knows it.
Does the Taiwanese government want its military to be firing at drones off to the Chinese coast? I'm not suggesting this is a conspiracy by the CCP to cause an incident, but I would have thought it's quite possible the soldiers are instructed not to shoot unless there's an emergency. Some nob with a privately-owned drone thinking they're incredibly funny isn't an emergency.

Might sound harsh, but these outlying islands would be impossible to defend if China attacked, so I would totally understand if the personnel stationed there are told to refrain from using lethal force.

(Please note, I am proposing an idea, not saying this is so.)

As for Paul Huang, the Chinese authorities are quick to arrest people for flying drones when they don't like what they're up to. Perfectly possible the individual(s) who flew the drones did so with agreement from the local CCP/authorities or was even encouraged to do so. Also possible they did it without permission - whether these drone events continue would probably be a sign of which it was.
 
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OPSSG

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Part 2 of 3: Problems faced by Kinmen Defence Command & others in ROC Army

3. Taiwan is not a poor country and its has superb capabilities in some niche areas (like recce pods) but it does so poorly in others.

Does the Taiwanese government want its military to be firing at drones off to the Chinese coast?
4. On 28 Aug 2022, the Kinmen defense command stated that in accordance with SOP, the troops fired warning flares at the drone and maintained surveillance and a high state of alertness. It then vowed that when future drone intrusions occur, the ROC Army will take necessary countermeasures to "drive away" the drones. According to Wu Zhengting and Tu Jumin in an earlier Chinese language news report, current countermeasures include whistle blowing, broadcasting, firing flares (as the case may be), and finally "shoot down", according to Kinmen Defence Command.
(a) Located far closer to the Chinese cities of Xiamen and Quanzhou than Taiwan island, Kinmen county is a major strategic location for both Beijing and Taipei. The Ministry of National Defense went on to explain that the defence zones located on Taiwan’s outlying islands will be prioritized in the system’s rollout over the next few years. In 2023, Taiwan plans to acquire a remote control drone defence system; it will start with obtain 5 sets of these systems and 232 jammer guns.​
(b) The cross-Strait military balance is not what it was in the 1980s to 1990s. Taiwan needs substantive help before 2027, not more symbolic visits by politicians. President Joe Biden’s team supports quietly accelerating arms sales but worries that more symbolic support to Taiwan could trigger a conflict rather than deter one.​
(c) Under Team Biden, American ship building plans are rubbish. It would be useful to learn how del Toro, as Secretary of the Navy proposes to overcome problems in attracting young Americans to join the US Navy and the Marine Corps, and to expanding the size of the fleet from its current 300 ships, a level so low it was last seen during the early 1930s.​
(d) A major concern for Taiwan had been finding ways to insulate its 6 main fighter air bases against the PLA ballistic missiles, which Phalanx or any similar system would have no chance at defeating. The Taiwanese Air Force built Jiashan and Taitung Air Bases on the eastern shores of the island with hangars and other facilities tucked away at least partially inside mountains specifically to make them difficult to hit.​

5. Basically, the ROC Army has a problem that it can’t solve until new anti-drone equipment arrives. Typically, an army needs to go the range to maintain currency on escalation of force (EOF) procedures. If Taiwan wants to shoot down mainland drones, today, they need to ask 2 questions:

Q1: Have they trained their troops on guard duty EOF procedures?​

Q2: Have they considered what happens to the solider if a stray bullet falls & kills (or injures) someone?​

6. Taiwan already has a Sky Net System and has plans for more capable anti-aircraft capabilities that could be beneficial in picking off a buzzing UAV. They say that a “remote-controlled drone defense system” that uses drones is a recent addition to Taiwan’s counter-UAV lexicon.
 
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OPSSG

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Part 3 of 3: Problems faced by Kinmen Defence Command & others in ROC Army


I guess that issue has been resolved fairly quickly, then. Perhaps now people, whether encouraged by the CCP or not, won't bother trying to buzz defence posts on outlying Taiwanese islands.
7. As Paul has said & as the Chinese government said — China has denied being directly involved in any of these incidents — but has left open the possibility that private nationals are responsible.

8. The Kinmen Defense Command, said a drone was shot down after warning flares failed to drive it away.

9. Despite the above, @PaulHuangReport is correct in his assessment on the initial shambolic response — throwing rocks at the drone. But if Chinese civilians want to provide target practice (in the face of Taiwanese resolve to shoot) & help Taiwanese troops on guard duty practice EOF procedures, it is their choice to have their drones destroyed.
 
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STURM

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"China is the world’s largest builder of seagoing vessels, having produced over 26 million tons of civilian shipping in 2021. By comparison, the American assault force directed against Sicily, which Pietrucha uses as a benchmark, only had a “combined tonnage of around 780,000 tons.” China is also the world’s second largest arms producer. Like the United States before World War II, China has a large but latent industrial base that could quickly produce what its military needs at scale and speed. Moreover, America’s amphibious challenge in World War II was global, whereas China’s is relatively local. China already has 57 major military amphibious ships and a significant civilian fleet, which we discuss below. The additional production from Chinese shipyards in 19 months, or in more than 50 months, would likely be more than enough to invade an island only 100 nautical miles away despite the attrition anticipated by wargames."

"The latest report in the series, on invasion logistics, is more circumspect for China’s near-term prospects and echoes the preliminary results of the abovementioned wargames: “t is likely the PLA does not currently possess the requisite logistics capabilities to successfully support a large-scale amphibious landing on Taiwan and a possible protracted conflict involving the United States and allies.” That said, the report draws heavily from a 2017 PLA book on invasion logistics, meaning the PLA has identified and at least started to remedy these deficiencies. It also notes that “problem areas might be resolved with several years of sustained effort and complex training.” Failure is not fated."


As the author of this article makes clear; we must never overlook the important role China's large number of civilian and militia sea lift assets would play in an amphibious assault and that despite the huge challenges faced with such an undertaking; China actually has a fair chance of landing a significant number of troops on the island.

Whether or not the troops who have landed can actually breakout from the beachhead is the question. China's ability to reinforce and resupply the troops which have landed would also get significantly harder if the Americans get involved at an early stage. The author also points out [he uses the Faklands as an example] how the Chinese may not necessarily have to gain air superiority over the whole island but only over the landing beaches at the initial stage.

Everything will depends on what China does; initiate hostilities with an sue campaign [including IRBM/cruise missile attacks] and a blockade for an extended period [with the risk of the Americans intervening and hugely complicating things] or a short air campaign with an amphibious assault soon after? The question is at what stage would the Americans intervene? Would they only intervene when an amphibious assault is launched and Wil it intervene at all if China restricts its action to a blockade and and air campaign?
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
The timing of American involvement would be critical as would be if key allies were joining at the same time. Would be interesting to know what private agreements might exist between the US, Japan, and SK wrt a full Chinese assault on Taiwan.
 

STURM

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Would also be interesting to know if China has any agreements with Russia. During a conflict with China there may be certain things that Russia might do short of actual war to distract American attention.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Would also be interesting to know if China has any agreements with Russia. During a conflict with China there may be certain things that Russia might do short of actual war to distract American attention.
Agree, would be another interesting factor. However, other than nuclear posturing and perhaps committing some nuclear subs to the theatre, I really do not know what more they could offer above and beyond China’s significant capabilities. Their performance in the Ukraine wouldn’t excite senior Chinese military leaders IMHO.
 

STURM

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Their performance in the Ukraine wouldn’t excite senior Chinese military leaders IMHO.
Russia still has highly capable strategic missile/bomber and subs units; it's these forces which would pose a threat to the U.S. and its allies in the event war broke out over Taiwan and Russia was requested by China to keep U.S. forces tied down in Europe. Another means of keeping the U.S. distracted would be for China to get North Korea to undertake certain actions.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Russia still has highly capable strategic missile/bomber and subs units; it's these forces which would pose a threat to the U.S. and its allies in the event war broke out over Taiwan and Russia was requested by China to keep U.S. forces tied down in Europe. Another means of keeping the U.S. distracted would be for China to get North Korea to undertake certain actions.
The Russian sub force and possible NK action would be a problem. Russian strategic bombers would be killed off quickly.
 

STURM

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Russian strategic bombers would be killed off quickly.
Yes but after or before they've launched their ordnance? As it stands it's unlikely Russia would join in if China was embroiled in a war but it's still in its power to undertake certain actions in support of China.
 

ngatimozart

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Russian strategic bombers would be killed off quickly.
Never take that as a given. They have been given some harsh experiences by Ukraine and I have no doubt that they will working hard on learning those lessons. After all the crews have a modicum of self interest involved in this after all.


"China is the world’s largest builder of seagoing vessels, having produced over 26 million tons of civilian shipping in 2021. By comparison, the American assault force directed against Sicily, which Pietrucha uses as a benchmark, only had a “combined tonnage of around 780,000 tons.” China is also the world’s second largest arms producer. Like the United States before World War II, China has a large but latent industrial base that could quickly produce what its military needs at scale and speed. Moreover, America’s amphibious challenge in World War II was global, whereas China’s is relatively local. China already has 57 major military amphibious ships and a significant civilian fleet, which we discuss below. The additional production from Chinese shipyards in 19 months, or in more than 50 months, would likely be more than enough to invade an island only 100 nautical miles away despite the attrition anticipated by wargames."

"The latest report in the series, on invasion logistics, is more circumspect for China’s near-term prospects and echoes the preliminary results of the abovementioned wargames: “t is likely the PLA does not currently possess the requisite logistics capabilities to successfully support a large-scale amphibious landing on Taiwan and a possible protracted conflict involving the United States and allies.” That said, the report draws heavily from a 2017 PLA book on invasion logistics, meaning the PLA has identified and at least started to remedy these deficiencies. It also notes that “problem areas might be resolved with several years of sustained effort and complex training.” Failure is not fated."


As the author of this article makes clear; we must never overlook the important role China's large number of civilian and militia sea lift assets would play in an amphibious assault and that despite the huge challenges faced with such an undertaking; China actually has a fair chance of landing a significant number of troops on the island.

Whether or not the troops who have landed can actually breakout from the beachhead is the question. China's ability to reinforce and resupply the troops which have landed would also get significantly harder if the Americans get involved at an early stage. The author also points out [he uses the Faklands as an example] how the Chinese may not necessarily have to gain air superiority over the whole island but only over the landing beaches at the initial stage.

Everything will depends on what China does; initiate hostilities with an sue campaign [including IRBM/cruise missile attacks] and a blockade for an extended period [with the risk of the Americans intervening and hugely complicating things] or a short air campaign with an amphibious assault soon after? The question is at what stage would the Americans intervene? Would they only intervene when an amphibious assault is launched and Wil it intervene at all if China restricts its action to a blockade and and air campaign?
One other thing to think about; the PLA like the Russian military is riven by corruption and we have seen how that has corroded the Russian military battlefield capabilities and capacity by its performance in Ukraine. The real and concerning question for the CCP Politburo Standing Committee. is whether or not the PLA exhibits similar levels of corrosion. when it is thrown into the furnace of battle against a determined enemy? If it does it is good for Taiwan and its allies and bad for the CCP, but if it doesn't then Taiwan has a proper fight on its hands.
 
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