Defence of Taiwan

Cooch

Active Member
Does Taiwan have many systems that can hit the Chinese shoreline? China on the other hand has significant numbers of missiles with long enough range to hit Taiwan. No one is saying that China can invade Taiwan or attempt a cross straight amphibious assault without loss, but the initial softening salvo from China would probably include several thousand missile launches with no real risk of getting hit back.


I
TCP...
I don’t know, but wouldn’t it be smart of Taiwan to make sure that they have that capacity?

The question is not whether an invasion can be done without loss, but whether it can be done with an acceptable loss. Wars are normally started on the basis of calculations that war will achieve something at a price that the belligerent party can afford. Deterrent is based on raising that cost until the would-be conqueror decides that the gain is not worth the pain.

Also, the main Island of Taiwan has an area of 3500 square km. How many missiles with that range does China have again? Carpet-bombing the entire island is not an option, so any attempted “degradation” of the Taiwanese defences requires above-average intel regarding location of the defences, and missiles with not just the range, but the precision to take out concealed, hardened weapons-bunkers.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
Sturm..
With respect, I’m not sure that you are taking into account the cost of “degrading” the Taiwanese defence.
How many ships and aircraft are the PLA/N prepared to lose in the process?
I was merely looking at a possible scenario.

A air [ ballistic and and cruise missile attacks] in parallel with a sea campaign [mines and subs]; as well as EW and cyber attacks; to degrade Taiwan's capabilities and to get political concessions is an option the Chinese I'm sure have looked at.

How many ships and aircraft are the PLA/N prepared to lose in the process?
If it reached a point where they've decided on armed action the Chinese political leadership would have accepted that high losses is the price they have to incur.

Can anyone point to a successful amphibious landing against a well-fortified shoreline, that did not involve an extensive preparatory bombardment?

By air, as well as from the sea?
Which is precisely why before undertaking an amhib assault the Chinese would do their best to degrade Taiwan's defences. Whether they're successful or not is a different story but they will try and on paper they certainly have the means.

To be a devil's advocate can anyone point to a landing on a defended beachhead which was successful to a large extent because the defences had been severely degraded by air and sea attacks? Normandy, Inchon, Tarawa, etc?

The question really is not whether a Chinese air and sea campaign will be successful or whether China has the means but whether an invasion would be proceeded by a air and sea campaign or whether at the very start of hostilities China would undertake an amphib assault.
The Taiwanese could make their island such an expensive proposition to take, that doing so would leave very little worth the taking.
They could but would it a really lead to China deciding not to invade? Are you underestimating the political will China has to "unify" Taiwan [peacefully or otherwise] and to incur the large casualties and political backlash that would result if "unification" was via an invasion?


Also, the main Island of Taiwan has an area of 3500 square km. How many missiles with that range does China have again?
Quite a few actually; missiles with the range to hit a whole list of targets in Taiwan.
 
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ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
If the Taiwanese were as defence savvy as the Israelis, and as stubborn, then the PRC would be looking at a totally different proposition. A nuclear armed very well conventionally armed and equipped island with a highly professional force. Ah dreams are free.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
True but unlike the Israelis the Taiwanese are only able to buy kit from the Americans [even then it's no guarantee they'll get what the request to buy and are able to pay for] and did not have the means to acquire nuke technology [Israel at one period had a very sympathetic and compliant France]. Also, unlike the Israelis who have long faced a host of Arab countries whose priority was regime survival and threats rom other Arab countries rather than confronting Israel; Taiwan faces a much greater threat in the form of China.
 

Musashi_kenshin

Well-Known Member
Does Taiwan have many systems that can hit the Chinese shoreline?
It does have a few. You can see them with a map overlay on a website run by CSIS, albeit it is somewhat out of date because the main page says the Yun Feng is in development but then the page for the missile says it's operational.


If we're talking about actual stockpiles of individual missiles, that's more difficult because the numbers aren't published. Back in 2008 it was reported that Taiwan was building 300 HF-IIE cruise missiles. CSIS says Taiwan had a target annual production capacity of 50 a year from 2009 before full rate production started in 2011. If we keep it simple and say Taiwan continued to build up to 50 a year, that would mean as many as 650 now.

As for the Wan Chien, according to CSIS there was a target set around 2017 of more than 100 missiles. Previously it seems that Taiwan was making 18 Wan Chien missiles a year, so that target would appear to have been met by now if not exceeded.

Going forwards, missile production has been increased. Amongst other things, every year Taiwan will be building (or able to build) 50 Wan Chien missiles and 131 of the two types of cruise missiles it operates.
 
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Musashi_kenshin

Well-Known Member

A further boost to the military aid package for Taiwan. Probably more likely that this will pass than the separate piece of legislation that was proposed. The article makes some good points about how Congress would have struggled to force defence companies to leapfrog Taiwan above other countries ordering the same item.

$10 billion would be quite a lot, and Taiwan could buy some nice-to-have things that aren't strictly urgent, like more Abrams tanks.
 

weaponwh

Member

A further boost to the military aid package for Taiwan. Probably more likely that this will pass than the separate piece of legislation that was proposed. The article makes some good points about how Congress would have struggled to force defence companies to leapfrog Taiwan above other countries ordering the same item.

$10 billion would be quite a lot, and Taiwan could buy some nice-to-have things that aren't strictly urgent, like more Abrams tanks.
honestly taiwan is not a poor country, so i'm not sure why not pushing taiwan to buy more weapon rather than free aid. taiwan only spend 2% of its gdp for it military, it can certainly afford $10billions to buy weapons.
 

Musashi_kenshin

Well-Known Member
honestly taiwan is not a poor country, so i'm not sure why not pushing taiwan to buy more weapon rather than free aid. taiwan only spend 2% of its gdp for it military, it can certainly afford $10billions to buy weapons.
Taiwan is spending closer to 3% of GDP currently once you take into account special arms purchases funded via legislation rather than the annual budget.

Also Taiwan didn't ask for US aid, it's an initiative from American legislators perhaps recognising that Taiwan sometimes has to pay more for its arms than other countries because it can only ever buy significant items from the US.
 

Cooch

Active Member
To be a devil's advocate can anyone point to a landing on a defended beachhead which was successful to a large extent because the defences had been severely degraded by air and sea attacks? Normandy,
Normandy is a classic example.
The Germans were unable to move anything by road during daylight hours, or by rail at all in support of their troops, either to concentrate them once the point of attack had been identified, or in the form of a mobile reserve. Rommel specifically argued that holding the reserves back was an error, because they would be unable to deploy them once the landing pints were identified.
This was due to an extensive campaign of bombing to destroy transport routes and infrastructure, as well as tactical bombing against German forces on the ground.
An considerable weight of Naval gunnery was deployed as fire-support for the troops landing on the beachheads, with arrangements made for direct communication between observers with the landing troops, and ships operating in their sector. Individual pill-boxes and strong-points were deliberately targeted and knocked out.

”Combined arms” doctrine was not discarded just because it was a sea-landing.
 

Cooch

Active Member
The question really is not whether a Chinese air and sea campaign will be successful or whether China has the means but whether an invasion would be proceeded by a air and sea campaign or whether at the very start of hostilities China would undertake an amphib assault.

They could but would it a really lead to China deciding not to invade? Are you underestimating the political will China has to "unify" Taiwan [peacefully or otherwise] and to incur the large casualties and political backlash that would result if "unification" was via an invasion?
You don’t invade anything much if your invading force is at the bottom of the Taiwan straight.
You don’t “degrade” anything much if your missiles can’t hit their targets and your planes are playing submarine.

The Russians have been trying to suppress and degrade the Ukrainian Air Defence for 7 months. How’s that working out?
They reason that they are losing fast jets and attack helos to MANPADS at low altitude is because the longer-range GBAD is making it even more dangerous to operate anything at altitude.

The Chinese don’t like to lose face… and a failed invasion does just that.
 
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koxinga

Well-Known Member
The Chinese don’t like to lose face… and a failed invasion does just that.
Not really.

The CCP has staked a large part of their political capital ("this is our historical mission") around the return of Taiwan to such as extent that a failure to respond would be worst than failing in the invasion.
 

koxinga

Well-Known Member
If we keep it simple and say Taiwan continued to build up to 50 a year, that would mean as many as 650 now.
As for the Wan Chien, according to CSIS there was a target set around 2017 of more than 100 missiles. Previously it seems that Taiwan was making 18 Wan Chien missiles a year, so that target would appear to have been met by now if not exceeded.
Going forwards, missile production has been increased. Amongst other things, every year Taiwan will be building (or able to build) 50 Wan Chien missiles and 131 of the two types of cruise missiles it operates.
There are two factors to consider 1) launch points/launchers and 2) kill chain.

1) It does not matter how much missiles that Taiwan can or is able to build. They have a constraint around the number of missile bases/silos, launchers. With mobile launchers, they are slightly more surviable but their stockpiles would still remain vulnerable, unless they are also being moved around. And moving around hundreds of spare missiles in a shell game is going to be a herculean task in the middle of a war.

2) My other concern is around the kill chain. Great, Taiwan has offensive missiles that can reach deep into southern China. But does it have the ISR capability to keep tabs on PLA Rocket Force, who will be doing their own version of a shell game? This is where the US can help to provide targeting information but it has to be reliable and near real-time.

Also, the main Island of Taiwan has an area of 3500 square km. How many missiles with that range does China have again? Carpet-bombing the entire island is not an option, so any attempted “degradation” of the Taiwanese defences requires above-average intel regarding location of the defences, and missiles with not just the range, but the precision to take out concealed, hardened weapons-bunkers.
All are valid points, but the threat to the Chinese are not the concealed, hardened weapons-bunkers. Those would have been scouted a long time ago. Even if they were missed out, once those bunkers are used, they would be exposed to Chinese targeting. Mobile batteries would be more troubling to the Chinese.

The other earlier point was the Chinese themselves are open to targeting by the Taiwanese. True, but to use your example... if the main island of Taiwan has a 36,197 sq km, what about Fujian province opposite? That is 121,400 sq km of room for PLA Rocket Force to hide their mobile launchers.

My gut feel is the Chinese have never seriously complained about Taiwanese offensive missile capability (they obviously know about them) because they see it as militarily ineffective and possibly a fool's errand if the Taiwanese tried to match them in this area.
 
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STURM

Well-Known Member
Normandy is a classic example.
Normandy is a classic example of the defender facing immense problems moving men and material where it needed to be because of extensive Allied tactical and strategic bombing to rail hubs; bridges, ammo dumps, etc but it had little bearing on the actual defences on Omaha, Utah, Sword, Gold and Juno. The defences there were largely intact; that was the point I was alluding to.

Rommel specifically argued that holding the reserves back was an error, because they would be unable to deploy them once the landing pints were identified.
Because of his experiences in North Africa. Rundstedt in contrast had never faced Allied air power; he maintained that the Panzers should be held back until it was clear where the man landings were. Problem is both were right which is why a compromise was reached and Rommel was allowed to place 21st Panzer on the coast; as well as 12th Hitler Jugend further in. The rasing of Panzer Group West was also part of the compromise.


This was due to an extensive campaign of bombing to destroy transport routes and infrastructure, as well as tactical bombing against German forces on the ground.
Thanks for the history lesson but I'm aware of the role air power played. I was disputing the notion that airpower severely degraded the actual defences on the beaches; wasn't claiming that air power didn't have an adverse bearing on the ability of the Germans to move men and material to the invasion beaches.

An considerable weight of Naval gunnery was deployed as fire-support for the troops landing on the beachheads
As was the case in Tarawa, Iwo Jima and other places but ultimately the beach defences were not severely degraded by naval gunfire or air power. They were heavily hit yes but they were not degraded to the extent that they were unable to fiercely contest the landing.


”Combined arms” doctrine was not discarded just because it was a sea-landing
It took combined arms to secure the beaches and to eliminate enemy resistances from the various strong points which were largely intact despite the naval bombardment.

You don’t invade anything much if your invading force is at the bottom of the Taiwan straight.
You don’t “degrade” anything much if your missiles can’t hit their targets and your planes are playing submarine.
You're assuming too much; that an amphib assault is doomed to fail and that the Chinese will suffer from the same problems the Russian are facing; poor C3; the inability to wage joint multi domain ops; the inability to detect, fix and hit targets, etc. I won't make the same assumptions.

Yes I'm extremely aware that conducting an amphib assault is an extremely risky and complex endeavour. Given the resources China has it's not far fetched to take into account that the crossing might succed; whether or not the landed troops can expand the beachheads is the key question. A lot will also depend if China is conducting a crossing in the face of Taiwanese resistance or Taiwanese and American resistance. There is also the possibility that the Chinese will not rush to launch a crossing as many assume but only after Taiwan's defences have been degraded by a sustained air, naval and cyber assault.


The Russians have been trying to suppress and degrade the Ukrainian Air Defence for 7 months.
You're assuming that operational circumstances faced in the Ukraine will replicated in Taiwan. BTW the Serbs did the same thing; a defence in depth and preservation of an air force in being; albeit less effectively as the Ukrainians.

They reason that they are losing fast jets and attack helos to MANPADS at low altitude is because the longer-range GBAD
Indeed and that's a problem the Ukrainians also face. Ultimately both sides are constrained in their use of air power because both are unable to mount an effective SEAD/DEAD campaign. As stands however both sides are still employing airpower.

The Chinese don’t like to lose face… and a failed invasion does just that.
They will ''lose face'' if they fail to respond to certain moves undertaken by Taiwan. If for example Taiwan declares independence or if China decides that Taiwan is obtaining certain capabilities which will alter China's ability to successfully mount an invasion; China will react [it will have no choice in the matter] and it will accept that high losses or even a failed amphib assault is a penalty worth incurring.

Perhaps you should take into account the place Taiwan occupies in China's pysche. The Chinese are extremely aware that losses will be high and that a military attempt might fail but they will still initiatite military action if they have to and just like how they have thoroughly analysed American ops in Kosovo, Iraq and other places; are doing the same with the current war in the Ukraine.
 
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Musashi_kenshin

Well-Known Member
There are two factors to consider 1) launch points/launchers and 2) kill chain.

1) It does not matter how much missiles that Taiwan can or is able to build....

.....
In case anyone wants to know, for the record I wasn't trying to make a point about the effectiveness of Taiwan's offensive capabilities. Rather I was simply trying to be informative and helpful towards another user who seemed to lack data on the existence of said offensive capabilities.
 

koxinga

Well-Known Member
No problem.

I am also not saying that Taiwan should not invest in an offensive missile capability; the retaliatory capability does have military utility especially in targeting key command and control nodes, landing forces and marshalling areas prior to an invasion.

What I am saying is to be aware of the potential downsides and not being over reliant on it as their key strength or a silver bullet.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
  • Thread Starter Thread Starter
  • #416
Part 1 of 5: Adm. Phil Davidson’s window

Q2: Do you have any formal military training on armoured warfare?

In an armour formation, MBTs don’t fight alone. They are supported by tracked AFVs/IFVs. Your replies to my post indicate tt you don’t read armour doctrine.

Try to understand the diff btw a Stryker & a Bradley.

1. Typical Taiwanese Govt insider bullsh!t, when told by the Americans that they are under-investing in defence. In particular, Taiwan’s mindset on investing in military training of its active and reserve troops has to change, now — before it is too late.

2. Americans should be worried and they should understand that the dynamic driving Taiwan tensions is deeply interactive, involving behavior in Taipei, Beijing and Washington.
(a) Attacking Taiwan remains a VERY uncertain gamble for Beijing. At this time, the PLA does not possess the military power to seize the island with confidence and the factors that would motivate it to do so in 2022 to 2026, are mainly political, not military. I would argue that this will change by 2030, when the PLA can risk a first strike on Taiwan.​
(b) The Sino-U.S. competition is becoming an end unto itself — the 2 super powers need to end the self-righteous finger pointing and accept responsibility. Meanwhile the warnings by Blinken and US DoD about Taiwan are becoming increasingly urgent. Yet I don’t see the Biden Administration taking the actions needed to address the threat.​
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
  • Thread Starter Thread Starter
  • #417
Part 2 of 5: Adm. Phil Davidson’s window

3. Americans are discussing Adm. Phil Davidson’s 2021 window — of when the PLA will actually be capable of invading Taiwan. I believe Davidson is wrong (by 2027) & the PLA will only be able to do so by the 2030s.

(a) Americans do themselves no favors by acting like the threat to Taiwan is always imminent. If the US DoD keep saying things like this they are gonna be the boy who cried wolf. Even if war starts in 2030, America does not have the logistics capability to ‘win’ in a multi-year war over Taiwan.​
F766D0C2-BC98-4B5A-83F1-195167A40B7A.jpeg
(b) Some people need to be laughed at —on 16 Oct 2022, Jeremy Huai-Che Chiang​
inferred Taiwan was doing more than enough on ‘prep & response’ but on 20 Oct 2022, he acknowledges tt the Americans say ‘TW doesn’t have a sense of urgency.’ Jeremy plays the card tt Taiwan does not have agency for its current military weakness. Prior to Pelosi’s visit, Team Biden was urging Taipei to do more in defence. Not saying tt the 4th Taiwan Straits is not the CCP’s fault too — the visit put Biden & Xi on a collision course.​
4686440F-7104-4C50-B882-9ED9F8974342.jpeg
In case anyone wants to know, for the record I wasn't trying to make a point about the effectiveness of Taiwan's offensive capabilities. Rather I was simply trying to be informative and helpful towards another user who seemed to lack data on the existence of said offensive capabilities.
4. What most don’t realise — is that Taiwan has a bigger defence budget than Finland or Singapore. Therefore, my simplistic response to your posts in this thread, telling me things are fine and Taiwan is doing well— we have to simplify things to help you understand my 3 sources of concern:

(a) the increase in PLA capability by 2027;​
(b) the lack of US munitions & war stocks available for a peer war in theatre by 2027; &​
(c) the misallocation of resources coupled with the decayed & rotten military capability of the ROC Army of both:​

(i) the 188k active troops; &​
(ii) the Taiwanese reserves.​
 
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Cooch

Active Member
Not really.

The CCP has staked a large part of their political capital ("this is our historical mission") around the return of Taiwan to such as extent that a failure to respond would be worst than failing in the invasion.
A failed invasion means the loss of a very large chunk of their navy and airforce, plus a public demonstration of national impotence. It takes any potential reunification from “sometime”, to “never”.

They have been “failing to respond” since the CCP took control of mainland China. Putting it off for another decade might cost Xi his “legacy” - depending on how long he expects to live - but it won’t even go close to costing CCP power.

They control the mass-media and increasingly the social media…. So they control the narrative.
 
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Cooch

Active Member
As was the case in Tarawa, Iwo Jima and other places but ultimately the beach defences were not severely degraded by naval gunfire or air power. They were heavily hit yes but they were not degraded to the extent that they were unable to fiercely contest the landing
Fallacy right there…. Arguing that if the defences were not reduced to the point of ineffective resistance, that they were not reduced at all.

Irony is that you are arguing that fire support has hitherto been ineffective in reducing resistance to amphibious landings, but that the PLA will be able to do it just fine.

Agreed, the Chinese experience is likely to be different from that of the Russians, because it is far more difficult to hide your air-defence and SEAD assets when the only “terrain” you have available is the curvature of the earth.
 

Musashi_kenshin

Well-Known Member
Therefore, my simplistic response to your posts in this thread, telling me things are fine and Taiwan is doing well— we have to simplify things to help you understand my 3 sources of concern:

(a) the increase in PLA capability by 2027;​
(b) the lack of US munitions & war stocks available for a peer war in theatre by 2027; &​
(c) the misallocation of resources coupled with the decayed & rotten military capability of the ROC Army of both:​

(i) the 188k active troops; &​
(ii) the Taiwanese reserves.​
OPSSG, I have indicated multiple times that I acknowledge your concerns and that there is no need to restate them to me further. Of course, if you feel others need to be made aware of the points it would make sense for you to respond to their posts. But you can rest assured I know about those problems you've identified in the past and above.

This is why I stressed in my last post that I was not trying to state Taiwan's offensive capabilities were a trump card, instead just trying to put some facts out there to help another user.

Also on point (b), I read an article on that yesterday which I will post now.


The Biden administration is considering a plan to jointly produce weapons with Taiwan, according to three people familiar with the plan. It aims to increase production capacity for U.S.-designed arms, speed their transfer and strengthen deterrence toward China.

....

A person with direct knowledge of the matter acknowledged that initial discussions on joint U.S.-Taiwan production had begun. It is likely for U.S. defense companies to provide technology to manufacture weapons in Taiwan, or to produce them in the U.S. using Taiwan-made parts. "This is going to take some time to really shake out," said another source, adding that the process is likely to continue throughout 2023.


Without commenting on whether or not this will happen, at the least it demonstrates the US recognises the issue of the slow delivery of defence-related equipment is a problem and is proactively considering ways to resolve it, which is better than nothing.
 
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