China - Geostrategic & Geopolitical.

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Are there any border clashes between Pakistan and China to the west of the current troubles?
I would assume that the CCP would try to demonstrate a clear difference in in how they engage with the two Kashmir adversaries, obviously in favour of Pakistan.
 

ngatimozart

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  • #102
Are there any border clashes between Pakistan and China to the west of the current troubles?
I would assume that the CCP would try to demonstrate a clear difference in in how they engage with the two Kashmir adversaries, obviously in favour of Pakistan.
Not that I have heard. They are more or less joined at the hip with Pakistan highly dependent upon the PRC economically and more so as each day passes. They are a large recipient of the BRI scheme, and a strategic prize for the PRC.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
Indeed.

Pakistan & China disagreed about the border until 1962, when China agreed to discuss the dispute - after Pakistan voted in favour of the PRC getting China's UN seat. They signed an agreement in 1963 which divided the disputed area, China getting most of it. Some people in Pakistan call it a cession by China, saying Pakistan (& before that the rulers of Kashmir) had never disputed China's sovereignty over the land it agreed was Chinese, & it was just a question of delimiting the border. Pakistan has had Chinese support since then.

The border in question is between Kashmir (Gilgit & Baltistan) & Sinkiang.
 

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Indeed.

Pakistan & China disagreed about the border until 1962, when China agreed to discuss the dispute - after Pakistan voted in favour of th PRC getting China's UN seat. They signed an agreement in 1963 which divided the disputed area, China getting most of it. Some people in Pakistan call it a cession by China, saying Pakistan (& before that the rulers of Kashmir) had never disputed China's sovereignty over the land it agreed was Chinese, & it was just a question of delimiting the border. Pakistan has had Chinese support since then.

The border in question is between Kashmir (Gilgit & Baltistan) & Sinkiang.
Thanks.
 

OPSSG

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Staff member
Post 1 of 2: Update on LAC Fiasco

1. An Indian Army patrol that was attacked by the PLA with nail-studded rods on 16 June 2020 has suffered 20 deaths and 76 injured in the clash with China in the Galwan Valley along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The good news is that 4 of the critically injured soldiers are out of danger.

2. As an external observer, I see the Delhi’s response as limited and lacking in resolve. That being the case, Beijing will use the standard Leninist tactic of 'probe with a bayonet – If you encounter mush, proceed; if you encounter steel, withdraw.' IMHO, only when the Delhi, as the weaker and less prepared party, steel up their resolve, will this probing process by Beijing stop. Having steel in their resolve does not mean going to war. It also does not mean a short term deployment of more Indian troops to the LAC (which is temporary in nature) or the knee jerk burning of Chinese flags. IMHO, having steel in their resolve may mean:
(i) investing in even more roads and railways in Arunachal and Assam that will be needed to mobilise the offensive strike groups and transport them to the border fast enough to pre-empt any Chinese counter deployment;​
(ii) speeding up the retirement of antiquated MiG-21s and acquiring modern fighters as replacement and investing in better IFF systems (to prevent friendly fire) — to routinely protect and defend Indian airspace;​
(iii) improving ISR capability through the acquisition and deployment of 3 new squadrons of advanced UAVs to patrol the LAC along with the necessary improvements made to 3 to 4 airbases near the LAC to house additional fighter squadrons with hardened aircraft shelters; and​
(iv) providing better support to troops on the LAC by having 12 to 24 hour notice to move, QRFs (to be housed/stationed at various staging points along the LAC), properly supported with adequate numbers of CH-47F Chinooks with IFF systems (to conduct a company sized troop lift of men and their organic helicopter-lift vehicles, in 1 wave, for each of these QRF battalions) and a flight of AH-64E Apaches to protect the troop lift. The Bronco would be the ideal low ground pressure vehicle in this role for the QRF battalions.​
3. On the one hand, following the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers along the LAC, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said “peace-loving” India was capable of giving a fitting reply if provoked.

They are more or less joined at the hip with Pakistan highly dependent upon the PRC economically and more so as each day passes.
4. On the other hand, actions of China and Pakistan, to raise tensions with India at their respective LACs are coordinated. This will present the Indian Army with a dilemma to split their focus.

5. "On 16 June 2020, in the late evening hours, Pakistan initiated unprovoked ceasefire violation along the LOC in Naugam Sector by firing mortars and other weapons," the defence spokesman was quoted as saying by news agency PTI. He said Indian Army strongly retaliated to Pakistan's unprovoked firing.

6. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar said the extremely violent incident on Monday night “will have a serious impact on the bilateral relationship” between the two neighbours. Both accused troops of the other side for violating the understanding reached by their respective senior commanders on June 6 but agreed to "cool down" tensions on the ground "as soon as possible" and maintain peace and tranquillity in the border area. Jaishankar also said the Chinese side reneged on the June 6 agreement on de-escalation and disengagement along the LAC when it sought to erect a structure in the Galwan valley “on the Indian side of the LAC... While this became a source of dispute, the Chinese side took pre-meditated and planned action that was directly responsible for the resulting violence and casualties.”

7. The Indian Army’s Mountain Strike Corps has been hit by lack of funds and the ITBP’s requirements for all-weather border posts at Pangong long been delayed. Most importantly, while Report(s) of the Indian Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence highlighting depressing delays – 68% of Indian Army equipment is classified as ‘vintage.’ Further, the PLA is prepared consolidate their gains on the ground and Chinese diplomats are prepared to handle Indian protests by diplomatic channels. What strong message did India send?

8. As a journalist and former solider, Ajai Shukla, is speaking truth to power against the lies of his country’s politicians. The PLA(AF) flies some 2,000 combat aircraft – more than thrice the size of the IAF. The 1962 Sino-Indian war was fought entirely between land troops, with neither side using its air force or navy against each other. But in a military face-off today, the PLA(AF), will operate in numbers from the ten-odd air bases in Tibet. To degrade the IAF, the PLA would very likely begin the war with cruise and ballistic missile strikes on Indian air bases in Tezpur, Bagdogra and Hashimara, using missiles from the PLA’s Second Artillery. This might be preceded, or accompanied, by a carefully directed cyber attack to disable the IAF’s surveillance network, satellite communications and command and control systems. His 2012 article, “Don’t fight 1962 all over again”, contains key insights of reforms needed.

(i) He said that: “Indian Army needs to rethink its strategy, relying on local partnership as in the 1950s, rather than on an overwhelming presence that could start being resented...​
(ii) This must involve a three-fold action plan:​
Firstly, recruit at least twenty territorial army battalions from local tribes, which will defend their homeland fiercely against the Chinese, rather than relying on regular army battalions....​
Secondly, rather than committing the bulk of our regular army battalions into defensive deployments aimed at stopping the Chinese at the border, reorganise these formations into offensive strike groups that are geared, trained and equipped to retaliate against any Chinese incursion with counter-incursions into Tibet...​
Thirdly, create the infrastructure of roads and railways in Arunachal and Assam that will be needed to mobilise the offensive strike groups and transport them​
(iii) In his view, “it is foolish to adopt an entirely defensive deployment, and that too focused almost exclusively on the areas in which the Chinese attacked in 1962 (as if to say that the Chinese would just dust out the old plans and re-implement those, instead of coming up with an entirely new plan). Instead of trying to unilaterally fight the 1962 war all over again, [India] should let [the PLA] come in, defeat them in-depth, and simultaneously launch ripostes in pre-decided sectors with pre-prepared, pre-rehearsed and properly supported strike groups.”​
(iv) He has also given talks on the 1962 War, that India lost, to ensure lessons learnt are retained.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Post 2 of 2: A lose-lose outcome

9. Both Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi have built public support in large part on hyper nationalism and a promise of future greatness. This often translates into jingoism and aggressive rhetoric, particularly when playing to a domestic audience. Such an approach was evidenced in Chinese coverage of the PLA maneuvers in the Himalayas. Equally, despite Delhi's announcement Saturday of easing tensions, leading Indian government figures struck an aggressive tone with Home Affairs Minister Amit Shah telling a rally of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) that "any intrusion into the the borders of India will be punished."


10. India will now impose costs on China whenever it tries its favourite salami-slicing tactics in a bid to incrementally grab territory, a move that marks a decisive change in India's long-standing border management policy to largely maintain “peace and tranquility” along the Line of Actual Control, said top official sources. The “days of walk-in options for the PLA are over” said the sources, even as Indian armed forces went on their highest state of alert along the 3,488-km LAC as well as the eastern seaboard after the bloody skirmish in the Galwan Valley.

11. China has in the last three decades, transformed its military, and is prepared to use the same to pursue its policy. It has enforced a status quo with respect to border infrastructure on its own terms. In the meanwhile, the clueless Indian ministry of defence is belatedly re-thinking the protocol followed by its soldiers of carrying firearms in the forward areas, given that PLA has flouted the 2013 Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (2013 BDCA) and 4 other agreements, including the 1996 CBM on the LAC Agreement — these agreements lay down norms to exercise restraint in use of weapons during confrontations. But that is for border policing in normal times and not during military operations. The agreement does not lay down any restrictions on carriage of weapons. Moreover, when the lives of soldiers is threatened, the commander on the spot can use all weapons at his disposal, including artillery fire. The decision to not carry weapons was deliberate and a wrong one taken by the military hierarchy.

12. Despite the potential for clashes at the LAC, five major Sino-Indian agreements have – until now – largely kept the peace. The first of these, the Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement (BPTA), signed in September 1993, is the “mother agreement.” It was supplemented with the 1996 confidence-building measures (CBM) on the LAC agreement; a 2005 standard operating procedures for patrols that come into contact agreement; a 2012 agreement that sets out processes for consultation and co-operation; and, most recently, the 2013 BDCA. Both Beijing and New Delhi realise that a mutually delineated LAC would end the uncertainty that causes troop clashes. The 1996 agreement explicitly notes the need for a “common understanding of the alignment of the line of actual control in the India–China border areas”. It states that the two sides “agree to exchange maps indicating their respective perceptions of the entire alignment of the line of actual control as soon as possible”. However, China stonewalls the exchange of LAC maps, keeping alive the window for clashes.

13. In the standoff between India’s 14 Corps led by Lt General Harinder Singh and the Xinjiang Military Command, Major General Lin Liu, we see a fiasco unfolding at multiple levels for both Beijing and Delhi.
On the one hand, the PLA and the CCP have a PR fiasco for initiating the attack and killing Indian soldiers with nail-studded rods. The PLA is shown as engaging in thuggery, not soldiering —destroying PLA’s hard earned international reputation, as military professionals, by its strong participation in numerous UN peacekeeping operations and its evacuation of 35,860 Chinese nationals stranded in riot-torn Libya were rescued in a huge air, sea and land operation in Feb and Mar 2011. This thuggish mindset is like the Johnson South Reef Skirmish that took place on 14 March 1988, where the PLA(N) was perfectly willing to gun down Vietnamese troops attempted to erect the Vietnamese flag on the reef.​
On the other, the Indian BJP government suffered from a credibility gap given its hyper nationalist language usage, obvious spin control with lies and actual actions — where it is ONLY re-thinking the protocol followed by its soldiers of not carrying firearms. There is also a gap the Indian ability to conduct timely ISR to support its unarmed troops under attack. And I am not even sure if they have a QRF for timely rescue of the injured. The BJP government should have given powers to the the Indian Armed Forces to make emergency procurements to stock up its war reserves, months ago (and not just after 20 had died). If that had been authorised months ago, it would have signalled real resolve.​

14. IMO, like China’s propaganda mouth pieces, BJP’s jingoistic rhetoric also does not allow critical engagement in any sphere. It projects anything critical of the BJP ruling party as anti-national. The reality is that it is the BJP that decided to procure only 36 Dassault Rafale in a Euro €7.87 billion contract (and failing to order a 2nd tranche of 36 more). Likewise the previous government failed to conclude the MRCA tender for 126 fighters and only ordered 11 C-17s by moving too slowly before the line closed (when they had a requirement for 16). In the 2011 C-17 contract, for 10 aircraft, was worth US$4.7 billion, India had an option to purchase 6 more C-17s over its order of ten. However, a lack of funds ensured that the follow-on order was not processed.

15. From China’s arms procurement perspective, India does not have a competent arms procurement process —India’s ruling party and its opposition can never find a bipartisan path forward to spend on defence. Even now, with Indian soldiers dead and injured the politicians are more or less engaging in political stunts to blame each other rather than finding a fix to their problems in defence. Correctly understood, it has a ministry of defeat, instead. The Indian defence ministry also took years to sign the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) with the US, despite years of buying American weapons. Without COMCASA, the Americans had to strip out equipment on aircraft sold to India, including crucial comms equipment for the Indian P-8Is.

16. The real art of public policy is not treating security and prosperity as strict alternatives but finding ways that get the most for both. PLA’s June 2020 hostile action to gain some inconsequential land along the LAC has resulted China destroying the trust created by prior border agreements and creating another enemy, when they could have kept India in the neutral camp.

(i) China’s self defeating approach extends to the Nov 2016 HK Terrex episode, where Chinese intelligence caused HK to detain Singapore’s armoured vehicles being shipped back from Taiwan — earning the distrust of another ‘neutral,’ who has now entered the F-35B club in Asia, along with Japan. Singapore's recent purchase of the F-35B fighter jets is part of the vital and longstanding relationship shared between the two countries, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, Mr Rene Clarke Cooper, said on 10 Feb 2020. Speaking to global media, Mr Cooper also said that “the US-Singapore partnership is one very clear tangible example of the United States' commitment to a very free and open Indo-Pacific for all states in the region," he added. The US government has approved the sale of up to 12 F-35Bs to Singapore, the first sale to a country in South-east Asia.​

(ii) Many in the Indo-Pacific is hedging with the rise of China. With Trump’s unpredictability, there is strong incentive for Japan, Indonesia and Australia, as G20 members, to grow closer bilateral defence and economic ties. On the diplomatic front, the 6 Dec 2019 joint statement from the Australia–Indonesia foreign and defense ministers’ meeting expressed “serious concerns” about developments in the South China Sea. The rare united statement is a starting point for more discussions on how both countries could work together on strengthening sovereignty.​
(iii) In Southeast Asia, there is no “one-size-fits-all” narrative regarding China. While many countries are increasing ties with China to hedge against declining US influence, the survey also underscored how power dynamics in Southeast Asia are about much more than just the US and China. Japan and India, are also viewed as major players, with Indonesia holding significant influence in its own right.​
(iv) China’s unnecessary turn to hostility with its neutral neighbours has increased hedging behaviour in Asia, resulting in the trilateral naval exercise involving India, Singapore and Thailand in Sep 2019 that includes HTMS Kraburi and RSS Tenacious, from Thailand and Singapore. The Indian Navy was represented by INS Ranvir, INS Kora, and INS Sukanya along with a P8I MPA.​
 
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ngatimozart

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  • #109
This BS should be a clear message for Canada. Begin a rapid disengagement from China, both in trade and diplomatic relations. Forget extradition to the US (can’t trust Trump, may just return her for a favour leaving our people in prison). She should be jailed until an exchange can be arranged. Afterward, our policy to China...GFY!https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/kovrig-spavor-china-espionage-1.5618674
If you give in now, they will use the same tactic against you next time. Yes it's 2 Canadian citizens and it's a really crappy deal, however it has to be done for the greater good of the country.

The Chicoms have launched a massive cyber attack against Australia in recent times: Australia targeted by 'state-based' cyber attacks and the Chicoms are screaming foul 'Baseless nonsense': China denies cyber attack spree in Australia. The more they cry foul, the more they have to hide.
 

pussertas

Active Member
This BS should be a clear message for Canada. Begin a rapid disengagement from China, both in trade and diplomatic relations. Forget extradition to the US (can’t trust Trump, may just return her for a favour leaving our people in prison). She should be jailed until an exchange can be arranged. Afterward, our policy to China...GFY!https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/kovrig-spavor-china-espionage-1.5618674View attachment 47442
I gave up leading tours to China after the murder of Chinese citizens by the PLA.
 

Black Jack Shellac

Active Member
If you give in now, they will use the same tactic against you next time. Yes it's 2 Canadian citizens and it's a really crappy deal, however it has to be done for the greater good of the country.

The Chicoms have launched a massive cyber attack against Australia in recent times: Australia targeted by 'state-based' cyber attacks and the Chicoms are screaming foul 'Baseless nonsense': China denies cyber attack spree in Australia. The more they cry foul, the more they have to hide.
I am confident that Canada will stay the course and let the courts decide what to do with Meng Wanzhou. I don't think much of Trudeau, but he learned his lesson about messing with the courts after the SNC Lavalin and Admiral Norman affairs. Canada will likely try some diplomatic pressure to free our citizens, equally likely with no success. Bottom line is we are just one of a pack of countries that China is p*ss**g on right now. If we cave, we are no different than China.
 

Stampede

Active Member
An interesting article suggesting the timing is right for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Some valid points but it would be risky.
Damn interesting question.

I'd like to think it wont happen.
But if id did, how should we / could we respond?

Trust we don't have to answer this question anytime soon.


Regards S
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Damn interesting question.
1. First, it must be remembered that Taiwan is not an American ally and they have no duty to defend Taiwan. Secondly, this question was also asked and answered in Tanner Greer’s poorly researched Sept 2019 article in the Foreign Affairs, ‘Taiwan’s Defense Strategy Doesn’t Make Military Sense: But It Does Make Political Sense.’
(i) While I agree that Taiwan needs to up its game for defence procurement (against a PLA invasion scenario), Greer’s article demonstrates his ignorance of real and valid Taiwanese concerns — with his objection to Taiwan refreshing their submarine force — including their fear of their SLOCs being choked and thereafter restricted in their ability to trade by the PLA(N), from distant seas.​
(ii) The PLA(N) is on the verge of or has acquired a blue water capability. This question on attacking across the Taiwan Straits was also asked past threads, like the Moderated taiwan invasion war game (that we agreed will never be reopened).​
(iii) By choosing to end conscription in Taiwan, without a successful transition to an all professional force, the Taiwanese have said they do not believe in defending their island — therefore it is only logical to ask, why should we fight for them?​
I'd like to think it wont happen.
But if id did, how should we / could we respond?
2. It will not happen in round 2: 2017 to 2021 as the 7th Fleet by itself presents an over match and it is very unlikely to happen in round 3: 2022 to 2026, if you factor in American allies, including the JMSDF. Beyond 2032 (round 5), it becomes harder to predict at this stage. The only other country with troops and bases in Taiwan is not Australia. Your country does not have to get involved — but a small country that is upgrading its ties with Australia and the US gets a vote, which vote might be a vote of neutrality (in 2032 onwards)— depending on:
(i) who is in power in the US and how much of the illogical ‘America First’ policies have been dismantled by 2032 (or does it remain just as toxic under Trump at that time);​
(ii) who is at fault in any China-Taiwan dispute, especially the behaviour of the two faced politicians in Taiwan in the lead up to conflict and the untested fighting ability of the Taiwanese armed forces;​
(iii) whether the JMSDF has decided to fight on the side of the American Navy, and if the Americans find the political will to declare war and decide that such attack should be resisted; and​
(iv) support by ASEAN (or lack there of) — by Donal Trump’s rejection of the TPP, the Americans automatically reduced support by some in the ASEAN region.​
3. But the question is, how much can you rely on the US, if Trump remains in charge (after the coming election). President Trump has balked at upholding the country’s NATO commitments, demanded massive increases in defense spending from such long-standing allies as Japan and South Korea, and suggested that underpaying allies should be left to fight their own wars with shared adversaries. Trump’s ire has been so relentless and damaging that U.S. allies in Asia and Europe now question American ability to restore itself as a credible security guarantor, even after a different president is in the White House.
Trust we don't have to answer this question anytime soon.
4. The more interesting question is the possibility of Taiwanese election to surrender of its security interests to the Chinese so as to avoid a fight. The Taiwanese will not be unique as the Philippines very nearly surrendered its core interests in the hopes of gaining Belt and Road benefits. Their foreign secretary, Locsin wrote on social media that the suspension of the termination of the VFA was made upon President Duterte's "instruction". "It has been received by Washington and well at that," he added.

"The suspension shall start on even date and shall continue for six months, which period is extendible by the Philippines for another six months," after which the countdown to termination "shall resume", read a June 1 letter by Locsis to the embassy of the US in Manila.​

5. In a statement, the US embassy said it welcomed the Philippine government's decision. Having observed their prior poor performance at ADMM Plus Maritime exercises, other navies are certain that the Pinoys do not train like they need to fight.

6. In India’s case, it’s Prime Minister has backed down even after 20 of their soldiers were killed. This will save more lives as India was not prepared. Resolve is not easy to find, in the weak. Indian BJP politicians are capable of calculating their own self interest and it may be in a manner that is directly against their country’s security interests.

7. India is only belatedly seeking reciprocal military logistics pacts with like-minded countries, like Japan, to extend its strategic and naval operational reach, with an eye firmly on China’s expansionist behavior in the Indo-Pacific. India has already entered into mutual logistics support arrangement (MLSA) with Australia, US, France, South Korea and Singapore.

8. In contrast to politicians in India or the Philippines who are keen to surrender, a Singapore leader will show more spine. This is thanks to the fact that the SAF is more prepared for war (in part due to tensions caused by Malaysian hostility in 2018 and 1991), with the Singapore Air Force setting up a training detachment in Guam and the Singapore Navy’s frigates have been training in Guam, to fight as a combined task unit, in Exercise Pacific Griffin 2017 and in 2019. For the Americans, Singapore is a partner that behaves like an ally.
(i) These realistic bi-annual bilateral exercises simulate the defence and protection by frigates and destroyers of high value units (like a LPD), going into harm’s way, should the need arise. In the 2017 edition of the exercise, RSN’s 2 frigates, RSS Stalwart and RSS Supreme, protected the LPD, RSS Endurance (acting as the high value unit in the exercise).​
(ii) The deployment of a surface action group of 3 ships (SAG) may not seem to be much; but it is more naval combat power than Philippines (an American ally) or NZ (a former ally under the ANZUS Treaty) can muster. Keeping in mind that the troops in both these countries fought with distinction in the Korean War against China.​
9. For an idea of the complexity of Exercise Pacific Griffin 2019, participating:

(i) naval assets included the littoral combat ship USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS 10), the Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer USS Momsen (DDG 92), Los Angeles-class submarine USS Key West (SSN 722), Military Sealift Command dry cargo and ammunition ship USNS Amelia Earhart (T-AKE 6), and Singapore’s frigates RSS Formidable (FFS 68) and RSS Intrepid (FFS 69); and​
(ii) air assets included MH-60S helicopters from Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 23 and 25, MH-60R helicopters from Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 35, maritime patrol aircraft from Patrol Squadrons (VP) 1, 5 and 47, and B-52s Stratofortress bombers from U.S. Air Forces' Expeditionary 69th Bomb Squadron.​

10. Additionally, both navies successfully executed a sinking exercise (SINKEX) of former USS Ford. “Our planners have worked very closely with one another and established very strong working relationship, and more importantly trust between us,” said Republic of Singapore Navy Commander First Flotilla and Commanding Officer of 185 Squadron, Colonel Lim Yu Chuan.
 
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Stampede

Active Member
1. First, it must be remembered that Taiwan is not an American ally and they have no duty to defend Taiwan. Secondly, this question was also asked and answered in Tanner Greer’s poorly researched Sept 2019 article in the Foreign Affairs, ‘Taiwan’s Defense Strategy Doesn’t Make Military Sense: But It Does Make Political Sense.’
(i) While I agree that Taiwan needs to up its game for defence procurement (against a PLA invasion scenario), Greer’s article demonstrates his ignorance of real and valid Taiwanese concerns — with his objection to Taiwan refreshing their submarine force — including their fear of their SLOCs being choked and thereafter restricted in their ability to trade by the PLA(N), from distant seas.​
(ii) The PLA(N) is on the verge of or has acquired a blue water capability. This question on attacking across the Taiwan Straits was also asked past threads, like the Moderated taiwan invasion war game (that we agreed will never be reopened).​
(iii) By choosing to end conscription in Taiwan, without a successful transition to an all professional force, the Taiwanese have said they do not believe in defending their island — therefore it is only logical to ask, why should we fight for them?​

2. It will not happen in round 2: 2017 to 2021 as the 7th Fleet by itself presents an over match and it is very unlikely to happen in round 3: 2022 to 2026, if you factor in American allies, including the JMSDF. Beyond 2032 (round 5), it becomes harder to predict at this stage. The only other country with troops and bases in Taiwan is not Australia. Your country does not have to get involved — but a small country that is upgrading its ties with Australia and the US gets a vote, which vote might be a vote of neutrality (in 2032 onwards)— depending on:
(i) who is in power in the US and how much of the illogical ‘America First’ policies have been dismantled by 2032 (or does it remain just as toxic under Trump at that time);​
(ii) who is at fault in any China-Taiwan dispute, especially the behaviour of the two faced politicians in Taiwan in the lead up to conflict and the untested fighting ability of the Taiwanese armed forces;​
(iii) whether the JMSDF has decided to fight on the side of the American Navy, and if the Americans find the political will to declare war and decide that such attack should be resisted; and​
(iv) support by ASEAN (or lack there of) — by Donal Trump’s rejection of the TPP, the Americans automatically reduced support by some in the ASEAN region.​
3. But the question is, how much can you rely on the US, if Trump remains in charge (after the coming election). President Trump has balked at upholding the country’s NATO commitments, demanded massive increases in defense spending from such long-standing allies as Japan and South Korea, and suggested that underpaying allies should be left to fight their own wars with shared adversaries. Trump’s ire has been so relentless and damaging that U.S. allies in Asia and Europe now question American ability to restore itself as a credible security guarantor, even after a different president is in the White House.

4. The more interesting question is the possibility of Taiwanese election to surrender of its security interests to the Chinese so as to avoid a fight. The Taiwanese will not be unique as the Philippines very nearly surrendered its core interests in the hopes of gaining Belt and Road benefits. Their foreign secretary, Locsin wrote on social media that the suspension of the termination of the VFA was made upon President Duterte's "instruction". "It has been received by Washington and well at that," he added.

"The suspension shall start on even date and shall continue for six months, which period is extendible by the Philippines for another six months," after which the countdown to termination "shall resume", read a June 1 letter by Locsis to the embassy of the US in Manila.​

5. In a statement, the US embassy said it welcomed the Philippine government's decision. Having observed their prior poor performance at ADMM Plus Maritime exercises, other navies are certain that the Pinoys do not train like they need to fight.

6. In India’s case, it’s Prime Minister has backed down even after 20 of their soldiers were killed. This will save more lives as India was not prepared. Resolve is not easy to find, in the weak. Indian BJP politicians are capable of calculating their own self interest and it may be in a manner that is directly against their country’s security interests.

...

10. Additionally, both navies successfully executed a sinking exercise (SINKEX) of former USS Ford. “Our planners have worked very closely with one another and established very strong working relationship, and more importantly trust between us,” said Republic of Singapore Navy Commander First Flotilla and Commanding Officer of 185 Squadron, Colonel Lim Yu Chuan.
Thanks for the informative reply.
I personally doubt / hope this scenario doesn't develop any time soon.
This is not to say however that the PRC will not continue a "Robust " relationship with most of her neighbours that don't share a world view as seen through the CCP lens.


Regards S
 
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OPSSG

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Staff member
Understanding the Taiwan Card

1. Taiwan is playing a very dangerous intelligence operatives driven game in trying to destroy CCP credibility in their one-country, two-systems promise — that was originally proposed for Taiwan and implemented elsewhere.

2. It’s a matter of time before they get caught red handed and when it happens, China-Taiwan relations could deteriorate rapidly. IMHO, they should stand alone and face the consequences. I wish them luck, because they will need it, when that happens. If the worse case scenario happens, US think tanks beholden to Taiwanese money will try to spin a story to drag the US military into Taiwanese shit.
An interesting article suggesting the timing is right for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Some valid points but it would be risky.
3. Thanks for sharing this valuable point of view by retired US military professions on the PLA and CCP mindset towards cross-strait relations. In this respect, US DOD support for Taiwanese military modernisation efforts is crucial for Taiwan.

4. The key to the Taiwanese ability to defend Taiwan and it’s de facto independence is the civil-military establishment’s ability to align and grow its commonality of security interests with the Japanese, the Israelis and the Americans as key technology suppliers. The authors behind US Strategic Approach to the PRC make it clear the struggle against the Communist state will take a while. In a document released by the Trump administration, it laid down its new rules for dealing with China in 16 pages. It’s made clear the US isn’t abandoning Taiwan and “Beijing’s failure to honor its commitments under the [US-PRC] communiques, as demonstrated by its massive military buildup, compels the US to continue to assist the Taiwan military in maintaining a credible self-defense.” The US$10 billion worth of arms sales to Taiwan in 2019 is mentioned for added effect.

5. In this respect, I am not optimistic. President Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP are at least as untrustworthy as the KMT. They keep up the appearance of pretending to modernise their armed forces but when you probe deeper, their efforts ring hollow. The Taiwanese could betray the efforts of others to support them, as and when it suits them. By lacking in a strategic culture, the Taiwanese undermine their own efforts or over play the cards they have in the most cynical way possible, for short term gain. The day may come when Taiwan or the weaker ASEAN states, like the Philippines, can no longer see enough space to hedge, or are forced into making a China choice. Even then, those would be vassal states.

6. On 11 Jan 2020, Singapore has congratulated Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen and her party on their election victory. "We welcome the successful conclusion of the elections in Taiwan on 11 Jan 2020, and congratulate Dr Tsai Ing-wen and her party on their victory," the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) said. "Singapore and Taiwan share a close and friendly relationship, which goes back many years. We will continue to grow this relationship based on Singapore's 'One China' policy," the statement said.

7. Peaceful and stable development of cross-strait relations would not be possible without wisdom and pragmatism by the leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait — thus far, President Tsai Ing-wen actions and decisions give me absolute confidence that the Taiwanese leadership in power lacks that pragmatism.

8. I wish Japan good luck as they attempt to help the Taiwanese in their efforts in one key area of Taiwanese effort to develop its military-industrial base.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Wrong analysis of alternatives does not help solve the border problem

1. The importance of this crisis is clear. China has taken by force small pieces of territory that India perceives as its own. In doing so, China crossed two important Indian red lines: seizing territory and killing Indian soldiers. Do modern conquests typically involve large, valuable areas or smaller areas whose worth one must squint to discern? And what can be done in response? Answering these questions exposes the surprising normalcy of what has happened in Ladakh. To my mind and most western security analysis, deterrence “is the use of a threat (explicit or not) by one party in an attempt to convince another party not to upset status quo” (Quackenbush, 2010: 60). More specifically, deterrence is the persuasion of an aggressor that the cost and/or risk of a given course of action he might take outweighs its benefits (George & Smoke, 1974: 11). Where the preference is not to fight.

2. In common with the Chinese mindset, deterrence for the Indians is a mutual relationship that involves communication and signaling and assumes that states in competition or conflict make decisions in accordance with rational cost-benefit calculations that can be manipulated (Mazarr & Goodby, 2011).

3. But the key difference is China’s willingness to fight, as a next step, to communicate to the Indians in the language of deterrence by shedding blood. That is why I worry a lot when I see an Indian reporter say:
“...China clearly wants more. India faces the choice of moving towards becoming a vassal state or purposefully safeguarding its sovereignty and self-respect. True, China is several times more powerful and wealthy than India, and a military confrontation would incur a heavy cost. However... Sovereignty has a price and sometimes that price has to be paid.”​
4. I believe that the CCP’s strategy must be understood correctly — as the fait accompli. Each fait accompli is a calculated gamble and the CCP bet that it could take small areas in Ladakh without provoking India to start a wider war. So far, that bet has played out in Beijing’s favor, but the crisis is not over. I suspect that China’s motive is to establish deterrence against India by a limited border skirmish and the Indian politicians must be prepared to suffer deaths to draw a line and after that happens, to seek a path to peace. The choice is not about becoming a vassal state or sovereignty. The choice for India is to be sovereign but to pay for such unpreparedness in blood. That is to engage in war planning but execute with clear stop lines.

5. China’s encroachments in Ladakh share the most baffling quality of conquest in recent decades: risking military conflict for such a small territorial payoff. Only when the Indians are in a position to make such a payment, can they get China to withdraw to their side in a manner that minimises the amount of bloodshed for this border dispute.

6. It is my suspicion that India is headed to a path of a limited war with China. Peaceful coexistence and restoration of Sino-Indian relations after a limited war would not be possible without wisdom and pragmatism by the leaders on both sides.
 
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Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
China's trick is to do everything bit by bit, slowly, over a long period. The chinese expect that India regards loosing a small piece of land is not worth a full war. But over the years these small bits together are quite large of course.

And this trick can be very successful, just look to the Spratly Sea. The last decades china has built many 'fishermen villages' and 'scientific laboratoria for peaceful purposes' at that place, and now a large part of that sea is under control of china.

Also the process of strengthening the control over Hong Kong, is step by step and slowly but sure.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Post 1 of 2
The chinese expect that India regards loosing a small piece of land is not worth a full war. But over the years these small bits together are quite large of course.
1. See point 4 of Hu Xijin's op-ed in the Global Times, where he talks about defeating the US on China’s doorstep.

2. India and the South China Sea are at China’s doorstep. To establish deterrence against India, Indonesia and Malaysia as countries at their doorstep, they want to water down American efforts in the Indo-Pacific. China will walk all over these three countries, if they don’t have the right systems, defence policies and capabilities, deployed in the right place, at the right time.

3. While India has the manpower and large 1.2 million strong standing army, when compared to China, they are not ready for war.
(i) Watching the multiple failures in defence procurement by India tells me that the Indians are not ready for war — no matter how brave their soldiers are.​
(ii) Indian leaders just have to get used to the idea of losing a little land, in each dispute.​

4. The purpose of extracting these concessions is not about the land but to train Indians to be accustomed to defeat, in the same way the British colonial power trained the Indians who served the East India Company. This mental shaping of India, by small cuts, creates deterrence.

5. China wants to train Indian leaders to fear conflict and to avoid actively supporting the Americans, due to Indian need for self preservation. After all, India has a shared 4,056 km land border with China. Chinese credibility is enhanced as the strength of the PLA has been reduced from 2.5 million to just under 2.3 million. This will at a structural level, free up significant sums money for China’s military modernisation efforts, with a 2020 defence budget of 1.268 trillion yuan.

6. Given the economic consequences of Covid-19, China’s recent increase in defense spending sends a clear signal that President Xi Jinping remains committed to completing the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) by 2035 and transforming the PLA into a “world-class” military by 2049.

7. At this time, I believe that China’s ability to mobilize people and resources to safeguard China's core interests, is far greater than that of Indonesia. It is likely that by 2035, China will ask for your country’s leader to surrender even more of Indonesia’s interests in favour of China. There only two things Indonesia can do, now. They are, as follows:
(i) one, for the Indonesian navy to get closer to the American and the Japanese navies, as resident naval powers that do not have to bend to PLA(N) coercion. Working with friendly powers with interests in the Indo-Pacific region ensures that Indonesia does not stand alone at its time of need; and​
(ii) two, for the Indonesian Government to strengthen ASEAN, by working closely with Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand and Singapore, on areas of shared concern.​
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Post 2 of 2
8. China’s military activities around Japan are shown above. It is interesting to see how Japan documents these Chinese activities.

9. PLA’s modernisation efforts in every area, including self propelled artillery (PCL 181) is well advanced. This means the PLA is ready for high tempo shoot and scoot operations. It is likely that any enemy fire mission that lasts longer than 5 mins against the PLA will face counter battery fire from Chinese artillery.

10. For a sense of balance, PLA is also doing good, delivering medical supplies where it is needed.
 
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Ananda

Well-Known Member
believe that China’s ability to mobilize people and resources to safeguard China's core interests, is far greater than that of Indonesia. It is likely that by 2035, China will ask for your country’s leader to surrender even more of Indonesia’s interests in favour of China.
China always try to get into each countries politicall establishment and buy their influence in. They're doing it in Asean, South Asia, Middle East, Africa, even in Europe and North America.
We know some Indonesian politicall circle already under Chinese influence. However China create own problem for their own private interest by asking and demanding too far and I can say too soon.

This COVID 19 also change many domestic perspective in many countries about China accountability, like it or not for China or their supporter everywhere (including their ten cents army on lines). While at the same time they are demanding more from their neighbors. They simply willingly playing to US accusations circles.

It's getting harder to be pro Chinese. Off course they will always play business and Investment card, but US simply showing one thing (at least in Asean), China demand part of your sovereign rights. That what China with their action in SCS, just dig themselves deeper toward US playbook.
 
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