China - Geostrategic & Geopolitical.

[ngatimozart]

@Vivendi Don't blind yourself by being stuck in a euro-western mindset, assessing and analysing the Chinese or any other non European culture through a western lens using a western European values system. By doing so you limit your analysis and end up with a flawed results. The Chinese definitely do not see the world the way the west does. They have a completely different cultural interpretation of it and their culture goes back 2,500 years give or take. How long does the European or western culture go back, 1,000 years? 500 years? Western science and technology per se were at least 1,000 years behind the Chinese in some aspects and hundreds of years in others. The Mongols, although not Chinese but sitting on the Chinese imperial throne, reached the gates of Vienna and their empire was a land empire that stretched from China to the Danube. No other power has created such an empire before or since, not even the USSR. It was only in the 18th Century that the west really started to forge ahead of China and the 19th Century when it cowed and forced a weakened Chinese imperial dynasty into concessions.

First things first. Although the CCP have tried very hard to eliminate Confucian thought, belief systems, morality and ideals from Chinese society, replacing it with CCP thought, dogma, belief systems, morality and ideals, it hasn't succeeded because the Confucianism is almost part of the Chinese DNA. It is passed from generation to generation regardless of what the CCP dictates and that is a real bugbear for the CCP because it does not tolerate alternate belief systems to its own. It brooks no opposition at all and that's one large reason why the CCP regards the assimilation of Taiwan as an imperative. It cannot allow a living breathing successful example of a Chinese political, social and economic system and society that is different to the image of the idealised political, social and economic system and society that they propagandise to the citizens of the PRC. Taiwan has the same Confucian thought, belief systems, morality and ideals that permeate the PRC and are found in all Chinese ethnic populations throughout the world, especially the ones who are free of the CCP taint. It is that Confucian thought, belief systems, morality and ideals that is why the Chinese people view the world differently way to those of the west, or Russia, the Middle East, or Polynesian peoples (of which I belong). However with the PRC you also have the CCP and its political dynamic which adds to the mixture, and with the CCP everything is political. So they are not only looking at the world through a Chinese Confucian lens, but also a CCP political lens. And that's what we must attempt to do when trying to analyse PRC intentions especially WRT Taiwan. Failure to do so will just end up giving you rubbish. It's the old saw; rubbish in = rubbish out.

 

[swerve]

@Vivendi ...The Mongols, although not Chinese but sitting on the Chinese imperial throne, reached the gates of Vienna and their empire was a land empire that stretched from China to the Danube. ...

They came close to Vienna, true, but that was raiding parties, not an army able to threaten the city & they didn't rule to the Danube. Their invasion of Europe in 1241-2 ended just as the invasion of Rus in 1227 did, with withdrawal, but this time they didn't return for a long time. They left most of Rus unoccupied but subject to punitive raids if it didn't pay tribute.

In the 1280s they returned, twice, & both times suffered heavy defeats.

 

[STURM]

What the Chinese Army Is Learning From Russia’s Ukraine War

A retired Army lieutenant general discusses why a tenet of PLA modernization has been validated by the conflict—but is also paradoxical.

carnegieendowment.org

If anyone has any doubts whether the Chinese are closely and keenly observing events in the Ukraine [like they did with other wars]; this article is essential reading. I'm sure their planners will draw the right lessons from the Russian experience and the Ukrainian and Western response but whether or they are are successfully in making the needed changes will unfortunately only be known if an actual war breaks out.

''The PLA are careful and meticulous students of modern warfare, particularly the U.S. way of war. They are voracious consumers of publicly available information, as well as all of the information that their very aggressive intelligence efforts provide them. When I was the defense attaché at [Pacific Command] and in the Office of [the] Secretary of Defense, I used to say, “If it’s online, they’ve read it.” And I remember being in meetings where they would quote word for word any doctrine that we had posted online, or revisions to our doctrine, as well as the performance capabilities of U.S. weapon systems.''

''The second [fundamental change] is the concept that they have an overwhelming advantage in mass. But qualitative quantity has an even higher quality all its own. So there’s been an abandonment of this perception that [the PLA] have this overwhelming advantage in mass that’s sufficient to deter an enemy from attacking, and more of an emphasis on reducing the size of the PLA ground forces and increasing the quality of the strategic rocket forces and the support forces in the Navy, in an effort to ensure that their quality matches the qualitative advantage that the United States has always enjoyed.''

Chinese and Russian militaries share a potential weakness, new US report finds | CNN

China's military leaders share a potential weakness that has undermined their Russian counterparts in Ukraine and could hamper their ability to wage a similar war, according to a new report from the US National Defense University.

edition.cnn.com

A 73 page reports points out an interesting fact; it ''delved into the backgrounds of more than 300 of the PLA’s top officers across its five services – army, navy, air force, rocket force and strategic support force – in the six years leading up to 2021. It found that in each service leaders were unlikely to have operational experience in any branch other than the one they began their careers in''.

It also mentions ''“operational commanders, for instance, rarely have career-broadening experience in logistics, and vice versa,” said the report by Wuthnow, a senior research fellow at the university’s Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs. Operational commanders who never needed to gain a high level of understanding of logistics or maintenance might fail to use those forces optimally, paralleling another Russian failure in 2022.”

The bright spots for the PLA however is the level of training provided to recruits and unlike the Russians they don't rely on conscripts; plus the fact they have quality NCOs. As of 2022 even when we have a much clearer picture of what's happening within the PLA compared to previous years; there is still a tendency to assume the Chinese are good but not good enough; that like the Russians the Chinese will underperform; that superior U.S. and allied experience and capabilities will always prove decisive; ; etc. IMO these are dangerous assumptions to make.

''Carl Schuster, a former director of operations at the US Pacific Command’s Joint Intelligence Center in Hawaii, said the new report “is the best assessment of where China is at and going that I have seen. But he cautioned against using it as a predictor of how the PLA might fare in a Ukraine-like war as it had numerous other advantages over the Russian military. China gives better training to new recruits and no longer relies on conscripts, he said, whereas the Russian army “relies on seven-month conscripts for 80-85% of its enlisted personnel. And, unlike Russia, China has a professional non-commissioned officer corps, he added.'

''Schuster, who now teaches at Hawaii Pacific University, estimated that China is about four or five years behind the US in terms of joint operation abilities – but warned recent exercises “suggest they are catching up. He cited recent Chinese operations like those around Taiwan after US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited the island in early August as demonstrating this. “The study’s unstated implication that the PLA may be unable to do effective joint ops is misplaced,” Schuster said.''

Moderator Edit.
Link to report cited in CNN article: https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/china-perspectives-16.pdf

 

[koxinga]

In particular if the country in question will get massive support of resourceful countries across the globe.

On the contrary... beyond the US, I can't see any countries willing to offer much to Taiwan if war starts.

That countries in the region has a vested interest is not having a war in the Taiwan Straits or seeing China be more assertive does not translate to material support nor a desire to ensure democracy continues to fly in the region. They see it as bad for business more than anything.

If I break it down:

1) European countries? Beyond words of condemnations and sanctions, practically difficult to ship meaningful supplies tens thousands of miles away.
2) ASEAN? Canned statements of condemnations, desire for peace, willingness to be abitrators, and sit this one out. They haven't exactly got mountains of supplies to start with and most have their own problems, save Singapore.
3) South Korea? For the Koreans, unless they are militarily provoked, they will not be keen to get involved, especially with the North at their doorsteps.
4) Japan? For the Japanese, they recongize China as a major security threat and the general public have a poor perception of the Chinese. Perhaps the war will tilt perceptions into tangible assistance but I suspect it will be limited. It would be a propoganda coup for the Chinese if the Japanese get involved.
5) Australia? They are probably the closest to get into the fight.
6) India? If they can bit off a chunk of Aksai Chin in the process, they would. Again, their own interest comes first.

Being someone from the region, my sense is most countries here will see where the wind blows.. Most countries in region sign-up the One China principle; it gives them the flexibility to look the other way.

If the US or some other non-regional actors want to get involved, they won't stop them since its "free".

 

[hauritz]

In recent years the US has chastised its NATO allies for not pulling their weight. I feel it is just a matter of time before we see the US really starting to pressure some of the larger Asian powers to step up and start taking more responsibility for their mutual defence. I actually have my doubt's whether the US would defend Taiwan unless it could put together a regional coalition of the willing to back them up.

 

[STURM]

They haven't exactly got mountains of supplies to start with and most have their own problems, save Singapore.

Singapore has large stockpiles of key essentials but whether it actually rushes these to Taiwan remains to be seen given that Singapore has its own priorities, concerns and interests to watch out for. My guess is that like its neighbours; any conflict with over Taiwan would see Singapore adopting a cautious 'wait and see' approach and not getting directly involved unless it absolutely had no choice.

I actually have my doubt's whether the US would defend Taiwan unless it could put together a regional coalition of the willing to back them up.

It would depend on the circumstances. Does war start with a full blown Chinese air and sea campaign followed almost immediately with an amphibious assault or will there be a period of tensions with the Chinese relying initially on a sea and air campaign with no sign of an immediate amphibious assault; giving the Americans time to deploy what they need to the area?

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

Japan? For the Japanese, they recongize China as a major security threat and the general public have a poor perception of the Chinese. Perhaps the war will tilt perceptions into tangible assistance but I suspect it will be limited. It would be a propoganda coup for the Chinese if the Japanese get involved.

Why would Chinese propaganda factor into Tokyo's considerations?

If Beijing attacks Taiwan, the Chinese propaganda network will go into 100% and national fevour will also reach 100%. Contrary to American motivational speakers, there is no such thing as 110% when measuring the maximum capability of something. A Japanese intervention would change the words but not the outcome in terms of sentiment - unless you're a Japanese national stupid enough to be living in China at the time, in which case tough luck.

Japan does not want Taiwan to fall to China under any circumstances. The security and wider geopolitical ramifications would be immense. The CCP would be only emoldened to embark on an expanionist policy - the Ryuku Islands could be next. The fact China's economy might well be in the shitter by then wouldn't be a restraining factor, if anything it could be a reason to use foreign/military policy to distract an otherwise unhappy Chinese populace. It's a lot easier to justify crap living standards via your propaganda network if you're embarking on glorious military adventures overseas.

Therefore, there are very good reasons for Japan to give more than token support.

More importantly, this assumes that China does not attack Japan first, whether SDF bases or American bases in Japan. If China were to let the US operate out of Japan freely it would be a significant advantage to Washington.

European countries? Beyond words of condemnations and sanctions, practically difficult to ship meaningful supplies tens thousands of miles away.

European countries could reassure the US that they had Russia locked down, so it could focus on Taiwan. "We" also have a fair amount of airlift, so supplies could be flown to Japan as a staging point. Finally, depending on how quickly tensions rose, the Royal Navy might deploy one or more SSNs to Asia to support the USN.

It would depend on the circumstances. Does war start with a full blown Chinese air and sea campaign followed almost immediately with an amphibious assault or will there be a period of tensions with the Chinese relying initially on a sea and air campaign with no sign of an immediate amphibious assault; giving the Americans time to deploy what they need to the area?

Is it even possible for China to hide the military build up required for an invasion? I think most experts admit that the US would know days or even weeks ahead of an invasion if it were going to happen, because the amount of personnel required to avoid the invasion force not getting slaughtered on the beaches and to support the invasion would be huge.

 

[STURM]

Is it even possible for China to hide the military build up required for an invasion? I think most experts admit that the US would know days or even weeks ahead of an invasion if it were going to happen

The Yanks would certainly know something was up; such a build up would be impossible to hide. Unless they have solid intel [like that case with the Ukraine] however; it would be hard to tell for sure whether it was a large scale exercise or indeed if the PLA was on the verge of initiating military action; if was a prelude to an actual assault or air and naval action.

 

[koxinga]

Japan does not want Taiwan to fall to China under any circumstances. The security and wider geopolitical ramifications would be immense.

Absolutely. Recent initiatives and programs are all aimed at deterring China.

Japan eyes stockpiling 1,000 long-range missiles amid China tensions

We bring you the Asian business, politics, economy and tech stories others miss.

asia.nikkei.com

Domestically though, the sentiments remains split on the extent of support. IMO, a direct attack on US bases in Japan would tilt those opinions

Taiwan tensions are a minefield for Japan’s leaders - Tokyo Review

Prime Minister Kishida has new room to maneuver on security issues – but Japan’s support for Taiwan is an issue with no simple answers.

www.tokyoreview.net

The CCP would be only emoldened to embark on an expanionist policy - the Ryuku Islands could be next. The fact China's economy might well be in the shitter by then wouldn't be a restraining factor, if anything it could be a reason to use foreign/military policy to distract an otherwise unhappy Chinese populace. It's a lot easier to justify crap living standards via your propaganda network if you're embarking on glorious military adventures overseas.

Beyond terrorities with sketchy historical claims (e.g SCS, Diaoyu, Dokodo), I am skeptical of projecting an expansionist approach to China's ambitions, especially physical acquisitions beyond those claims.
They want like any great power, influence and the ability to define international order that is favourable to them. It can be achieved without taking over countries.

European countries could reassure the US that they had Russia locked down, so it could focus on Taiwan. "We" also have a fair amount of airlift, so supplies could be flown to Japan as a staging point. Finally, depending on how quickly tensions rose, the Royal Navy might deploy one or more SSNs to Asia to support the USN.

Taiwan does not figure in European security environment and I would be skeptical that you would see the same level of fervour or military support. At a principle level, yes, the European Union, the Parliament will obviously condemn an attack on Taiwan and provided some support.

Practically, an attack would likely see a naval and air blockage of Taiwan. Whatever airlift would be further limited. The terrain works both ways; it makes an invasion immensely difficult but at the same time, it makes resupply equally difficult.

Is it even possible for China to hide the military build up required for an invasion? I think most experts admit that the US would know days or even weeks ahead of an invasion if it were going to happen, because the amount of personnel required to avoid the invasion force not getting slaughtered on the beaches and to support the invasion would be huge.

I agree, I don't think it is possible to hid the build-up. It is not just about the difficulty to hid the movement of equipment from satelitte but also about Western HUMINT resources.

But if Ukraine has shown anything, it is a lot more complicated than detecting troop movements. It boils down to how the political leadership uses that information and "strategic surprise". Plenty of people were still saying the Russians were just posturing on 23 Feb. Even Macron was shown recently to be stunned when told by Zelensky that it was a full scaled invasion.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1567549769915965441

 

[swerve]

The Yanks would certainly know something was up; such a build up would be impossible to hide. Unless they have solid intel [like that case with the Ukraine] however; it would be hard to tell for sure whether it was a large scale exercise or indeed if the PLA was on the verge of initiating military action; if was a prelude to an actual assault or air and naval action.

Absolutely right.

It's like October 1973. The Israelis knew that Egypt & Syria were moving stuff to near the front lines, but there was more than one possible cause, & the Arabs ran a successful deception campaign to conceal their intentions. The Israelis cottoned on shortly before the attack, but too late to do much.

Knowing what does not necessarily tell you why, & intentions matter.

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

Beyond terrorities with sketchy historical claims (e.g SCS, Diaoyu, Dokodo), I am skeptical of projecting an expansionist approach to China's ambitions, especially physical acquisitions beyond those claims.

They want like any great power, influence and the ability to define international order that is favourable to them. It can be achieved without taking over countries.

As the Russian invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated, assuming dictatorships and autocracies will act rationally isn't worth betting the farm on. The invasion of Ukraine was widely regarded as being "impossible", not just by Russophiles but also people more aligned with US foreign policy.

In the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan I personally would rule nothing out, not least because the southern edge of the Ryuku Islands are well placed to attack Chinese bases and push back the PLAN - the SDF is already in the process of setting up anti-air and anti-ship missile batteries there.

 

[STURM]

As the Russian invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated, assuming dictatorships and autocracies will act rationally isn't worth betting the farm on. The invasion of Ukraine was widely regarded as being "impossible", not just by Russophiles but also people more aligned with US foreign policy.

Events in Iraq and Afghanistan [amongst other places] also demonstrated that democracies can bugger up in a major way; despite all the checks and balances in place.

It was widely assumed that the invasion would go well for Russia given the on paper disparity between it and the Ukraine and because many [including me] assumed that they would go in fully prepared with the required resources in expectation of meeting determined resistance. Nobody could have imagined that the Russian political leadership would be operating under gagaland assumptions with major consequences for the Russian military.

 

[koxinga]

From the comments, I am more concerned about the assumptions we are drawing from the war in Ukraine:

1) that authoritarian regimes operate in largely the same way
2) that authoritarian regimes are largely corrupt with an apparatus (civil, military, citizenry) that are unmotivated and would not fight
3) that the West, by virtue of a superior value system would ultimately unite and triumph..

And try to apply this model to China. It is not to imply those points are wrong, but their effects vary to various degrees and the context matters significantly.

 

[STURM]

Like I said previously the widely held assumptions are the Chinese are good but not good enough; that American and allied superior experience and skills will always prevail:; that China will make the same mistakes as Russia; that the PLA is bad at joint multi domain operations; that it's written in stone that an amphibious assault will fail and that superior will on the part of the Taiwanese; plus the fact that they love democracy, freedom and a rules based order and will be supported by other similarly minded nations means China will fail.

In the 1990's and early to mid 2000's the common view was that the Chinese were catching up but were still generations behind. Today we hear that they're very good but still not good enough. When there is objective and through analysis of why the PLA might be more capable than we think and that it's not inconceivable that they might succeed: it's largely glossed over or overlooked.

"The Dictator's Army : Battlefield Effectiveness In Authoritarian Regimes [Talmadge] and "Armies Of Sand"" [Pollack] do a great job explaining why undemocratic regimes can produce effective armies.

 

[ngatimozart]

In recent years the US has chastised its NATO allies for not pulling their weight. I feel it is just a matter of time before we see the US really starting to pressure some of the larger Asian powers to step up and start taking more responsibility for their mutual defence. I actually have my doubt's whether the US would defend Taiwan unless it could put together a regional coalition of the willing to back them up.

If you have read @OPSSG and @Ananda comments WRT ASEAN and the Asian way of doing things you will understand why your statement about the US pressuring Asian nations to take responsibility for their own defence against the PRC is ill considered and out of touch. Think about why SEATO didn't last.

If anyone has any doubts whether the Chinese are closely and keenly observing events in the Ukraine [like they did with other wars]; this article is essential reading. I'm sure their planners will draw the right lessons from the Russian experience and the Ukrainian and Western response but whether or they are are successfully in making the needed changes will unfortunately only be known if an actual war breaks out.

Right lessons according to who? The right lessons according to the CCP? Or the right lessons according to the West? Don't forget that the CCP see everything as political and that the PLA is first and foremost a political military. Out of this war the CCP / PRC also has collected another vassal state, Russia, and it didn't even have to do any work because Putin turned Russia into a CCP / PRC vassal state. He's had to go to Beijing cap in hand and this has made the occupants of the Zhongnanhai (CCP Politburo Standing Committee work and residential compound in Beijing) rub their hands with glee.

"In the twentieth century, the Soviet Union viewed China—at least until the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s—as a poorer cousin, a country to be steered and helped along in its fitful progress toward respectability. Decades later, the tables have turned decisively. China has for some time boasted a more robust and dynamic economy, greater technological prowess, and more global political and economic clout than Russia. That asymmetry is destined to become only more pronounced in the coming years as Putin’s regime depends on Beijing for its survival. China will likely gobble up more of Russia’s overall trade. It will become an essential market for Russian exports (notably natural resources) while Russian consumers will increasingly rely on Chinese goods. And it will take advantage of Russia’s predicament to assert the renminbi as both a dominant regional and major international currency. ​

​

To keep China happy, Russian leaders will have little choice but to accept unfavorable terms in commercial negotiations, to support Chinese positions in international forums such as the United Nations, and even to curtail Moscow’s relations with other countries, such as India and Vietnam. In the writing of many Western analysts, China and Russia often appear as a pair, two great authoritarian powers seeking to revise the international order. But theirs is not a relationship of equals. The Kremlin’s dependence on China will turn Russia into a useful instrument in a larger game for Zhongnanhai, a tremendous asset in Beijing’s competition with Washington. ... ​

​

Given its growing leverage, Beijing will be able to extract from Moscow something that was unthinkable a year ago: access to the most sophisticated Russian weapons and their designs, preferential access to the Russian Arctic, the accommodation of Chinese security interests in Central Asia, and Russia’s support—as a permanent member of the UN Security Council—for China’s positions in all regional and global issues, most notably in territorial disputes between China and its neighbors. In effect, the Kremlin will have protected itself from Western pressure at the expense of losing a very high degree of its strategic autonomy. " China’s New Vassal (Sorry paywalled)​

​

So this now makes the PRC top dog in the region especially within the Collective Security Treaty Organisation.

 

[STURM]

Right lessons according to who? The right lessons according to the CCP? Or the right lessons according to the West?

The right lessons with regards to how events in the Ukraine have a bearing on how the PLA might perform if called to undertake military actions against Taiwan.

China's political leadership may indeed see things largely from their own lens and the PLA may be a political military but I doubt if the political leadership will make the same assumptions the Russians did. My feeling is irrespective of all the political bluster China's leadership has a more sobered outlook about just what the PLA can be expected to realistically achieve and what it's unable to.

 

[koxinga]

Re the oft mentioned issue of corruption, it exists but is it as pervasive as Russia remains unknown.

But it is also important to recognise that Taiwan is no better in this regards.

Military corruption is business as usual - Taipei Times

Bringing Taiwan to the World and the World to Taiwan

www.taipeitimes.com

And this brings me to another point about assumptions. We should be careful about assuming Taiwan will respond with the same strength and tenacity of Ukraine.

Beyond this article below, there are other research from think-tanks that elaborate on the deep institutional flaws with TW leadership and MoD.

There is a lot of noise that comes from flashy DSCA notices on buying hardware but I fear that they do not have the right people to use these effectively.

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

But it is also important to recognise that Taiwan is no better in this regards.

Military corruption is business as usual - Taipei Times

Bringing Taiwan to the World and the World to Taiwan

www.taipeitimes.com

I'm not sure that's a valid comparison. The article is more about a senior stiffing his subordinate for the cost of a meal, which is something that happens in lots of countries in the public and private sectors.

You can't use such events to make generalisations about a military's capabilities. A British Major General was jailed only last year for falsely claiming financial support for school fees. Apparently this is something that used to be/is quite common. Does this mean the British Army can't be expected to fight properly?

 

[koxinga]

You can't use such events to make generalisations about a military's capabilities.

Good point. But I hope we use the same yard stick when we speak about China and corruption. Or a least a common reference point like Transparency International's index (Taiwan is well ahead), with the usual caveats.

In other news, Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation released their latest polls. Among the questions asked included:

5. Do Taiwanese have confidence in their eventual victory in a war against China? with not very encouraging results. (only ~29.6% think Taiwan has a chance to win, with 51% expecting China to win).

https://www.tpof.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/20220920-TPOF-September-2022-Public-Opinion-Poll-%E2%80%93-English-Excerpt.pdf

 

[Vivendi]

Breaking news: the recent rumors of Chinese coup have been investigated by brave investigators in Beijing, brace yourself:

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1573949280234008576

(Apologies to all, I could not resist...)