I think this plan works as an interim introduction to service, but misses the cultural change we need RAInf to undergo. These beasties need a very different mindset to the traditional, light infantry mindset that permeates so much of our Army. Unfortunately, I've seen it already - my favourite being present for a phone call where a senior RAInf officer, in planning a Corps conference, demanded LAND 400 people attend, but "not talk about that mech crap". I've also seen senior RAInf bang on the desk to make the main gun dismountable and able to be fired off a tripod - "just like the M113s".
In many ways, this is Kiowa to Tiger again. AS4 to IFV needs a cultural change that demands technical aptitude, leans heavily on the RAAC method of training and seeks to inculcate a significantly different approach to fighting. The reality is that light skills can be learnt quickly, mech can't; so the Corps needs to focus on the latter. Unfortunately, RAInf is the only Corps that, overall, doesn't get this. Some do, some are bloody brilliant at pushing it. But they usually don't have the rank or are on the outside.
If the way that the Corps handled AS4 introduction is a guide, the best thing the Australian Army can do for the IFV capability is put it into Battalions, but not let any red lanyard near the doctrine, training or career management. Not fair to all, but at least then the Joint Force will have an IFV capability it can rely on.
Yes I've seen a few of those "not talk about that (fill the blank) crap". The army is if anything, very tribal with its command structure based on length of time living and breathing the status quo. Always thought it was the ultimate cheek to force experienced lateral transfers from OS services, that are already doing what we are trying to learn how to do, to drop from SSGT or WO to CPL, or from Major to Captain. In industry if we got people like that we'd make the team lead or manager to get the most out of their experience.
In my experience there is very little recognition or respect for anyone outside of the particular silo they have progressed through, that is until they start hitting ranks with greater forced exposure to all corps training and requirements, i.e. E7/8 and O5. In my reserve days back in the 90s I had no idea of the issue as we all had day jobs so there was a lot more to each of us over and above our military training, while the cadre staff were usually experienced E8s and above. The exception in the full time army seems to be the members who joined at a later age and had a real life before the army, especially those with technical and professional qualifications and experience earned outside army, then again they tend to cop it from the pure grown army types as well. I have never encountered a culture so determined to force people to forget, or at least never mention relevant experience gained else where, it almost like a race handicap, instead of outside skills and experience being seen as beneficial, if they are not specifically itemised in you PD they are never to be mentioned.
Agree on the Kiowa to Tiger analogy, IFV is going to have issues because army is not going to listen to those in the know. I can pretty much guarantee for instance, none of the ex Brit SNCOs with IFV operation / maintenance experience are going to be put into key roles, it will be the Teflon coated "rising" stars who are good at looking good. The best of them will learn by trial and error, eventually muddling through, posting out by the time they get it down pat, the worst will fail and take others down with them (or maybe leave others to take the blame).
A bloke I and others wanted to throttle a year ago has got his stuff together six months out from posting to his next new experience. Another who has left a trail of broken careers behind them is also posting out, ironically I initially thought they were ok, the issues only starting when they were given their own command and their inability to look out for their subordinates became apparent. It really was a case of hands off management, delegating supervision and tasking authority every which way then throwing people under the bus when problems occurred. Technically they never did anything wrong, but that's because they actually did very little. A standout example of this was a digger, who discovered a serious technical issue, being charged for not following the stated procedure (if he had he wouldn't have made the chance discovery he did, which averted a potentially very serious incident). A real leader would have acknowledged procedure hadn't been followed, but a serious issue had been identified, and worried more about fixing the process problem than punishing initiative.