Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[Wombat000]

I agree.
I think you have stated the case for specialist organisation, to ‘crawl walk & sustain’ within those diverse operational domains.
we don’t have the luxury of an easy second MCG of troops to take the initial deployments, we need to get it right from the step-off.

im guessing (& I mean guessing ) that we won’t have a great deal of implied success operating in our regional context if we try to fight it as if it’s Afghanistan or Iraq.
Army, & I guess we, have become accustomed to the notion of like-Brigades so recoil at the de-linking of that concept.

the ADF as a whole operates at a far higher tempo than previously, so there will (im sure) be interaction between the other Brigades, they’ll just focus on their own role.

however in the juggling act of equipping and forging capability there is likely merit in consolidating capability-sets for the greater outcomes. Just MHO.

 

[Armchair]

1RAR will remain Bushmaster / Light leading to what can only be described as a tremendously unbalanced Brigade.

why does having both mechanised and motorised infantry make that brigade more unbalanced though (the army will be unbalanced certainly)?
If the intended use is to land forces on islands and seek to protect them / threaten targets with missiles then they would need infantry to protect the missile batteries Etc. without using the tiny number of mechanised infantry for that purpose.

 

[Armchair]

The M1A2SEPv3 will now only be issued to 2 CAV Regt in Townsville. Boxer will still go to 2/14LHR as well as 2 CAV but there is no ACR for 1 Brigade any longer, so no A vehicles of any kind in the entire 1st Brigade…

on this point having no heavy vehicles in Darwin could be consistent with a deteriorating strategic situation (but that situation is more local and has shifted far to the east of Darwin from East Timor). Until they have their littoral lift how would heavy vehicles in Darwin get anywhere to deploy in a moderate threat situation? The only sovereign option is to Send a LHD or Choules escorted by the RAN surface fleet through the Torres Strait and have it stuck in the Arafura and Timor Seas.

My guess is that the reorg is partly about signalling. Look at 3 Brigade on a wall map now and it is a mixed role brigade that is in a high state of readiness every three years. Look at 3 Brigade after reorg and it is a mechanised brigade (with colocated attack and medium lift helicopters) that can be brought to readiness in x months. That will be apparent to a US Admiral, to a potential adversary and to regional parties. Bringing 3 Brigade or 7 Brigade to high readiness will be an obvious signal available to government (akin to moving F-111s).

I don’t think the reorg is a good way to go about sustainment, recruitment, retention and integration with reserves etc or even dealing with potential contingencies necessarily, but I don’t agree that it it means that the threat perceived by govt is low.

 

[Bob53]

1 battalion does not a brigade make… Arguably 2 doesn’t either, but it’s much easier to add rifle companies to an existing organisation than it is to raise an RAR battalion from scratch. Or bring an entire reserve battalion up to SERCAT 7 levels… It is however vastly cheaper to strip the Army of battalions and squadrons than it is to support a larger standing army and here we are…

For the record in addition to my earlier mention of Army’s cuts and yet another reason why Leahy has blasted this “plan” is the ‘4th’ combat brigade Army was raising in Adelaide (9th Brigade) is also gone with the 10/28th Battalion, Royal South Australian Regiment being stripped of it’s frontline kit and being consigned back to 2nd Division in a “security response“ role…

All the other choc units are going back to 8th Brigade, the Combat engineers never even got to see their armoured engineering vehicles and the local arty? Well they of course have missed out on their SP guns... What that gibberish in the “DSR” about “artillery guns not providing the range or lethality required” was actually referring to - aka the expansive cuts Army was about to receive, in the name known as a “focussed force”…

As to tanks. there are presently 3 tank squadrons in Army issued to 1 Armoured, 2 Cav and 2/14 LHR. Each of which is an ACR equipped with ASLAV and M1A1, and has been that way for that decade that you speak of. This was the result of Plan Beersheba. The tanks were moved from a consolidated structure in 1 Armoured Regt, to 3 independent squadrons in the 3 ACR’s, to give each brigade similar capability and combined arms experience to support force generation activities.

The ‘insufficient’ tanks issue was created because the squadrons were dispersed between the brigades. They needed about another 6 or so tanks per brigade to support the availability of the 14 that were supposed to be operational. In one regiment they could swap cars between squadrons as needed to generate a battlegroup. When dispersed among the brigades, they couldn’t. That is what lead to the increased number of tanks being sought for the new M1A2SEPv3 Abrams purchase. That situation will end in 2024 thanks to the current Government.

The M1A2SEPv3 will now only be issued to 2 CAV Regt in Townsville. Boxer will still go to 2/14LHR as well as 2 CAV but there is no ACR for 1 Brigade any longer, so no A vehicles of any kind in the entire 1st Brigade…

1 Armoured Regt is no longer an Armoured Regiment from 2024 onwards, it is a technology and innovation trials and development unit whatever that means (less than 50 pers in the “Regiment” in total however) and will be stripped of most if not all of it’s armour.

So in short -

Adelaide - loses the entire 9th Brigade and all equipment therein. “Gains“ the HIMARS Regiment it was already getting under existing planning anyway, but the current Government now takes credit for what the previous Government had already approved, and no-one seems to be questioning this for some weird reason.

Darwin - 1 Brigade loses it’s entire ACR but gains part of 7RAR into a consolidated battalion previously and once again known as 5/7RAR. In equipment terms it loses Abrams, Boxer, M113, IFV, SP guns, armoured engineering vehicles and all the CSS. Gains whatever boats emerge from the littoral manoeuvre project. Darwin loses 1 Aviation Regt in it’s entirety without any replacement.

Brisbane - Loses it’s tank squadron, loses M113, IFV, SP guns, armoured engineering and related CSS, but at least keeps it’s Boxers and both battalions. Gains whatever boats emerge from the littoral manoeuvre project and the HQ for 16 Brigade and some Apaches and Blackhawks at Oakey.

Townsville - loses 16Avn Brigade but gains 1 Aviation Regt. Keeps it’s battalions and ACR. Gets all the tanks, but no extra squadrons or regiments to be raised to operate them. Gets all the armoured engineering but no extra squadrons or regiments to operate them. Gets all the IFV’s but only enough are approved to issue to 3RAR. 1RAR will remain Bushmaster / Light leading to what can only be described as a tremendously unbalanced Brigade. Arguably Brisbane is better balanced, although even so it will maintain far less combat capability. Also gains boats from littoral manoeuvre project. Most of the former 9th brigade ARA Cadre from Adelaide is being moved to Townsville.

So that’s the 2023 re-org in a nutshell. Every major part of Army has endured cuts. Our land combat capability has been diminished by about 2/3rds and yet we’re told our strategic situation is rapidly descending into the toilet…

how did the new structure come about?
1. Houston Smith and Marles decided that was it?
2. The DSR team above said to current Army leaders you have to find savings of $xxxx over the next 10 years starting now? We don’t care how you do it. find it.
3. current army leaders went to give and said we are about to be too big and modern Can you cut our budget as we want to restructure anyway?

 

[Takao]

on a basic level,
i imagine if Army was to deploy to jungles of Asia, then a cadre of light infantry brigade of SMEs might be a good nucleus to generate that capability?
if one needed rapidly mobile capability, they might draw upon a cadre of motorised SMEs, perhaps a motorised Brigade?
if one needed heavy capability, likewise you might seek to expand upon a heavy brigade as the nucleus of that capability.

See, none of that is necessarily correct, nor does it address the real issues of capability.

For starters, everything can deploy everywhere** (for all intents and purpose). The view that jungle = light forces was seriously questioned in 1942-45 and, for us and the US, firmly killed by 1 AR in 1965. If I needed to go fight in jungle today I'd be sure as hell taking M1A2, IFV and SPH. Likewise, any deployment needs sealift, so the time to grab the land force is capped, and it doesn't matter if light, medium or heavy.

This also ignores what next. Sure, grab 3 Bde to fight the heavy role. Who is replacing them? What is the reinforcing/replacement Bde doing? 3 Bde will probably last 6 months at most. Take off a month for transit/HO/TO/theatre gateway 'stuff' and you now have 5 months. Let the mission rehearsal exercise take, say, 6 weeks, add in a week for leave and now you are at just over 3 months. It takes longer than 3 months to train up RAAC, RAA, or RAE OR/JNCO or RAInf JNCO. So your follow on force will actually be worse trained than your initial force... With a like Bde (as we had), you can draw your replacement Bde from people who are already familiar with the other arms. Last year, every RAInf JNCO had worked with tanks at least once within the previous 6 months. Now? They might not even see a tank for their career...

The multirole Bde's (that were not war fighting Bde) provided that cadre. It's now been significantly weakened.

** the exception would be the significant mountainous areas at high altitude, a'la Indian border ranges. But, (a) the Indians, Chinese and Pakistanis have all deployed armour in this terrain and (b) such terrain requires unique equipment and training that the Australian Army has never had - and would take years to stand up.

the ADF as a whole operates at a far higher tempo than previously,

Questionable. The tempo within some units is very high, but that's mainly driven by HADR taskings which is a questionable use of military assets. There is also some institutional issues within the officer cadre that drives the non-exercise/deployment tempo.

so there will (im sure) be interaction between the other Brigades, they’ll just focus on their own role.

It didn't happen pre-Beersheba, I highly doubt it'll happen now. Like Bde's encourage diversity, specialised Bde's encourage stovepiping. I understand that RAInf and RAA promotion courses could be quite....testy when 1 and 3 Bde people were on - simply because their Corps operated so differently.

on this point having no heavy vehicles in Darwin could be consistent with a deteriorating strategic situation (but that situation is more local and has shifted far to the east of Darwin from East Timor). Until they have their littoral lift how would heavy vehicles in Darwin get anywhere to deploy in a moderate threat situation? The only sovereign option is to Send a LHD or Choules escorted by the RAN surface fleet through the Torres Strait and have it stuck in the Arafura and Timor Seas.

Not necessarily. 1 Bde (or the old 9 Bde) could road and rail to the east coast easily. Having internal communications links offers significant flexibility. And, while I'm venting on this in other places, the DSR map includes Africa and the Indian Ocean. If your argument holds up about 3 Bde - what happens if we need to deploy armour to Africa or the ME?

My guess is that the reorg is partly about signalling. Look at 3 Brigade on a wall map now and it is a mixed role brigade that is in a high state of readiness every three years. Look at 3 Brigade after reorg and it is a mechanised brigade (with colocated attack and medium lift helicopters) that can be brought to readiness in x months. That will be apparent to a US Admiral, to a potential adversary and to regional parties. Bringing 3 Brigade or 7 Brigade to high readiness will be an obvious signal available to government (akin to moving F-111s).

Ah yes, but with a Beersheba Bde I could draw on all three to build a Bde ready to fight now. Unless you want to hold 3 Bde at high levels of readiness (and bye bye retention), you simply can't do that now. Previously I could grab 2 Cav, 1 RAR, 5 RAR, 1 CER, 7 CSR, 1 CSSB and 1 Regt and go. They all could draw on their parent Bde to get up to speed rapidly (so in this case they are drawing on 3x CSSBs and 3x JLUs; now it all falls on 3 CSSB and JLU-NQ).

I don’t think the reorg is a good way to go about sustainment, recruitment, retention and integration with reserves etc or even dealing with potential contingencies necessarily, but I don’t agree that it it means that the threat perceived by govt is low.

I think that's more an actions v words question. I'm yet to see any action that indicates there is a real threat. Lots of words, but no actions. And that's just Defence; there certainly is no actions (I'd argue the opposite in some cases) from DFAT, Treasury, Industry, Science and Resources, etc.

 

[Armchair]

Not necessarily. 1 Bde (or the old 9 Bde) could road and rail to the east coast easily. Having internal communications links offers significant flexibility. And, while I'm venting on this in other places, the DSR map includes Africa and the Indian Ocean. If your argument holds up about 3 Bde - what happens if we need to deploy armour to Africa or the ME?

I am thinking the intention is for 1 Bde to operate in the Indonesian archipelago with allies
If It is harder for the government to send armour to Africa or the ME (especially during WW3 when there are submarines and other threats) that is a good thing in my view. If Aus govt wanted to be able to project power around the world it needed to start to build adequate escorts and aircraft carriers decades ago.

Ah yes, but with a Beersheba Bde I could draw on all three to build a Bde ready to fight now. Unless you want to hold 3 Bde at high levels of readiness (and bye bye retention), you simply can't do that now. Previously I could grab 2 Cav, 1 RAR, 5 RAR, 1 CER, 7 CSR, 1 CSSB and 1 Regt and go. They all could draw on their parent Bde to get up to speed rapidly (so in this case they are drawing on 3x CSSBs and 3x JLUs; now it all falls on 3 CSSB and JLU-NQ).

I agree it appears to me a decline in actual capability (On the basis of your arguments and others).

I think that's more an actions v words question. I'm yet to see any action that indicates there is a real threat. Lots of words, but no actions. And that's just Defence; there certainly is no actions (I'd argue the opposite in some cases) from DFAT, Treasury, Industry, Science and Resources, etc.

Which past conflicts exhibit that level of wisdom of forethought, though? Could an Iraqi observer in 2003 have picked (on the basis of actions in departments other than Defence) that Australia was going to help invade and occupy it? I suggest not (and they would have had similar problems in the US and UK). Rhetoric and military preparations would have been a good guide though (Again I agree that the preparations here may be less than well formed).

 

[Todjaeger]

Which past conflicts exhibit that level of wisdom of forethought, though? Could an Iraqi observer in 2003 have picked (on the basis of actions in departments other than Defence) that Australia was going to help invade and occupy it? I suggest not (and they would have had similar problems in the US and UK). Rhetoric and military preparations would have been a good guide though (Again I agree that the preparations here may be less than well formed).

I am pretty sure that an honest (with oneself) and perceptive Iraqi observer in the US in 2003 would have an inkling that something was afoot, given what was happening within the US and US gov't at the time.

Also it might be worth remembering that prior to the Gulf Wars: Episode II The Clone of the Attack, Iraqi gov't/leadership did take steps which, whilst limited due to sanctions, were efforts to preserve gov't or the members of gov't. One must remember that the Republic of Iraq under Saddam Hussein fell ~end of April 2003, but Hussein himself remained at large and in hiding until 13 December 2003 and IIRC he was found with a large amount of US currency. Such preservative efforts would have required some degree of prior planning.

To that end, the way I take what @Takao posted in the quote below

I think that's more an actions v words question. I'm yet to see any action that indicates there is a real threat. Lots of words, but no actions. And that's just Defence; there certainly is no actions (I'd argue the opposite in some cases) from DFAT, Treasury, Industry, Science and Resources, etc.

Is that if gov't (AusGov) really believed that there are real threats, particularly imminent ones, then there would be a more whole of gov't effort towards getting Australia ready rather than what appears to be happening, which largely seems to consist of rhetoric but little in the way of real action being taken. Yes, some steps have been taken, sort of anyway. Establishing a sort of strategic petroleum reserve would have been a good step, if the storage was in Australia. Having a strategic reserve for Australia, but stored in Japan and therefore subject to events which impact Japan, as well as events which can interdict the SLOC between Australia and Japan makes the value and potential effectiveness of such a strategic reserve rather less.

So far, it does seem that at least part of the current gov't strategy on defence amounts to what in the US might be considered a "spaghetti" defence, (i.e. throw ideas at a wall like spaghetti and see what sticks)

 

[Armchair]

Is that if gov't (AusGov) really believed that there are real threats, particularly imminent ones, then there would be a more whole of gov't effort towards getting Australia ready rather than what appears to be happening, which largely seems to consist of rhetoric but little in the way of real action being taken.

and I can only say that I can’t see much recent evidence of nations making such sensible whole of government efforts in advance of conflict. Certainly not Australia in previous conflicts I can think of.
I do think that the reorganization and accelerated priorities of the Australian Army are consistent with an intention to respond to a regional threat or serious contingency (but not necessarily through a well formed or sustainable response). I don’t buy the argument that if there was a real threat that AusGov would be doing other clever things, because I don’t think governments normally make those clever preparations (even when they know they should).
Anyway I hope you are right.

 

[Todjaeger]

and I can only say that I can’t see much recent evidence of nations making such sensible whole of government efforts in advance of conflict. Certainly not Australia in previous conflicts I can think of.
I do think that the reorganization and accelerated priorities of the Australian Army are consistent with an intention to respond to a regional threat or serious contingency (but not necessarily through a well formed or sustainable response). I don’t buy the argument that if there was a real threat that AusGov would be doing other clever things, because I don’t think governments normally make those clever preparations (even when they know they should).
Anyway I hope you are right.

One of the key things in preparing for a future conflict is to recognize that one is in the offing. Consider for a moment the differences in the governmental activities in the 1930's in Germany and Japan vs. in the British Empire or even the US. I seem to recall that prior to the outbreak of WWII, there were only a handful of 2-pdr AT guns in the whole of Australia. The scarcity of which lead to troops of the 2nd AIF training on dummy AT guns prior to their arrival in Egypt, when 2-pdr AT guns produced in Britain were issued to Australian troops.

What seems to be happening now is that some of the messaging from gov't is that there is a threat or threats, but then measures which would be most likely to provide an effective response across a spectrum of potential threats seem to not being taken. For example, when there is repeated talk of the importance of sovereign defence production capabilities, but gov't seems more inclined to reduce and/or delay orders which absent changes will starve industry of work needed to sustain a sovereign production capability.

This in turn suggests that either the threat messaging is hyping the potential for conflict, or conflict is coming but gov't is not or perhaps refusing to admit it.

 

[Armchair]

What seems to be happening now is that some of the messaging from gov't is that there is a threat or threats, but then measures which would be most likely to provide an effective response across a spectrum of potential threats seem to not being taken.

Well I look at the measures they are taking and try to judge what contingencies they are trying to address. Concentrating equipment and personnel in NE Australia and prioritised acquisition of littoral lift (to be operated by Army) suggests they are not preparing to go terribly far (Northern approaches).
If they are planning to go further (e.g. send a brigade to help defend the northern Philippines) then I would agree with you entirely, but I deduce (and hope) from the lack of measures (e.g. limited planned ground based air defence based on the cost estimates in various plans) that is not the contingency they are preparing for.

For example, when there is repeated talk of the importance of sovereign defence production capabilities, but gov't seems more inclined to reduce and/or delay orders which absent changes will starve industry of work needed to sustain a sovereign production capability.

They are erratic on this. Cancelling SPHs seems stupid if there are to be regiments with M777 in other brigades. They seem to be accelerating missile production. I expect the IFV order to increase at a politically determined time. I would be very surprised if the littoral lift vessels are built offshore.

This in turn suggests that either the threat messaging is hyping the potential for conflict, or conflict is coming but gov't is not or perhaps refusing to admit

That sounds contradictory but I think you have it right, actually. They are both hyping the potential for conflict and being vague. Reasons for that are well outside the scope of the thread (e.g. AusGov doesn’t know who will be in office as US President in 2026)

 

[meatshield]

See, none of that is necessarily correct, nor does it address the real issues of capability.

For starters, everything can deploy everywhere** (for all intents and purpose). The view that jungle = light forces was seriously questioned in 1942-45 and, for us and the US, firmly killed by 1 AR in 1965. If I needed to go fight in jungle today I'd be sure as hell taking M1A2, IFV and SPH. Likewise, any deployment needs sealift, so the time to grab the land force is capped, and it doesn't matter if light, medium or heavy.

This also ignores what next. Sure, grab 3 Bde to fight the heavy role. Who is replacing them? What is the reinforcing/replacement Bde doing? 3 Bde will probably last 6 months at most. Take off a month for transit/HO/TO/theatre gateway 'stuff' and you now have 5 months. Let the mission rehearsal exercise take, say, 6 weeks, add in a week for leave and now you are at just over 3 months. It takes longer than 3 months to train up RAAC, RAA, or RAE OR/JNCO or RAInf JNCO. So your follow on force will actually be worse trained than your initial force... With a like Bde (as we had), you can draw your replacement Bde from people who are already familiar with the other arms. Last year, every RAInf JNCO had worked with tanks at least once within the previous 6 months. Now? They might not even see a tank for their career...

The multirole Bde's (that were not war fighting Bde) provided that cadre. It's now been significantly weakened.

** the exception would be the significant mountainous areas at high altitude, a'la Indian border ranges. But, (a) the Indians, Chinese and Pakistanis have all deployed armour in this terrain and (b) such terrain requires unique equipment and training that the Australian Army has never had - and would take years to stand up.



Questionable. The tempo within some units is very high, but that's mainly driven by HADR taskings which is a questionable use of military assets. There is also some institutional issues within the officer cadre that drives the non-exercise/deployment tempo.



It didn't happen pre-Beersheba, I highly doubt it'll happen now. Like Bde's encourage diversity, specialised Bde's encourage stovepiping. I understand that RAInf and RAA promotion courses could be quite....testy when 1 and 3 Bde people were on - simply because their Corps operated so differently.



Not necessarily. 1 Bde (or the old 9 Bde) could road and rail to the east coast easily. Having internal communications links offers significant flexibility. And, while I'm venting on this in other places, the DSR map includes Africa and the Indian Ocean. If your argument holds up about 3 Bde - what happens if we need to deploy armour to Africa or the ME?



Ah yes, but with a Beersheba Bde I could draw on all three to build a Bde ready to fight now. Unless you want to hold 3 Bde at high levels of readiness (and bye bye retention), you simply can't do that now. Previously I could grab 2 Cav, 1 RAR, 5 RAR, 1 CER, 7 CSR, 1 CSSB and 1 Regt and go. They all could draw on their parent Bde to get up to speed rapidly (so in this case they are drawing on 3x CSSBs and 3x JLUs; now it all falls on 3 CSSB and JLU-NQ).



I think that's more an actions v words question. I'm yet to see any action that indicates there is a real threat. Lots of words, but no actions. And that's just Defence; there certainly is no actions (I'd argue the opposite in some cases) from DFAT, Treasury, Industry, Science and Resources, etc.

To your first point about armour in the jungle. I watched this documentary the other day and it is an example A for the above.

Apologies if its been posted before

The Battle of Sattelberg - November 1943 - YouTube

 

[swerve]

...For starters, everything can deploy everywhere** (for all intents and purpose). The view that jungle = light forces was seriously questioned in 1942-45 and, for us and the US, firmly killed by 1 AR in 1965. If I needed to go fight in jungle today I'd be sure as hell taking M1A2, IFV and SPH. Likewise, any deployment needs sealift, so the time to grab the land force is capped, and it doesn't matter if light, medium or heavy....

IIRC the Australians acquired a few hundred Matildas as they were withdrawn from use in North Africa & used them in New Guinea, etc. Some had the 2pdr gun replaced by a 3" howitzer, which was much more effective against the target set in the Pacific. From what I've read, the Matilda was pretty effective in jungle.

And of course, they also used Centurions effectively in Vietnam.

Doh! Just noticed the YouTube film. Exactly! Matildas in New Guinea.

 

[Todjaeger]

Well I look at the measures they are taking and try to judge what contingencies they are trying to address. Concentrating equipment and personnel in NE Australia and prioritised acquisition of littoral lift (to be operated by Army) suggests they are not preparing to go terribly far (Northern approaches).
If they are planning to go further (e.g. send a brigade to help defend the northern Philippines) then I would agree with you entirely, but I deduce (and hope) from the lack of measures (e.g. limited planned ground based air defence based on the cost estimates in various plans) that is not the contingency they are preparing for.

If the contingency planning revolves (or perhaps devolves) around not going 'far' from mainland Australia, then I would posit that the contingency planning is more about developing plans to fail. In that regards, I would lump such plans into a similar basket as Kiwi defence plans which never look farther than the EEZ for potential security threats and far more often only look at the risk of invasion. Given that the specific areas looked at tend to be fairly safe or low risk, the nonsense of a 'benign strategic environment' has been getting repeated for decades. Meanwhile there are potential security threats to and conflicts over SLOC that NZ trade makes use of including the supply of much of NZ's domestic fuel needs.

I mention the above because Australia faces some similar issues, since some of those same SLOC are used by Australia, including to meet domestic fuel needs, or in other areas of economic activity. Yes, Australia does have significant land and natural resources, but the threat of actual invasion by a hostile power is fairly low and would likely only be able to occur after a hostile power managed to achieve significant dominance and control of the Asia-Pacific region, i.e. like Japan managed in early 1942.

In that regards, it would be much better for Australia to develop a defence force which is capable of engaging in and the sustaining expeditionary operations to at least be able to contest the control adversaries might attempt to exert on some of the key SLOC chokepoints. Unfortunately it does not seem as though that is the direction the ADF is really being taken in.

 

[ADMk2]

When effects on Army in the DSR are/were being determined, how much input did Army actually have?

My point is,
did Govt politicians just dream up the solutions, independent of Army advice?
Smith & Houston are the authors, but how much did they dream up by themselves?
- IE: Did Army have influence on answering how to best meet the strategic mission statements required by Army, then reviewed and outcomed by the DSR? Or, just how much of this is actually and conveniently to be blamed on political ideology and dogma?

If within the ‘ADF bunker’ greater esteemed military minds in answer to this have concluded that Army’s role has ‘refined*” and hence the strategic weight being placed on sea and air domain capability, has Army recommendations or preferences been considered in this outcome?
Gen. Leahy (I have great respect for him and his advocacy ) is I believe no longer in the inner circle, tho no doubt I suspect he retains his contacts, so his opinion may not be so relevant to the ‘bigger picture’ or shared by current generation of ADF leadership.

* by ‘refined’ im implying reorg into what I interpret as land force doctrinal specialties = Light, Motorised, Heavy Brigades, and the greater emphasis on long range fires and amphibious operations.

The chief of Army spoke out against these cuts prior to the release of DSR. How much more ‘inner circle’ can you get?

 

[ADMk2]

why does having both mechanised and motorised infantry make that brigade more unbalanced though (the army will be unbalanced certainly)?
If the intended use is to land forces on islands and seek to protect them / threaten targets with missiles then they would need infantry to protect the missile batteries Etc. without using the tiny number of mechanised infantry for that purpose.

Half the brigade will be extremely mobile, extremely hard-hittinng, modern and able to deploy to just about any level of conflict you can imagine (for a couple of days) and the other half won’t...

If that isn’t the vey definition of an unbalanced brigade, then I am not sure what more there is to say…

 

[ADMk2]

on this point having no heavy vehicles in Darwin could be consistent with a deteriorating strategic situation (but that situation is more local and has shifted far to the east of Darwin from East Timor). Until they have their littoral lift how would heavy vehicles in Darwin get anywhere to deploy in a moderate threat situation? The only sovereign option is to Send a LHD or Choules escorted by the RAN surface fleet through the Torres Strait and have it stuck in the Arafura and Timor Seas.

My guess is that the reorg is partly about signalling. Look at 3 Brigade on a wall map now and it is a mixed role brigade that is in a high state of readiness every three years. Look at 3 Brigade after reorg and it is a mechanised brigade (with colocated attack and medium lift helicopters) that can be brought to readiness in x months. That will be apparent to a US Admiral, to a potential adversary and to regional parties. Bringing 3 Brigade or 7 Brigade to high readiness will be an obvious signal available to government (akin to moving F-111s).

I don’t think the reorg is a good way to go about sustainment, recruitment, retention and integration with reserves etc or even dealing with potential contingencies necessarily, but I don’t agree that it it means that the threat perceived by govt is low.

How many LPD’s or LHD’s are stationed in Townsville? Or Brisbane?

Project LAND 8710 isn’t about uplifting a mechanised battle group, or even a motorised one. You need LHD’s or LPD’s for that regardless of where they are based.

 

[ADMk2]

I am thinking the intention is for 1 Bde to operate in the Indonesian archipelago with allies
If It is harder for the government to send armour to Africa or the ME (especially during WW3 when there are submarines and other threats) that is a good thing in my view. If Aus govt wanted to be able to project power around the world it needed to start to build adequate escorts and aircraft carriers decades ago.

Right there is the issue. You don’t build a defence force for a single mission (aka a focussed force) unless you’re an idiot who ignores history, OR there is a specific reasoning behind it, aka - funding…

At the end of WW2, we thought the days of massive land battles were done. Sweet, downsize the force, make it hugely unbalanced to suit a peacetime budget and pretend we actually have a serious capability.

Oops! What? 5 years later we were back at it again on the Korean peninsula. Our single light infantry battalion facing at times, forces 20x their size were saved in reality by allies who brought the capabilities we needed but didn’t fund…

Clearly every scenario will be like that. Our allies will always be there and able to save us, won’t they?

I agree it appears to me a decline in actual capability (On the basis of your arguments and others).

Only if you consider the loss of 1/4 of what was meant to comprise the high-readiness Army “significant” plus the other cuts - no armour for 1 of 3 remaining brigades. Not a single A vehicle…

Imagine if the RAAF took a 25% cut to it’s high readiness units, and remaining ones were stripped of high-end capabilities?

For example - 77 Sqn - gone.

75 Sqn - well, I suppose you can stay, but you’ll have to send all your JSF’s to 3 Sqn and instead you can fly Hawk Mk.127’s… Which 79 Sqn won’t need as we are disbanding them too and spreading their staff among other RAAF units as away from where their families and lives have been established as we can manage…

1 Sqn, you can keep the SHornets, but you can’t have LRASM, JASSM-ER, JSOW, JDAM or AARGM. All of them are going to 3 Sqn…

Would seem pretty significant to most I guess…

 

[Anthony_B_78]

Only if you consider the loss of 1/4 of what was meant to comprise the high-readiness Army “significant” plus the other cuts - no armour for 1 of 3 remaining brigades. Not a single A vehicle…

A quarter is a little exaggerated. One infantry battalion of six cut - that's a 16.67 per cent cut. No armour for one brigade? Well, yeah, and the US Army, the British Army, practically every army, has brigades without armour too. They generally concentrate the armour, which is what we're going to be doing. We still don't know enough to really understand the extent of the cuts. They are cuts; I agree with that.

 

[ADMk2]

A quarter is a little exaggerated. One infantry battalion of six cut - that's a 16.67 per cent cut. No armour for one brigade? Well, yeah, and the US Army, the British Army, practically every army, has brigades without armour too. They generally concentrate the armour, which is what we're going to be doing. We still don't know enough to really understand the extent of the cuts. They are cuts; I agree with that.

I was referring to 9th brigade and the intended developments for that brigade, becoming the 4th ‘ready combat’ brigade for Army under Army Objective Force 2028. Now excised entirely from the Orbat…

10/27 is gone back to 2nd Div as well, losing all it’s ARA Cadre staff, it’s pers going back to SERCAT 5 and 1 Armoured Regt is now armoured in name only…

 

[Armchair]

Half the brigade will be extremely mobile, extremely hard-hittinng, modern and able to deploy to just about any level of conflict you can imagine (for a couple of days) and the other half won’t...

If that isn’t the vey definition of an unbalanced brigade, then I am not sure what more there is to say…

3 Bde will have tanks, cav, IFVs and light infantry (with PMVs and also co-located medium lift helicopters). That is as balanced as an Australian Army brigade can get given the limitations set by gov’t.
If your critique is that it should have two mechanised battalions in order to be coherent then I fully agree but that option was not available to Army.
i guess the two infantry battalions could be mixed mechanised/motorised. Would that be better In your view? If more IFVs are ordered in 2028 then that might make transition easier (though for reasons raised by Takao I agree they should not all be in Townsville).