Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[ngatimozart]

Last I looked, Sherman’s were deployed to Iwo Jima.
Armour was deployed to PNG, Borneo during WW2 & Vietnam et al.
SEA nations themselves have substantial fleets of heavy armour.

If the concern is that tanks don’t float, then before one puts its eggs in Amphibs, then one must surely be secure in the sea lanes safety simply to get there.

Amphibs are awesome, but ASW is a prerequisite, correct?
…..And when you do get there, I’m guessing one will want an IFV and close armour support once ashore.

Yes the Shermans were deployed, but you still have to get it ashore and into the battle. You have to look at the DSR overall rather than concentrating upon one or two individual items. It also listed three priorities:

"1.19 Instead of a 10-year warning time, the Review has identified three distinct time periods for Defence planning: ​

the three-year period 2023-2025 (for those matters which must be prioritised and addressed urgently); ​

the five-year period 2026-2030; and ​

the period 2031 and beyond." P.25.​

The way I read it is that they are prioritising what needs are urgent and what can be dealt with later. Just because they are cancelling one regiment of SPH now doesn't mean that the 2nd Regiment won't be looked at further down the track. The same with the IFV. In both cases you have the industrial capability to build both, but other things are just more urgent in the short term.

Later it defines National Defence:

"3.10 National Defence includes: ​

Defence strategy and policy supporting whole-of-nation strategies; ​

an enhanced and expanded Alliance with the United States, including key force posture initiatives in Australia; ​

a new, more focused approach to defence planning based on net assessment; ​

a focus on deterrence through denial, including the ability to hold any adversary at risk; ​

a new approach to critical Defence capabilities that drives force structure; ​

a new approach to force posture for the ADF; ​

a whole-of-nation effort to develop strategic resilience; ​

accelerated military preparedness; ​

a more capable ADF; ​

the development of a fully joined-up and Integrated Force; ​

a new approach to the management of risk across government; ​

fundamental changes to Defence recruitment and workforce management; ​

enhanced sovereign defence industrial capacity in key areas; ​

a new approach to developing advanced military technology; and ​

a renewed focus on national planning for Defence preparedness." ​

P.32.​

It is important to understand that is the context upon which changes to force structures, capabilities etc., have been suggested. You have to consider the wider perspective because that informs the changes to come.

 

[Lolcake]

8.79 While we are supportive of Defence’s approach to developing an ADF common IAMD capability, we are not supportive of the relative priority that the program was given. The program is not structured to deliver a minimum viable capability in the shortest period of time but is pursuing a long-term near perfect solution at an unaffordable cost. 8.80 In-service, off-the-shelf options must be explored.

What are the options here? Patriot? Is this not in the midst of a replacement cycle by the outcome of LTAMDS?

 

[Anthony_B_78]

Yes the Shermans were deployed, but you still have to get it ashore and into the battle.

That's right, and don't disagree with anything else you said either. I just want to add to this point here there is a big difference between tanks being deployed in support of infantry in the Pacific campaign and the use of armoured (armored in American parlance) formations in the European threatre.

Not one US Army armored division fought in the Pacific theatre. Not one. The Australian 1st Armoured Division was broken up and some of its constituent tank regiments did see combat, albeit they tended to operate as squadron-sized elements.

Our region is largely - not exclusively by any stretch, but largely - not suited to large-scale combined arms warfare. That's due to the prevailing terrain and lack of infrastructure, ports and roads.

If we deploy armour into our region, it will likely be similar to the past, with squadron/company-size teams. This also makes sense in terms of our ability to, as you say, get them ashore and into battle.

 

[ADMk2]

8.79 While we are supportive of Defence’s approach to developing an ADF common IAMD capability, we are not supportive of the relative priority that the program was given. The program is not structured to deliver a minimum viable capability in the shortest period of time but is pursuing a long-term near perfect solution at an unaffordable cost. 8.80 In-service, off-the-shelf options must be explored.

What are the options here? Patriot? Is this not in the midst of a replacement cycle by the outcome of LTAMDS?

Many nations are still buying it brand new, off the shelf, Switzerland and Sweden being 2, along with the US Army buying additional fire units, so I suspect it has plenty of legs left in it, as well as an iterative development path moving forwards.

SAMP-T could be an option too, but I rather suspect RAAF will be staying with the US on this...

 

[ADMk2]

Yes the Shermans were deployed, but you still have to get it ashore and into the battle. You have to look at the DSR overall rather than concentrating upon one or two individual items. It also listed three priorities:

"1.19 Instead of a 10-year warning time, the Review has identified three distinct time periods for Defence planning: ​

the three-year period 2023-2025 (for those matters which must be prioritised and addressed urgently); ​

the five-year period 2026-2030; and ​

the period 2031 and beyond." P.25.​

The way I read it is that they are prioritising what needs are urgent and what can be dealt with later. Just because they are cancelling one regiment of SPH now doesn't mean that the 2nd Regiment won't be looked at further down the track. The same with the IFV. In both cases you have the industrial capability to build both, but other things are just more urgent in the short term.

Later it defines National Defence:

"3.10 National Defence includes: ​

Defence strategy and policy supporting whole-of-nation strategies; ​

an enhanced and expanded Alliance with the United States, including key force posture initiatives in Australia; ​

a new, more focused approach to defence planning based on net assessment; ​

a focus on deterrence through denial, including the ability to hold any adversary at risk; ​

a new approach to critical Defence capabilities that drives force structure; ​

a new approach to force posture for the ADF; ​

a whole-of-nation effort to develop strategic resilience; ​

accelerated military preparedness; ​

a more capable ADF; ​

the development of a fully joined-up and Integrated Force; ​

a new approach to the management of risk across government; ​

fundamental changes to Defence recruitment and workforce management; ​

enhanced sovereign defence industrial capacity in key areas; ​

a new approach to developing advanced military technology; and ​

a renewed focus on national planning for Defence preparedness." ​

P.32.​

It is important to understand that is the context upon which changes to force structures, capabilities etc., have been suggested. You have to consider the wider perspective because that informs the changes to come.

Long term it may not be a cost-cutting exercise but for the "enhanced force in being" (aka short term spending) it most definitely is. PM made specific mention of $24B worth of un-budgeted capability in the IIP as it stood and that has been addressed by suspending, reducing and cancelling projects outright.

Funds have been shifted to immediate priorities (littoral manoeuvre, long range fires, air defence etc) and long term some or all of these projects may return but for the immediate future cutting cost is a definite priority.

 

[Volkodav]

A

Anthony I cannot see how you equip a brigade with 129 hulls? Not all of those 129 will be IFV's there will be support elements there as well, leaving no attrition stock and very little for training.

In raw, basic numbers, back in the 90s, 15 APCs in a CAV Sqn would re-role as an APC Troop to lift an Infantry company. I know this because my units did precisely this on exercise as required.

Each Troop of four vehicles re-roled as an APC section under a corporal, lifting a platoon.

129 is more than enough for a single Btn, plus training and other overheads, at a stretch i.e. an emergency, using other vehicle types in support, it's enough for two Btns.

The important thing is local production kicks off. Once that is underway additional vehicles can be acquired more easily.

Also of importance it the use of simulators for training, reducing the number of vehicles required for such.

 

[Redlands18]

In raw, basic numbers, back in the 90s, 15 APCs in a CAV Sqn would re-role as an APC Troop to lift an Infantry company. I know this because my units did precisely this on exercise as required.

Each Troop of four vehicles re-roled as an APC section under a corporal, lifting a platoon.

129 is more than enough for a single Btn, plus training and other overheads, at a stretch i.e. an emergency, using other vehicle types in support, it's enough for two Btns.

The important thing is local production kicks off. Once that is underway additional vehicles can be acquired more easily.

Also of importance it the use of simulators for training, reducing the number of vehicles required for such.

The first order of Bushmasters was for only 299 vehicles, final number ordered was 1054, all the GOTD had to do was find the money. Get these factories up and running and there is potential for export orders as well.

 

[Volkodav]

I imagine that statement would surprise most observers on defence talk. I don’t know any western navies that are building larger numbers of smaller vessels. The Germans are the only ones building corvettes but they operate in the Baltic. The Uk no, US no, the Canadians, French, Italians? I know the French are building a small number of gp frigates but this is in smaller number as compared to the FREMM class. I fear this is just a justification for cutting the Hunter class and replacing them with cheaper and less capable vessels.

Probably semantics but technically the Constellations and Type 31 are smaller than Hunter/Type26. There are a number of Euro programs re capitalising their GP and patrol frigate fleets. Japan is building Mogami, South Korea is replacing their earlier KDX frigates.

Instead of nine Hunters supporting three Hobarts, we will likely get six. The cancelled three will, fingers crossed result in six GP frigates.

Looking outside the square, as the review is meant to be a radical change, any mix could occur. Say Hunter cut to five hulls, five new GP frigates, and then two plus three proper DDGs to supplement and replace the Hobart's.

Fingers crossed we will be seeing the end of RAN PBs and OPVs. If the Army is getting anti surface, strike and air defence missiles, to counter the increased threat environment, how can anyone justify calling an aluminium death trap with a single 25mm in Typhoon mount a "combatant".

Whether we get missile corvettes or light frigates to supplement the dozen plus majors, is for the review to decide. There are a number of interesting possibilities going forward, i.e. survivable littoral warfare vessels, capable of mine warfare, special forces support, UUV, USV, UAV mother ships etc.

Wait and see, but stop wasting resources on capability with no way time role.

One thought is the support ships being acquired would be capable of year round presence and patrol in our outer EEZ and region. Far more useful and versatile than PBs or OPVs, and not in the slightest pretending to be combatants.

 

[CJR]

129 is more than enough for a single Btn, plus training and other overheads, at a stretch i.e. an emergency, using other vehicle types in support, it's enough for two Btns.

Per a report/paper on cove.army.gov.au (Fig. 2) the Plan Keogh Mech infantry battalion has 87 APCs (M113s and M577s), of which 57 are used as personnel carriers with the rest being an admixture of command (about 10 all up), logistics, mortar carrier and repair/recovery assets.

So, if focused just on fitting out the close combat elements plus command (turning mortars over to Elbit SPEAR or similar on the back of Hawkeis; leaving logistics and recovery to trucks or M113s...), 129 is two Battalions with bugger all spares. Bump it up another 50-80 hulls (a relatively small investment if we're building the production line anyway) and supporting two Mech Inf Battalions looks quite possible...

 

[Takao]

Agree on your first par, but how many IFVs and SPHs can you deploy and sustain in our immediate neighbourhood?

If you fill a Canberra LHD with armour, how long to get all of those vehicles on the beach? You have four embarked landing craft. They can carry one each at at time of Abrams, IFVs, Boxers, SPHs, etc. How long to do, say, six round trips to land 24 vehicles?

I know there will be more investment in additional amphibious lift, but this is what we have now. And even with the extra capabilities, it's not going to change the challenges you'll face on a Pacific island with underdeveloped infrastructure and difficult terrain.

Maybe in some scenarios, better to have a howitzer you can fly in by Chinook than a SPH that has to wait its turn to be landed ashore?

Frankly? A reinforced Bde worth. If not more.

You are confusing the immediate landing force with what an invasion is. Yes, the ARG cannot carry a reinforced Bde. But that's ok, it means that we need additional logistic ships. Hence the JSS and the rudimentary 'RAFA'/merchant fleet announced recently. We also have standing contracts for shipping lift that, while a bit slower than launching the stand-by LHD, reinforces our lift. We are weak in connectors, but it was always envisioned that the Army watercraft fleet would deploy as part of the ARG to reinforce that.

The terrain is significantly overrated as a threat. Would we use armour in the close fight during the Battle of Shaggy Ridge II? Probably not - it's a dog of a hill.** Would we during the Battle of Lae II? Or Buna II? I mean, we used tanks in Buna I... But yes, AFVs are more than capable of operating in the region. We proved MBTs could work in the jungle in Vietnam which helped the US bring their own armour into theatre. All this is especially so when the CER has the breaching and engineer assets provided. Also remember, the mobility a modern force provides means that the overall campaign would be different.

Which actually leads on to the last point. M777 belong on the 30 fathom line. An SPH is superior in every way - and partially due to its range and mobility it means that it can cover more terrain than a M777. Mainly because to hit X, the SPH has multiple options while the towed gun may not even have a single option. Plus, the rate of fire of a M777 is abysmal in most of our regional terrain, an SPH is untouched.

** Having said that, the Brit's got Centurions into some interesting positions in Korea, and that terrain is arguably worse. Noting the sheer power of modern AFVs, I'd say we would find more terrain where AFVs surprisingly worked than terrain we expected AFVs to work but didn't.

 

[Takao]

Per a report/paper on cove.army.gov.au (Fig. 2) the Plan Keogh Mech infantry battalion has 87 APCs (M113s and M577s), of which 57 are used as personnel carriers with the rest being an admixture of command (about 10 all up), logistics, mortar carrier and repair/recovery assets.

So, if focused just on fitting out the close combat elements plus command (turning mortars over to Elbit SPEAR or similar on the back of Hawkeis; leaving logistics and recovery to trucks or M113s...), 129 is two Battalions with bugger all spares. Bump it up another 50-80 hulls (a relatively small investment if we're building the production line anyway) and supporting two Mech Inf Battalions looks quite possible...

This post may be topical. How many IFVs do we need?

There is a link in that to a tank one.

 

[Reptilia]

Rheinmetall and Lockheed to Develop German HIMARS

Rheinmetall and Lockheed Martin have signed an agreement to jointly develop a rocket artillery system for the German military.

www.thedefensepost.com

Could we be build HIMARS at Rheinmetall(Redbank)?

 

[Anthony_B_78]

Snipped

Two points in response.

First, I'm not confusing the immediate landing force with follow up forces. What can be brought in on day one would be critical in many conceivable operations in our near-region. If we were wanting to contribute to, say, a second Korean War, then I would agree that more heavier forces would make sense; that you can take the time to build them up and so forth.

Second, the terrain is not a threat; it shapes operations and employed forces. No one is saying armoured vehicles do not have their utility in the jungles of South-East Asia and the South Pacific. Experience shows they do. What is also true though is that by and large the terrain is not suitable for the combined arms warfare we saw in the wars involving Iraq, in the European theatre of WW2, or as we would have seen in western Europe if the Cold War had gone hot. There is simply not the room to maneuver. When you add to that the lack of infrastructure, including bridges and roads and ports, it makes it all the more obvious. Armour supporting infantry, yes, but not armoured formations moving at tempo across open spaces.

 

[knightrider4]

Two points in response.

First, I'm not confusing the immediate landing force with follow up forces. What can be brought in on day one would be critical in many conceivable operations in our near-region. If we were wanting to contribute to, say, a second Korean War, then I would agree that more heavier forces would make sense; that you can take the time to build them up and so forth.

Second, the terrain is not a threat; it shapes operations and employed forces. No one is saying armoured vehicles do not have their utility in the jungles of South-East Asia and the South Pacific. Experience shows they do. What is also true though is that by and large the terrain is not suitable for the combined arms warfare we saw in the wars involving Iraq, in the European theatre of WW2, or as we would have seen in western Europe if the Cold War had gone hot. There is simply not the room to maneuver. When you add to that the lack of infrastructure, including bridges and roads and ports, it makes it all the more obvious. Armour supporting infantry, yes, but not armoured formations moving at tempo across open spaces.

Interesting point you make. I guess only a single mechanised battalion is going to have issues in terms of sustainment in the field. How do you rotate the force? What happens when/if it gets its pants pulled down what do you replace it with? I guess you don't replace it. The point I'm trying to make is that I don't think any advocates of heavy armour in the Australian context are advocating a Hussars Charge down the North German plain. But simply 129 hulls is not combat effective nor combat sustainable. Another point to consider is the flow on effects of this, for example the loss of combined arms knowledge and skill/experience is a real concern for me this is not something you can switch on overnight when you suddenly realize ooops we got that wrong. Another issue of concern for me is with so few hulls it leaves the MBT and support vehicles in extreme danger well because the combined arms doctrine which cover the weaknesses of the other platforms is now compromised.

 

[Anthony_B_78]

Interesting point you make. I guess only a single mechanised battalion is going to have issues in terms of sustainment in the field. How do you rotate the force? What happens when/if it gets its pants pulled down what do you replace it with? I guess you don't replace it. The point I'm trying to make is that I don't think any advocates of heavy armour in the Australian context are advocating a Hussars Charge down the North German plain. But simply 129 hulls is not combat effective nor combat sustainable.

It is if you don't deploy it as a single entity. For example, a battlegroup with a mechanised company, maybe a tank squadron, and a cavalry squadron, plus supporting sub-units, including an SPH battery. You could - when all equipment is in service - deploy such a force for three rotations. Another example would be an amphibious operation in our region. You might reinforce the force with an armoured combat team, with, say, a troop of tanks and two mechanised platoons. Five tanks, a Hercules ARV, and maybe 10 IFVs, would take a few lifts to get ashore but would be a good force multiplier, especially if your opponent lacked armour.

 

[knightrider4]

It is if you don't deploy it as a single entity. For example, a battlegroup with a mechanised company, maybe a tank squadron, and a cavalry squadron, plus supporting sub-units, including an SPH battery. You could - when all equipment is in service - deploy such a force for three rotations. Another example would be an amphibious operation in our region. You might reinforce the force with an armoured combat team, with, say, a troop of tanks and two mechanised platoons. Five tanks, a Hercules ARV, and maybe 10 IFVs, would take a few lifts to get ashore but would be a good force multiplier, especially if your opponent lacked armour.

That sounds even worse. I can't see a scenario where a force of 5 tanks ,a single ARV and maybe 10 IFV with the grand total of 60 men in an IFV is going to bother a serious enemy. I mean what enemy would bother travelling thousands of kilometers through potentially hostile waters to land a force to combat what most countries would use to put down a large civil disturbance. I mean what happens if you lose an ARV? Sorry men but you will have to just stay bogged? So in reality yes you may have a mechanised Battalion but you will never be able to use it as such because, we cant sustain it in the field. So you don't even really have that mechanised battalion do you? Well no you have it on paper it just cant be deployed as such. Raise, train, sustain. So in reality what we will have is at best a mechanised company that can be kept in the field.

 

[Anthony_B_78]

That sounds even worse. I can't see a scenario where a force of 5 tanks ,a single ARV and maybe 10 IFV with the grand total of 60 men in an IFV is going to bother a serious enemy. I mean what enemy would bother travelling thousands of kilometers through potentially hostile waters to land a force to combat what most countries would use to put down a large civil disturbance.

Well it's about what a USMC Marine Expeditionary Unit has been deploying for decades (up until recently with some cuts to their forces).

Just be a little more openminded to possibilities. Maybe one of those small island states in our neighbourhood has a coup, maybe with some foreign national involvement. Armour would help overmatch any opposition.

By the way, don't forget we're talking about a force multiplier here, it would be in addition to a Pre Landing Force and an infantry battalion.

 

[Volkodav]

Interesting point you make. I guess only a single mechanised battalion is going to have issues in terms of sustainment in the field. How do you rotate the force? What happens when/if it gets its pants pulled down what do you replace it with? I guess you don't replace it. The point I'm trying to make is that I don't think any advocates of heavy armour in the Australian context are advocating a Hussars Charge down the North German plain. But simply 129 hulls is not combat effective nor combat sustainable. Another point to consider is the flow on effects of this, for example the loss of combined arms knowledge and skill/experience is a real concern for me this is not something you can switch on overnight when you suddenly realize ooops we got that wrong. Another issue of concern for me is with so few hulls it leaves the MBT and support vehicles in extreme danger well because the combined arms doctrine which cover the weaknesses of the other platforms is now compromised.

I think you are confusing an ongoing counter insergency, which doesn't usually involve armoured brigades, and a hot war such as the 91 gulf war or the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

One requires the rotation of forces, the other does not.

An armoured brigade, with modern IFVs and MBTs, is exactly the capability we lacked when our allies would have appreciated it the most.

If you still need your heavy armour in theatre after several months you either shouldn't have been there to start with, or you are working with allies you can rotate with.

 

[knightrider4]

I think you are confusing an ongoing counter insergency, which doesn't usually involve armoured brigades, and a hot war such as the 91 gulf war or the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

One requires the rotation of forces, the other does not.

An armoured brigade, with modern IFVs and MBTs, is exactly the capability we lacked when our allies would have appreciated it the most.

If you still need your heavy armour in theatre after several months you either shouldn't have been there to start with, or you are working with allies you can rotate with.

Thanks for the input. I'm not looking at fighting a COIN type conflict. I'm thinking of a scenario where we may have to fight a peer enemy.

 

[knightrider4]

Well it's about what a USMC Marine Expeditionary Unit has been deploying for decades (up until recently with some cuts to their forces).

Just be a little more openminded to possibilities. Maybe one of those small island states in our neighbourhood has a coup, maybe with some foreign national involvement. Armour would help overmatch any opposition.

By the way, don't forget we're talking about a force multiplier here, it would be in addition to a Pre Landing Force and an infantry battalion.

Yes I understand where your coming from but I'm not looking at low intensity the locals have had enough of higher taxes and want to boot the government out scenario. I'm thinking about serious combat against an enemy who has the means and intent and the forces we will have at our disposal going forward will be dangerously exposed. Sometimes the gods smile and you get away with it. Sometimes they do not.