Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[spoz]

The Navy had had a digital network for 30 years by 2004, with Link 16 in widespread use, including in helicopters. Wedgetail was well underway, if having problems. There were certainly arguments put up at the time (late 90s) that all new aviation platforms should be capable of it.

 

[Volkodav]

My favourite comparison with Tiger is we went from a 1968 Volkswagen Bug to a 2008 Porsche 911 overnight - with no real change. In fact, we actually got rid of some stuff like teaching troubleshooting on our promotion courses and certain avionics skills because we believed the onboard test system would tell us everything. Now, after use we realised that was....optimistic, but there is a cohort of soldiers who didn't learn how to troubleshoot failures. When the CAPT knows tricks the CPLs don't (and let me be the first to say, these aren't real tricks) that's not a good sign. I still remember olds and bolds getting frustrated we didn't just roll the Tigers under the trees like we did with Kiowa's - ignoring the size and (4x!) weight difference

The skipping hurts. Imagine being the CO of 3 Sqn and trading in your Mirage III for an F-35? Its another reason why we should be seeking to roll our equipment over, and not doing silly stuff like M113AS4.

Whoops posted too soon.

IMO we stuffed up buying Iroquois gunships instead of the planned Cobras back in the 70s, the serial A16 was even allocated for them.

Agree 100% on the need to turn over gear more often. It keeps the defence organisation proficient in selecting, procuring and supporting new gear, while allowing the operators to stay abreast of the latest equipment as well,as how to use it.

It also avoids expensive, difficult, risky and poor value for money upgrade programs.

Another advantage is the ongoing roll over of equipment encourages new people to join up, while also preventing the closed minded attitudes of more conservative elements who have only done one thing, one way in their entire career.

 

[Gooey]

... that, and the Army should simply not be flying complex systems.

I am not denigrating the boys and girls of AAVN; however, the 1980's transfer of helo to Army has been proven to be a disaster to Australian air power. It is of course too late, by decades, to reverse this decision but the simple point remains: air power is best run and coordinated by RAAF; ground combat is best run and coordinated by LAND. Helo are air power as they are complex air systems ISO the Joint aims, and are not just for Army support, and as such they are an ADF air asset that should be operated by RAAF. This has been the lesson of numerous conflicts since the Air domain started life and Vietnam was no exception. The fact that some elements within Army thought else-wise is just wrong and tramples on the spirits of many fine airmen and members of the Green machine. As a result, Australia, Army, AAVN, and RAAF are still dealing with the fall-out of this crass division including the waste of MRH-90 and ARH procurement.

The irony is that not only has Army saddled itself with a mission that it was unable to understand or support, including Staff work, but that RAAF too was considerable weakened due to the loss of pilots and personnel; that is the loss of mass and the flexibility and efficiency this provides. The RAAF seniors were not by any means blameless in this episode, especially Army support, but that was being slowly learned and corrected. To say nothing of Joint relations being poisoned for years.

To quote from COMMAND AND CONTROL OF BATTLEFIELD HELICOPTERS by Martin Sharp (Air Power Studies Centre, 1998 p88):

"The decision to transfer the helicopters does seem to be have been an extreme reaction to resolving any shortcomings in command and control arrangements, which could have been addressed with far less draconian measures. Moreover, it seems that by the time the decision was made, the RAAF had acquired a high level of expertise in its helicopter operations, and was highly regarded for its support to Army operations."

https://airpower.airforce.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-03/FELL17-Command-and-Control-of-Battlefield-Helicopters-The-Search-for-a-Joint-Approach.pdf

Of interest, I had not realised (according to Mr Sharp) that Didd had his fingers in this decision too by writing a report that recommended the act. I wonder how many back-briefings were provided from Army discontents who thought they knew best. A similar situation happened in 1990's NZ when elements of Army muddied the waters of Jointness, including Army command, by back-briefing the political opposition IOT prioritise LAND over air power; a very strange concept for a small maritime nation. When the Party got into power the first thing it did after knifing RNZAF air power was gut 2 generations of NZDF seniors to ensure loyalty. Such are the unintended consequences of swimming, no doubt for many good intentions, outside of ones lane.

 

[Stampede]

... that, and the Army should simply not be flying complex systems.

I am not denigrating the boys and girls of AAVN; however, the 1980's transfer of helo to Army has been proven to be a disaster to Australian air power. It is of course too late, by decades, to reverse this decision but the simple point remains: air power is best run and coordinated by RAAF; ground combat is best run and coordinated by LAND. Helo are air power as they are complex air systems ISO the Joint aims, and are not just for Army support, and as such they are an ADF air asset that should be operated by RAAF. This has been the lesson of numerous conflicts since the Air domain started life and Vietnam was no exception. The fact that some elements within Army thought else-wise is just wrong and tramples on the spirits of many fine airmen and members of the Green machine. As a result, Australia, Army, AAVN, and RAAF are still dealing with the fall-out of this crass division including the waste of MRH-90 and ARH procurement.

The irony is that not only has Army saddled itself with a mission that it was unable to understand or support, including Staff work, but that RAAF too was considerable weakened due to the loss of pilots and personnel; that is the loss of mass and the flexibility and efficiency this provides. The RAAF seniors were not by any means blameless in this episode, especially Army support, but that was being slowly learned and corrected. To say nothing of Joint relations being poisoned for years.

To quote from COMMAND AND CONTROL OF BATTLEFIELD HELICOPTERS by Martin Sharp (Air Power Studies Centre, 1998 p88):

"The decision to transfer the helicopters does seem to be have been an extreme reaction to resolving any shortcomings in command and control arrangements, which could have been addressed with far less draconian measures. Moreover, it seems that by the time the decision was made, the RAAF had acquired a high level of expertise in its helicopter operations, and was highly regarded for its support to Army operations."

https://airpower.airforce.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-03/FELL17-Command-and-Control-of-Battlefield-Helicopters-The-Search-for-a-Joint-Approach.pdf

Of interest, I had not realised (according to Mr Sharp) that Didd had his fingers in this decision too by writing a report that recommended the act. I wonder how many back-briefings were provided from Army discontents who thought they knew best. A similar situation happened in 1990's NZ when elements of Army muddied the waters of Jointness, including Army command, by back-briefing the political opposition IOT prioritise LAND over air power; a very strange concept for a small maritime nation. When the Party got into power the first thing it did after knifing RNZAF air power was gut 2 generations of NZDF seniors to ensure loyalty. Such are the unintended consequences of swimming, no doubt for many good intentions, outside of ones lane.

Not sure I agree.
Does that suggest the Fleet Air Arm should swing to the RAAF!
I feel it was correct for Army to take over the helicopter fleet, but agree it has been a big under taking.
Decades on there is some success out there.
Unfortunately Tiger and Taipan have not been apart of that story.

It's sometimes complicated when kit is on the cusp of two services.
Army's future water craft fit that realm.
LCM8 replacement......................Army or Navy.
What about a heavy landing ship...................Army or Navy.

Probably not a golden answer either way.


Cheers S

 

[Redlands18]

It would not have been material as money was never the problem AAAvn has been awash with funds in comparison to other Corps. Simply put Airbus Australia is not capable of meeting the spares demand as the production of spares by the parent prime consortium of the NATO Frigate Helicopter industrial program is the issue at hand. Australian DoD has long banged its head against Airbus Australia's door but the problem resides offshore. No operators have been successful extracting the required support including the RNZAF (which is already quietly grounding airframes for lack of certified spares). Defence spent ten years pretending before it had to get honest about the sustainment disaster that NHIndustries presides over. Buying and flying the new Black Hawks will be significantly cheaper than just retaining and not flying the MRH90 fleet. As to Tiger, it's inability to designate a target beyond 60 percent of the AGM-114M's publicly stated range and more importantly network within the ADF's digital framework made it obsolete before it entered service. Tiger looked great on paper, but the reality didn't live up to the paradise brochure.

... that, and the Army should simply not be flying complex systems.

I am not denigrating the boys and girls of AAVN; however, the 1980's transfer of helo to Army has been proven to be a disaster to Australian air power. It is of course too late, by decades, to reverse this decision but the simple point remains: air power is best run and coordinated by RAAF; ground combat is best run and coordinated by LAND. Helo are air power as they are complex air systems ISO the Joint aims, and are not just for Army support, and as such they are an ADF air asset that should be operated by RAAF. This has been the lesson of numerous conflicts since the Air domain started life and Vietnam was no exception. The fact that some elements within Army thought else-wise is just wrong and tramples on the spirits of many fine airmen and members of the Green machine. As a result, Australia, Army, AAVN, and RAAF are still dealing with the fall-out of this crass division including the waste of MRH-90 and ARH procurement.

The irony is that not only has Army saddled itself with a mission that it was unable to understand or support, including Staff work, but that RAAF too was considerable weakened due to the loss of pilots and personnel; that is the loss of mass and the flexibility and efficiency this provides. The RAAF seniors were not by any means blameless in this episode, especially Army support, but that was being slowly learned and corrected. To say nothing of Joint relations being poisoned for years.

To quote from COMMAND AND CONTROL OF BATTLEFIELD HELICOPTERS by Martin Sharp (Air Power Studies Centre, 1998 p88):

"The decision to transfer the helicopters does seem to be have been an extreme reaction to resolving any shortcomings in command and control arrangements, which could have been addressed with far less draconian measures. Moreover, it seems that by the time the decision was made, the RAAF had acquired a high level of expertise in its helicopter operations, and was highly regarded for its support to Army operations."

https://airpower.airforce.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-03/FELL17-Command-and-Control-of-Battlefield-Helicopters-The-Search-for-a-Joint-Approach.pdf

Of interest, I had not realised (according to Mr Sharp) that Didd had his fingers in this decision too by writing a report that recommended the act. I wonder how many back-briefings were provided from Army discontents who thought they knew best. A similar situation happened in 1990's NZ when elements of Army muddied the waters of Jointness, including Army command, by back-briefing the political opposition IOT prioritise LAND over air power; a very strange concept for a small maritime nation. When the Party got into power the first thing it did after knifing RNZAF air power was gut 2 generations of NZDF seniors to ensure loyalty. Such are the unintended consequences of swimming, no doubt for many good intentions, outside of ones lane.

The problem with this supposition is, that Army's problems centre around only the European helicopters. The Army (with only 1 exception fairly early*) have had few problems operating the Chinooks, Blackhawks and Iroquois. The only aircraft lost are the 2 Blackhawks in 1996 and 1 Chinook in Afghanistan, all operating under extreme conditions at the time.

 

[Volkodav]

... that, and the Army should simply not be flying complex systems.

I am not denigrating the boys and girls of AAVN; however, the 1980's transfer of helo to Army has been proven to be a disaster to Australian air power. It is of course too late, by decades, to reverse this decision but the simple point remains: air power is best run and coordinated by RAAF; ground combat is best run and coordinated by LAND. Helo are air power as they are complex air systems ISO the Joint aims, and are not just for Army support, and as such they are an ADF air asset that should be operated by RAAF. This has been the lesson of numerous conflicts since the Air domain started life and Vietnam was no exception. The fact that some elements within Army thought else-wise is just wrong and tramples on the spirits of many fine airmen and members of the Green machine. As a result, Australia, Army, AAVN, and RAAF are still dealing with the fall-out of this crass division including the waste of MRH-90 and ARH procurement.

The irony is that not only has Army saddled itself with a mission that it was unable to understand or support, including Staff work, but that RAAF too was considerable weakened due to the loss of pilots and personnel; that is the loss of mass and the flexibility and efficiency this provides. The RAAF seniors were not by any means blameless in this episode, especially Army support, but that was being slowly learned and corrected. To say nothing of Joint relations being poisoned for years.

To quote from COMMAND AND CONTROL OF BATTLEFIELD HELICOPTERS by Martin Sharp (Air Power Studies Centre, 1998 p88):

"The decision to transfer the helicopters does seem to be have been an extreme reaction to resolving any shortcomings in command and control arrangements, which could have been addressed with far less draconian measures. Moreover, it seems that by the time the decision was made, the RAAF had acquired a high level of expertise in its helicopter operations, and was highly regarded for its support to Army operations."

https://airpower.airforce.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-03/FELL17-Command-and-Control-of-Battlefield-Helicopters-The-Search-for-a-Joint-Approach.pdf

Of interest, I had not realised (according to Mr Sharp) that Didd had his fingers in this decision too by writing a report that recommended the act. I wonder how many back-briefings were provided from Army discontents who thought they knew best. A similar situation happened in 1990's NZ when elements of Army muddied the waters of Jointness, including Army command, by back-briefing the political opposition IOT prioritise LAND over air power; a very strange concept for a small maritime nation. When the Party got into power the first thing it did after knifing RNZAF air power was gut 2 generations of NZDF seniors to ensure loyalty. Such are the unintended consequences of swimming, no doubt for many good intentions, outside of ones lane.

You do realise that Army was successfully operating Nomad, Porter and Kiowa before they took over Blackhawk?

Many on the issues that occured during the 2000s related to funding, training, basing and manning decisions made in the 90s and 2000s. As well as the elephant in the room, the procurement decisions, specifically in relation to support systems and supply chains.

I should add these issues affected the whole of the ADF, the root cause being dumb ar$e politicians, dumber ideology, stripping engineering and sustainment capability from defence and giving it to contractors.

Read back to the late 2000s in these threads. The consistent theme was how damaging the various defence reviews and economy drives of the 90s had been. How bad things were and how much money was being wasted under outsourcing policies.

If the RAAF is so perfect, explain what the hell is going on with the Spartan. Rule of thumb, if it flies and isn't supported by either FMS or a massive commercial fleet, it has issues, why, because of decades of unsuccessful outsourcing and "efficiencies".

I had a yelling match with a couple of old and bolds (predominately the light blue variety) over the years who simply decided he didn't have do certain things anymore because the TAREGs had been replaced by DASR, which focuses on airworthiness without any regard to operational effectiveness.

Because they perceived government didn't care, they didn't care, because it was no longer, as they saw it, required by the system they knew, they decided it didn't matter. The problem is these were the people now in the governance and assurance roles that were meant to be ensuring all of these things still happened. They wrote, managed and enforced the requirements that were meant to deliver the capability.

Some of these w@nkers are army, some are navy, a great many on the aviation side are airforce, most are ex full time, some still serving. Don't get me wrong, there are a lot of very good people in the ADF, still doing what they joined to do, but you need to ask yourself, where to the not so good ones go?

 

[Volkodav]

The problem with this supposition is, that Army's problems centre around only the European helicopters. The Army (with only 1 exception fairly early*) have had few problems operating the Chinooks, Blackhawks and Iroquois. The only aircraft lost are the 2 Blackhawks in 1996 and 1 Chinook in Afghanistan, all operating under extreme conditions at the time.

It was put to me recently that many European maintenance procedures assume a level of knowledge and skill that the US systems simply do not.

As Tokao said skills in fault finding and trouble shooting for instance are something that is assumed in older systems but seen as unnecessary now due to modern, digital maintenance systems.

I have spent much of my career, irrespective of role or even industry, identifying process issues. I read them quite literally then apply knowledge and experience to determine what the actual intent is (or was). It drives many old and bolds insane as they seem to expect people either explicitly follow the written instruction, or without any guidance or input, determine it is wrong and just do it anyway. You can't have it both ways.

 

[spoz]

The problem with this supposition is, that Army's problems centre around only the European helicopters. The Army (with only 1 exception fairly early*) have had few problems operating the Chinooks, Blackhawks and Iroquois. The only aircraft lost are the 2 Blackhawks in 1996 and 1 Chinook in Afghanistan, all operating under extreme conditions at the time.

Plus the one lost off the back of Kanimbla in 2006.

Army did have difficulty early on coming to grips with as complex a platform as the Blackhawk, but that passed by the early 2000s at the latest. The AF these days has no, none, zip, nada, experience in helicopters; and to this Naval person who has had a lot to do with Naval aviation, no interest. (Although they do run the tech reg organisation; but the rotary wing section is staffed ny Navy and Army.) I quite understand why Army wanted control of what, to them, is a critical battlefield asset but which to AF is a bit of a sideshow; and, similarly to Navy, they need people who are intimately familiar with the operational usages in the field of warfare in which they are engaged. That means Army for Army and Navy for Navy.

 

[ngatimozart]

... that, and the Army should simply not be flying complex systems.

I am not denigrating the boys and girls of AAVN; however, the 1980's transfer of helo to Army has been proven to be a disaster to Australian air power. It is of course too late, by decades, to reverse this decision but the simple point remains: air power is best run and coordinated by RAAF; ground combat is best run and coordinated by LAND. Helo are air power as they are complex air systems ISO the Joint aims, and are not just for Army support, and as such they are an ADF air asset that should be operated by RAAF. This has been the lesson of numerous conflicts since the Air domain started life and Vietnam was no exception. The fact that some elements within Army thought else-wise is just wrong and tramples on the spirits of many fine airmen and members of the Green machine. As a result, Australia, Army, AAVN, and RAAF are still dealing with the fall-out of this crass division including the waste of MRH-90 and ARH procurement.

The irony is that not only has Army saddled itself with a mission that it was unable to understand or support, including Staff work, but that RAAF too was considerable weakened due to the loss of pilots and personnel; that is the loss of mass and the flexibility and efficiency this provides. The RAAF seniors were not by any means blameless in this episode, especially Army support, but that was being slowly learned and corrected. To say nothing of Joint relations being poisoned for years.

To quote from COMMAND AND CONTROL OF BATTLEFIELD HELICOPTERS by Martin Sharp (Air Power Studies Centre, 1998 p88):

"The decision to transfer the helicopters does seem to be have been an extreme reaction to resolving any shortcomings in command and control arrangements, which could have been addressed with far less draconian measures. Moreover, it seems that by the time the decision was made, the RAAF had acquired a high level of expertise in its helicopter operations, and was highly regarded for its support to Army operations."

https://airpower.airforce.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-03/FELL17-Command-and-Control-of-Battlefield-Helicopters-The-Search-for-a-Joint-Approach.pdf

Of interest, I had not realised (according to Mr Sharp) that Didd had his fingers in this decision too by writing a report that recommended the act. I wonder how many back-briefings were provided from Army discontents who thought they knew best. A similar situation happened in 1990's NZ when elements of Army muddied the waters of Jointness, including Army command, by back-briefing the political opposition IOT prioritise LAND over air power; a very strange concept for a small maritime nation. When the Party got into power the first thing it did after knifing RNZAF air power was gut 2 generations of NZDF seniors to ensure loyalty. Such are the unintended consequences of swimming, no doubt for many good intentions, outside of ones lane.

Ahem, the army have been flying for decades and you are spouting single service bull crap. The idea of army aviation is that you have people who think army operating the helos, just as the navy has navy operating its helos because they aircrews think navy. The US Army, British Army and numerous other armies operate their own air arms quite effectively. If the USAF, who are the most territorial of all air forces, had its way, they would be operating all US military aviation. However they don't and the US Army has had wars with the USAF over aviation assets.

 

[Rob c]

It was put to me recently that many European maintenance procedures assume a level of knowledge and skill that the US systems simply do not.

As Tokao said skills in fault finding and trouble shooting for instance are something that is assumed in older systems but seen as unnecessary now due to modern, digital maintenance systems.

I have spent much of my career, irrespective of role or even industry, identifying process issues. I read them quite literally then apply knowledge and experience to determine what the actual intent is (or was). It drives many old and bolds insane as they seem to expect people either explicitly follow the written instruction, or without any guidance or input, determine it is wrong and just do it anyway. You can't have it both ways.

Many, many years ago, I had a boss who had a large framed slogan behind his desk which I took to heart and have tried to live to, which said ,"RULES ARE FOR THE GUIDANCE OF WISE MEN AND THE BLIND OBEDENCE OF FOOLS"
I still believe that it is a totally relevant saying today.

 

[Maranoa]

Tiger and Taipans issues are extraordinarily well documented. No military force on planet earth has managed to put either helicopter to hard work. The Germans hate both and have massively slashed their acquisitions of both, the Swedes, Australians, Belgians and Norwegians are all scrapping their MRH90s and in Australia's case replacing the Tiger at 21 years. I was at the Tiger debut parade at Oakey in 2004, but by 2007 I was already aware of the significant issues with the aircraft from official reports. Remember the truckload of plastic ties to separate the cabling to prevent catastrophic abrasion, if not maybe go and read the ANAO report on this treasure of a helo.

 

[Wombat000]

the 1980's transfer of helo to Army has been proven to be a disaster to Australian air power

I don’t agree.
Transfer of battlefield domain aviation belongs to Army, because they’re the end customers of its effects.

The counter-argument would be to strip RAAF of its ADGs & tactical ground assets to Army, because they’ve been doing that since before manned flight, and the RAAF was originally an Army Corp.

The transfer of battlefield aviation to Army was and remains a demonstration of a matured and equiped doctrine.

 

[ngatimozart]

Many, many years ago, I had a boss who had a large framed slogan behind his desk which I took to heart and have tried to live to, which said ,"RULES ARE FOR THE GUIDANCE OF WISE MEN AND THE BLIND OBEDENCE OF FOOLS"
I still believe that it is a totally relevant saying today.

Oh yes, I had a few SNCOs that lived by that and I also took it to heart.

Tiger and Taipans issues are extraordinarily well documented. No military force on planet earth has managed to put either helicopter to hard work. The Germans hate both and have massively slashed their acquisitions of both, the Swedes, Australians, Belgians and Norwegians are all scrapping their MRH90s and in Australia's case replacing the Tiger at 21 years. I was at the Tiger debut parade at Oakey in 2004, but by 2007 I was already aware of the significant issues with the aircraft from official reports. Remember the truckload of plastic ties to separate the cabling to prevent catastrophic abrasion, if not maybe go and read the ANAO report on this treasure of a helo.

Your claim is quite spurious. The RNZAF have the NH90 working earning its keep. The French Army have both their Tiger variants in combat and earning their keep also.

 

[Gooey]

Gents, thank you for your spirited reply's and thoughts.

I don't believe in sacred cows etc and was attempting to communicate from the perspective of air power, certainly not single service "bull crap" (thanks Nga for your unnecessary emotion and spectacularly missing my point). As mentioned, the golden answer (DS solution!) is not always there with some compromises normally needed.

Army does army; Navy does navy: this does not work for aviation/air power. Aviation is the ultimate format of centralised execution over penny-packeting out because "we know best". As I said "RAAF too was considerable weakened due to the loss of pilots and personnel; that is the loss of mass and the flexibility and efficiency this provides." To a degree, I believe the same about Navy Air: for max return, especially for the size of Aus/NZ, this should be single service. An example, what if RAN gets light carriers again: should they operate F-35Bs?

Apologies for the short answers:

Plenty of other countries do so, like Israel and Canada.

I'd suggest that Nomad etc are not complex aircraft.

Chinook, ironically, is a good example of multi-role air power; like Attack & Blackhawk. That is, not just Army support missions.

I never said RAAF was perfect. Far from it after my time in light blue! As an ex C130 guy, I come at this with a better understanding of Jointness than most.

Spartan is a spectacular example of DMO not working, Political interference, and 'replacing for the sake of replacing'.

I'll leave it there. My apologies if any Green machine type fellas are upset. I understand that we are where we are, so no worries. My points were purely from the perspectives of maximising air power efforts, both operationally and TTPs. Again, certainly not anything to do with throwing mud at the AAVN (or Navy).

 

[Gooey]

Nga, I claim my $5: you are paid by Eurocrap HR

 

[Wombat000]

It’s an interesting concept.
I think the Gold Standard would be to have your crews be utter specialists in the domain in which they operate.
So, rotating your crew assets around the wider aviation world (that’s the point of centralising them under a single service) would be counter-productive.

To be ‘utterly expert’ in a domain would imply the aviation crew focus their efforts in that domain.
Air focus on Strategic Air effect and dominance, and Space.
Land (battlefield) focus on application of Tactical Air,
Sea, focus on Maritime factors relevant to Naval ops at sea.

so, would a theoretical naval F35B be better served as dedicated Naval Air, of course it would, but it would need the resources for it to be optimally ‘single service specialist‘.

The fact that the ADF has the minimum critical mass and the resources to dedicate single service aviation specialties is a credit to them, it demonstrates maturity of doctrine, of the individual services themselves, and the government to have faith in that investment.

 

[jack412]

When the French can only get 25% Tiger availability. We aren't the only ones having trouble.

French military helicopter readiness? Depends on the fleet

The latest official update on readiness of French military helicopters show an average availability less than 50 percent, with the Tiger attack helicopter only ready for operations a quarter of the time.

www.defensenews.com

"The latest official update on readiness of French military helicopters show an average availability less than 50 percent, with the Tiger attack helicopter only ready for operations a quarter of the time. "

 

[old faithful]

Oh yes, I had a few SNCOs that lived by that and I also took it to heart.

Your claim is quite spurious. The RNZAF have the NH90 working earning its keep. The French Army have both their Tiger variants in combat and earning their keep also.

When NZ only has 8 aircraft to maintain and keep flying, they have no excuse for poor availability what so ever. I do wonder how many aircraft are available at any one time though....

 

[buffy9]

Germany in talks to buy $3b tank-like vehicles from Australia

The government is negotiating its most lucrative arms export deal, with Berlin hoping to purchase Queensland-made Boxer armoured vehicles.

www.afr.com

Germany is negotiating to procure Australian-built Boxer CRV for up to $3 billion, likely built at the MILVEHCOE, as part of its planned rearmament. The export deal is apparently not contingent on Rheinmetall winning Land 400 Phase 3...

All three services of the Bundeswehr will also apparently be taking part in Talisman Sabre later this year - to include a para company, an airlifter and 'naval amphibious forces.' This likely builds upon Pitch Black last year.

Edit: p.s. removed

 

[Maranoa]

Oh yes, I had a few SNCOs that lived by that and I also took it to heart.

Your claim is quite spurious. The RNZAF have the NH90 working earning its keep. The French Army have both their Tiger variants in combat and earning their keep also.

Do some research. You'll find that the RNZAF has grounded airframes too and is not immune to the NHIndustries woes. As to the French, believe what you will but they have also slashed original acquisition numbers of both Tigre and MRH and are already moving on to a new airframe. PM me if you need some help with documentation. In the meantime google Sweden NH90, Germany NH90, Belgium NH90 et al maybe Norway as I know they are thrilled with their NH90s too. The German military aviation certification agency really loves the NHIndustries as only a German can loathe a failed politically expedient but completely technically unsound industrial consortium sponsored by EADS.