Australian Army Discussions and Updates

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Sheridan is completely wrong - and as been said above, most of this lays at the feet of Army. Oops...

Everything above provides the justification for armour; let me have an attempt at strategically justifying it. I'll apologise now for length and beg your indulgence for (a) length and (b) accidently telling you to suck eggs

DSU para 1.3 - 1.6 highlight how the security situation within the Indo-Pacific is degrading, with Great Power competition and 'grey zone activities' {:rolleyes:} increasing. Para 1.6 - 1.8 highlight how there is an effective arms race within the region, with multiple nations conducting military modernisation. Para 1.12 sums it up:



Para 1.17 - 1.20 further define the security situation in the region as degraded and under increased risk beyond 'simple' State-on-State conflict. As para 1.20 says:



Chapter 2 hits the key points, but I'll note that while there is a focus on the Indo-Pacific region, para 2.11 highlights our need to be able to respond at further distances if needed (although not an equal level force design determinant, it is still Government direction). Additionally, para 2.13 directs, among others, increased self-reliance for deterrence and enhance the lethality of the ADF.

Now it boils down to the three key bulwarks of the DSU: shape, deter, respond. Para 2.14 onwards define this, but key points for this discussion are:

Shape - build new, and strengthen existing, partnerships, strengthening sovereignty and resilience to coercion, cooperative defence activities is fundamental to our ability to shape our strategic environment, be prepared to lead coalition operations

Deter - Australia take greater responsibility for our own security, deliver deterrent effects against a broad range of threats.

Respond - The ADF must be better prepared for such conflict if deterrence measures fail, or to support the United States and other partners where Australia’s national interests are engaged, enhance the lethality and readiness.

So what does this mean for the Land Domain? Firstly, to shape and lead we need a credible military. The reality is that coalition leaderships and credibility still (rightly or wrongly) fall upon the land forces, especially in this region. So the land force needs to be credible, meaning its well trained and equipped to fight a broad range of threats, including China (although that is less relevant - as chap 1 highlights, war with China is but one possibility). A land force that is credible, trained and equipped means that it has some deterrence effects, and here you get into another aspect. The land force needs to be able to hit hard. And, as much as possible, from range and at any time. This demands firepower, and heavy firepower at that. It also demands excellent communications and the ability to respond quickly, be it tactically or strategically. A land force that can do these can respond, but note that we have to respond across a range of scenarios.

So the land force needs to be credible, flexible, resilient, protected, have good chunks of firepower and comms. This could be anything - until you take a step back and consider how any army fights.

The reality of any element within the land force is that they all have flaws. Infantry is squishy, slow and weakly armed; artillery vulnerable at range and if it can't see; armour vulnerable in close terrain and if you get in close; engineers are just plain offensive {:p} but lack firepower and aviation struggles in persistence and weather. So we know that any land force needs counters for each of the negatives for any force it uses. The key is simple and relearnt again in 1917 - combined arms. It's one of two basic planks of how the Australian Army operates. Arty gives me fire support in all weather but is slow to respond across a theatre while Avn responds rapidly but lacks persistence. So, SPH + ARH. Bade dudes put up obstacles to kill our slow and weak infantry, so we throw the Sappers in. And the infantry can protect the Sappers.

Now, like strawberries and cream, soldiers and beer or dogs and happiness, the two arms that cover each other the best are armour and infantry. Almost every single negative for a tank is a positive for infantry and vice versa. Which means that everywhere you put a grunt, you want a tank. Well, a Coy of grunts and a Tp of tanks - they don't fight alone. Without tanks your infantry can only be used for the lightest of duties. Now this does demand other attributes - logistics and engineers - but we return to the DSU we find they also contribute to the other parts of resilience and shape, both trades are essential to building partnerships and responding to threats. Furthermore, nothing can provide the shock action, firepower, mobility and persistence of a tank - all of which are much more than the sum of its parts.

So to meet the Government directives and you need tanks. They give credibility, lethality and persistence in a way nothing else can. There may be a replacement the future - but not now.

But where to use them (the second half of your question)? Well, the DSU answer is yours - wherever there are infantry and there is a threat. @Volkodav says it best here, but if the threat has tanks you need the same and if they don't you have over match. The statistical answer is that studies with and without armour consistently show that adding tanks to the mix in all forms of warfare from COIN to peer conflict mean you save lives, mostly infantry. This is for Russian, European, Middle Eastern, American and Australian experiences - any nation that practices combined arms warfare. In Vietnam we saved lives with tanks, and in Afghanistan the Canadians found that was the case. In both these conflicts we can even compare before and after tanks.

But if committing tanks saves lives, why not us in AFG or IRA? Two things - outdated tank (Leo 1) that was not survivable and politics. Every force we commit is a political decision, and none of the governments of the day wanted a big Australian presence or one that was in enough combat to take casualties. So it was more palatable to adopt lower threat areas and restrictive ROE than deploy tanks. Plus the appearance of sending tanks wouldn't have fit with either Party's goals of downplaying our involvement; same as why Tiger didn't go.

Fundamentally, to look at limited wars of choice and say 'we didn't use them so don't need them' is really bad. We'd have never bought F/A-18's if that was the case. JTF's are politically built, and just because there is a threat doesn't mean that the ADF will get their way in what they send. I'd argue that the job the F/A-18's were doing in the MEAO recently could have been done by almost any propeller plane and they weren't engaged in air-to-air combat, but you'll never see me saying the RAAF hasn't fought since 1952 so we don't need fighters. Tanks allow that flexibility, the government can chose not to send them. Better that than committing forces and realising we need tanks - but don't have them. It also gives the Government more options as to how to respond to conflicts, or even if they do in the first place.

Overall / TLDR - the Government has directed the ADF to be credible, lethal and able to respond. The tank is a critical part of the Army's contribution to these aspects that cannot be replaced by any other system. They literally save lives; you should deploy them anywhere there is a threat armed with more than a rifle and there are Australian or friendly infantry. And finally, decisions to use assets previously should not be sued for force design in the future as they are political, not capability based.
Thank you for your response.
My lack of land warfare education has been somewhat improved.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Thank you for your response.
My lack of land warfare education has been somewhat improved.
Think of it like the run down of ASW capability until recently, or previously the move away from medium calibre guns on major surface combatants.

Hasn't been used in the living memory of the decision makers, hence it can't be that important and we can survive without it.

A disturbing angle on this current "guided weapons are awesome" slant is it's not too dissimilar to the thinking in the 50s and 70s when major capabilities were reduced or even retired because missiles and aircraft carrying guided weapons were the future and made those capabilities obsolete. The cabinet papers relating to the carrier replacement are full of mistruths and twisted advice by missile fanbois in the public service, they were more liberal with facts than the RAAF were.
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I'd say it's one thing for the USMC to divest their tanks when they have the US Army behind them. Quite another for the ADF to lose its MBT capability completely...
And USMC have never said they won’t need tanks, they absolutely will. They just said they can’t afford tanks and acquire their (dubious) required future systems and so they fully expect the US Army will provide the capability instead.
 

MARKMILES77

Active Member

One of the articles in the Australian Defence supplement has an interesting proposal.
Keep the Tiger ARH even when the Apaches arrive. Each Tiger still has thousands of hours of service life left. With the deteriorating Strategic situation the extra firepower they offer Army may make them worth keeping in service. Not said in the article but another option, would be to keep them in storage, such that they could rapidly be brought back into service if required.
 

Takao

The Bunker Group

One of the articles in the Australian Defence supplement has an interesting proposal.
Keep the Tiger ARH even when the Apaches arrive. Each Tiger still has thousands of hours of service life left. With the deteriorating Strategic situation the extra firepower they offer Army may make them worth keeping in service. Not said in the article but another option, would be to keep them in storage, such that they could rapidly be brought back into service if required.
How do we pay for one of those fleets?

At the moment, all of the funding line for Tiger will transition to Apache. Just like Kiowa's did to Tiger. So one of the fleets miss out.

How will we pay for the maintainers? Even if they aren't flying, they still have calendar servicing's. Someone will have to do that, and we are normally stretched for RAEME as is. Plus the training school will have to keep the Tiger modules open.

Just like Marcus Hellyer B-21 bullshit in the other post, this falls down when you ask simple finance questions. If we had the cash to keep two ARH fleets flying, why not buy extra AH-64 and consolidate? It's dumb, and the fact that Hellyer and co can get worked up over $50b v $80b (when it's the same number) for sub's but not do simple USD-AUD conversions or fleet logistics is......irritating.

Two additional, minor though, quibbles. One, yes, most of the kit is maintained here. But the spares come from France. and two, yes AH-64 is a little wider, but all bar six hangers in Robertson Barracks are designed for MRH and hence can fit an Apache.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
How do we pay for one of those fleets?

At the moment, all of the funding line for Tiger will transition to Apache. Just like Kiowa's did to Tiger. So one of the fleets miss out.

How will we pay for the maintainers? Even if they aren't flying, they still have calendar servicing's. Someone will have to do that, and we are normally stretched for RAEME as is. Plus the training school will have to keep the Tiger modules open.

Just like Marcus Hellyer B-21 bullshit in the other post, this falls down when you ask simple finance questions. If we had the cash to keep two ARH fleets flying, why not buy extra AH-64 and consolidate? It's dumb, and the fact that Hellyer and co can get worked up over $50b v $80b (when it's the same number) for sub's but not do simple USD-AUD conversions or fleet logistics is......irritating.

Two additional, minor though, quibbles. One, yes, most of the kit is maintained here. But the spares come from France. and two, yes AH-64 is a little wider, but all bar six hangers in Robertson Barracks are designed for MRH and hence can fit an Apache.
I confess to have been one who was guarded as to the need for the replacement of the Tiger ARH in the current time frame.
That said, the decision has been made and the reasons for it we trust were justified and as such should be supported.
As such the Apache is the way forward and therefore the Tiger should be retired.
A dual fleet makes no sense.
I notice APDR are also proposing a duel Tiger / Apache fleet.

Trust Apache serves us well.

Regards S
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I confess to have been one who was guarded as to the need for the replacement of the Tiger ARH in the current time frame.
That said, the decision has been made and the reasons for it we trust were justified and as such should be supported.
As such the Apache is the way forward and therefore the Tiger should be retired.
A dual fleet makes no sense.
I notice APDR are also proposing a duel Tiger / Apache fleet.

Trust Apache serves us well.

Regards S
From this side of the ditch, IMHO go with one or the other - not both. Logistically and support wise you'll be asking for problems. If the situation changes and current Apache acquisition doesn't have enough helos, you can always order a second tranche. Problem solved and more cost effective in the long run.
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
How do we pay for one of those fleets?

At the moment, all of the funding line for Tiger will transition to Apache. Just like Kiowa's did to Tiger. So one of the fleets miss out.

How will we pay for the maintainers? Even if they aren't flying, they still have calendar servicing's. Someone will have to do that, and we are normally stretched for RAEME as is. Plus the training school will have to keep the Tiger modules open.

Just like Marcus Hellyer B-21 bullshit in the other post, this falls down when you ask simple finance questions. If we had the cash to keep two ARH fleets flying, why not buy extra AH-64 and consolidate? It's dumb, and the fact that Hellyer and co can get worked up over $50b v $80b (when it's the same number) for sub's but not do simple USD-AUD conversions or fleet logistics is......irritating.

Two additional, minor though, quibbles. One, yes, most of the kit is maintained here. But the spares come from France. and two, yes AH-64 is a little wider, but all bar six hangers in Robertson Barracks are designed for MRH and hence can fit an Apache.
Then of course there is the minor issue that the Tigers are nearing obsolescence in many ways, hence why the Tiger upgrade program, which we were invited to participate but declined, is going ahead…
 

south

Well-Known Member
@Takao. Thanks for the post 7898- can you please expand on the two excerpts from this post? Particularly why you think coalition leadership and credibility fall upon land forces, and secondly why that is so in this region?

So what does this mean for the Land Domain? Firstly, to shape and lead we need a credible military. The reality is that coalition leaderships and credibility still (rightly or wrongly) fall upon the land forces, especially in this region.
And then - I've seen you post this discussion point a number of times. Can you propose what 'propeller plane(s)' could have done the job, and why?
I'd argue that the job the F/A-18's were doing in the MEAO recently could have been done by almost any propeller plane and they weren't engaged in air-to-air combat, but you'll never see me saying the RAAF hasn't fought since 1952 so we don't need fighters.
 
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Takao

The Bunker Group
@Takao. Thanks for the post 7898- can you please expand on the two excerpts from this post? Particularly why you think coalition leadership and credibility fall upon land forces, and secondly why that is so in this region?
A key to coalition leadership lies in the willingness of the leading nation to commit troops, and where needed accept the casualties that this entails. We've seen this in every coalition I can think of (from big stuff like Washington, London, Moscow dictating the war against Germany over to the little stuff like Canberra in Timor-Leste in 1999) and to me it slots neatly into human nature. The one who commits the most (normally) gets the most say.

In this scheme, ground forces are more valuable than other types. Mainly because of two reasons, they need higher numbers (a unit of ground forces will be ~800 - 1000 while a unit of air or sea will be no larger than ~300-350) and because the risk is higher - you are more likely to lose blood with ground forces. We've seen this most clearly in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as nations committed more or less ground forces each year their 'ranking' within the coalitions (and hence their seat at the table and willingness for the US to listen) increased or decreased.

In our region, the navies and air forces are usually token - especially the former. While naval forces are vital in the region (and I'm already sold on expanding the RAN), there is still significant amounts of land forces needed. This becomes even more lopsided in terms of land forces with operations below the threshold of a major war - things like humanitarian support to Aceh or aiding the Timor-Leste independence in 1999 and 2006 have to have land forces. On top of that, the majority of armed forces in the region are armies, and the majority of politicians who are/were in the armed forces are Army (I think Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama is the only naval one?). This results in a culture where, for good or for ill, land forces are seen as the premier force. If you want to lead these nations, have the respect and right to do so, they need to trust your land forces are at least as capable, if not more.

And then - I've seen you post this discussion point a number of times. Can you propose what 'propeller plane(s)' could have done the job, and why?
For what the Hornets were doing in the MEAO? A PC-9 could have. Or Tiger for some of them. Frankly, a P-47 or A-1 would have been just as capable.

Our operations against ISIS in Iraq were in the airspace of a friendly nation, one we were working with to strike a force that had...rudimentary air defence and no air force. In addition we were operating within the wider US plan, who provided enough air defence capability for us.

Operations in Syria were a little more complex with the intermixing of the various combatants - but two things stand out. One is again, we were operating within a wider US operation wo guaranteed air supremacy and two, over 4 years the Hornets flew only 50 missions and dropped 68 munitions. If we chose not to do those handful, there would have been no impact or difference on the operations, our alliance or - frankly - anything. As an indication, in the same time period there were 167 912 missions conducted by OIR, 4038 of which were RAAF (and that includes E-7 and KC-30). Losing 50 is meaningless.

I understand why we used Hornets, they were the only thing that we had at hand at the time. But we didn't need them, nor did they represent value for money or a demonstration that we need jet strike aircraft. They certainly don't represent a justification for maintaining fighters.

I will take this opportunity to clarify I think we need a capable and fearsome fighter force - I'd prefer to fight under friendly skies. But when 'experts' say sill stuff like "we haven't used x since y so we don't need them" when we have only fought wars of choice often fail to consider that their pet project hasn't fought for longer....
 

Redlands18

Well-Known Member
A key to coalition leadership lies in the willingness of the leading nation to commit troops, and where needed accept the casualties that this entails. We've seen this in every coalition I can think of (from big stuff like Washington, London, Moscow dictating the war against Germany over to the little stuff like Canberra in Timor-Leste in 1999) and to me it slots neatly into human nature. The one who commits the most (normally) gets the most say.

In this scheme, ground forces are more valuable than other types. Mainly because of two reasons, they need higher numbers (a unit of ground forces will be ~800 - 1000 while a unit of air or sea will be no larger than ~300-350) and because the risk is higher - you are more likely to lose blood with ground forces. We've seen this most clearly in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as nations committed more or less ground forces each year their 'ranking' within the coalitions (and hence their seat at the table and willingness for the US to listen) increased or decreased.

In our region, the navies and air forces are usually token - especially the former. While naval forces are vital in the region (and I'm already sold on expanding the RAN), there is still significant amounts of land forces needed. This becomes even more lopsided in terms of land forces with operations below the threshold of a major war - things like humanitarian support to Aceh or aiding the Timor-Leste independence in 1999 and 2006 have to have land forces. On top of that, the majority of armed forces in the region are armies, and the majority of politicians who are/were in the armed forces are Army (I think Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama is the only naval one?). This results in a culture where, for good or for ill, land forces are seen as the premier force. If you want to lead these nations, have the respect and right to do so, they need to trust your land forces are at least as capable, if not more.



For what the Hornets were doing in the MEAO? A PC-9 could have. Or Tiger for some of them. Frankly, a P-47 or A-1 would have been just as capable.

Our operations against ISIS in Iraq were in the airspace of a friendly nation, one we were working with to strike a force that had...rudimentary air defence and no air force. In addition we were operating within the wider US plan, who provided enough air defence capability for us.

Operations in Syria were a little more complex with the intermixing of the various combatants - but two things stand out. One is again, we were operating within a wider US operation wo guaranteed air supremacy and two, over 4 years the Hornets flew only 50 missions and dropped 68 munitions. If we chose not to do those handful, there would have been no impact or difference on the operations, our alliance or - frankly - anything. As an indication, in the same time period there were 167 912 missions conducted by OIR, 4038 of which were RAAF (and that includes E-7 and KC-30). Losing 50 is meaningless.

I understand why we used Hornets, they were the only thing that we had at hand at the time. But we didn't need them, nor did they represent value for money or a demonstration that we need jet strike aircraft. They certainly don't represent a justification for maintaining fighters.

I will take this opportunity to clarify I think we need a capable and fearsome fighter force - I'd prefer to fight under friendly skies. But when 'experts' say sill stuff like "we haven't used x since y so we don't need them" when we have only fought wars of choice often fail to consider that their pet project hasn't fought for longer....
Probably the best experience we got out of the Iraq operations were from the E-7s and KC-30s.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
From this side of the ditch, IMHO go with one or the other - not both. Logistically and support wise you'll be asking for problems. If the situation changes and current Apache acquisition doesn't have enough helos, you can always order a second tranche. Problem solved and more cost effective in the long run.
Agreed, if the extra funding and resources can be found to retain the Tiger, in addition to acquiring Apache then the obvious long term, and most efficient solution is to channel that money into expanding to Apache capability.

Alternatively, the only way I can see it determined that the current strategic situation dictates the short term retention of Tiger along side Apache is for maritime operations. That is to say one squadron of Tigers is retained until Apache achieves FOC on the LHDs.

My primary concern when the Apache decision was announced was that we were committing ourselves to a legacy platform (highly capable but still legacy) when it's replacement was due before an upgraded Tiger would need replacement. Retaining Tiger along side Apache is basically a less efficient, more complex way to achieve a given capability.
 

spoz

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Army centric in the Pacific would certainly be a new concept to the US; all CinCPACs since 1942 have been Navy, and the majority of action there in WW2 was the marines. In limited wars such as Korea or Vietnam I would agree that the Army was dominant in theatre; but they were geographically very constrained compared to a major war, and the US had complete maritime dominance. And, I don’t think there is much doubt who would lead a western coalition in any future major war in the Pacific.
 

south

Well-Known Member
A key to coalition leadership lies in the willingness of the leading nation to commit troops, and where needed accept the casualties that this entails. We've seen this in every coalition I can think of (from big stuff like Washington, London, Moscow dictating the war against Germany over to the little stuff like Canberra in Timor-Leste in 1999) and to me it slots neatly into human nature. The one who commits the most (normally) gets the most say.

In this scheme, ground forces are more valuable than other types. Mainly because of two reasons, they need higher numbers (a unit of ground forces will be ~800 - 1000 while a unit of air or sea will be no larger than ~300-350) and because the risk is higher - you are more likely to lose blood with ground forces. We've seen this most clearly in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as nations committed more or less ground forces each year their 'ranking' within the coalitions (and hence their seat at the table and willingness for the US to listen) increased or decreased.

In our region, the navies and air forces are usually token - especially the former. While naval forces are vital in the region (and I'm already sold on expanding the RAN), there is still significant amounts of land forces needed. This becomes even more lopsided in terms of land forces with operations below the threshold of a major war - things like humanitarian support to Aceh or aiding the Timor-Leste independence in 1999 and 2006 have to have land forces. On top of that, the majority of armed forces in the region are armies, and the majority of politicians who are/were in the armed forces are Army (I think Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama is the only naval one?). This results in a culture where, for good or for ill, land forces are seen as the premier force. If you want to lead these nations, have the respect and right to do so, they need to trust your land forces are at least as capable, if not more.



For what the Hornets were doing in the MEAO? A PC-9 could have. Or Tiger for some of them. Frankly, a P-47 or A-1 would have been just as capable.

Our operations against ISIS in Iraq were in the airspace of a friendly nation, one we were working with to strike a force that had...rudimentary air defence and no air force. In addition we were operating within the wider US plan, who provided enough air defence capability for us.

Operations in Syria were a little more complex with the intermixing of the various combatants - but two things stand out. One is again, we were operating within a wider US operation wo guaranteed air supremacy and two, over 4 years the Hornets flew only 50 missions and dropped 68 munitions. If we chose not to do those handful, there would have been no impact or difference on the operations, our alliance or - frankly - anything. As an indication, in the same time period there were 167 912 missions conducted by OIR, 4038 of which were RAAF (and that includes E-7 and KC-30). Losing 50 is meaningless.

I understand why we used Hornets, they were the only thing that we had at hand at the time. But we didn't need them, nor did they represent value for money or a demonstration that we need jet strike aircraft. They certainly don't represent a justification for maintaining fighters.

I will take this opportunity to clarify I think we need a capable and fearsome fighter force - I'd prefer to fight under friendly skies. But when 'experts' say sill stuff like "we haven't used x since y so we don't need them" when we have only fought wars of choice often fail to consider that their pet project hasn't fought for longer....
Thanks for the prompt reply. Copy your point about numbers, he who commits the mostest gets the most votes. But I’m not sure how relevant operations in land-locked Afghanistan are when compared to the open expanses of the Indo-Pacific. As Spoz has outlined above Commander INDOPACOM has always been USN. There is no indication that will change, and equally there is no indication that if the big war occurs it won’t be dominated by Air and Naval forces.

I’d be interested in your views in terms of regional engagement, it seems that the RAN, then the RAAF are shouldering a majority of that burden at present.

It is demonstrably false that a PC-9, or upgraded cousins like a Super Tucano, could provide the capabilities that the Classic and Super Hornet provided (I won’t bother addressing P-47/A-1 and I’ll assume it was fierce exaggeration). To suggest otherwise is either deliberately misleading, or belies a complete lack of understanding as to how the air component executed, and capabilities they bring to the fight. The types you listed don’t have the speed, range, or flexibility of payload (big bombs). None of the types you have listed have any meaningful ISR payload, which is significantly important.

While it is true to suggest the lack of speed, range (and hence operational persistence) could have been mitigated; to do so the platform would have needed to be based in country. This would have increased risk, both politically and risk to support personnel, which may or may not have been acceptable. Logistically it would have been far more difficult and/or expensive. There would be an requirement to re-base in multiple areas (as the fight moved around the AO) and they still wouldn’t have had the flexibility or payload options that were frequently required. Even so, these types would not have had the ability to be retasked, in a meaningful manner, to cover other mission roles, or other discrete areas when tasking opportunities presented; simply put, while there are some opportunities it would equally be seen as a limfac

Whether the increased operational risk and reduced operational flexibility, when balanced with cost of running disparate fleets, justifies the purchase of a propellor strike aircraft I’ll leave for someone else to argue (noting the USAF is not proceeding with a AT-6/A29 light COIN aircraft) but given the sheer size of the AO I’d say it’s not the best use case.

To extend further - I’d argue you have missed some of the strategic and political aspects of what was occurring within Operation Inherent Resolve, by looking through an Okra lens. There are reasons behind why the US committed air superiority fighter (F-22A, F-15C). The fact that within Okra, Australia did not commit more resources to Syria, or to other roles such as DCA, is only highlighting the political posture of Govt, and should not be used as a justification against those roles. As an analogy, the way that the FA-18s were employed in OIR (CAS/Strike/ISR only) is fundamentally similar to the way that the Army was employed in Afghanistan or Iraq - even if Australian forces were not performing the role, other forces were providing the capability and conducting the mission.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Can I suggest the overriding consideration in regards to deployments has been survivability while being seen to be making a worthwhile contribution. This is what led to the overuse of special forces, Cavalry and Chinooks, as well as the under use of infantry, and other army aviation assets.

Deployment of the Legacy Hornet and Rhino was because it was them or nothing in that space.

It could be argued that the fixed wing army aviation of old could have been useful in Afghanistan, updated of course, but that ship sailed long ago.
 

spoz

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
The key thrust of the Pacific war in WW2 was up through the island chain. The USA was not heavily involved on point in that apart from at the beginning in the Solomons. However you look at it, most of the rest was sideshows - the Phillipines, New Guinea, the Aleutians - if important ones, and to Australia of course at least one of those was vital. The Australian Army, largely fighting with them, similarly wasn’t playing in the main strategic game and that became very obvious with Balikpapan etc (That was largely MacArthur: but if it had been strategically critical he couldn’t have done it.)

They tied up Japanese resources, and that was vital, but they weren’t really on the point in the critical offensive. I’m not downplaying the fighting the Army did, and at the same time of course they were also carrying most of the load for the US in Europe apart from the bomber offensive.

Even where the Army campaigns did attract the critical battles they tended to be maritime - the Phillipines Sea etc. Winning in that war, and arguably any major war, in the Pacific demands a maritime strategy.
 
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ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
The key thrust of the Pacific war in WW2 was up through the island chain. The USA was not heavily involved on point in that apart from at the beginning in the Solomons. However you look at it, most of the rest was sideshows - the Phillipines, New Guinea, the Aleutians - if important ones, and to Australia of course at least one of those was vital. The Australian Army, largely fighting with them, similarly wasn’t playing in the main strategic game and that became very obvious with Balikpapan etc (That was largely MacArthur: but if it had been strategically critical he couldn’t have done it.)

They tied up Japanese resources, and that was vital, but they weren’t really on the point in the critical offensive. I’m not downplaying the fighting the Army did, and at the same time of course they were also carrying most of the load for the US in Europe apart from the bomber offensive.

Even where the Army campaigns did attract the critical battles they tended to be maritime - the Phillipines Sea etc. Winning in that war, and arguably any major war, in the Pacific demands a maritime strategy.
I would disagree. The left flank advance through New Guinea and the Philippines was a deliberate strategy and definitely not a side show. It was deliberate in moving towards China and blocking off Japan from its resources in the Dutch East Indies and South East Asia. The plan was to move from the Philippines to mainland China and establish a large foothold there. At the same time the South East Asia Command under Mountbatten was to move around through Burma Malaya, Borneo, Siam, bypass French Indochina, and link up with US forces in China.

The sole reason for the island hopping campaign was to provide bases for the B-29s to bomb Japan and to provide a fighter escort base. They were also planning to use them as jumping off points for OP OLYMPIC the first part of OP DOWNFALL, the invasion of Japan. OP OLYMPIC was the planned invasion of Kyushu with the D-Day was planned for 1st November 1945. This operation was intended to invest part of Kyushu as a staging area for the invasion of the main island of Honshu which was to occur in 1946.

OP CORNET was the second component of OP DOWNFALL and was to be the invasion of Honshu north of Tokyo so that the allied forces could break out into the Kwanto Plain. However none of this came to pass because of the Japanese unconditional surrender after the two nuclear attacks at Hirsohima and Nagasaki.

The two pronged advance against Japan was actually forecast in Warplan Orange which was discarded prior to 1941 by the USN.
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
I confess to have been one who was guarded as to the need for the replacement of the Tiger ARH in the current time frame.
That said, the decision has been made and the reasons for it we trust were justified and as such should be supported.
As such the Apache is the way forward and therefore the Tiger should be retired.
A dual fleet makes no sense.
I notice APDR are also proposing a duel Tiger / Apache fleet.

Trust Apache serves us well.

Regards S
I was also a little surprised by the early replacement of the Tiger. The Apache is really seems a move sideways rather than a move up. If we persevered with them for another 10 years better options for their replacement will have emerged.

However now the decision has been made there is little sense in operating both types. Perhaps stick them in storage somewhere just in case the proverbial hits the fan at some point.
 

Geddy

Member
I was also a little surprised by the early replacement of the Tiger. The Apache is really seems a move sideways rather than a move up. If we persevered with them for another 10 years better options for their replacement will have emerged.

However now the decision has been made there is little sense in operating both types. Perhaps stick them in storage somewhere just in case the proverbial hits the fan at some point.
I’m not so sure it’s a sideways move. Australia was unable to deploy Tiger to Afghanistan for 7 years or so, probably due to reliability, spares, supportability and the future upgrade path. By the look of it all the above are good reasons to move to the Apache. I would imagine the Army lost confidence in the platform ( am I right?)

What makes me wonder is how we selected it in the first place given all this must have been predictable.
 
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