Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[Massive]

What you have listed there is actually about a doubling of the manoeuvre force, not just increasing by a third. In particular the ACR you describe is about double the size of the planned one, and would need about 335 armoured vehicles. That is some regiment. It would also need an equivalent increase in the rest of the Army to support. Of course, just increasing the Army by a planned Beersheba brigade will be more achieveable.

Thanks for your reply Raven.

The ACR is large. I put the lift squadrons and tanks in there for convenience to illustrate my point - the lift squadrons could just as easily be attached to the infantry battalions and the tanks independent.

I agree that this is a very significant increase in the manoeuvre force. That was my point.

It is also an indication as to how weak the Beersheba brigades will be - they will be able to deliver about two and a half battlegroups each (accepting that any definition of a battlegroup is very fluid).

Regards,

Massive

 

[Massive]

could there be a case for us to get some of the AAV's ?

Given the amount of combat power the army is likely to be able to generate, the need for an AAV or equivalent capability could well be an excellent guide to the sort of operations that the ADF should not be asked to do.

Regional stability operations are unlikely to need this sort of capability, and I would have thought that this type of operation is what the ADF is likely to do on its own/lead without significant support from allies able to generate much more combat power and with significant amphibious assault capability.

Regards,

Massive

 

[Crock8]

Given the amount of combat power the army is likely to be able to generate, the need for an AAV or equivalent capability could well be an excellent guide to the sort of operations that the ADF should not be asked to do.

Regional stability operations are unlikely to need this sort of capability, and I would have thought that this type of operation is what the ADF is likely to do on its own/lead without significant support from allies able to generate much more combat power and with significant amphibious assault capability.

Not sure what you mean by 'amphibious assault', but the AAVs weren't designed for any 'assault' in 1967, change of name not withstanding.

Generally, speaking in terms of functional engineering requirements, a military system is designed for the most difficult, not the most 'likely to do', scenario.

From a cursory read there was a bit of discussion in this thread about what the Army would do and what Cavalry does, etc., but it seems to me there is very little consideration of what the Navy would do, since they too are a stakeholder in the LAND400. If you have a read of the CONOPS, the RAN isn't mentioned.

However, the USN has advised the USMC that it isn't going anywhere near a beach in its future CONOPS. I think the RAN probably shares this intent.

Of course its all well and good to be thinking force structure, but the Australian Army has never been an army, but in fact operates just like a marine corps. It has always gone everywhere by ship, at least where equipment is concerned. That is in fact acknowledged in the strategic guidance given to the Army by the Government - an expeditionary future.

The problem is, that no one sees the LCMs hauling 35t LAND400 150-200nm to shore one at a time.

By the way, the USMC has been trying to bring into service an AAV replacement since August 1974. Think about it.

What are "Regional stability operations"?

 

[Raven22]

Of course its all well and good to be thinking force structure, but the Australian Army has never been an army, but in fact operates just like a marine corps. It has always gone everywhere by ship, at least where equipment is concerned. That is in fact acknowledged in the strategic guidance given to the Army by the Government - an expeditionary future.

Rubbish. Except for Gallipoli and the later stages of the war in the pacific, the Austalian Army hasn't done any amphibious operations. It has not operated anything like a marine corps. The fact that the Army has gone to war by boat is simply a result of Australia being an island nation. I mean, do we call our forces in Afghanistan paratroopers because they got there by plane?

 

[Massive]

What are "Regional stability operations"?

Thanks for your reply Crock.

I was referring to the 'second priority task' from the 2009 White Paper. I should have been clearer:

"After ensuring the defence of Australia from direct attack, the second priority task for the ADF is to contribute to stability and security in the South Pacific and East Timor. This involves conducting military operations, in coalition with others as required, including in relation to protecting our nationals, providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance and, on occasion, by way of stabilisation interventions."

[bold text is theirs]

Regards,

Massive

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Not sure what you mean by 'amphibious assault', but the AAVs weren't designed for any 'assault' in 1967, change of name not withstanding.

The LVTP7 aka AAV was designed for amphibious assaults.

By the way, the USMC has been trying to bring into service an AAV replacement since August 1974. Think about it.

Actually you can add another decade. The LVTP7 was fielded as an interim vehicle to replace the LVTP5. But what the USMC has been doing for the past 50 years is trying to field an amphibian that meets all the traditional needs of such (armour, surf crossing, land mobility) with much high sea speeds and longer sea ranges. So as to allow for over the horizon amphibious assaults to minimise the danger to the amphibious ships and increase the range of coastline held under threat (to reduce the density of enemy defences).

Unfortunately the two times in the past 50 years they have actually progressed an over the horizon amphibian to production stages have corresponded with Government fiscal tightening (Carter and Obama administrations). Of course it’s also a hard vehicle to build as seen in the abject failure of the Chinese ZBD 2000 attempt.

What are "Regional stability operations"?

Operations like East Timor and the Solomon Islands peacekeeper deployments. Which usually require what is called an administration amphibious capability. This is unopposed deployment of forces by sea but without the benefit of capable or functioning port facilities. The RNZN MRV ship (HMZS Canterbury) is designed as an administration landing support vessel.

 

[Crock8]

Rubbish. Except for Gallipoli and the later stages of the war in the pacific, the Austalian Army hasn't done any amphibious operations. It has not operated anything like a marine corps. The fact that the Army has gone to war by boat is simply a result of Australia being an island nation. I mean, do we call our forces in Afghanistan paratroopers because they got there by plane?

Marines go by ship, and paratroopers go by plane...so functionally they need to optimise for those modes of transport. Their equipment needs to reflect this. Wouldn't you say?

 

[Crock8]

Thanks for your reply Crock.

I was referring to the 'second priority task' from the 2009 White Paper. I should have been clearer:

"After ensuring the defence of Australia from direct attack, the second priority task for the ADF is to contribute to stability and security in the South Pacific and East Timor. This involves conducting military operations, in coalition with others as required, including in relation to protecting our nationals, providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance and, on occasion, by way of stabilisation interventions."

[bold text is theirs]

Regards,

Massive

Afghanistan is a stability operation.
The US Army has this cute Clear-Hold-Build strategy, so stability would be which?

 

[StevoJH]

Marines go by ship, and paratroopers go by plane...so functionally they need to optimise for those modes of transport. Their equipment needs to reflect this. Wouldn't you say?

You do realise that Sea Transport is the most efficient way to move any fully equiped military unit right?

Paratrooper units tend to be much more lightly equiped than traditional infantry and vehicle centric units due to the load limitations of Aircraft.

The difference is that Marines specialise on entering combat *from* the sea, where as non specialised forces generally use the ocean just for transport.

 

[Crock8]

The LVTP7 aka AAV was designed for amphibious assaults.

The LVTP7 aka AAV was designed for amphibious assaults.

Thank you Abraham

Ok, so the USMC wants "assault", but they get "landing"?

And although they really want assault, even rename the Landing into Assault, in 40 years no one can build the vehicle that the USMC wants in the most advanced economy in the World for 40 years, on time, on budget?

There were other budgets between the Carter and Obama administrations. The AAAV started in 1988, the Reagan administration. There were the Bush administrations, father and son.

I don't agree that the LVTP-7 was built for assault. I looked it up, and it seems the vehicle's contract was for a "10 year interim design", so they definitely were not getting 'assault'. And, in GoogleBooks it says the USMC at the same time issued an RFI for a Landing Vehicle, Assault, so clearly LVT was not it.

What do you think the LV,A ought to do?

 

[Crock8]

You do realise that Sea Transport is the most efficient way to move any fully equiped military unit right?

Paratrooper units tend to be much more lightly equiped than traditional infantry and vehicle centric units due to the load limitations of Aircraft.

The difference is that Marines specialise on entering combat *from* the sea, where as non specialised forces generally use the ocean just for transport.

Steve, thank you for pointing that out.
But, Sea Transport is not only the most efficient, its the only way to move fully equipped military units of states with large coastlines and no land enemies, i.e. maritime powers.

Just so we are not getting confused about who is a Marine, specialised on entering combat *from* the sea, have you seen a movie called "Saving Private Ryan"?

 

[Crock8]

You do realise that Sea Transport is the most efficient way to move any fully equiped military unit right?

Paratrooper units tend to be much more lightly equiped than traditional infantry and vehicle centric units due to the load limitations of Aircraft.

The difference is that Marines specialise on entering combat *from* the sea, where as non specialised forces generally use the ocean just for transport.

So, are the Marines "fully equipped", "lightly equipped", "traditional" or "vehicle centric" infantry? And, are they still Marines if they can't "enter combat *from* the sea"?

I guess for an Australian the question would be same regarding the Army.

In any case, I recall that His Majesty's Marine Forces were not intended to enter combat from the sea, but to provide a ship's infantry component when defending it against boarding and in assisting with the handling of the guns, or suppressing mutiny. When shore parties were formed aboard the Royal Navy ships, the Marines were brigaded with sailors, but in large actions, sailors provided a brigade of their own. At Gallipoli, the 63rd Division on Cape Helles was largely that of brigaded sailors.
Even by 1939 the RM were not particularly trained in amphibious warfare.

So the bit about fighting from the sea is a recent functional addition that has nothing to do with the name. There was a good recent article I saw about the first Australian amphibious landing of WW2. Can try to find it if you are interested. No Marines in that.

 

[Marc 1]

Steve, thank you for pointing that out.
But, Sea Transport is not only the most efficient, its the only way to move fully equipped military units of states with large coastlines and no land enemies, i.e. maritime powers.

Just so we are not getting confused about who is a Marine, specialised on entering combat *from* the sea, have you seen a movie called "Saving Private Ryan"?

Disagree. Just about every item of equipment the US military needs is transportable by air. C-5's and C-17's can take M1's for example (probably the heaviest load). It is just not practicable to do so unless time is of the essence (think opening phases of Desert Shield - and even then I don't recall many if any M1's being air landed).

What's the point of your question? Did the allies 'stuff up' by not having an all marine force because the invasion was a contested landing? Frankly the marine corps are just grunts with a specialised set of equipment and manning scales to perform certain roles better than regular infantry who lack the seagoing toys. Same goes for armies that have 'mountain units', or paratroopers, or arctic warfare specialists etc. Wih the right equipment and training a force can perform whatever role it needs to - as we don't have the luxury of massive numbers wearing green I think we do pretty well with the existing light conventional structure. It is the jack of all trades/master of none approach - but it works pretty well for us.

When I was in 6RAR we seemed to do pretty well landed across a beach in USMC AAV7's, were given some kind of mythical Chindits/supermen reputation for a night raid behind enemy lines on exercise in the states and still didn't need to wear our jocks on the outside. If as you suggest we optimise our force equipment toward being a Marine Corps first, then that will entail compromises that may make us less effective in other phases of warfare. Placed side by side any decent swimming amphibious APC/MICV is going to have a larger footprint than say a Bradley/Puma/Warrior. As such it will probably result in greater casualties in the larger vehicles than in the more purpose designed non amphibs. I'd rather see Aussie M113's replaced by Puma than AAV7's (or EFV's had that gotten a guernsey). Any 'assault' by Australian forces would most likely be unopposed or very lightly opposed - Puma's will land very well from LCH's - and when ashore be far more survivable than a design compromised by swimability.

 

[icelord]

In any case, I recall that His Majesty's Marine Forces were not intended to enter combat from the sea, but to provide a ship's infantry component when defending it against boarding and in assisting with the handling of the guns, or suppressing mutiny. When shore parties were formed aboard the Royal Navy ships, the Marines were brigaded with sailors, but in large actions, sailors provided a brigade of their own. At Gallipoli, the 63rd Division on Cape Helles was largely that of brigaded sailors.
Even by 1939 the RM were not particularly trained in amphibious warfare.

There is still a BIG difference between RN Marines, and the USMC.
The RN Marines are utilised as part of a ships company by the RN and are still in effect there to defend against hostile boarding(ridiculous in fact, but true) Most RN boarding parties are Marines, with a small number of RN sailors. They are trained more effectivly in boardings and weapons, and are utilisted for Force Protection. The USN use their own ships company in this regard, and their own forces. The USMC while still a secondment of the USN, is its own force in their own right. The are trained now days for beyond the beach, and have gone towards a more "elite" US Army branch. While many consider the US Army as a large battalion, the USMC is more agile force able to mobilise faster anywhere in the world(although recent evaluations and excercises brought their ability to do this into question) Both Marines share the idea of having an armed force at sea ready to deploy, which is why USN LHDs carry a Marine Expeditionary Unit so that they can react to any situation globally. The RN Marines do the same, but on a smaller scale.
The USMC are currently undergoing a re-evalutaion of sorts to bring themselves into the 21st century. After ops in Iraq and Afghanistan, they became to bloated and slowly started to become like another US Army Battalion, contrary to what i have pointed out here. At this point they will be changing some of their gear out, and looking towards being the Scalpel to the Armys Axe.

Comparisons between the Aus Army being a defacto marines, and any notion of this are far far from the point. The ADF as a whole must operate across multiple scenarios, on different landscapes. We cannot afford having specialised battalions like a dedicated marines, or a dedicated Airborne. Our forces must be able to change and adapt to their operational requirments. The US Armed Forces and the UK have different requirements and abilities to anywhere near what we could offer, and can have Marines dedicated to attacking from the Sea.

Just so we are not getting confused about who is a Marine, specialised on entering combat *from* the sea, have you seen a movie called "Saving Private Ryan"?

They were US Army Rangers in Saving Private Ryan...

Is it school holidays already?!?

 

[Raven22]

Marines go by ship, and paratroopers go by plane...so functionally they need to optimise for those modes of transport. Their equipment needs to reflect this. Wouldn't you say?

Here's one for you - the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions that parachuted into Normandy on D-Day were transported from the US to Britain by ship. Does that make them Marines? That is essentially what you are saying, that if you use a ship to get to the theatre you are a Marine. This is patent nonsense.

Just to remind you what I was replying to, you said this:

Of course its all well and good to be thinking force structure, but the Australian Army has never been an army, but in fact operates just like a marine corps. It has always gone everywhere by ship, at least where equipment is concerned. That is in fact acknowledged in the strategic guidance given to the Army by the Government - an expeditionary future.

That is patently false. As I said, except for Gallipoli and the latter part of WW2, the Australian Army has never operated like a marine corps. We have simply used ships to get to the operational theatre. To say otherwise is to learn the wrong lessons from history.

 

[Crock8]

Disagree. Just about every item of equipment the US military needs is transportable by air. C-5's and C-17's can take M1's for example (probably the heaviest load). It is just not practicable to do so unless time is of the essence (think opening phases of Desert Shield - and even then I don't recall many if any M1's being air landed).

Marc, as I recall it took the USA six months to concentrate forces for the DESERT STORM. Clearly C-5's and C-17's are not enough. CAMP RHINO was established by an air assault, but Marine. If air transportation was sufficient, and the USA has more than most, why truck stuff through Pakistan from the coast?

What's the point of your question? Did the allies 'stuff up' by not having an all marine force because the invasion was a contested landing? Frankly the marine corps are just grunts with a specialised set of equipment and manning scales to perform certain roles better than regular infantry who lack the seagoing toys. Same goes for armies that have 'mountain units', or paratroopers, or arctic warfare specialists etc. Wih the right equipment and training a force can perform whatever role it needs to - as we don't have the luxury of massive numbers wearing green I think we do pretty well with the existing light conventional structure. It is the jack of all trades/master of none approach - but it works pretty well for us.

That's the problem though. National security doesn't work on the "jack of all trades/master of none approach" principle. There is a thing called Strategic Guidance. Within it the ADF is directed to acquire Expeditionary Operations capability. Part of that capability is to enable land entry when the ordinary infrastructure points of entry are denied or unavailable. This leaves the beach, and at least a 50/50 chance it would be defended.
The role the grunts are supposed to fill, and the equipment they need, should reflect at least the most likely environment they will need to perform in. In the spectrum of all environments you listed, neither the arctic, airborne of mountain seem to me to figure prominently in the Australian region of influence or interest, but the possibility of being "seagoing" tends to occupy a large slice of that spectrum.
Doesn't every equipment procurement start with establishing the proposed capability need? Clearly the USMC felt they had the need for assault, and now they are "refocusing" towards Asia-Pacific. So I guess ADF has a different insight into the Asia-Pacific security environment over the next 40 years to that of the major Ally.

When I was in 6RAR we seemed to do pretty well landed across a beach in USMC AAV7's, were given some kind of mythical Chindits/supermen reputation for a night raid behind enemy lines on exercise in the states and still didn't need to wear our jocks on the outside. If as you suggest we optimise our force equipment toward being a Marine Corps first, then that will entail compromises that may make us less effective in other phases of warfare. Placed side by side any decent swimming amphibious APC/MICV is going to have a larger footprint than say a Bradley/Puma/Warrior. As such it will probably result in greater casualties in the larger vehicles than in the more purpose designed non amphibs. I'd rather see Aussie M113's replaced by Puma than AAV7's (or EFV's had that gotten a guernsey). Any 'assault' by Australian forces would most likely be unopposed or very lightly opposed - Puma's will land very well from LCH's - and when ashore be far more survivable than a design compromised by swimability.

I certainly would not suggest the Australian Army adopt USMC equipment. Its not designed to do what the USMC is purportedly supposed to be able to do. The Bradley/Puma/Warrior designs were not of course entirely useful even during the
Cold War, so certainly not now.
I don't claim the ability to predict 40 years in future. Of course c.1902 no one in Australia thought their sons, brothers and fathers would be combating Turks in a decade and a bit (Boers were a surprise enough), or the Japanese in New Guinea in 1942 (we were still waiting for the Russians!).
I dare say that when the first time RFI was issued for the M113 replacement in 1980 there wasn't one Army officer that contemplated the design's usefulness in Somalia. Lucky that Tobruk had prior experience with poor wharf facilities in the Pacific. Many US ships couldn't unload at all, and just went back to Diego Garcia.

But, for the sake of Australians in uniform, I hope all their assaults are unopposed or 'lightly' opposed. Any 'well done' assaults, would be murder.
All I see is a World with a lot more PGMs.

As for the design being compromised by swimability, perhaps you suggest that the PUMA ICV flies to the beach? Between the LCH and the BLZ, there is the LCM, still compromised by swimability, which is a part of its functional design engineering requirement.
Or maybe you suggest that the SOFs assault the beach to clear the way?

I also hope that when the Australian Army get the Puma, they choose their deployments carefully so the terrain closely matches that for which it was built, Germany.
Interestingly in May this year CRS reported that one of the designs for the the US Army GCV was by the SAIC-led team based on the Puma IFV that was developed based on lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan. It was rejected after a protest. Perhaps because every war tends to deliver its own unique lessons? One doesn't go to lessons for lessons' sake, but to get a degree. The same report identified that other than the Israeli Namer, none of the foreign "off the shelf" vehicles can meet the GCV requirement to accommodate a nine-soldier squad.

But, this isn't the real problem. I'm sure the Puma is a finely engineered Scherman design.
The problem for me is that its a defensive design. It was designed for the Cold War, and the Cold War is over.
It was not designed for expeditionary operations.
Expeditionary operations are generally considered manoeuvre warfare, and therefore offensive. Particularly, the pre-emptive strategy is suggested, that can generate the element of surprise. It suggests agility, flexibility, ease of deployment, etc. To me the PUMA doesn't seem that sort of a system.
Worse, the Puma is designed for a very different logistic set up, not tied to a support vessel. That fine MTU engine is going to need a lot of juice crawling around rain-sodden Asia-Pacific soils, don't you think? Or do you see the 6RAR somewhere less well served by seasonal moisture content?

 

[Crock8]

There is still a BIG difference between RN Marines, and the USMC.
The RN Marines are utilised as part of a ships company by the RN and are still in effect there to defend against hostile boarding(ridiculous in fact, but true) Most RN boarding parties are Marines, with a small number of RN sailors. They are trained more effectivly in boardings and weapons, and are utilisted for Force Protection. The USN use their own ships company in this regard, and their own forces. The USMC while still a secondment of the USN, is its own force in their own right. The are trained now days for beyond the beach, and have gone towards a more "elite" US Army branch. While many consider the US Army as a large battalion, the USMC is more agile force able to mobilise faster anywhere in the world(although recent evaluations and excercises brought their ability to do this into question) Both Marines share the idea of having an armed force at sea ready to deploy, which is why USN LHDs carry a Marine Expeditionary Unit so that they can react to any situation globally. The RN Marines do the same, but on a smaller scale.
The USMC are currently undergoing a re-evalutaion of sorts to bring themselves into the 21st century. After ops in Iraq and Afghanistan, they became to bloated and slowly started to become like another US Army Battalion, contrary to what i have pointed out here. At this point they will be changing some of their gear out, and looking towards being the Scalpel to the Armys Axe.

Comparisons between the Aus Army being a defacto marines, and any notion of this are far far from the point. The ADF as a whole must operate across multiple scenarios, on different landscapes. We cannot afford having specialised battalions like a dedicated marines, or a dedicated Airborne. Our forces must be able to change and adapt to their operational requirments. The US Armed Forces and the UK have different requirements and abilities to anywhere near what we could offer, and can have Marines dedicated to attacking from the Sea.


They were US Army Rangers in Saving Private Ryan...

Is it school holidays already?!?

I think you missed my point.
Which is that "Marines" is just a word, just like "Rangers" for that matter, or "Army".
Troops need to be able to perform appropriately tot he functional requirements of their operational environment.

For maritime nations this environment is dominated by the maritime deployments.
It says so in every ADF document at least since 2009.

"The ADF as a whole must operate across multiple scenarios, on different landscapes. We cannot afford having specialised battalions like a dedicated marines.....Our forces must be able to change and adapt to their operational requirments." - lets work on this.

"the different landscapes" - these are in fact "seascapes" for Australia, or littoralscapes if you like :

"multiple scenarios" - Environment/terrain has a lot to do with this

"specialised...dedicated marines" - well, the USMC isn't. The only difference between them and the US Army from the enemy POV is that they would present a smaller target in the water, but would arrive earlier. 'Specialised' comes from special, as in Special Forces. What's special about the USMC except the security detachment (marine force recon)?

"Our forces must be able to change and adapt" - no, actually they don't.
I guess school is in.
You see, those who "change and adapt" are those without the initiative to force their will on others to change and adaptation, i.e. they are the 'prey', soon to become victim.
On the other hand a small force like the ADF can't afford to change and adapt. Maybe they can tactically for a short time, but not operationally or strategically. There isn't the capacity or resources. Therefore, they need to think offensively, like the predators. The entire chain of command right up to the PM.
This is the problem with Americans, they don't. For all of USMC's "force-in-readiness" and "aggressiveness", they were two months late for 1 September 1990, and they choked.
But, the USMC has the USN, the USAF and the US Army to back it up. The ADF doesn't. Sometimes, it may have to manage all on its own like a national defence force its supposed to be, and the best form of defence, is of course offence. Offence is where one seizes the initiative and forces the enemy to change and adapt, though hopefully he can't.
If this isn't the attitude of the ADF, and the Army in particular, we may as well start learning some other language. With the ADF on the defensive, Australia is undefended. The RAN knows this. This is why we are getting the LHDs and eventually the 12 new subs. The RAN's leadership is offensive-minded. LHDs are not for trucking the Army around the Asia Pacific. They are functionally expeditionary vessels, and expeditionality means first and foremost pre-emption. The Army it seems will need to learn how to think like the Navy.

 

[Crock8]

Here's one for you - the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions that parachuted into Normandy on D-Day were transported from the US to Britain by ship. Does that make them Marines? That is essentially what you are saying, that if you use a ship to get to the theatre you are a Marine. This is patent nonsense.

Raven22 - No, I am not saying that the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions are the "marines". I am saying that in the wider, strategic view, the USA is a maritime power, or has been since 1854. All its forces not required for land border protection, or conversely, all its forces earmarked for service outside its territorial airspace, are expeditionary. Doesn't matter if these are USMC parachute units, or US Army landing craft, or the USN fighter aircraft, Coast Guard boarding parties, they are all expeditionary. So, yes, on the day the 82nd were expeditionary parachute unit, and the 1st Infantry Division on the beach was an expeditionary amphibious assault unit, and the Rangers were expeditionary mountain infantry unit while they scaled the cliffs. For me its function that takes precedence over nomenclature.

Just to remind you what I was replying to, you said this:

That is patently false. As I said, except for Gallipoli and the latter part of WW2, the Australian Army has never operated like a marine corps. We have simply used ships to get to the operational theatre. To say otherwise is to learn the wrong lessons from history.

If the "marine force" is modelled on the RM, the Australian Army has never been a "marine force". However, as I said above, its all nomenclature. The Australian Army, by the force of geography is, and always will remain an expeditionary force, which is what defines the USMC since 1936. The ADF just hasn't had the range of capabilities to be truly effective in this role. I think this is due to a) over-reliance on the British Empire and then the USA, and b) the incomprehensible strategy of 'Defence of Australia' as if it was ever possible.
In fact the first time the Army had to make an amphibious landing in 1942, it needed the USN for a lift. Mind you, by 1945 there were several hundred domestically constructed landing craft, including in the 120t displacement, in Brisbane. (wonder what happened to those)

I don't understand how a nation that prides itself on its competitive nature can be so spectator-minded in national security.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

I think you missed my point.
Which is that "Marines" is just a word, just like "Rangers" for that matter, or "Army".

Yes Marines is a word and like ALL words it has meaning. A marine is simply a soldier employed by a Navy. You seem to have a real problem with the dictionary.

Ok, so the USMC wants "assault", but they get "landing"?

And although they really want assault, even rename the Landing into Assault, in 40 years no one can build the vehicle that the USMC wants in the most advanced economy in the World for 40 years, on time, on budget?

There were other budgets between the Carter and Obama administrations. The AAAV started in 1988, the Reagan administration. There were the Bush administrations, father and son.

I don't agree that the LVTP-7 was built for assault. I looked it up, and it seems the vehicle's contract was for a "10 year interim design", so they definitely were not getting 'assault'. And, in GoogleBooks it says the USMC at the same time issued an RFI for a Landing Vehicle, Assault, so clearly LVT was not it.

What do you think the LV,A ought to do?

You’re the dumbest idiot in the internet.

 

[Raven22]

Crock, can please provide me with a translator to interpret whatever it is you've written? I'm an intelligent bloke, but I don't have a clue what you are saying. Mind you, I doubt you do either.