21st century Anzacs
By PETER GREENER and NICHOLAS FLOYD
24/09/2009
http://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/opinion/2897072/21st-century-Anzacs
* Dr Peter Greener is Senior Fellow at the Command and Staff College, NZDF, Trentham, Wellington. Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas Floyd is the Australian Chief of Army's Visiting Fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney.
Courage, mateship, loyalty.
Such personal qualities have embodied the Anzac ideal from 1915, but now that heritage looks to be reinvigorated beyond individual deeds, with politicians on both sides of the Tasman - keen to enhance closer defence relations - calling for development of what might be called a "future Anzac force". However, while legacy and sentiment might run deep, the purpose, employment and shape of such a force needs careful consideration.
Recent political statements from both governments on ideas for an Anzac rapid response force certainly have their precedents, but rarely have they been raised at prime ministerial levels, and in the absence of a clear threat to common national interests.
Some sense of the possible scope was given in Australia's Defence White Paper, Force 2030: developing an Anzac task force that could "deploy seamlessly into our region at short notice" was one possibility envisaged within "opportunities to rebuild our historical capacity to integrate Australian and New Zealand force elements".
Both Prime Minister John Key and Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd revealed on August 20 that respective defence chiefs had been asked to explore the details.
First expressed through the 1944 Canberra Pact, and later the 1951 Anzus Alliance, and closer defence relations, our formal relations embody a shared vision of close allies confident in their ability to operate together.
The Australian and New Zealand defence forces annually exchange many personnel - on secondment and training - and conduct high-level talks. The future security environment, and how best to meet its challenges, are regularly and frankly discussed; equally, ideas for new capabilities are shared.
Even with this degree of co-operation, there are limits to our current Anzac interoperability. Not all doctrine, tactics and techniques are "seamless", and while both countries hold forces ready to respond to crises, response options are not always considered in concert between headquarters. There is a deal of compatibility in strategic logistic support and maritime surveillance, but further interoperability would enhance regional security efforts.
It undoubtedly makes sense to optimise defence resources. However, there are political ramifications beyond needing to agree on rules of engagement. An inescapable shared crisis such as the Great War certainly galvanises governments: but when matters affecting national interests evolve slowly, it's hard to agree unilaterally on a strategy, let alone bilaterally. This emphasises the need for both countries to ensure great clarity about the purpose and utility of the force.
Additionally, both countries must accept that a future "Anzac force" may not be able to deploy in every instance. Each country's strategic interests have diverged in recent history, such as New Zealand's deployment to Bosnia and Australia's to Iraq. Respective force rotation and preparedness regimes would need to accommodate unilateral national interests if required.
Moreover, each country's strategic outlook can at times be very different. Force 2030 foresaw a future considering worst-case scenarios, as evidenced by the planned purchase of 100 Joint Strike Fighters and 12 submarines. This contrasts with New Zealand Defence Minister Wayne Mapp's comment that "we don't envisage shooting down enemy aircraft or sinking submarines".
While raising an actual, bilaterally manned Anzac standing force might make a politically potent statement, it would appear more practical to establish an enduring rotational commitment model - similar in some respects to Europe's Allied Rapid Reaction Corps - where force elements from varied units rotate through. Though in some ways more complicated, this would allow broader exposure to trans-Tasman interoperability, and establish more personal-level linkages.
Given the greater suitability of a rotational model, army elements would most probably predominate in any future Anzac force. This is not at all to say that the other services are not required: however, naval and air force elements can achieve necessary levels of interoperability in other ways, rather than needing to be home-ported together. The same cannot be said for land forces, which demand far greater intimacy at all levels. More importantly, a visibly two-nation land force poses a starker message of common resolve.
Like any ready group, a future Anzac force would need to be agile, and readily configured for multiple styles of mission and degree of threat. First, this means certain levels of force protection and mobility. Second, the force would need vital offensive support and information collection assets capable of strategic feeds equally to Canberra and Wellington. Third, the force would need to be big enough to operate on its own and make a difference, but not so large as to eviscerate its parent services. Fourth, it would need to be well-equipped with transport and logistic support - inside and out of theatres.
Finally, a "seamless" future Anzac force would need to be integrated with field elements of all the other government agencies required to deliver a comprehensive response to the security challenge at hand. This would mean MFAT/DFAT, AusAid/NZAid and federal police agents as well as others; but it also reinforces the rationale for the type of command and co- ordination needed. Such a force would be bereft without a form of multilateral and multi-agency command and co-ordination arrangement typified by the special co- ordinator role set up for Ramsi in the Solomon Islands in 2003.
A future Anzac force holds many practical trans-Tasman advantages. However, its viability depends on both governments realistically considering the bounds of its employment, and ensuring it's designed to support our common national interests in the widest array of challenges.