ANZAC Joint HQ/force

[Goknub]

I'll chuck my 2 bob in...

Really while it sounds nice I can see a permanant ANZAC Force as being more of a hinderance then a positive. There are too many scenarios where differing political positions would end up destroying any hope of joint action. Remember that Howard offered the US an armoured brigade (or to that effect) at the start of the Iraq war, only the fact that the force existed largely only on paper and most equip was obsolete stopped this from becoming a reality.

A NZ decision not to commit goes from a non-issue to having a direct impact where half the HQ and significant forces suddenly pull-out. I'm in favour of increased co-training but that is about it. Anything more risks doing more damage than good.

An ANZAC force smacks too much of the joint forces the Euro's put together that look great but will never realistically have to stump-up to fight.

 

[Twickiwi]

Australia abolished the final route of appeal to the PC (the State court system) in 1986.

NZ has also abolished final appeal to PC and set up a Supreme court.

 

[recce.k1]

There's been some great thoughts and discussions here (but I think there are one or two bits going off on a bit of a tangent).

So far publically, Australian and New Zealand media have talked about a Ready Reaction type force.

This would make a lot of sense, especially in regards to Australian & NZ (and other A-P countries) taking the lead to deal with troubles Bouganville, Timor, Solomons, Tonga etc. In these instances the two countries deployed jointly, so anything to create a formal framework would make planning for these current and any future deployments a lot smoother would be welcomed.

So in other words, Australia & NZ, since the mid-90's, but more so since East Timor, have already been working together on operations jointly (also NZ's Bosnia deployment was independent of Australia, it was with the UK, so that instance doesn't count etc). To me then, what is being proposed then is a formalisation of this working arrangement.

They say Australia and NZ (along with many other countries of course) have been at their busiest (and ongoing now for several years plus), since, when was it, Vietnam, Korea or WW2?

So perhaps the interesting question is, why hasn't this happened sooner? (Don't answer that, the answer would be the NZ politcal landscape over the last few years of course)!

So it will be interesting to see what results. If a RRF, naturally there would have to be commonality with weapons and ammo (most likely nearly 100% common already), training/doctrine (expect more joint training exercises together), uniforms (presumably), comms equipment (NZ has updated their Vietnam era comms, although unsure if it's the same as Aus, but that's easily solved).

May as well have a ANZAC JF HQ (after all, during WW2 we had A-NZ-US commands/HQ's eg Australia & USAF and NZ & USN etc. Ditto Vietnam: NZ company working with Aust Battalion, RNZAF Huey pilots deployed to RAAF operational sqns at the time & (on a tangent, RNZAF Skyhawk personnel working with USMC Skyhawks etc).

Other opportunities as raised here include logistics and support. Incidentally the two countries have shared resources already over the years (eg where NZ supported Aust includes ADF using NZ 757's & Tanker ship in the Gulf exclusively for ADF tasking). So again this can be formalised and as already pointed out here by others, perhaps NZ realigns future purchases eg Tanker replacement, vehicle fleet etc.

As raised, NZ could contribute to 1 (or 2) C-17's. I've always liked the idea of 2 min (because of servicibility issues) but then again, if it's part of an ANZAC air transport arrangement, then probably one would be all we need (after all our two 757's are underutilised).

Anyway, there's been talk of NZ having a niche and that being withdrawn affecting ADF (eg RNZAF mariatime strike training at Norwa). True. But I think the purpose of this exercise is primarily those assets that will be deployed to keep the peace in this region. Any higher end warfare stuff (air and naval combat) is most likely to be another issue altogether (slightly) and I'd say isn't the primary focus of this ANZAC joint force idea. Although having said that, as happens now, consultations over deploying (and annual joint training using) these higher end assets have always happened (eg Timor 99) so these are probably part of the equation but not at the formost mind of the two PM's (eg it's not like Rudd and Key said they wanted a joint warfare strategy etc)! However no doubt some NZ realignments may happen in the following years, but presumably that's longer term due to costs and policy differences.

So I don't think we need to get too tied up with NZ's lack of high end combat resources at the moment (granted if it remains like this in 10 years time or get worse, then sure, let's worry)! Over time, some of this (NZ's capabilities) will improve. Nor do we need to be too tied up with NZ leaving Australia in the lurch (eg ANZUS breakdown, Norwa withdrawl etc).

Another asute NZ political and business journalist, Fran O'Sullivan, offers insight into the politcal thinking behind this ANZAC joint force idea. It's a natural coming together of areas of mutual interest to Australia and NZ, be that financial & regulatory, business, tourism, industry capabilities etc. Defence is also part of that equation to an extent.

So it's part of the natural realignment occuring in the wider Asia-Pacific area eg the Asean and other trade groupings, the importance of engaging with the regional players, business and financial opportunities with the likes of the Asian countries and of course China and India etc.

Most importantly, as stated by the Australians themselves, Australia is positioning itself as the "middle power" in this region. They need others on board eg NZ (but that could also be other like minded democratic countries eg Singapore, Indonesia too I suppose, etc).

As Fran O'Sullivan says," Under this scenario, Australia - as a country with "middle power" pretensions - will increase its regional impact by drawing New Zealand further within its own strategic sphere of influence". Very interesting two page article for those that are interested.

I also found another recent Australian piece on the matter.

As stated publically, Australia & NZ has to rely a lot less on the US (let alone the UK and France etc), hence it seems a natural progression to me, that this is happening. As I always say, the world is changing (for us down here). One needs to keep ahead or be left behind by the bigger Asian powers (China and India). On a side issue that joint Australian and NZ Cabinet Meeting a couple of weeks ago was a great idea. I hope this becomes an annual affair.

 

[riksavage]

I disagree reference your comment about Australia relying less on the US/UK. Remember the Aussies have access (along with the Canadians) to intelligence gleaned through the Echelon and other strategic assets based out of GCHQ / NSA operational HQ's. This has strategic implications way beyond public perception of Australia's future international relations priorities. Australia's access is higher than that offered to mainland Europe and Japan. Because of NZ's Nuclear stance they are not privy to the same level of intelligence access, this could change now NZ has a new Government in power.

If Australia decides to move away from it's traditional English speaking allies in favour of closer relations with Asia, it needs to weigh-up the consequences at the highest level. Geography is one thing, mutual intelligence support in times of crisis is another. It's not just about who has the largest numbers of ships, planes and boots on the ground in the region.

 

[StingrayOZ]

If Australia decides to move away from it's traditional English speaking allies in favour of closer relations with Asia, it needs to weigh-up the consequences at the highest level. Geography is one thing, mutual intelligence support in times of crisis is another. It's not just about who has the largest numbers of ships, planes and boots on the ground in the region.

Australia works closely, as closely as allowed with the military of Indonesia, Singapore, Mayalasia (Japan in the future) etc. We work socially and aid wise very closely with lots of countries (including india, china but in particular Vietnam and North Korea). However we are doing this while maintaining and independant of our close US and UK relationships.

Australia sees itself as promoting regional security. It will have one of the (if not the) strongest militaries in the region (not agressively but simply because of its territory), but its about linking with other strong partners in the region to form a very stable leadership and very capable force able to discourage outside influence and deal with regional issues.

I feel that Australian efforts may be better invested in teaming up with other strong regional powers as a first priority. If NZ wants to joint the party it can, but I don't think Australia is really hung up on incorperating NZ into some high level strategic decision making. NZ historically hasn't been overtly concerned with do that, and has historically worked against it.

 

[recce.k1]

I disagree reference your comment about Australia relying less on the US/UK. Remember the Aussies have access (along with the Canadians) to intelligence gleaned through the Echelon and other strategic assets based out of GCHQ / NSA operational HQ's. This has strategic implications way beyond public perception of Australia's future international relations priorities. Australia's access is higher than that offered to mainland Europe and Japan. Because of NZ's Nuclear stance they are not privy to the same level of intelligence access, this could change now NZ has a new Government in power.

Of course, I absolutely agree with what you have said. Intelligence is critical, and I have no issue of the importance and continuation of the 5 eyes type agreements that oversee all of this etc.

What I was really meaning was boots on the ground (I think the aussies/kiwis here know what I mean etc) although that is also not intended as a criticism, merely a fact of reality (it also gets drummed into us downunder, by the bigger powers & commentators on the very odd occassion. Also be more self sufficient. It's common sense stuff really).

That's not also to say that help won't be forthcoming if it were ever needed, of course.

However for "localised" instability issues the bigger powers expect Australia and NZ to handle these low level "conflicts" themselves or as much as they can. Where additional help is needed (such as Timor 99, a number of traditional type allies had covert subs or low key Cruisers assisting), so I suppose I should have been a lot more clearer with my writings, to which your points are quite valid

 

[recce.k1]

Australia works closely, as closely as allowed with the military of Indonesia, Singapore, Mayalasia (Japan in the future) etc. We work socially and aid wise very closely with lots of countries (including india, china but in particular Vietnam and North Korea). However we are doing this while maintaining and independant of our close US and UK relationships.

Australia sees itself as promoting regional security. It will have one of the (if not the) strongest militaries in the region (not agressively but simply because of its territory), but its about linking with other strong partners in the region to form a very stable leadership and very capable force able to discourage outside influence and deal with regional issues.

Actually that's the way I see it too!

As you say, Australia has been resolute in maintaining its traditional relationships with the US and UK since WW2. [NZ too until the ANZUS issue, however like a game of tidlywinks being played by 100 year olds hunched over their walking sticks, NZUS relations are slowly improving, why even today we have the USPACOM Commander popping over for talks].

Also, as you say, the relationship building with the regional (Asia-Pacific) countries are critical too. Economically the ties are getting stronger. It's only natural for Australia (and NZ) to engage more on defence etc. [A case of keeping one's friends close and enemies closer perhaps!].

I feel that Australian efforts may be better invested in teaming up with other strong regional powers as a first priority. If NZ wants to joint the party it can, but I don't think Australia is really hung up on incorperating NZ into some high level strategic decision making. NZ historically hasn't been overtly concerned with do that, and has historically worked against it.

Although here you are thinking of something beyond the ANZAC Joint Force strategy. You're probably thinking of a more aggressive or counter offensive strategy to ring fence say the likes of North Korea or Burma or any ambitions other nations may have longer term, so existing US containment policies would surely still be the best policy etc, but by all means greater co-operate with the Asian allies, but this is a seperate topic in itself really.

Funnily enough tonight I finally picked up the current Listener mag here to read and there's a very interesting article on Gerald Hensley's new book (Beyond the battlefield - researched in the war archives of UK, and US I believe as well as NZ and I think Aust?) which includes NZ's relationship fallout with Australia during WW2 over the commitment of troops away from Europe back to the Pacific. Fascinating as it reveals what most of us didn't know until now, but anyway it seems that in some respects the roles were completely reversed until now, in that NZ followed the strategic direction of the UK to fight where the fight was the greatest so to speak (in Europe, to Churchill's admiration of NZ, as revealed in correspondance in the book etc, but Australia took a more introspective viewpoint of its situation. So similar today but NZ has been of late introspective and Australia more strategic. So historically things can change over time! Anyway I'm a bit more optimistic that NZ will pull its weight, but this will take some time, the important thing right now is setting the framework for better cooperation and I'm sure it will bear fruit.

 

[Twickiwi]

Funnily enough tonight I finally picked up the current Listener mag here to read and there's a very interesting article on Gerald Hensley's new book (Beyond the battlefield - researched in the war archives of UK, and US I believe as well as NZ and I think Aust?) which includes NZ's relationship fallout with Australia during WW2 over the commitment of troops away from Europe back to the Pacific. Fascinating as it reveals what most of us didn't know until now, but anyway it seems that in some respects the roles were completely reversed until now, in that NZ followed the strategic direction of the UK to fight where the fight was the greatest so to speak (in Europe, to Churchill's admiration of NZ, as revealed in correspondance in the book etc, but Australia took a more introspective viewpoint of its situation. So similar today but NZ has been of late introspective and Australia more strategic. So historically things can change over time! Anyway I'm a bit more optimistic that NZ will pull its weight, but this will take some time, the important thing right now is setting the framework for better cooperation and I'm sure it will bear fruit.

Another interpretation is that Australia of the 1940s had enough cultural maturity to be primarily focused on the security of Asia-Pacific, while NZ was still mired in an Anglo-centric colonial world view, and fell into line like the good sons of empire they hoped Winston would note them to be. For Australia the great breach from the mother country was the debacle at Singapore, while NZ had to wait until the UK entry into the common market of 1973 before the scales fell from our eyes.

If you accept (the highly speculative and vaguely treasonous) contention that there remains a 35 year phase between Australian and New Zealand Strategic Thinking development then NZ is in the position of Australia during the Vietnam war, realising that their armed forces require refocusing, up-teching and expanding, and suddenly becoming very keen on the closest regional power.

Tell me I'm wrong. <Please, I beg you!>

I speculate that the ANZAC project will be broken into mini-ventures:

-A European-style paper brigade group for hypothetical deployment with its own GHQ.
-A joint procurement panel.
-A biannual planning conference.
-A real (as opposed to paper based) Amphibious Ready Reaction Taskforce.
-A combined Airlift group.
-Greater cooperation of Antarctic support programs.
-A combined Pacific patrol command, or more likely, defined areas of responsibility and a common OPV/OCV platform.
-Greater secondment/transfer opportunities for NZ senior officers/NCOs into ADF.

By breaking it up politicians can have ribbon cutting ceremonies with successes and program failure in any particular venture can be quarantined so that the whole program isn't seen to be failing. Procurement can also broken up, so that the NZ electorate won't be asked to eat the whole elephant of upgrading the NZDF in one go.

 

[recce.k1]

Another interpretation is that Australia of the 1940s had enough cultural maturity to be primarily focused on the security of Asia-Pacific, while NZ was still mired in an Anglo-centric colonial world view, and fell into line like the good sons of empire they hoped Winston would note them to be. For Australia the great breach from the mother country was the debacle at Singapore, while NZ had to wait until the UK entry into the common market of 1973 before the scales fell from our eyes.

If you accept (the highly speculative and vaguely treasonous) contention that there remains a 35 year phase between Australian and New Zealand Strategic Thinking development then NZ is in the position of Australia during the Vietnam war, realising that their armed forces require refocusing, up-teching and expanding, and suddenly becoming very keen on the closest regional power.

Tell me I'm wrong. <Please, I beg you!>

I don't want to be focusing on events 60+ years ago, but I do accept a lot of what you are saying eg the Australians prior to the Singapore strategy even, were building up their Naval fleet by not wanting to put their eggs into one basket (Singapore) and wanted more atonomy. Good thinking on their behalf. Whereas NZ was, as you say, focused more on the British Empire being the protector and the importance of the Singapore stategy. Mind you NZ was broke for many, many years prior to WW2 so I'm not suprised (sounds familiar doesn't it)! I've read some interesting naval history books which details all of this, and boy did Australia and NZ have huge political fallouts for a long time back then over NZ not perceivably supporting Australia at the time (instead supporting the UK). So it seems to be in Australia and NZ's nature to be at odds with each other at times! But not always, obviously post WW2 and the creation of ANZUS in the 1950's saw things align together better (and even today NZDF staff join the ADF's training schools etc). You'd know of course that in the 60's NZ starting moving away from UK kit in favour of US, for ANZUS commonality (and favourable finance), so I think the break away from mother England happened sooner than the EEC issues of the 70's.

So the ironic parallel I was making (just for fun, as it's not really an issue) is that NZ were once big on collective defence and Australia, whilst it was too, saw the light and were more indepedant. Australia has maintained this dual stance since WW2 whereas since the 80's under Labour NZ became more introspective and since the 90's under National starting re-engaging more (think Bosnia etc). Since then we've had a change of Govt back to Labour and since last year a shift back to National. Without wanting this to be politcal, I'm merely highlighting how a change of Govt in NZ (politics) affects NZ's foreign relations etc.

So how does the world know NZ won't flip-flop again when the current Govt changes in the future? We don't know the answer of course, for we don't have a crystal ball. But Mr C. has a valid point (and hence my attempts to try and reassure StingrayOZ) that generational changes are occurring here (as they do in places like Iran etc, time is the answer it seems).

Probably most people outside of NZ won't know that two of the several drivers of the 1980's Labour breakup of ANZUS became PM and Deputy PM when the Labour coalition came back to power in 99. Suprised then that the ACF was dismantled? These two, among several others are big on that so called "NZ independant foreign policy" smokescreen issue (for it is clear that NZ's foreign policy independance started during WW2, not with these guys in recent times as they are always keen to portray, makes good PR and sucks in the public I suppose etc)! Anyway one of them is now gone and the other has reached retirement age (and is a one MP party). But this isn't about politics so I can't say this! Except to put NZ defence into perspective.

By breaking it up politicians can have ribbon cutting ceremonies with successes and program failure in any particular venture can be quarantined so that the whole program isn't seen to be failing. Procurement can also broken up, so that the NZ electorate won't be asked to eat the whole elephant of upgrading the NZDF in one go.

Well of course one should be sceptical when pollies start talking up these ANZAC JF ideas, after all, what's in it for them?! However the political personalities seem to be taking a strategic view on supporting working closer in many aspects of governance including it seems, defence, and they have given the ADF and NZDF the green light to formally work on this, so really this can only be a good thing at the end of the day!

 

[riksavage]

Another interpretation is that Australia of the 1940s had enough cultural maturity to be primarily focused on the security of Asia-Pacific, while NZ was still mired in an Anglo-centric colonial world view, and fell into line like the good sons of empire they hoped Winston would note them to be. For Australia the great breach from the mother country was the debacle at Singapore, while NZ had to wait until the UK entry into the common market of 1973 before the scales fell from our eyes.

If you accept (the highly speculative and vaguely treasonous) contention that there remains a 35 year phase between Australian and New Zealand Strategic Thinking development then NZ is in the position of Australia during the Vietnam war, realising that their armed forces require refocusing, up-teching and expanding, and suddenly becoming very keen on the closest regional power.

Tell me I'm wrong. <Please, I beg you!>

I speculate that the ANZAC project will be broken into mini-ventures:

-A European-style paper brigade group for hypothetical deployment with its own GHQ.
-A joint procurement panel.
-A biannual planning conference.
-A real (as opposed to paper based) Amphibious Ready Reaction Taskforce.
-A combined Airlift group.
-Greater cooperation of Antarctic support programs.
-A combined Pacific patrol command, or more likely, defined areas of responsibility and a common OPV/OCV platform.
-Greater secondment/transfer opportunities for NZ senior officers/NCOs into ADF.

By breaking it up politicians can have ribbon cutting ceremonies with successes and program failure in any particular venture can be quarantined so that the whole program isn't seen to be failing. Procurement can also broken up, so that the NZ electorate won't be asked to eat the whole elephant of upgrading the NZDF in one go.

NZ was not blinkered by an anglo-centric world view, she just accepted Churchill's argument that the free worlds resources should be focused in Europe, and that the defeat of the greater evil - Germany must be a priority. This they considered to be of greater strategic importance than the defeat of Japan - in hindsight they were right.

Churchill took the very difficult decision of diverting vital war material away from Singapore and instead sent it to the Russian front (500 Hurricanes for one). He knew the Russian's would 'bleed' Germany dry of man-power and material, the same way Napoleon was bled dry in 1812. The loss of Singapore was a terrible event, but not one which influenced the final outcome of the war - the same couldn't be said if Russia and/or Britain had been totally defeated.

If Britain had fallen, there would have been no Royal Navy (vital for the arctic convoy's, defence of the ME oil fields and Mediterranean), there would have been no second front, Germany could then divert the 22 - Divisions sitting in France to reinforce the Eastern Front. With the fall of the Soviet Union the war in Europe would have been lost and instead of just facing the Japanese in the Pacific you would have been fighting the German's as well.

Even though Darwin was bombed and the Jap's reached Kokoda, they never managed to bring to the fore 20 odd Divisions to within 20- 30 miles of either Australia's or NZ's shores. Churchill and the Allies had to deal with the immediate threat, once the US entered the war they too sent most of their material and man-power to fight Germany, suprising considering Pearl Harbor.

 

[Gibbo]

... Without wanting this to be politcal, I'm merely highlighting how a change of Govt in NZ (politics) affects NZ's foreign relations etc....

The changes beween National & Labour led Govt's have seen flip-flops in many portfolios, but often they've been more complicated that most think. With defence the genral feel tends to be National is pro-defence & Labour is somewhat 'anti'.

Yet the early-mid 1980's saw National slash defence funding and cancel projects (chopper replacement etc, loss of Andovers etc etc) whereas Labour purchased the ANZAC Frigates and more recently has invested large sums and deployed the SAS & other troops in record numbers (which National will continue with of course).

I think, as you say, that it is the differecnes in foreign policy that definitely separate the two parties! Labour has a rather 'rose tinted' view whereas National talks tougher but hasn't always put it's money where's it's mouth is!

Anyway I think we're starting to see a (slow but surely) mood-shift in both NZ politics & public opinion towards improving our defence capability, and the joint force is an excellent platform on which to build that capability. Interesting to hear the US Navy's Admiral saying he hopes the defence review doesn't see a 'significant change in capability (ie: don't drop the Frigates or P-3K's).

Roll on the defence review!

 

[recce.k1]

Yeah, and for balance both parties have done good and bad things, so I don't want to put people off and now quit mentioning such things!

But in regards to mood-shifts, for the last couple of days we've had newspapers (and tv) run gushing stories about NZ's entry into WW2 (being the 70th anniversary) & related nostalgia. Eh, what's brought on all this on? It ain't me pulling the strings! Today's DomPost was almost ANZAC Day like with a couple of spreads. Then again Hensley has timed his book launch well! The Govt should be knighting this fellow for his services to various Govt's of different hues over the decades anyway! Perhaps we have him to thank for his timely contribution to NZ's growing awareness the younger generations are showing towards their grand-parents sacrifices etc. And for balance of course our former PM supported the acceleration of public awareness campaigns involving NZ war history, so she should also be thanked .. and perhaps offered the chance to become a Dame! After all it would hold some prestige with those heads of states & donors mingling at VIP lounges of European ski lodges

Right that's enough. Back to serious matters of the ANZAC joint force idea, in Todjaeger's post #7 he talks of naval replenishment and that HMNZS Endeavour is due for replacement (was it 2011 or 2013?) and HMAS Success about 2105.

Just thinking outside the square, I wonder whether there is any merit of NZ trying to keep Endeavour going a bit longer and replacing her a few years later with the same type as what the RAN will acquire? Would a JSS type be viable by then? For commonality in terms of training, liasing, deploying etc? Including trainee/trade joint courses and working up on either one of these same types of vessels, so that in practice crews could swap easily between the two when on deployment if the need arose (eg injury, attack etc) as they would not only know how to operate both ships, but could streamline efficiencies on deployment when offloading/resupplying etc. Would each Navy still need two ships, why not one? I'd say two because of their criticalness on an operation and of course one of them could be in dry dock, and what if there were more than one operation (such as what's happenning now)?

But if Endeavour's life couldn't be extended, and a joint replacement was still years away, what to do with her personnel. In say 4 years time could they intergrate with HMAS Success (an example of training and operating jointly) and come time to train up on the replacements, again it would be a shared experience?

Or another could another option be a class of ship that offers a couple of variants of different tonnage, whereby because of timeframes NZ buys the smaller version first (of a larger size the RAN wants but a bit later), again with very similar layout, machinery and facilities, to allow as much as possible integrated training opportunities etc?

This illustrates one problem that the two countries have, where some items are out of step in terms of replacement timing, and if the cycle can't be broken it continues for decades (until the next lot of replacements are required).

Looking simplistically it would almost be fair to say the two air forces are mostly in sync with aircraft type replacements, the Army too, but Navy is a problem (bar the Frigates, as they are in step) with their various support vessels so this needs to be addressed as best it can.

 

[Gibbo]

.....

Right that's enough. Back to serious matters of the ANZAC joint force idea, in Todjaeger's post #7 he talks of naval replenishment and that HMNZS Endeavour is due for replacement (was it 2011 or 2013?) and HMAS Success about 2105.

Just thinking outside the square, I wonder whether there is any merit of NZ trying to keep Endeavour going a bit longer and replacing her a few years later with the same type as what the RAN will acquire? Would a JSS type be viable by then? For commonality in terms of training, liasing, deploying etc? Including trainee/trade joint courses and working up on either one of these same types of vessels, so that in practice crews could swap easily between the two when on deployment if the need arose (eg injury, attack etc) as they would not only know how to operate both ships, but could streamline efficiencies on deployment when offloading/resupplying etc. Would each Navy still need two ships, why not one? I'd say two because of their criticalness on an operation and of course one of them could be in dry dock, and what if there were more than one operation (such as what's happenning now)?

But if Endeavour's life couldn't be extended, and a joint replacement was still years away, what to do with her personnel. In say 4 years time could they intergrate with HMAS Success (an example of training and operating jointly) and come time to train up on the replacements, again it would be a shared experience?

Or another could another option be a class of ship that offers a couple of variants of different tonnage, whereby because of timeframes NZ buys the smaller version first (of a larger size the RAN wants but a bit later), again with very similar layout, machinery and facilities, to allow as much as possible integrated training opportunities etc?

This illustrates one problem that the two countries have, where some items are out of step in terms of replacement timing, and if the cycle can't be broken it continues for decades (until the next lot of replacements are required).

Looking simplistically it would almost be fair to say the two air forces are mostly in sync with aircraft type replacements, the Army too, but Navy is a problem (bar the Frigates, as they are in step) with their various support vessels so this needs to be addressed as best it can.

Yes some good points there - I think the Big E's replacement (due 2013 but not cast in stone) will be quite exciting for the RNZN - so long as the pollies don't meddle & try & take the cheap & nasty approach!:shudder

RNZN have already stated that they are investigating the option of a vessel that combines the functionality of both Canterbury & Endeavour. For example look at this from Merwede's website:

Joint Support Ships

The key to inter-operability is more complicated than just having the same platform, its about how it's used and the component parts on each . As an example the RAN SeaSprites were to have been vastly different to the RNZN's so crews couldn't have 'swapped' without certification - nor swapped weapons, but they could have cross-decked).

As for Endeavours replacement - the hull type isn't so much the key, it's the navigation & communication equipment; machinery & platform management systems; RAS fittings and deck equipment (crane types etc) that we should make as common as we practically can. That said it's more important each Navy tries to minimise the number of such equipment types across each of their own fleets rather than just simply hull types. Commonality between the 2 Navies comes next.

I think we'll see a bigger vessel replace Endeavour - and she'll more than likely be another commercial spec, but that's common these days & isn't necessarily a bad thing if it makes a more flexible platform more affordable. Nor is there anything to say the Merwede version will get the nod.

By the time Endeavour is replaced Canterbury will be about 6-7 years old and by then it is unlikely the same exact versions of equipment will be available, and some may be no longer available, but that's normal with such things.

I only hope the powers that be then see the need to have credible FIAC protection on such a platform - at the VERY least .5 cal mini-typhoon and/or 25mm typhoon mountings covering all angles of surface attack, and decoy systems. I can't understand why neither Canterbury nor Endeavour currently have even basic manually operated .5 cal all around the deck! Is it that the Navy have asked & been told 'forget it' or do they simply themselves not appreciate the need? Would like to hear a current Navy man's view on that point - hint,hint!)

 

[Todjaeger]

What I posted before of commonality in kit between ADF and NZDF personnel (at least for the Joint force) I meant that the forces should use the same kit for operations... Not different verions or variants of the same gear. While yes, the RAN and RNZAF were both supposed to operate SH-2G Seasprites, the RAN ones were (supposed) to be vastly different, with significantly more advanced avionics to support ASuW ops. By using a different fitout, there was no longer commonality with NZDF Seasprites, apart from the airframe and perhaps engines/machinery.

What I had more in mind was that attempts should be made so that there is no difference between versions of equipment used by the ADF and NZDF. An upcoming case in point would be for the NZDF NH-90s vs. the ADF MRH-90s. IIRC the NZDF went with 8+1 examples of French-build NH-90 TTH, while Australia ordered a number (46 if memory serves) of Australianized versions of the NH-90 TTH to be called the MRH-90. The Australian helis are to be manufactured in Australia.

While I do not know, I would expect that there would be at least a few subtle differences between the NH-90 and the MRH-90, perhaps in the layout of the cockpit, where elements of the wiring loom are, etc. This in turn means that ADF personnel might not be able to maintain NZDF NH-90s, at least without additional training. By the same token, NZDF personnel might have similar issues trying to repair or maintain MRH-90s. At the same time, this means that the two aircraft may have at least partially different logistical trains require, instead of possibly drawing upon a source of common spares.

Something to consider.

-Cheers

 

[recce.k1]

I agree.

Also because we've already invested heavily in them (well for NZ!) it would make sense to me that if things worked out as projected, then another 4 airframes are bought & perhaps then from the Australian line. I presume (at a guess) that the NZ and Australian variants
(the first 4 Oz ones were built in France & the rest at a Eurocopter subsidary in QSLD) would be mostly the same internally except for special or customised equipment etc. Apparently they have the same engines (Rolls Royce Turbomecca RTM 322).

This would give us the numbers for say two seperate deployments of 3 in a flight, with 3 at home for homeland type security & 3 in for servicing. Remember also only 1-2 would be available within a flight, ususally. These grunty beasts (over the Huey) will be very handy for us. No doubt SAS would like a flight for somewhere over there. Or more likely, the regular forces in an enhanced air/sea/land rapid response role...

I'd like to see 3 bought specially for the Canterbury for troop/lift (but with a surface search radar if possible).

 

[Todjaeger]

I agree.

Also because we've already invested heavily in them (well for NZ!) it would make sense to me that if things worked out as projected, then another 4 airframes are bought & perhaps then from the Australian line. I presume (at a guess) that the NZ and Australian variants
(the first 4 Oz ones were built in France & the rest at a Eurocopter subsidary in QSLD) would be mostly the same internally except for special or customised equipment etc. Apparently they have the same engines (Rolls Royce Turbomecca RTM 322).

This would give us the numbers for say two seperate deployments of 3 in a flight, with 3 at home for homeland type security & 3 in for servicing. Remember also only 1-2 would be available within a flight, ususally. These grunty beasts (over the Huey) will be very handy for us. No doubt SAS would like a flight for somewhere over there. Or more likely, the regular forces in an enhanced air/sea/land rapid response role...

I'd like to see 3 bought specially for the Canterbury for troop/lift (but with a surface search radar if possible).

NZ might only need to purchase 3 additional MRH-90's to achieve a total of 3 always available for deployment. IIRC the NZDF was getting a total of 9, 8 for ops and then a spare/parts heli. If that was instead setup as an operational heli, and then the NZDF connected to the ADF source for parts, etc for their MRH-90's, that could work. This could also potentially allow 3 deployed from Canterbury that would already be familiar to any ADF personnel who might be carried during a deployment.

Two other items came to mind regarding a Joint HQ or Force.

The first is that by using a joint HQ, it is possible that NZ could then get some help monitoring its EEZ from Australian land-based EW systems. AFAIK the JORN and similar systems have a sensor footprint which does extend into portions of NZ's EEZ. This could potentially help NZ monitor the amount of ship traffic and make more efficient use of patrol resources.

The other item I have is more in the form of a question. Assuming some form of joint Ready Reaction Force was created, what should the OrBat look like? I ask because IMO, this force is the one which would, more than any other need to have common equipment between ADF and NZDF personnel. Any ideas on what type of troops should be included, the size of the force, etc?

I would think an appropriately sized force would be either company or battalion sized (in total) and be based primarily around motorized infantry, either in LAVs or perhaps in Bushmasters. I do not think SAS (either from the ADF's SASR or the NZDF's SAS) should be used in a Ready Reaction force, as I envision the force to be used primarily as a stabilization force like in East Timor, BAMSI, etc. Basically the area of ops would be in the South Pacific, this would likely mean much of the heavier equipment like heavy artillery, air defence, etc would not be needed. However, some form of deployable medical unit would also likely be needed, and potentially an engineering section as well as an aviation element. The whole force would also need to have organic support for equipment fielded.

How do others see the Rapid Reaction Force?

-Cheers

 

[recce.k1]

A perspective from the experts

21st century Anzacs
By PETER GREENER and NICHOLAS FLOYD
24/09/2009
http://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/opinion/2897072/21st-century-Anzacs
* Dr Peter Greener is Senior Fellow at the Command and Staff College, NZDF, Trentham, Wellington. Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas Floyd is the Australian Chief of Army's Visiting Fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney.

Courage, mateship, loyalty.

Such personal qualities have embodied the Anzac ideal from 1915, but now that heritage looks to be reinvigorated beyond individual deeds, with politicians on both sides of the Tasman - keen to enhance closer defence relations - calling for development of what might be called a "future Anzac force". However, while legacy and sentiment might run deep, the purpose, employment and shape of such a force needs careful consideration.

Recent political statements from both governments on ideas for an Anzac rapid response force certainly have their precedents, but rarely have they been raised at prime ministerial levels, and in the absence of a clear threat to common national interests.

Some sense of the possible scope was given in Australia's Defence White Paper, Force 2030: developing an Anzac task force that could "deploy seamlessly into our region at short notice" was one possibility envisaged within "opportunities to rebuild our historical capacity to integrate Australian and New Zealand force elements".

Both Prime Minister John Key and Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd revealed on August 20 that respective defence chiefs had been asked to explore the details.

First expressed through the 1944 Canberra Pact, and later the 1951 Anzus Alliance, and closer defence relations, our formal relations embody a shared vision of close allies confident in their ability to operate together.

The Australian and New Zealand defence forces annually exchange many personnel - on secondment and training - and conduct high-level talks. The future security environment, and how best to meet its challenges, are regularly and frankly discussed; equally, ideas for new capabilities are shared.

Even with this degree of co-operation, there are limits to our current Anzac interoperability. Not all doctrine, tactics and techniques are "seamless", and while both countries hold forces ready to respond to crises, response options are not always considered in concert between headquarters. There is a deal of compatibility in strategic logistic support and maritime surveillance, but further interoperability would enhance regional security efforts.

It undoubtedly makes sense to optimise defence resources. However, there are political ramifications beyond needing to agree on rules of engagement. An inescapable shared crisis such as the Great War certainly galvanises governments: but when matters affecting national interests evolve slowly, it's hard to agree unilaterally on a strategy, let alone bilaterally. This emphasises the need for both countries to ensure great clarity about the purpose and utility of the force.

Additionally, both countries must accept that a future "Anzac force" may not be able to deploy in every instance. Each country's strategic interests have diverged in recent history, such as New Zealand's deployment to Bosnia and Australia's to Iraq. Respective force rotation and preparedness regimes would need to accommodate unilateral national interests if required.

Moreover, each country's strategic outlook can at times be very different. Force 2030 foresaw a future considering worst-case scenarios, as evidenced by the planned purchase of 100 Joint Strike Fighters and 12 submarines. This contrasts with New Zealand Defence Minister Wayne Mapp's comment that "we don't envisage shooting down enemy aircraft or sinking submarines".

While raising an actual, bilaterally manned Anzac standing force might make a politically potent statement, it would appear more practical to establish an enduring rotational commitment model - similar in some respects to Europe's Allied Rapid Reaction Corps - where force elements from varied units rotate through. Though in some ways more complicated, this would allow broader exposure to trans-Tasman interoperability, and establish more personal-level linkages.

Given the greater suitability of a rotational model, army elements would most probably predominate in any future Anzac force. This is not at all to say that the other services are not required: however, naval and air force elements can achieve necessary levels of interoperability in other ways, rather than needing to be home-ported together. The same cannot be said for land forces, which demand far greater intimacy at all levels. More importantly, a visibly two-nation land force poses a starker message of common resolve.

Like any ready group, a future Anzac force would need to be agile, and readily configured for multiple styles of mission and degree of threat. First, this means certain levels of force protection and mobility. Second, the force would need vital offensive support and information collection assets capable of strategic feeds equally to Canberra and Wellington. Third, the force would need to be big enough to operate on its own and make a difference, but not so large as to eviscerate its parent services. Fourth, it would need to be well-equipped with transport and logistic support - inside and out of theatres.

Finally, a "seamless" future Anzac force would need to be integrated with field elements of all the other government agencies required to deliver a comprehensive response to the security challenge at hand. This would mean MFAT/DFAT, AusAid/NZAid and federal police agents as well as others; but it also reinforces the rationale for the type of command and co- ordination needed. Such a force would be bereft without a form of multilateral and multi-agency command and co-ordination arrangement typified by the special co- ordinator role set up for Ramsi in the Solomon Islands in 2003.

A future Anzac force holds many practical trans-Tasman advantages. However, its viability depends on both governments realistically considering the bounds of its employment, and ensuring it's designed to support our common national interests in the widest array of challenges.

Some interesting thoughts. I only wish the NZ Defmin would think about putting his comments in context. Whilst he may be mostly correct in a pure NZ only scenario, he is downplaying the fact that NZDF operates throughout the A/P region where the chances of what he is saying is actually quite the opposite. This only reinforces the perception that there are major differences in strategic perspectives that the two countries have, which is quite unnecessary, and in a practical sense is not necessarily always the case. Anyway I'd take that as more of a blip as I guess one thrust of the ANZAC proposal is that on the whole operational realities when dealing with regional issues also force the two countries to closely examine potential external threats in greater detail (thanks to improved intelligence cooperation etc) and influences that could escalate any localised conflicts. Fortunately at the present there doesn't seem to be any undue external influences in a military sense, but that is not the same as saying such external influences won't occur in the future as regional powers develop enhanced blue water capabilities. It's also a certainty that one cannot say that this could never happen. Vigilence and deterence is what is needed, for NZ that includes credible anti-surface and anti-submarine systems and at the very least credible ship based anti-air and ground based air defence systems. I do accept that for the timebeing air-air defence is not on the agenda (but I'm not saying NZ shouldn't invest in a small air combat reserve, using the Macchis, nor would I say NZ shouldn't invest in putting a few of these top pilots through the RAAF in a joint-ANZAC approach. Australia can never have enough air and ground crews, and a few more from over the ditch would be of benefit to the two nations. If in the future geo-political realignments means NZ having again a small but credible ACF, at least the capability and basic infrastructure exists to expand. Unfortunately NZ doesn't have that luxury now, but a small but practical investment now would be a wise move for the future).

 

[the road runner]

The Australian and New Zealand governments are having discussions in Sydney about ANZAC co-operation bout bloody time

Australia, NZ Discuss Joint ANZAC Capabilities | Defense & Security News at DefenceTalk

Seems as WE will be forming a Pacific focused rapid reaction force.....this seems as a very good idea after seeing the Tsunami and Earthquackes that have rocked the Pacific.
This Rapid Reaction force will ensure that we maximise our 2 countrys relief efforts to our Pacific neighbours.I do see this as a good idea.

Australia and New Zealand will be making a ANZAC airlift capability.I wonder if this will influenec New Zealand in purchasing new C-130J,C-27 or dare i say a coupla C-17

All in all its good to see the ball rolling on the idea of a joint Australian and New Zealand reaction force.

 

[Todjaeger]

Yes, I am aware this is a bit of a necro thread. However, the post is about a possible joint venture between the ADF/NZDF.

Following some discussions a week ago regarding possible routes for the RNZAF to regain a fast jet training capability, here is what I have been considering.

As I had posted previously, one possible route for NZ to regain a fast jet trainer capability was through the creation and operation of an advanced jet trainer school. Following Singapore's decision to remain training in France, that does not seem like NZ could start a training school.

However, one area did come to mind as a possibility. AFAIK RNZAF personnel do undergo some training in Australia with the RAAF, specifically for Air Navigation. The RAAF also currently does operate fast jet trainings (Hawk 127 LIFT) but with a fleet of only ~33, the RAAF currently appears to have only enough capacity to meet its own needs. However, it is also possible that RAAF Hawks are being utilized at a greater tempo than originally planned, which means that the expected 25 lifespan of the airframe might turn out to be a bit less than that.

Given that the RAAF Hawks were ordered ~1997, they should be nearing their MLU soon. Given how long defence programmes can take, it is certainly possible that the RAAF/ADF has started to plan for the Hawk replacement. Particularly if due to stress cracks and accidents, it looks like the Hawk might not last until ~2025.

What could potentially be done, would be a joint RAAF/RNZAF buy of T/A-50 Golden Eagles from S. Korea, or perhaps a solely RAAF purchase of the Golden Eagles, but with the RNZAF leasing flight hours and training slots for pilots.

The idea being that with NZDF participation, a larger pool of fast jet training aircraft could be established. Depending on the costs, time frame and interest, there could also be some participation from other FPDA or friendly ASEAN countries.

From the ADF POV, there is some benefits due to efficiencies of scale, as well as cost sharing with an ally. Additionally, if the Golden Eagle is selected, a (more) potent lightweight fighter/trainer is in RAAF inventory than the subsonic, radar-less Hawk 127 LIFT. From the NZDF POV, there would be training slots (and aircraft) available to skill RNZAF pilots, beyond what is currently available. Additionally, since there would be aircraft available as well, NZDF personnel could train in air defence vs. 'aggressor' units, as well as in the use of CAS. Lastly, aircraft could be available in needed for an emergency intercept, or to provide some air defence during special events.

At a guess, I would think that ~50 Golden Eagles would be sufficient to meet RAAF training needs, and then have slots (and aircraft) left over for the RNZAF and perhaps even have slots left over for small numbers of other allied nations.

-Cheers

 

[Kirkzzy]

I think a joint fast jet training program would be a great idea, and could encourage NZ to get back its air combat capability and with the identical training the forces would have greater compatibility and would encourage more joint ops. With NZ helping with the purchase (say 20 percent as they need less pilots) it will also show that they are not just relying on Australia but we are working together.