ADF General discussion thread

MickB

Well-Known Member
Imagine the near future where ocean resources are even more depleted and China dispatches its "coast guard" to protect a fishing fleet strip mining the EEZs of PNG, Solomons, Fiji etc
A battery of ASMs quickly flown in might provide the proper intimidation factor to prevent the situation escalating.
And give time to resolve the situation through other means.
Or if it blows up, the muscle to back our allies.

I know some will say the battery itself is an escalation.
But i fail to see why if China, Russia etc; threaten force to get their way, there are many who will just shrug and except it, but if a western aligned country threatens to reply to that force with force of its own the same people deem that to be a dangerous provocation.
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I think that's a perfectly legitimate concern to have. And, quite frankly, I've never actually seen the (mainly Army) concept of forward deployed land based missiles actually genuinely considered, or argued against.

Where are those forces going? Many of the neighbours we casually throw around have a very different relationship with Beijing. They are not going to want to be dragged into a major regional conflict between the US and China. The uncontested idea that we can park on Indonesian, Malaysian etc territory and shoot at PRC targets is not an assumption I would grant a Staff Cadet at RMC, let along Russell Offices. Some nations may - PNG for instance - but what does that achieve for us? Defending our north-east quadrant is great for us, but what is it achieving from a PRC point of view? Are the PRC even going to send surface vessels to the Coral Sea when they are in the fight of their lives around Taiwan?

How are those forces getting there? The closer we go to the PRC, the easier it is to target our forces and the more options the PRC has to throw at us. The options they have to strike Guam v Darwin is literally orders of magnitude. So how do we get these missile launchers there? Note also, the PRC doesn't have to strike the strategic lift. It can just track them. Someone mentioned Gull and Sparrow force above - they all died. For nothing. you cant hide the deployment of these beasties.

What are you taking? Some Strikemaster? Bahahahahahahaha....... that's murder. Such short range weapons are a joke. So HiMARs or better. Cool. Note at the moment that's still well within the PRC WEZ, but the best (land) option we have at the moment. So, what, a Battery of HiMARs? That's 14 launchers. 14x PrSM missiles. Ok.....I mean, that's less than the Tier 2 combatants we were going to buy, but sure. Not sure it's going to do anything - the PLA-N is designed to fight an enemy with 122x VLS Ticos, 96x VLS Burkes and multiple CVNBG.... I'm not sure what 14 extra missiles are going to do (not nothing, but still....).

How are you going to protect them? I mean, you don't have to. You can leave them to die. But they will need protection. Their disembarkation point is known. The number of launch points worth of PRC attention is known. They are closer to the WEZ than anything else, so the PLA have even more options than striking Australia. This rapidly turns into a significant chunk of ADF power, dangling out .... 'there'

The advantage China has, is that Australia is negligible. We are not a threat. Anything worthy of striking here (which is Stirling and maybe a RAAF Base where a heavy USAF presence is) is geographically known (as opposed to a PLA-N SAG) and is already in range of multiple Chinese options. So the issues facing us, targeting, range, missile production rates, simply aren't an issue for Beijing. Their challenges in those areas relate to the mobile targets east of Taiwan, specifically the USN units. The only possible similarity facing Beijing is the ABO issues, but they already have long-range missiles and they travel out of the atmosphere - negating ABO. Furthermore, the possible diaspora to hide non-conventional forces in is in Beijing's favour, not ours.

I've been arguing against Army owning anti-ship missiles since writing the first needs statement in 17/18. Lessons from the Baltic and Black Seas don't apply here. It's a waste of resources - if you want an anti-ship capability you fund the RAAF and RAN. They do it better and faster. The reason I'm a HiMARs fan is because it's the beginning steps to a genuine very long range strike capability, preferably hypersonic. The PrSM plan gets us most of the way, and hopefully by then we have options to go beyond that. Then we can shoot from Australian territory at the things that matter.
All good points and I am not a fan of the Strikemaster myself, for the very same points you’d raise. If there genuinely is a need to buy land based long ranged missiles to cover our approaches, than why would we buy more of the shortest ranged anti-ship missile we already have? As you say, RAN and RAAF can already do better and will still be able to even if we did buy it, so why we aren’t investing in something mostly different is beyond me.

We will have 10 ships full of NSM by next year (if not already) that’s 80 rounds (assuming we have enough in our inventory and the missiles aren’t being rotated between ships, which would almost be a first for RAN…) does another 14 of the same weapon, help that much?

We have 3 ships available with Tomahawk with problematic ship load-outs if they are to be strike configured (if they are, they can’t really be AAW ships and vice versa).

Tomahawk gives us range we (almost) don’t currently have and again SM-6 gives us speed we almost don’t already have. (Same problem, only 3 ships with limited load-out).

In the short term Typhon MRC fixes both of those problems - later Increments of PRsM might as well (1000+ k ranges reportedly are being sought) but that’s a maybe - one day. Typhon MRC is available now.

Strikemaster fixes none of them and is nowhere near “ready” for service either, to boot...

For me it’s HIMARS with accelerated development and deployment of longer ranged PRsM with alternative mission profiles (aka maritime strike) or Typhon MRC…
 
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Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Imagine the near future where ocean resources are even more depleted and China dispatches its "coast guard" to protect a fishing fleet strip mining the EEZs of PNG, Solomons, Fiji etc
A battery of ASMs quickly flown in might provide the proper intimidation factor to prevent the situation escalating.
And give time to resolve the situation through other means.
Or if it blows up, the muscle to back our allies.

I know some will say the battery itself is an escalation.
But i fail to see why if China, Russia etc; threaten force to get their way, there are many who will just shrug and except it, but if a western aligned country threatens to reply to that force with force of its own the same people deem that to be a dangerous provocation.
I do not really view a battery of land-based AShM as being an escalation. Rather, I see it as an expensive (keeping in mind one needs to factor in everything to make such a setup actually functional and effective) but very niche capability with limited potential employment. Those same employment scenarios are one which also can be met by deploying other ADF assets already in service.

Given the scenario provided, a PRC "Coast Guard" escorted fishing fleet stripping an area of resources in the EEZ of a country like PNG, Australia is already able to deploy a RAN frigate which could get on station of both monitor the activities of the fishing fleet, as well as deter them. As an alternative, send RAAF P-8 Poseidons to monitor and deter said fleet. Or deploy both.

Realistically, Australia would likely need to deploy one or the other at least, in order for any land-based AShM batteries to be effective because they will need targeting data and IMO it is unlikely that PNG, the Solomons or Fiji would have the sort of systems to collect and then relay target quality data to a RAA unit.
 

spoz

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
At the risk of seeming cynical, this might be all about Army trying to remain, as they see it, relevant when much of the investment has been going to Air Force and is going to Navy. They, who traditionally see themselves as Australia’s premier service, may see a risk of being sidelined in the current strategic circumstances if they don’t get something like this. The current (possibly over) investment in landing vessels may also reflect this, given the push to resurrect an Army seagoing ability independent of Navy. As I say, the cynical view.
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
At the risk of seeming cynical, this might be all about Army trying to remain, as they see it, relevant when much of the investment has been going to Air Force and is going to Navy. They, who traditionally see themselves as Australia’s premier service, may see a risk of being sidelined in the current strategic circumstances if they don’t get something like this. The current (possibly over) investment in landing vessels may also reflect this, given the push to resurrect an Army seagoing ability independent of Navy. As I say, the cynical view
Maybe.

I think things are perhaps more complicated than they might appear.

While Australia has aegis destroyers, getting a whole fleet of strike capable frigates, and has F35 etc. We are surrounded in our region by those who cannot ever buy or operate such things. I wouldn't be surprised if this kind of capability is something other friendlies want, but may be best facilitated through Australia. I wonder if this is perhaps a transitory capability. We buy, operate, then we share and support others. While still somewhat limiting, it is a realistic, tangible capability that smaller nations could perhaps acquire. Enabling them to be more confident and engaged in advanced defence matters, offering a real, advanced, technical capability.

Engagement with our region is our strong point. If these sort of acquisitions facilitate that, facilitate stronger relations, build a pathway of sharing capabilities going forward, then that is a worthwhile thing.

Turning up to Fiji or PNG or Naru with an Aegis destroyer and F-35 is neat, but then there is the question of how and what do we interoperate with. The Army is a big part of that engagement, as pretty much everyone can field some sort of ground force.

Our responsibility is bigger than just ourselves. As the leading regional power, others look to us for leadership and to facilitate capabilities with them.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
I wouldn't be surprised if this kind of capability is something other friendlies want, but may be best facilitated through Australia. I wonder if this is perhaps a transitory capability. We buy, operate, then we share and support others. While still somewhat limiting, it is a realistic, tangible capability that smaller nations could perhaps acquire. Enabling them to be more confident and engaged in advanced defence matters, offering a real, advanced, technical capability.

Engagement with our region is our strong point. If these sort of acquisitions facilitate that, facilitate stronger relations, build a pathway of sharing capabilities going forward, then that is a worthwhile thing.

Turning up to Fiji or PNG or Naru with an Aegis destroyer and F-35 is neat, but then there is the question of how and what do we interoperate with. The Army is a big part of that engagement, as pretty much everyone can field some sort of ground force.

Our responsibility is bigger than just ourselves. As the leading regional power, others look to us for leadership and to facilitate capabilities with them.
I just do not see it. The countries which are close to SLOC chokepoints likely could raise and field such land-based batteries, assuming they are willing to pay the coin to purchase them. Whether or not the countries which can make the radars, comms and missiles themselves would be willing to sell such systems to these countries is another story. One which Australia would not have much say in. For the significantly smaller nations like the Solomons, Fiji, or Vanuatu, nations which do not really have much in the way of naval or aerial forces, I cannot really see them raising the sort of force needed to operate land-based AShM launchers, never mind an entire battery of them. For starters, how large are the current artillery sections of their respective armed forces? When I went to on Fiji since it has one of the larger populations of Pacific Island nations, it looks like ~6,500 personnel in the Fijian armed forces have a half-dozen 105 mm howitzers. Quite a large step up from there to mobile SSM launchers firing OTH AShM. Even more so when one considers that very little if any of the current Fijian kit is datalinked and IIRC that Australia provides much of the technical support needed for Fiji to keep their patrol boats in service.

To me, it still looks like someone in Australia saw what the US is doing with the USMC and decided it was a good idea to ape the Marines, all whilst ignoring questions on whether or not it was a good idea for the US to adopt, or that the ADF just cannot match US capabilities which might be able to get a bad idea to work.
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
To me, it still looks like someone in Australia saw what the US is doing with the USMC and decided it was a good idea to ape the Marines, all whilst ignoring questions on whether or not it was a good idea for the US to adopt, or that the ADF just cannot match US capabilities which might be able to get a bad idea to work.
That is entirely possible. Although, Australia has pretty rigorous assessment processes, but then again we have had some doozey acquisitions.

I just do not see it. The countries which are close to SLOC chokepoints likely could raise and field such land-based batteries, assuming they are willing to pay the coin to purchase them. Whether or not the countries which can make the radars, comms and missiles themselves would be willing to sell such systems to these countries is another story. One which Australia would not have much say in.
I think Australia has pretty significant say in who gets what in our region. Given that it would involve nations we give huge aid too, that are dependant on other aspects of Australian support for their commercial, civilian, and military capabilities. Australia is often accused of being too powerful/influential regionally. Australian aid to the pacific used to out weigh China, US and EU aid combined.

We have basically completely inhibited some countries from obtaining almost anything, including small arms. I think of RAMSI with the Solomons for example.

I think Australia has pretty significant influence with the US, Norway, Germany, France, UK etc. I don't see any of those countries over riding Australia's wishes and writing their own pacific nations weapons policy, particularly if it undermines Australia building a coalition. I think any such arrangements would be more like the US nuclear sharing agreement, the weapons would remain the property of Australia, they would perhaps be operated under a dual key arrangement, Australian personnel would be involved in the loop and on the ground. Such arrangements would also stop such nations seeking their own arrangement willy nilly, like East Timor did with its boats. Again, creating a hole that someone was going to step in and fill. For all we know, someone else is offering attractive alternatives.

Australia has been talking a lot about joint capabilities with other nations. The security arrangement with PNG would essentially unify the entire militaries together. There has to be something in there that works around unification that gives something back to those involved. There has been simular talk with Fiji and its oversized military as well. Fiji military is a problem unto itself, being oversized and over important from all the UN work they do.

The fact they aren't huge game changers is actually attractive in this case. Core capabilities would be core capabilities. But having these countries deeply involved and actively engaged in a coalition could be important.

Again all speculation. But there is a lot of speculation how regional engagement would occur, what regional nations would get out of such defence arrangements. I don't see Australia buying PNG or Fiji a destroyer or a F-35.

Also such arrangements might also be convenient ways for Australia and the US to pre-position munitions around the region. Here are 500 NSM, they can be used for your single local based NASAMS, or perhaps any allied ship that comes by and needs to reload, like this nearby taskforce. They are for the use of Local and friendly forces.

it looks like ~6,500 personnel in the Fijian armed forces have a half-dozen 105 mm howitzers. Quite a large step up from there to mobile SSM launchers firing OTH AShM.
People would have said that about the Australian army 20 years ago. Or the NZ army now. Fiji has 1/4 the strength of the NZ army artillery. It could be a catalyst to making them a more networked force.
 
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Todjaeger

Potstirrer
I think Australia has pretty significant say in who gets what in our region. Given that it would involve nations we give huge aid too, that are dependant on other aspects of Australian support for their commercial, civilian, and military capabilities. Australia is often accused of being too powerful/influential regionally. Australian aid to the pacific used to out weigh China, US and EU aid combined.

We have basically completely inhibited some countries from obtaining almost anything, including small arms. I think of RAMSI with the Solomons for example.

I think Australia has pretty significant influence with the US, Norway, Germany, France, UK etc. I don't see any of those countries over riding Australia's wishes and writing their own pacific nations weapons policy, particularly if it undermines Australia building a coalition. I think any such arrangements would be more like the US nuclear sharing agreement, the weapons would remain the property of Australia, they would perhaps be operated under a dual key arrangement, Australian personnel would be involved in the loop and on the ground. Such arrangements would also stop such nations seeking their own arrangement willy nilly, like East Timor did with its boats. Again, creating a hole that someone was going to step in and fill. For all we know, someone else is offering attractive alternatives.
I very much disagree re: Australian influence with regards to weapons acquisitions. You are also only noting that Australia has inhibited or prevented some nations from acquiring certain kit. I agree that the US and Euro nations friendly to Australia would likely listen to Australian objections to nation NN being able to purchase weapons system XYZ. However, you are ignoring where the likely problem would be. Namely, would a Euro country or the US being willing to sell all the specific pieces of kit needed to make a system work. It would be dependent on what was viewed as being in the national interests of whomever was the vendor nation and IMO Australian desires would not matter much if a sale deemed not in the interests of say, the US.

As for the notion of Australian-owned weapons systems stockpiled overseas for use in some sort of dual-key usage system... I consider that a rather unrealistic proposition. There would likely need to be buy-in/approval from the nation providing the systems to Australia, as well as agreements at least equal to what would be needed for Australia to forward deploy land-based AShM batteries overseas.

One thing people might want to stop and consider is what movements, if any, have nations like Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei or the Philippines made towards acquiring and fielding batteries of land-based AShM. From what I have come across when looking at their respective lists of artillery kit, it does not appear that any of the nations are currently seeking to establish AShM batteries, despite being countries with SLOC chokepoints in or near their territories.
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I very much disagree re: Australian influence with regards to weapons acquisitions. You are also only noting that Australia has inhibited or prevented some nations from acquiring certain kit. I agree that the US and Euro nations friendly to Australia would likely listen to Australian objections to nation NN being able to purchase weapons system XYZ. However, you are ignoring where the likely problem would be. Namely, would a Euro country or the US being willing to sell all the specific pieces of kit needed to make a system work. It would be dependent on what was viewed as being in the national interests of whomever was the vendor nation and IMO Australian desires would not matter much if a sale deemed not in the interests of say, the US.

As for the notion of Australian-owned weapons systems stockpiled overseas for use in some sort of dual-key usage system... I consider that a rather unrealistic proposition. There would likely need to be buy-in/approval from the nation providing the systems to Australia, as well as agreements at least equal to what would be needed for Australia to forward deploy land-based AShM batteries overseas.

One thing people might want to stop and consider is what movements, if any, have nations like Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei or the Philippines made towards acquiring and fielding batteries of land-based AShM. From what I have come across when looking at their respective lists of artillery kit, it does not appear that any of the nations are currently seeking to establish AShM batteries, despite being countries with SLOC chokepoints in or near their territories.
Err… Countries with severe budgetary restrictions aside, South East Asia and Asia more broadly are literally crawling with coastal defence missile systems, either in-service, on order or aspiring to do so. Malaysia can’t afford to arm it’s frigates properly let alone invest further and Brunei has an absolutely minuscule defence budget.

Phillipines:


Indonesia:


Vietnam:


Taiwan:


Japan:

 
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Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Err… Countries with severe budgetary restrictions aside, South East Asia and Asia more broadly are literally crawling with coastal defence missile systems, either in-service, on order or aspiring to do so. Malaysia can’t afford to arm it’s frigates properly let alone invest further and Brunei has an absolutely minuscule defence budget.

Phillipines:


Indonesia:


Vietnam:


Taiwan:


Japan:

I admit I missed the Philippines acquisition of two (of out three ordered) batteries of BraMos from India with the first battery delivered last year and the second this year.

With Indonesia still in discussions, it remains to be seen whether or not they will ever adopt BraMos, or even a capability like it.

However, that does of open up to question what the thinking behind Australia seeking to establish a land-based A2AD capability, when Australia does not really have an appropriate area for it to operate from. As I understand it, A2AD is fundamentally supposed to be a defensive strategy and was at least first conceived to provide capabilities which could be effective in defending against or deterring a more powerful adversary. With Australia not really being close to important SLOC where A2 could be effective, then it looks like Australia would either need to be invited in to deploy, or else seize an area and then deploy A2AD capabilities. Building up the A2AD capabilities ahead of the capabilities needed to get everyone to where a potentially opposed landing will be, as well as everything necessary to keep a landed force in the field, seems a bit of putting the cart before the horse.
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I admit I missed the Philippines acquisition of two (of out three ordered) batteries of BraMos from India with the first battery delivered last year and the second this year.

With Indonesia still in discussions, it remains to be seen whether or not they will ever adopt BraMos, or even a capability like it.

However, that does of open up to question what the thinking behind Australia seeking to establish a land-based A2AD capability, when Australia does not really have an appropriate area for it to operate from. As I understand it, A2AD is fundamentally supposed to be a defensive strategy and was at least first conceived to provide capabilities which could be effective in defending against or deterring a more powerful adversary. With Australia not really being close to important SLOC where A2 could be effective, then it looks like Australia would either need to be invited in to deploy, or else seize an area and then deploy A2AD capabilities. Building up the A2AD capabilities ahead of the capabilities needed to get everyone to where a potentially opposed landing will be, as well as everything necessary to keep a landed force in the field, seems a bit of putting the cart before the horse.
The capabilities needed to get people where they need to be and to be sustained would be things like LHD’s, Choules, LMV-M and H, C-130J’s, C-17A’s etc wouldn’t they?

All of which are in-service or just like HIMARS already under contract or approved? The first LMV-M is “scheduled” to be delivered in 2026 while the first LMV-H is “scheduled” to commence build activities in 2026.

The projects that are still to be delivered, actually seem to be pretty well aligned for once, at least on a schedule basis...
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
The capabilities needed to get people where they need to be and to be sustained would be things like LHD’s, Choules, LMV-M and H, C-130J’s, C-17A’s etc wouldn’t they?
Only partially, and that is still making some assumptions. The big one being that wherever the troops and kit are going, the locals are if not welcoming them, at least not actively opposing their arrival. OTOH if Australia were to try and deploy a HIMARS somewhere without the permission of the appropriate gov't, then some form of opposed landing might be necessary. This would require more forces in order for Australia to establish and control some sort of beachhead or LZ. Further, these forces, as well as subsequent reinforcements and re-supply would be subject to interdiction or attack whilst en route, once hostilities break out.

This is also why I asked when was the last time that Australian forces had to make an opposed landing, or when the last time Australian forces were subject to attack prior to arriving in theatre.
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Only partially, and that is still making some assumptions. The big one being that wherever the troops and kit are going, the locals are if not welcoming them, at least not actively opposing their arrival. OTOH if Australia were to try and deploy a HIMARS somewhere without the permission of the appropriate gov't, then some form of opposed landing might be necessary. This would require more forces in order for Australia to establish and control some sort of beachhead or LZ. Further, these forces, as well as subsequent reinforcements and re-supply would be subject to interdiction or attack whilst en route, once hostilities break out.

This is also why I asked when was the last time that Australian forces had to make an opposed landing, or when the last time Australian forces were subject to attack prior to arriving in theatre.
I am not sure ADF is contemplating opposed landings, given there has not been any Government direction to develop such a capability.

Given how things are changing in 1 Brigade especially, that may well be a long term intention, but we are still in the early days of rolling out the 2023/2024 NDS recommendations and no-one serious is stating or pretending that we have such a capability, because we quite simply do not.

Any deployment of forces will be subject to local consent, international waters / airspace or into enemy held territory at this stage, or at worse, limited covert insertion / deployment.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
I am not sure ADF is contemplating opposed landings, given there has not been any Government direction to develop such a capability.

Given how things are changing in 1 Brigade especially, that may well be a long term intention, but we are still in the early days of rolling out the 2023/2024 NDS recommendations and no-one serious is stating or pretending that we have such a capability, because we quite simply do not.

Any deployment of forces will be subject to local consent, international waters / airspace or into enemy held territory at this stage, or at worse, limited covert insertion / deployment.
Which then gets back to the question, "why is Australia trying to develop a land-based anti-ship/A2AD capability given the limitations, restrictions and costs involved?"

There was an 'interesting' capability demo done using the M142 HIMARS that sort of illustrates part of why I tend to shake my head on such things. The demo basically involved a C-130J with a M142 HIMARS onboard landing at an airfield an rapidly unloading the HIMARS. The HIMARS spent a little (very short) period of time to fire, and then was rapidly loaded back onto the C-130J which took off. Basically demonstrating a rapid artillery shoot 'n scoot using airlift and a MLRS instead of traditional tube artillery.

Now before anyone starts to think the demo showcased any real useful capability, consider that the max fires delivery would have been up to two PrSM. In order to effect those fires, it required a C-130J, an M142 HIMARS, the crews for both as well as a field large enough for the Herc to land and then have the HIMARS get out to fire before getting back in.

Now consider instead had the C-130J been loaded with Rapid Dragon missile pallets instead of a HIMARS, that very same aircraft could have launched a strike on up to a dozen targets, which could be at greater range than the PrSM can reach, without exposing the aircraft, crew, or the HIMARS and crew to the potential dangers of needing to land, unload, fire, reload and then take off again when the possibly exists of getting attack whilst on the ground.
 

Anthony_B_78

Active Member
Just playing Devil's Advocate here, but do you think the "scoot" part was more because they wanted to get home for dinner? I think we can all agree it is unlikely to be a tactic employed. Much more likely, the HIMARS would be deployed (alongside other assets) ahead of time and sit around waiting until, and unless, called upon, and not then be redeployed until the threat environment had changed. In this way, your C-130J could be available for other tasks when/if the targets emerge.
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
However, that does of open up to question what the thinking behind Australia seeking to establish a land-based A2AD capability, when Australia does not really have an appropriate area for it to operate from. As I understand it, A2AD is fundamentally supposed to be a defensive strategy and was at least first conceived to provide capabilities which could be effective in defending against or deterring a more powerful adversary. With Australia not really being close to important SLOC where A2 could be effective, then it looks like Australia would either need to be invited in to deploy, or else seize an area and then deploy A2AD capabilities. Building up the A2AD capabilities ahead of the capabilities needed to get everyone to where a potentially opposed landing will be, as well as everything necessary to keep a landed force in the field, seems a bit of putting the cart before the horse.
Of course we do. From Darwin covering the Timor and Arafura seas, from Cape York covering the Torres Strait and elements of the Coral Sea. From Broome or Exmouth covering North West shelf and on and on it goes. A battery sitting on Stirling providing 24/7 maritime approach coverage for our shiny new SSN’s might be a welcome addition to a layered defence for the place, do you not think? While we could use a frigate to do the same thing, we certainly could not do so anywhere near as economically or efficiently nor keep one there indefinitely and there are other uses for our (well known) limited frigate numbers. 90x HIMARS plus missiles, support etc (if approved) is costing us more than $1b less than the cost of a single Mogami FFM afterall…

The problem with your concept is imagining the only use for such a system is in our ability to deploy it to confront China in the SCS and not considering that while that may be one scenario in which we consider using it, first and foremost the ADF’s job is to defend Australia. We also have places where we could deploy such systems to good use - Manus is one, Christmas and Cocos Islands are others, without much in the way of political concern (as to access). We also have allies that may well ask us to deploy such systems to their aid in a time of crisis. Taiwan and the Phillipines are the obvious ones, but it isn’t difficult to conceive of scenarios where others could too…

LBASM is a defensive weapon and an offensive weapon. It is meant to complement air and naval capabilities in these regard. It provides more, persistence in this role than either air or naval capabilities can offer and depending on system configuration, more tactical mobility. It lacks in regards to strategic mobility and potentially self protection capability but that is why it is a complementary system. An LRASM armed P-8A lacks survivability too in many respects and yet it too, will be one of our main ASM launching platforms.

Given the extensive deployment referred to earlier of similar systems (of intended role, not necessarily technical characteristics) there is clearly a large appetite for such capabilities within the region and maintaining parity has long been a strategic yardstick by which we structure and equip our forces…
 
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