Todjaeger
Potstirrer
I'm unfamiliar with the acronym HAARP. :unknown
Can someone post info on what these systems are like, and/or which systems are being referred to?
-Thanks
Super radar detecting US stealth plane
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Can someone post info on what these systems are like, and/or which systems are being referred to?
-Thanks
What I know about HAARP (High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program) is that works as a really long range radar, also capable of detecting objects below earth surface (silos i.e.) and also water surface (submarines i.e.). Also, it's capable of affect the Ionosphere (which is used as a bounce shield) and hence, weather in a specific area.
But there is not too much info over there while regarding it's effectiveness...
But there is not too much info over there while regarding it's effectiveness...
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Ah, but I don't think it is quite this simple. Yes, advanced radars will be able to detect the F-35, but then they can also detect the F-22, F-117 and B-2, under the proper circumstances. The question is, can various advanced radars detect the F-35 (and other LO aircraft) effectively? By effectively, I am combining several different factors together.
These are listed here:
- Frequency of detection
- accuracy of detection
- range of detection
By frequency of detection, I am referring to how many times an advanced radar will detect a LO aircraft in the area. For example, if the Acme Inc. SPS-39 (yes, this is a made-up radar) is able to detect a LO aircraft at a rate of roughly once every one hundred sorties, then such a detection capability isn't of much use.
In terms of accuracy of detection, if a radar return is picked up, but the system or operator is unable to tell approximately where the cause of the return is, i.e. (I know they're out there...) but isn't able to give information to either target with a SAM, or vector allied aircraft, then again, it isn't of a great deal of use.
Lastly, range of detection. Generally, the closer an aircraft comes to a radar system, the better the chance the system has of getting enough return to detect the aircraft. What becomes important then (aside from meeting the above two requirements) is that the aircraft be detected far enough away to allow a useful response. If the LO aircraft can close to within striking distance (which depends on mission, aircraft and weapons load), then the fact that a radar detected it is of less importance, because it will have completed it's mission and would be returning to base. Presumably away from the detecting radar and associated defensive systems.
Lastly, while I find the topic interesting, it is very unlikely that anything resembling accurate information on LO or radar detection capabilities would be publically available on a forum. Oh well.
-Cheers
Where'd you get that from, gf? Just casual reference by someone in the know, or was it a published source?
salisbury
abramsteve
New Member
Salisbury? As in DSTO?
Dr. Renato
New Member
Need to talk to Radar or Sonar expert
Stealth planes are not invisible they just look like they are farther away than they really are. Therefore, a super long distance Radar, should be able to detect stealthy targets. I need to talk to a radar/sonar expert about this. Regards, Dr. Renato
Stealth planes are not invisible they just look like they are farther away than they really are. Therefore, a super long distance Radar, should be able to detect stealthy targets. I need to talk to a radar/sonar expert about this. Regards, Dr. Renato
No, thats not the case.
Stealth is a misnomer. It's actually more correct to refer to them as LO, and thats because their observable footprint (at an emission and detection level) is smaller
No, its got nothing to do with depth of detection, its got everything to do with the type(s) of detection
locutus
New Member
What's Next?
gf0012-aust,
I've been having a discussion with a friend of mine about stealth. We both believe a counter to stealth will be found. Of course, how long it will take is one question. Whether it takes one year or twenty-five years, what happens to stealth technology then? Does it become obsolete and a waste of money?
gf0012-aust,
I've been having a discussion with a friend of mine about stealth. We both believe a counter to stealth will be found. Of course, how long it will take is one question. Whether it takes one year or twenty-five years, what happens to stealth technology then? Does it become obsolete and a waste of money?
Short answer - no.
Long answer - continue on reading.
I think there are a couple of things that need to be determined first.
The most obvious is the definition of "stealth". Stealth is currently a buzzword typically thrown around in debate, and usually (and most commonly) with reference to platforms like the F-22 and JSF.
I guess at a personal level I get a bit irritated at that view as it dumbs down a very complex subject into a packaged "retail" type answer.
The whole basis of stealth is one of "low observability". very few people in industry use the term "stealth" as it's incorrect - it leads to follow on arguments by the more enthusiastic but less technically astute to also mumble about "invisibility" - when its clearly not.
So, LO platforms have been around for a while and need to be considered in the construct of an ability of a sensor system to correctly identify and respond defensively. The history of LO aerial management is important to look at as it shows why LO adapts and evolves and why it’s a moving feast that can't be pigeonholed as an obsolescent capability. I.e. it’s evolved over the last 90 years and will continue to evolve.
So, if I give a really brief history of Stealth concepts based around LO requirements, then it would be as follows:
E.g. the first stealth aircraft was in 1912 - it was a Taube biplane that had clear cellophane type skin named Emaillit to make it transparent vis a vis it's "bulk". LO was regarded as a visibility issue.
The second stealth aircraft was in 1913, (it was a monoplane) - the Germans decided to take it one step further and decided to retain the cellophane surface but to also paint the frame the same colour as the sky, i.e. blue/grey.
The third iteration of this was when the Germans fielded modified Fokker E111's in 1916; Emaillit was replaced with "Cellon". They then tried the same tech on a variety of different aircraft including an albatross, aviatik, rumpler and even a few bombers (VGO-1 and an R-1) so, as can be seen nice idea in principle, but ignored the fact that the engine, fuel tank and pilot were sitting up in the air for everyone to see.
But it did show lateral thinking. LO was regarded as an extension of the previous management of visibility issue. Both concepts failed as the cellophane material actually behaved like a reflector, and the pilots spent most of their time "snow blind" due to reflections. On top of that, Cellon was a material developed for the automobile industry and was applied by soaking it in water, and then stretching it over the airframe. The problem here was that when it rained, the Cellon started to expand, and thus become loose. Not exactly the best thing for an aircraft skin to do...
The next LO aircraft (in relation to enemy sensor systems being able to identify it and respond) was when the British used to run what was called "ferret missions" into the Soviet Union in the late 1940's and 1950's. The British used modified EE Canberra’s. When the Soviets developed more persistently competent missiles, radar systems and procedures to intercept, the west coast hi-speed low level ferret missions were reduced and eventually stopped. LO was regarded as low level and high speed as the Soviets did not have radar systems that could deal with low level hi speed entry, and their method of controlling gave the advantage to the ingressing aircraft. At one point the English also went high altitude as the lightened Canberras couldn't be intercepted by the Soviets (this changed once decent SAMs were bought into play). The Canberra btw was used as initially the RAF were badging USAF B-45 Tornados (which were flying lemons)
As a legacy of the success and superiority of the EE Canberra’s, the US then developed their own solution which emerged as the U2 and family. The U2 was considered LO due to a number of reasons, primarily the fact that for a short window of time the Soviets were unable to reach out and touch it. This changed with the arrival of the SA-2.
So the absolute advantage of high altitude to escape SAMs changed the LO requirement immediately. The requirement for LO management then turned to high speed high altitude aircraft.
The first purpose built LO aircraft was the A-12. It was considered LO as the Soviets could not and did not have any system capable of intercepting it. Even though it was "hot" and radar visible, the Soviets had no system capable of catching it - even when they volleyed intercepts. The LO management was high speed, high altitude where the enemy had no meaningful and managed capability to intercept even though the aircraft traffic was identified (not the plane though).
The follow on to the A-12 was the RS/SR-71 Blackbird. What's significant about the RS/SR-71 was that it was the bigger cousin to the A-12. What's even more significant was that it was a much harder beast to see and intercept. The fundamental reason was that not only was it finished in signature managing technologies, but when they discovered the impact of chine’s around the nose cone area, they were able to reduce its frontal aspect radar emitting footprint by 90%. The LO management was high speed, high altitude, onboard Elint and shape management.
At the same time that the SR-71 was in play, the US had also started to use unmanned aircraft for subsonic, low altitude recce. Again, the environment they were used in gave the US advantages. Although they lost a number of platforms, it was regarded as a success as it acted as the development vehicle for UAV's, RAM management, signature management, and it involved the enemy reacting to the threat and thus providing USAF escorting aircraft with harvesting opportunities. The Firebees/Lightning bugs were used in various guises, not just low level, so they were an adaptive platform.
The LO management was subsonic, low, medium, high altitude, surface management (they actually used RAM "blankets") and in some cases, the use of escorting aircraft as emission benefactors (such as Wild Weasels). They also developed Elint versions of these platforms (147TE). The final product development would have been a low footprint high altitude model to be used over China referred to as the 154.
The next series of LO aircraft basically were from the "Senior xxxx", "Have xxxx" and "Tacit xxxx" series of platforms. These were completely different in their LO management, and this was due to a number of reasons. One was the final comprehension of some study done by Bahret (US, and radar cross sections), Wright (US and RAM development)
The real breakthrough though was due to some Lockheed staff (Schroeder and Overholser). They came up with the concept of faceting. The original equations for faceting were done by a Scotsman named Maxwell.
These were then modified by a German electromagnetic expert named Sommerfield who developed signature management equations for simple shapes. This was followed up by some discoveries by a Russian named Ufmitsev who came up with an approach that could be applied to more complex shapes such as discs. The Russian is often touted as being the key to the development of "Stealth" - he is not, but he is one individual along a long line of others who contributed to the comprehension of LO management in its infancy.
What bought Maxwell, Sommerfield and Ufmitsev's calculations and mathematical assumptions to fruition were the improvements made in Computing. Schroder and Overholser were able to marry all of the previous work into a computer model and then made their own breakthroughs.
I'll ignore current LO trends as otherwise response this will turn into a book.....
So, why the long winded history lesson?
Well, that’s because "Stealth" or more correctly LO platforms are a moving feast, a moving technological development where the capability evolves against the response. What was regarded as "Stealthy" even 25 years ago is now obsolete and replaced with new technology concepts.It's a mistake to look at Stealth as a single technology entity - it’s not, and that why when you get people stating that bi-static radar, or OTHR or sympathetically merged commercial solutions such as mobile phone towers hooked into the sensor grid make it redundant, then they ignore the fact that the technology is not static. It ignores things such as the fact that sensor systems find it very hard to discriminate between nature and manufacture, e.g. there is a reason why the west chose subsonic cruise missiles over supersonics - and it’s tied into the history of stealth/LO development. The classic example of that is HALSOL (as a concept)
e.g., the F-22 can literally be LO managed due to its design.
Something simple like sensor arrays along the wings are able to be upgraded or improved via software. The F-22 will continue to have a role as the capability to identify it and commit to it is "not easy". The plane is not "invincible" and it’s not "invisible" - but it’s not meant to be - it’s meant to be able to be used as part of a package to exploit a weakness in the defenders grid so that other assets can bring their own "additional" sympathetic violence or electronic "wedge" to bear.
The danger is that some amateurs (and I don't mean that to be disrespectful and am making a sweeping statement out of convenience to clarify positions) only consider single platforms, they don't understand, comprehend or appreciate that response is about packages and systems. It’s also why this forum doesn't allow "this vs. that" threads as it just dumbs down the debate to a meaningless cycle of "mines bigger than yours"
As an observation, IMO the next LO platform in real terms will be hypersonics, as it is the next leap forward where existing sensor systems struggle to cope with intercepting it in time. It will then adapt to MIRVed responses on top of that hypersonic vehicle, and it will include (as the Russians have hinted at) controlled flight MIRV's. I would think that controlled flight MIRV's would have a degree of AI rather than just the Yakhont type "pop-up" "pop down" characteristics.
In a weapons management sense, miniaturisation of the prev weapons into carriers such as the F-22 make it even more relevant, when you consider that the F-22 will operate as part of a package with Compass and Rivet support, Prowler/Growler, an ability to hook into ForceNET etc etc... You can start to understand that LO participation in future wars is here to stay.
There will always be evolving counter solutions to any effective capability, but LO has been in play now for over 95 years, and we're already onto 6th and 7th generation solutions at the UAV level
Btw, I haven't even touched on LO management for ships and subs - and that’s a topic in its own right a well.
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locutus
New Member
Future of LO
gf0012-aust,
Thank you for your response. The aircraft you listed in your history, I've never thought of in terms of LO technology. Your history lesson tells me that there will always be niche or gap to exploit even if/when the current generation of LO technology is countered. That makes it obvious LO technology will never become obsolete.
My only other concern is whether it will be affordable. Given the cost of the F-22 and B-2, I'm thinking the future of LO will be in UCAVs and weapons not a new generation of aircraft.
gf0012-aust,
Thank you for your response. The aircraft you listed in your history, I've never thought of in terms of LO technology. Your history lesson tells me that there will always be niche or gap to exploit even if/when the current generation of LO technology is countered. That makes it obvious LO technology will never become obsolete.
My only other concern is whether it will be affordable. Given the cost of the F-22 and B-2, I'm thinking the future of LO will be in UCAVs and weapons not a new generation of aircraft.
If you look at the predecessor to the F-117 it was a combination of aircraft parts.
The engines came from a USN Hornet (minus the afterburners)
The F-18 also provided the multifunction CRT's, HUD, fuel controls, stick and throttles.
The sensor displays came from an OV-10 Bronco and a P3C Orion
The nav system was from a B-52
It also included parts from a T-33, SR-71, Hercules C130, an L1011 Tristar commercial jetliner and a F104 Starfighter
The Fly by Wire was from the F-16.
The programming was from an NT-33
Things don't always need to be expensive.
I agree that UAV's and PGMs have a clear future, but manned flight is not out of the game yet.
I would add, that current western LO weapons can trace their heritage back to "Tacit Blue".
eg, as much as some get excited about supersonics AShM's - they're not the threat.
I'd argue that there will be weapons in extremis.
eg, subsonics will definitely have a brighter future than supersonics. the LO management history supports a number of reasons as to why low, slow and managed emitting is far more dangerous than supersonics.
the other future lies in hypersonics, and weapons solutions which were discarded 30 years ago may well come back as the technology advances have made them buildable and viable.
eg, there are various multi-seeker systems under development which don't rely on GPS, so killing the GPS constellations won't be a deal breaker.
when one door closes, another door opens.
It will be interesting in a number of areas.
- current tech developments are demonstrating viability even though that doesn't translate to a deliverable weapons solution (not yet, but if the US discovered itself at war with a significant enemy, then I think the fast track time would be significant, I would guess that they could deploy a viable weapons system within 6 months using existing vehicles)
- previous work on hypersonics in both the US and UK was limited by technology capability, an almost non existent computing capability
- The Kruschev,Vanevaar Bush, McNamara,Sandys et al philosophy that guided weapons would replace guns meant that there was an extraordinary amount of work done by the US and UK. The Sovs were less interested and were more focussed on single effects mass destruction via ICBM's etc... so they were less active on hypersonics. (Actually it wasn't Kruschevs fault, he was convinced by his Aviation Generals that missiles were the future - the Sovs managed to keep guns through various platforms though)
locutus
New Member
I guess the most famous example of #3 is the F-4. Given this information, history may show this 'mistake' to actually have been an advantage.
Well, that was just "in". The Soviet Union, in the late 60s, operated:
with internal guns
1000 MiG-17 -> fighter (initial: 1952)
350 MiG-19 -> fighter (initial: 1955)
200 Yak-25 -> interceptor (initial: 1955)
without internal guns
750 Su-9 -> interceptor (initial: 1959)
350 Yak-28 -> interceptor (initial: 1960)
150 Tu-28 -> interceptor (initial: 1963)
400 Su-15 -> interceptor (initial: 1967)
Notice something?
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Numbers: CRS US/Soviet Military Balance, Statistical Trends, 1970-1980; stats for 1970
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