The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
His argument is not different from mine many years back - Russia considers Ukraine a vital national interest and the west does not, so Russia will go further to prevent Ukraine from turning into a larger version of the Baltic states. Understanding this reality, advocating for Ukraine to fight until victory or death, is in reality advocating for Ukraine to fight until death. This might be advantageous to the collective west (hello Russia's narrative about "fighting to the last Ukrainian") but ultimately isn't actually good for Ukraine. Instead it's likely to produce a worse end result for Ukraine.
Basically this. Degrade the potential as much as possible while Ukraine is willing to accept the losses.

IMG_2832.jpeg
 

Vivendi

Well-Known Member
It's too early to make predictions on how this will evolve, and what will benefit Ukraine the most, long term. Taliban initially lost in Afghanistan, however, 20 years later they won the country back. NOT the same situation in Ukraine but it still illustrates how difficult it is to make predictions, especially about the future, and it also illustrates the importance of will to fight an intruder, and how one can win the war even if a number of battles are lost, again and again.

Economy remains key. The West won the cold war without firing a shot (against the USSR), still, the USSR collapsed in the end. So the outcome may not be decided on the battlefield.

Ukraine can still win if we keep supporting Ukraine until either Russia pulls out, or Russia collapses just like the USSR collapsed.
 

Vivendi

Well-Known Member
Russia will be degraded for a long time to come but long term the real danger to Europe and the US (and countries like SK and Japan) are not Russia alone but the combination of Russia, China and perhaps also NK and even Iran. That's why it is so frustrating to see that the US and many European countries are offering no or limited support to Ukraine. The long term implications of Ukrainian defeat can be vast.
 

rsemmes

Active Member
It's too early to make predictions on how this will evolve, and what will benefit Ukraine the most, long term. Taliban initially lost in Afghanistan, however, 20 years later they won the country back. NOT the same situation in Ukraine but it still illustrates how difficult it is to make predictions, especially about the future, and it also illustrates the importance of will to fight an intruder, and how one can win the war even if a number of battles are lost, again and again.
Economy remains key. The West won the cold war without firing a shot (against the USSR), still, the USSR collapsed in the end. So the outcome may not be decided on the battlefield.
Ukraine can still win if we keep supporting Ukraine until either Russia pulls out, or Russia collapses just like the USSR collapsed.
You could have mentioned US in Afghanistan or even in Vietnam (and our support). Do you wish a 20 years war for Ukraine?
Yes, it is not the same situation, Ukraine is not a rugged terrain Third World Country, it is a western industrialized country. Yes, economy remains key, Ukrainian economy? The will to remain in a foreign country while there is a war in your country? What about an Ukrainian collapse? What about the "benefits" of the present?

Do you want Ukraine like Paraguay in the War of the Triple Alliance? You are making Jakub Janovsky's case.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Simply fascinating reporting by SkyNews here. a day in the killing zone, they join a team of Ukrainians at the Dobropillia direction. This is very good.

 

Vivendi

Well-Known Member
Do you wish a 20 years war for Ukraine?
No of course not. I wish Russia would pull all their forces out of Ukraine, send their war criminals to the Hague, pay reparations to Ukraine, and become a democracy with free press. Unfortunately Russia is still a fascist, imperialist, aggressive nation, focusing more on killing Ukrainians and trying to destroy democracies in Europe and Northern America than on the wellbeing of their average citizen.

What is your wish?
 

Redshift

Active Member
You could have mentioned US in Afghanistan or even in Vietnam (and our support). Do you wish a 20 years war for Ukraine?
Yes, it is not the same situation, Ukraine is not a rugged terrain Third World Country, it is a western industrialized country. Yes, economy remains key, Ukrainian economy? The will to remain in a foreign country while there is a war in your country? What about an Ukrainian collapse? What about the "benefits" of the present?

Do you want Ukraine like Paraguay in the War of the Triple Alliance? You are making Jakub Janovsky's case.
Nobody (apart from Russia ) wants it to be like Belarus either.
 

rsemmes

Active Member
No of course not. I wish Russia would pull all their forces out of Ukraine, send their war criminals to the Hague, pay reparations to Ukraine, and become a democracy with free press. Unfortunately Russia is still a fascist, imperialist, aggressive nation, focusing more on killing Ukrainians and trying to destroy democracies in Europe and Northern America than on the wellbeing of their average citizen.

What is your wish?
No high horses.
 

crest

Member
Basically this. Degrade the potential as much as possible while Ukraine is willing to accept the losses.

View attachment 53795
I would counter it all depends on what lessons Russia learned here. Truth is they had a massive pile of Soviet stuff stitting around and alot of that will be gone. They may very well come out of this with the idea larger quantities of the right vehicle is better then small qualities of the higher end stuff. I would argue that the difference from the army they started with vs the army they have now implied the Russian government is indeed taking lessons. They also have given there production some much needed reinvestment.

That is one thing about a war a state considers a matter of national security whatever politics and internal friction usually present when a nation goes to war are reduced. Perhaps that pendulum swings the other way.

From what I can see so far it didn't seem like Russia isn't learning nor does it seem like there focus isn't on the security of post war Russia. I think post war Russia will initially be far more of a potent fighting force then it would have been without this war. They may have less systems to use but it's not like it was all available to use at once anyways. It took years to fix much of what is now lost. Meanwhile they have improved there electronic warfare,there missile forces, the no have arguably the deadliest drones. And with production at scale.... Now as to rebuild to think that question will have to do with how Russia is treated post war. If they feel all they have done is fenced off this attack from the west it could be a arms build up with a high tempo of production.

I also think it's a fairly good bet that Russia will hold alot of scepticism about the intentions of the west towards it for some time and have a vested interest in a strong military. If for no other reason the to prevent a the west from just moving into Ukraine after regardless of any treaty because they don't think Russia can prevent it once a few years have passed. Call me sceptical but truth is I wouldn't put it past them either
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I would counter it all depends on what lessons Russia learned here. Truth is they had a massive pile of Soviet stuff stitting around and alot of that will be gone. They may very well come out of this with the idea larger quantities of the right vehicle is better then small qualities of the higher end stuff. I would argue that the difference from the army they started with vs the army they have now implied the Russian government is indeed taking lessons. They also have given there production some much needed reinvestment.

That is one thing about a war a state considers a matter of national security whatever politics and internal friction usually present when a nation goes to war are reduced. Perhaps that pendulum swings the other way.

From what I can see so far it didn't seem like Russia isn't learning nor does it seem like there focus isn't on the security of post war Russia. I think post war Russia will initially be far more of a potent fighting force then it would have been without this war. They may have less systems to use but it's not like it was all available to use at once anyways. It took years to fix much of what is now lost. Meanwhile they have improved there electronic warfare,there missile forces, the no have arguably the deadliest drones. And with production at scale.... Now as to rebuild to think that question will have to do with how Russia is treated post war. If they feel all they have done is fenced off this attack from the west it could be a arms build up with a high tempo of production.

I also think it's a fairly good bet that Russia will hold alot of scepticism about the intentions of the west towards it for some time and have a vested interest in a strong military. If for no other reason the to prevent a the west from just moving into Ukraine after regardless of any treaty because they don't think Russia can prevent it once a few years have passed. Call me sceptical but truth is I wouldn't put it past them either
There is one other big takeaway. Russia has made sensible upgrades to the their Soviet vehicles, but these vehicles are now badly outdated even with extra armor and new turrets/combat modules. Even half-modern vehicles like the BTR-22 and BMP-3 Manul would be better, but really they needed those Kurganets and Bumerang platforms, and even the T-15, or an equivalent on the T-90/72 chassis. It's not clear Russia has learned this lesson. Russian forces get upgraded T-72/80s or new T-90Ms and immediately start converting them into tank sheds. Yet we don't see anything from Russian design bureaus that effectively incorporates these lessons. To the best of my knowledge the record for surviving FPV drone strikes is that tank-shed covered in steel cable "dreadlocks" from the iirc 114th MRBde (former DNR), with 60 drone strikes. This is an excellent argument for a heavy tracked APC on a tank chassis with this kind of protection. Even just BMO-Ts with pre-built cages and "dreadlocks". But... no.
 

crest

Member
There is one other big takeaway. Russia has made sensible upgrades to the their Soviet vehicles, but these vehicles are now badly outdated even with extra armor and new turrets/combat modules. Even half-modern vehicles like the BTR-22 and BMP-3 Manul would be better, but really they needed those Kurganets and Bumerang platforms, and even the T-15, or an equivalent on the T-90/72 chassis. It's not clear Russia has learned this lesson. Russian forces get upgraded T-72/80s or new T-90Ms and immediately start converting them into tank sheds. Yet we don't see anything from Russian design bureaus that effectively incorporates these lessons. To the best of my knowledge the record for surviving FPV drone strikes is that tank-shed covered in steel cable "dreadlocks" from the iirc 114th MRBde (former DNR), with 60 drone strikes. This is an excellent argument for a heavy tracked APC on a tank chassis with this kind of protection. Even just BMO-Ts with pre-built cages and "dreadlocks". But... no.
I agree tho something like a new vehicle design for full production I can legitimately see as a project that may be done post war. I'm guessing stoping current production to make changes is not really a sound strategy. One would also think the improvments to there missiles and drones combined with the new production rates put new vehicle designs on the backburner. Of course you could be spot on as you think you would at least see some more modifications coming out of the factory.
Will be interesting to see any new stuff after the war. Personally I wonder if there going to opt for speed and mobility or survivability, utility. Either way I think there experience in Ukraine is going to leave them with a army that looks alot different then what anyone else is building these days.
The isr capabilities and sheer numbers that are present in Ukraine are well suited to crippling modern Army's. Be interesting to see what Russia's answer to the probloms is when looked at from not just doctrine changes but how the army built with that in mind.

Right now it's obviously secondary to keeping the army they have going be even under these conditions we have seen quite a bit of change. I don't know what the answer is for maneuver warfare i imagian commanders on both sides freaking out over a 1000km front and your lucky if you can sneak couple of squads across it in a vehicle. Due to that fact alone I'm sure there is lots of discussion on the subject

It's very possible they intend to go with a new chassis aswell and are just gonna stick with what they got for this war befor building it for the next one. I mean if they got a good enough idea of what direction they want to go the impact of drones certainly would certainly justify that level investment.

Something has to change simply put formations do not cross the no man's land of drones intact as cohsive fighting units. And if they do they are on a timer, I think you may have to design the whole concept of assaulting with that in mind I think alot of armoured war and combined arms tactics had some very very cold water pored on them in Ukraine
 
Last edited:

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I agree tho something like a new vehicle design for full production I can legitimately see as a project that may be done post war. I'm guessing stoping current production to make changes is not really a sound strategy. One would also think the improvments to there missiles and drones combined with the new production rates put new vehicle designs on the backburner. Of course you could be spot on as you think you would at least see some more modifications coming out of the factory.
I understand this logic on some level and I think it's part of the reason thinks like the Koalitsiya 2S35 are delayed. But the BMO-T was in production and could be produced on existing lines pre-war. There's a wider set of concerns about Russia's development priorities. The BMPT which showed itself to be survivable but not especially useful is now apparently going to be produced, even if only ~100 vehicles or so. And the continued pattern of turret cages being put in as part of the production run but as soon as vehicles arrive in their units, military personnel start adding either "dreadlock" armor or building sheds, or both. Yet the factories keep stubbornly putting out something that isn't well adapted to the realities of the war. I'm confident, based on observations, that Russia has bottlenecks in the production of heavy tracked chassis, but even converting old T-54/55s into H-APCs with assault sheds would be helpful. Yet that's not what we're seeing. BMP-3s are getting delivered with frankly minimalistic roof cages. Tanks are getting robust roof cages and rubber sheeting added, but still far less than what is adequate.

Some footage came out recently, I'll include it in the next update, that shows a Russian military repair unit doing testing on the survivability of unarmored vehicles with anti-drone cages, to determine optimal cage designs. They also test an improvised APS based on the Tucha smoke grenade launchers and some sort of optical device. Yet we're still not seeing Arena-M deployment, or anything else similar. It makes me wonder if the lessons of the war are being learned and internalized or if the Russian armed forces are evolving from below without a good grasp from above of what this entails in practice. BTR-82As are a particularly good example of a vehicle whose protection is inadequate and whose utility in this war is very limited, yet they're being continuously pumped out in voluem, and we haven't even seen a substantial attempt to improve their protection beyond the extra armor kits that can be mounted on the BTR-82AT. For comparison Serbia recently did some upgrades on BTR-80As (very similar vehicles) that they apparently sourced from Hungary and their extra armor looks much more robust and better designed then what Russia is doing, despite having incomparably fewer resources, and not being in the middle of a major war.

Will be interesting to see any new stuff after the war. Personally I wonder if there going to opt for speed and mobility or survivability, utility. Either way I think there experience in Ukraine is going to leave them with a army that looks alot different then what anyone else is building these days.
The isr capabilities and sheer numbers that are present in Ukraine are well suited to crippling modern Army's. Be interesting to see what Russia's answer to the probloms is when looked at from not just doctrine changes but how the army built with that in mind.

Right now it's obviously secondary to keeping the army they have going be even under these conditions we have seen quite a bit of change. I don't know what the answer is for maneuver warfare i imagian commanders on both sides freaking out over a 1000km front and your lucky if you can sneak couple of squads across it in a vehicle. Due to that fact alone I'm sure there is lots of discussion on the subject

It's very possible they intend to go with a new chassis aswell and are just gonna stick with what they got for this war befor building it for the next one. I mean if they got a good enough idea of what direction they want to go the impact of drones certainly would certainly justify that level investment.

Something has to change simply put formations do not cross the no man's land of drones intact as cohsive fighting units. And if they do they are on a timer, I think you may have to design the whole concept of assaulting with that in mind I think alot of armoured war and combined arms tactics had some very very cold water pored on them in Ukraine
I think we will have to wait and see. I'm of the opinion that the proliferation of cheap drones and even cheap loitering muntions changes things for armored and mechanized warfare. I'm not convinced we've arrived at the new plateau though. I think we will see more evolutions during this war. I remember when one drone per armored vehicle was considered good. Now we have a dozen per being normal. But I saw a video recently where Ukraine, the side with ostensibly fewer drones, used 7 to try and take out a single Russian service member. I don't think we've reached peak drone density or optimal design yet.
 

crest

Member
I think we will have to wait and see. I'm of the opinion that the proliferation of cheap drones and even cheap loitering muntions changes things for armored and mechanized warfare. I'm not convinced we've arrived at the new plateau though. I think we will see more evolutions during this war. I remember when one drone per armored vehicle was considered good. Now we have a dozen per being normal. But I saw a video recently where Ukraine, the side with ostensibly fewer drones, used 7 to try and take out a single Russian service member. I don't think we've reached peak drone density or optimal design yet.
I agree we definitely have not seen were this ends, I do however think we have hit a new platue at least as far as how we ecpect to fight it.
people speak of them as just another artillery form but the isr capabilities not to mention the much shorter reaction times and kill chain not just at the front but the supply routs, that's a game changer. At least against the way battles are currently fought, it's almost impossible to close with the enemy on favorable terms.

If you can't hard counter it is going to require a change in how you fight and that I think is something not even on the radar for many. From what I can gather there looking at how to continue with the practices and doctrine they have. But how much of that is neutralised if the enemy not only sees you coming but can break up the attack before it hits and do it reliability? It's very much worth noting that the drone war took time to evolve to this point in the war. Consider for a moment how far do you think Russia could get if it didn't have the overmatch in firepower, production,air power and men it has now or even if Ukraine didn't have a real shortage of men. It's not just about your superiority anymore even it's about the mass a defender can muster no matter the relative numbers there is still a critical mass that will see you and will break up your attack. The idea you still get that first blow you can ride to at least a local victory needs to be rethought over or the entire approach reworked imop

I see armoured assaults with the sole goal of hoping just a few get close enough to drop a small squad off before retreating. That's basically the norm and thats not even that reliable more often then not those formations are crippled before they get anywer close to the contact line. He'll just assembling them to head off is its own challenge. If Ukraine had the manpower to hold there fortifications and cover gaps I suspect russia would have a much harder time of it. Same goes for motorbikes and drg squads effective in this war but due to several factors that won't be present at the start of a war. namely slow development of the scale, capabilities and tactics now used and the effects attrition have already played on Ukraine. Nor do you always have 1000kms of frontline to spread defenders over

It kind of reminds me of trench warfare in WW1. That was all because of the defensive power of artillery was to much to attack into, that lead to trenches. Trenches lead to stalemate. That lead to the tank. The tank lead to a combined arms approch. in each case it wasn't the deployment of the weapon that changed how it was used in warfare. It was the lessons learned from being on the receiving end of it that prompted the real changes.
Russia and Ukraine are the first countries to see drone not as a military asset and perhaps a threat but as a system that has quite litterity forced them change there approach to warfare. I think that level of impact on there ability to conduct operations is what is going to make whatever changes they make very interesting indeed

Edit.
Actually there is one other country that seems to be taking drones as more of a factor that's china. Now I don't know if this is because of there links to Russia or perhaps there lack of experience also gives them a lack of bias when looking drone warfare. Aswell as the timing of its emergence with there modernization I'm sure all three play a part tho. Either way there parade showcased a military that did Infact look quite a bit different in its philosophy of battle in some regards.
 
Last edited:

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Another interesting outcome, things played out in that ironic fashion I speculated on earlier. Ukraine has effectively eliminated the so called Dobropol'ye salient, the one north of Mirnograd, but has lost Pokrovsk and the lid on the cauldron in Mirnograd seems to be closing. This might be our first actual encirclement of any substantial Ukrainian forces since Mariupol'. With current low troop densities it's an open question how many troops are actually caught in there, and there's the fact that drones are hunting everything, meaning it's often hard to manage a surrender of any kind. Either way, Russian assault teams are now within ~1kms of each other south of Rodinskoe and north-east of Pokrovsk.
 

crest

Member

Thought I would post this here it's a very good discussion on the ongoing attempts at battlefield adaptation by both sides. Critically not just the systems but the actual structural changes the governments are taking to identify adapt and deploy innovation.

I always thought Rubicon was a one off a rare spot of the Russian army shaking off that Soviet and post Soviet mold. I had no idea it was a direct result of a much deeper effort at decentralization. Or at least a real start at one it's still got major issues in fact they apparently send spies to the front line to see if what the being told is true. But then again it's having positive results.
Really good points on how the decentralization in Ukraine really does spur innovation but limits it's ability to capitalize on it. After the war I think nations should be headhunting alot of these squads to head up there drone units
 
Last edited:

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Some thoughts related to many of the posts above, without quoting any particular one; had some time hanging at the airport earlier today (Redshift probably misses my “essays”).

Consider the money being pumped into Ukraine to sustain a (most) likely (I am positive it is) losing war being pumped into rebuilding and prosperity of the country, building and supporting democratic institutions, modern infrastructure, industry, etc. Instead, the money is being dumped into a black hole that no one is likely to see any return on.

What is going to happen when the war ends one way or another? Most likely, in my opinion, there will be injections of funds to maybe sustain the country more or less functional so that it does not disintegrate. Domestic priorities will always be… well, the priority. Euros do not have the cash to throw around, some are basically broke and near default level, so with war ending, support will decrease dramatically. Americans straight up could not care less. Euro-integration is likely to slowdown and take a backseat. Ukraine is not unlikely to remain a more authoritarian state than it was prior and is now. Young people probably understand that and are leaving by thousands daily. This is probably also an indicator of how people who left will not be coming back after the war is over. There is better life elsewhere. Every single immigrant I know from that part of the world (post-Soviet space), and that is quite a few, needed, I would say, no more than a couple of years on average to live here to never look back (first visit back usually opens the eyes pretty quickly, right at the airport, in spite of nostalgia, if any, and all). It’s been that now and more. Here, if you are smart (not even a necessity) and work hard, you are likely going to prosper; to say otherwise, it is mostly up to you and there are opportunities to succeed. There… Well, you may very well still suck the suck and so will your kids. Reasonable people understand that and, like I said, a couple of years living here do the trick for almost everyone I have met (while anecdotal, but I would take it as factual for North America and I would assume (at least most of) Europe is no different). A few years stay outside, in the “western world”, for the kids is beyond the ability to quickly adapt upon the return. It is unreasonable to expect them to get used to that world again and just be happy (they will not be happy with their parents’ decision to move back). This is trivial stuff for anyone with the knowledge of the subject matter.

Furthermore, there are members of the EU that unilaterally restrict Ukrainian exports today and there will be even more opposition to the Ukrainian accession into the Union once the real discussion starts, which may not even happen to begin with. Again, young people (and probably older ones) realize this to be true and those who can are leaving today. Zelensky may (probably?) understands this as well. The war basically keeps the country going now with massive injections of money from the outside. Once that stops, the country will be left with constantly decreasing productive population, while the retirees and less capable are left within. A good chunk of the budget will have to be spent on those people that no longer contribute to the said budget in any meaningful way. This is clearly not sustainable. At the same time, the injection of money is gradually decreasing due to the internal priorities of the donors, even as the war is ongoing. Some may contribute more than before, perhaps, but the overall picture is not optimistic.

To cut this short, here we are. I have no idea what the solution is. I know that it is in the interest of Ukraine to settle today rather than tomorrow or a year from now. There is no question in my mind that Ukraine would end way before Russia does, western support at the current level or not. How the settlement happens, I really don’t know. If Donbas were to be given up, how does that happen and what happens to the people still residing in the region? I have asked a whole bunch of questions related to the subject previously. Any concrete security guarantees are clearly not in play at the moment (and won’t be because no one will fight Russia for Ukraine and everyone wants to have that buffer there to begin with, the buffer you do not have to throw your troops into, but provide financial and materiel help, if that). Ukraine is not in the position to build up their capabilities to serve as a deterrent for future invasion either, which is the only guarantee they can actually have. They will not be able to run their budget as they do now with all of it going into military and MIC. So building their own capabilities to outrace Russia is not in the cards.

What I see here is Georgia scenario, but on a much bigger scale, bigger sacrifices. I don’t see a future where Ukraine is fully independent of Russia. I don’t believe there is a choice to be had, really. They will have to work with Russia regardless of how this ends. Someone said something like having bigger Baltic states in the face of Ukraine is not in the cards for Russia. Well, I believe it is not in the cards at all, not for Russia, not for Ukraine.

Furthermore, imagine Ukraine being in a “deterrence race” with Russia. Ukraine alone will lose every time. Russia has more capabilities now and always will simply due to its depth, whether it is finances, resources, population, territory, you name it. There is no way around it. Ukraine cannot compete with that and not even close. Hence, the continuous talk of Russia needing to cease to exist as it does today. This is not currently in the cards either. We are really talking about all these drones and shed tanks today because Russia really ef-ed up in 2022 when they invaded completely unprepared. A major (historic level stuff) strategic failure. There would not be either if things were properly planned, that simple (though it is not, really). The main take away from all this is that you really need to think things through before you take a decisive action on such a grotesque scale. Which is why there will be no invasion of NATO members by Russia and vice versa unless there is a great weakness that is not observable today. Any talk of such is complete nonsense. Neither side is prepared for that kind of fight (beyond trying to rationalize reasons for doing so).

Thus, in a way, application of this amount of drones and shed tanks and the like has very limited implications in a wider context. But it certainly has implications for conflicts of any size in general and insurgency in particular. This is the technology and tactics that are much easier to pass (and learn on your own based on the experience provided in the countless video material in this war). Pretty big blows can be delivered very quickly to unprepared parties and everything that has been seen since is actually
unprepared parties for this type of warfare and we have already seen bomb drops and FPV hits. It certainly is part of the future, where ever it leads.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
On will, resources, etc. They all matter. You can have all the resources you want, but cannot fight and win without a will. You can have all the will you humanely can and beyond, but you cannot fight and win without resources. Ukraine’s will is far from ideal: there are those that are willing and are on the battlefield, those who are not willing are also forcefully there; there are those who are willing to sacrifice those on the battlefield, but also willing to live through the power outages, cold winter apartments, being deprived otherwise; there is probably a whole bunch of people to whom all this is simply inconvenience of life and they just want it to stop, regardless of how it does so. To me, their (Ukrainian) approach to this “existential war” is bonkers. WW2 (or, more precisely, The Great Patriotic War) was existential for the region and it was approached accordingly by the Soviets.

Resources… well, Ukraine has none. Which is also bonkers, to expect to succeed in years-long fight fully dependent on external help of hundreds of billions of dollars annually. It’s insane.

Anyway, while there is some will (or great will from some) and some resources still provided, the biggest piece that has been missing in this from the beginning is strategy. Strategic thinking is absent completely. I talked about it numerous times and all the regulars here are my witnesses (ha!). It seems for the first time a realistic goal had been set due to the great pressure from Trump, being forcing Russians to accept the frontline as the acceptable “end line” and resolute for (hopefully) peace. It may not be currently achievable (and the frontline is not stationary), but this is a realistic scenario. It isn’t fair, just, desirable (though it probably is highly so “right now” in the current circumstances), but it is a realistic scenario that talks can be built on, while the line keeps moving. All the nonsense about driving Russians completely out of Ukraine, sun-bathing on beaches of Crimea in the summer of 2023, then the next year, and the year beyond, was insanity caused by the Russian own strategic failures in the early days. The unexpected success in the early months of the war has caused this drunk state in everyone’s heads, like hopeless romantics with big dreams just to be crushed by the grim reality that some of us haven’t completely disconnected from (I will go with this analogy, rather than more brute terms I would normally use). The whole process has been like a casino, where a dude wins a few hands, goes ape crazy and ends up losing his home, family, and everything dear to him because casino always wins. Speaking of apes, this is another example, where the “apes” celebrate together some minor winnings in the stock market, then yolo all they have, take up debt because “zomg, to the moon” and we all know how that story ends too. They are all the same, these stories, and this one is no different.

The most important things to consider in any endeavour are what it is you are looking to achieve and what is your exit strategy if things do not work out, especially if you are the underdog. There are other important parts, but if either one of these is missing or has nothing to do with reality snd no space for adjustment, you are bound to fail, regardless of the will and resources. Provided, in combination, the weakness in the latter two as well, you are bound to fail regardless, period. It is also called strategy rather than a plan or an equivalent because it is contingent on other events and actions of other players. If you do not adjust, you lose. For big boys lacking both of the above, see the adventures of Americans in Afghanistan story (Soviets had similar adventures with the same strategic failures, both leaving with their tails between their legs), Iraq, Vietnam, hundreds of examples in military history and uncountable more in business failures. In case of Ukraine, floating on good vibes and feelings, supported by some idiotic statements from cheerleaders is going to get you with your face flat in the dumpster and, potentially, a huge debt to repay, while having no home, family, or the very cheerleaders because they will either forget you even existed to begin with or pat you on the back and say how sorry they are and they genuinely believed in you and did all they could and you did the best you could too and it is too bad things turned out this way, but what are you gonna do. They (cheerleaders) will move on with their lives, some may pick your pockets for the leftovers if there are any, and you will remain with your face in the garbage to pick yourself up. This is how the real world works.

Russians messed up bigly in the early days, where all their troubles are coming from. They then regrouped, reinvested, mobilized, and they are doing what they can. They have a goal, they have a strategy, they literally keep grinding, while being laughed at by many (second best army in Ukraine/Russia and whatever other nonsense). People talk about what their advances or lack of cost the country and praise Ukraine. If one looks back (soberly) and thinks about what Ukraine achieved since the late fall of 2022, that is in nearly three years, and what they lost in this time period, it should make one think what all the cheering was/is about. They lost a shit tonne of abled bodies, infrastructure, lots probably beyond repair, strategic towns, etc. I was looking for a couple of my posts after Kherson and Kharkiv counteroffensives ran out of steam and pre-2023 counteroffensive to quote for substance (more like predictions), but I could not find them. The regulars may remember what I had said back then, but perhaps many remember it as what Redshift called Russia support and someone else Russian propaganda. It is not either, but it is what it is, really.

Ukraine’s strategy has been clickbait media reports and social media content from the very beginning. Later on, suicidal “footholds”, “bridgeheads”, and “probing attacks” in Kherson and Crimea “landings” (usually in boats full of dead bodies), “Fortress of Bakhmut”, Kursk adventures, attempted trips to Belgorod, 2023 counteroffensive past the first two or three weeks of inception, epic thermite drones and now epic missiles produced in hundreds per annum (while begging for Tomahawks), hundreds of Bohdanas, and so on. Then there were earlier Ghosts of Kiev, Azov Fortress, man shooting Su from a shotgun, grandmas throwing pickle jars at drones, among countless others. Now there are troops in Myrnohrad and the area. All meant to build a cheerleader base and attract resources, by showing the will. Price - lots of blood and eradication of the very will and capability to defend via losing the very capable troops and, perhaps, most patriotic Ukrainians that the future could be built on, based on lives, not graves and stories of valour and honour told in another country years past this is all over. Try to get an average Ukrainian to join the infantry (or military in general) nowadays. No one wants to be treated as an expandable piece of body for content in the media and it is a rational approach. People have been had for years with the fairy tales, Zelensky keeps talking nonsense in his daily messages to the country and the world, and is being encouraged by the lemmings on social media and Euro politicians who refuse to have communication channels with the Russians and try to “play” Trump by announcing the ball being in someone’s court rather than theirs (hint: you want to have the ball). Basically cheering on a drug addict (no, this not a reference to the nonsense rumours of Zelensky sniffing coke) for his addiction and enhancing the delusion while the guy burns down the house. I referenced this Ukrainian saying previously and I will again now: the house had burnt down, let the fence burn as well. This is where we (rather they) are currently (the house is still burning, but the fence is already on fire as well). But what are you gonna do. Will, might, resources are all good. You can have it all, but with your head in the sand, none of those matter, individually or combined. Wars have been won and lost based on good and bad strategies, respectively, in circumstances that could not have been imagined before the events took place. Hey, maybe this is one of those historic events we are witnessing and Zelensky and Syrsky will be remembered as some great strategists of our time (laughing). Zaluzhny jumped ship just in time to be remembered as a great protector of Ukraine who won some significant battles (taking advantage of the Russian ef-ups), not for failure to think of defences for when the good times were over and what were to come next and he is now writing his essays about technological breakthroughs and stalemates. What will we be remembered for? For sticking with it to the end, in spite of Trump’s “strategic” blunder (talk to the Russians and cutting aid) that brought the whole (glass) castle down? Well, moments after Trump administration announced new sanctions on Russia, Merz gave a hug to Zelensky and posted “as long as it takes” again (aka “we are so back!”).

IMG_2722.jpeg

It’s funny how the talks of nukes disappeared altogether too for quite a while. Medvedev is the exception, of course. As if the nukes don’t exist, while the vice-president of the United States basically outlined the justification of their first (and hopefully last) use in his interview not long ago, on the example of the situation the Russians are finding themselves in right now. Are we going to get all concerned about these nukes if the Russian forces are “about to be defeated” again? Or are we going to calm ourselves down by repeating the nonsense about China prohibiting Russia from using the said nukes?

So anyway, yolo is not a strategy, but it seems to be the way it has been going since the end of the 2023 counteroffensive a week after it began for Ukraine.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
On moral stance (the five-page response Redshift was waiting for).

Nothing wrong with moral stance. But when this is all that is commented on, it is, in fact, silly.

Furthermore, some put the moral stance above logic, which clouds judgement and rational thinking.

I don’t believe I had ever expressed my moral stance on this forum. I strongly believe that it doesn’t belong in any rational discussion (unless we are discussing the morality itself). Repeating things like “illegal invasion”, like a lemming, is idiotic; invasion usually implies that it is “illegal”. “Unjustified Russian aggression” is also nonsense talk, as many same high-ranking officials explained the possible train of thought, saying beforehand that they are not trying to justify it (see Gen. Mark Milley’s quotes I cited here previously as a great example), which is fair and it is the explaining of things that I am interested in. And so on.

I personally don’t care who has what moral stance. I don’t care if one thinks if Russia is “justified” in doing what it is doing or otherwise. It has no relevance. I said in this very thread previously (I think it was to that Mainframe or whatever his handle was dude, the trophy guy that came back as an alt not that long ago): I don’t care if you push the Russian narrative or agenda, as long as you can support it with evidence or, at the very least, rational reasoning that is worth discussing. Things can be learned from any rational person as we never have all information available to us. Opinions can differ and the middle ground may never be found, but a discussion can always take place and, while not necessarily, something can be gained from it, potentially by both sides. If one starts and ends with nonsense without any supporting evidence or sufficiently rational reasoning behind it is another matter.

Not sure about others, but I know and interacted with many people over the years from different parts of the world, living in Canada allows that luxury, in addition to having contacts in various parts of the world and Ukraine and Russia in particular. All kinds of opinions out there. From emotional wrecks to complete indifference. One guy from Chernihiv told me this when I asked him what he thought of the conflict: “It doesn’t matter. Either you will be paid hrivnas or rubles, that is all. I prefer dollars.” Is that unreasonable or somehow immoral? I don’t know. Is it immoral or unreasonable being a Ukrainian in late 20-s early 30-s and whine about Russian attacks against Ukraine and how Russia must be defeated, while watching a drone show in the Heritage Park in Alberta, Canada months after running from Ukraine? I am not sure what the moral stance here is, I really don’t, and to each their own? I believe I mentioned this here last year and how weird it felt because I mostly thought about this very war watching the (fairly lame) show. Is it immoral for a dude in Russia to support this Russian aggression? Do you think if they had “free press”, the dude would instead desire the Russian Federation to go bankrupt, fall apart, and other “nasties”? That seems to be the expectations from the, so called, Russian opposition currently residing in the West. Was it moral for the Americans supporting their troops in Iraq or elsewhere? I guess we are turning to page five now or there about? Haha. I guess I have a few more things to say on the subject.

So morality is relative. Rational reasoning, not so much. In fact, as Aumann suggested, rational people that, in simple terms, have the same information and starting point, would never agree to disagree. Unfortunately, this is almost never the case in the real world (so rational reasoning is relative, after all?). Beyond the fact that many (most?) people are irrational, we all have different information and fundamental assumptions (which may make us look irrational?). Furthermore, the more of us participate, the more “imperfect” the space gets, but it usually gets divided into a couple of groups of supporting opposing points of view. Both groups would have those perceived by their peers to be from the other camp because their position is not perfectly in line with theirs and so on. And hence the need for discussion and learning from one another. If anyone is entirely convinced that everything they know and believe (which I think (but not sure) I already discussed previously to be a weird concept (“believe”)) is 100% correct, then why are they here? Nothing to learn or discuss, but to sound louder than others? Anyway, for those not familiar with Aumann’s theorem, here is a relatively brief (and basic) but interesting discussion with the man himself:


I am going to turn to page “n” now. Here is another thought, while discussing the subject of morality and whatnot. What is considered the moral stance, “right” or “wrong”? Russia is wrong and must (be) stop(ped)? Ukraine should survive with the best possible conditions for the future development snd existence? Russia must be destroyed? Something else?

So here is where the confusion may also be. I am not in the “anti-Russia” camp. I don’t believe Russia should be destructed, neither from within, nor from the outside forces. I see this as a completely ludicrous reasoning. When the US and UK invaded Iraq, created the “coalition of the willing” (the irony?), was I supposed to desire for a civil war in the United States or the United Kingdom, disappearance of these countries from the map, Poland (or Ukraine?) being absorbed by Russia for their very active (in case of Poland) participation in the invasion buying brownie points, etc? Of course not, that would be worse than idiotic and “death to America” equivalent. In fact, that would be cheering against my own wellbeing. Did I want the atrocities to end and wished it had never happened in the first place? Yes, absolutely (provided once the atrocities start, they are not easy to stop because things may have been moved for the worse by the initial actions and may need to be dealt with). I had never seen the same reaction from the very invaders and many of their supporters then as I see about the ongoing invasion and atrocities now. We live in the ”happily ever after” world, shitload of debt and the orange man blaming everyone and everything ruling the current greatest (power in the world). Like the dude from Brussel said, he would need to see some legal basis before handling the Russian money because no one had ever done that, even during the WW2.


So here is my five pages worth of… rubbish? Well, you get what you paid for it. This is a long way of saying that your (reader’s) moral stance ain’t worth much. Neither is mine or anyone else’s, but to ourselves alone because it makes us feel righteous, even if hypocritical. The utility we get from feeling this way is higher than if we felt otherwise or indifferent. Utility explains a lot of human behaviour (or behaviour explains the utility). However, It adds no value to understanding how things started and, more importantly now, how they end in this particular case. Moral stance peovides no gains in understanding war, its dynamics, and lays no path for victory (or defeat). Both sides feel morally and otherwise justified doing what they do. Thoughts and prayers don’t matter either. I believe comments like “you, I think/feel wrongly/undercover/whatever support Russia’s/Ukraine’s stance” have no value whatsoever. Assuming the person does either way, so what? Who cares? What is the point of discussing morality at all? Especially since it had been done so ad nauseam and all I see from some users is “you never said that about Russia” and the like. Provide a reasonable argument when you disagree and be a part of discussion to add relevance and substance. Otherwise why bother? I already asked some about that previously, they choose to keep on with keeping on, which is fine with me, I just do not see the relevance.
 

Vladb

New Member
Great vibe from the front:


Note the number of destroyed transport vehicles and constant focus on drone alerts during movement on the roads.

Also lots of motorbikes being employed for transport duties.

And apparently this is 15 km from the frontline, not 3 or 5.
 
Top