On will, resources, etc. They all matter. You can have all the resources you want, but cannot fight and win without a will. You can have all the will you humanely can and beyond, but you cannot fight and win without resources. Ukraine’s will is far from ideal: there are those that are willing and are on the battlefield, those who are not willing are also forcefully there; there are those who are willing to sacrifice those on the battlefield, but also willing to live through the power outages, cold winter apartments, being deprived otherwise; there is probably a whole bunch of people to whom all this is simply inconvenience of life and they just want it to stop, regardless of how it does so. To me, their (Ukrainian) approach to this “existential war” is bonkers. WW2 (or, more precisely, The Great Patriotic War) was existential for the region and it was approached accordingly by the Soviets.
Resources… well, Ukraine has none. Which is also bonkers, to expect to succeed in years-long fight fully dependent on external help of hundreds of billions of dollars annually. It’s insane.
Anyway, while there is some will (or great will from some) and some resources still provided, the biggest piece that has been missing in this from the beginning is strategy. Strategic thinking is absent completely. I talked about it numerous times and all the regulars here are my witnesses (ha!). It seems for the first time a realistic goal had been set due to the great pressure from Trump, being forcing Russians to accept the frontline as the acceptable “end line” and resolute for (hopefully) peace. It may not be currently achievable (and the frontline is not stationary), but this is a realistic scenario. It isn’t fair, just, desirable (though it probably is highly so “right now” in the current circumstances), but it is a realistic scenario that talks can be built on, while the line keeps moving. All the nonsense about driving Russians completely out of Ukraine, sun-bathing on beaches of Crimea in the summer of 2023, then the next year, and the year beyond, was insanity caused by the Russian own strategic failures in the early days. The unexpected success in the early months of the war has caused this drunk state in everyone’s heads, like hopeless romantics with big dreams just to be crushed by the grim reality that some of us haven’t completely disconnected from (I will go with this analogy, rather than more brute terms I would normally use). The whole process has been like a casino, where a dude wins a few hands, goes ape crazy and ends up losing his home, family, and everything dear to him because casino always wins. Speaking of apes, this is another example, where the “apes” celebrate together some minor winnings in the stock market, then yolo all they have, take up debt because “zomg, to the moon” and we all know how that story ends too. They are all the same, these stories, and this one is no different.
The most important things to consider in any endeavour are what it is you are looking to achieve and what is your exit strategy if things do not work out, especially if you are the underdog. There are other important parts, but if either one of these is missing or has nothing to do with reality snd no space for adjustment, you are bound to fail, regardless of the will and resources. Provided, in combination, the weakness in the latter two as well, you are bound to fail regardless, period. It is also called strategy rather than a plan or an equivalent because it is contingent on other events and actions of other players. If you do not adjust, you lose. For big boys lacking both of the above, see the adventures of Americans in Afghanistan story (Soviets had similar adventures with the same strategic failures, both leaving with their tails between their legs), Iraq, Vietnam, hundreds of examples in military history and uncountable more in business failures. In case of Ukraine, floating on good vibes and feelings, supported by some idiotic statements from cheerleaders is going to get you with your face flat in the dumpster and, potentially, a huge debt to repay, while having no home, family, or the very cheerleaders because they will either forget you even existed to begin with or pat you on the back and say how sorry they are and they genuinely believed in you and did all they could and you did the best you could too and it is too bad things turned out this way, but what are you gonna do. They (cheerleaders) will move on with their lives, some may pick your pockets for the leftovers if there are any, and you will remain with your face in the garbage to pick yourself up. This is how the real world works.
Russians messed up bigly in the early days, where all their troubles are coming from. They then regrouped, reinvested, mobilized, and they are doing what they can. They have a goal, they have a strategy, they literally keep grinding, while being laughed at by many (second best army in Ukraine/Russia and whatever other nonsense). People talk about what their advances or lack of cost the country and praise Ukraine. If one looks back (soberly) and thinks about what Ukraine achieved since the late fall of 2022, that is in nearly three years, and what they lost in this time period, it should make one think what all the cheering was/is about. They lost a shit tonne of abled bodies, infrastructure, lots probably beyond repair, strategic towns, etc. I was looking for a couple of my posts after Kherson and Kharkiv counteroffensives ran out of steam and pre-2023 counteroffensive to quote for substance (more like predictions), but I could not find them. The regulars may remember what I had said back then, but perhaps many remember it as what Redshift called Russia support and someone else Russian propaganda. It is not either, but it is what it is, really.
Ukraine’s strategy has been clickbait media reports and social media content from the very beginning. Later on, suicidal “footholds”, “bridgeheads”, and “probing attacks” in Kherson and Crimea “landings” (usually in boats full of dead bodies), “Fortress of Bakhmut”, Kursk adventures, attempted trips to Belgorod, 2023 counteroffensive past the first two or three weeks of inception, epic thermite drones and now epic missiles produced in hundreds per annum (while begging for Tomahawks), hundreds of Bohdanas, and so on. Then there were earlier Ghosts of Kiev, Azov Fortress, man shooting Su from a shotgun, grandmas throwing pickle jars at drones, among countless others. Now there are troops in Myrnohrad and the area. All meant to build a cheerleader base and attract resources, by showing the will. Price - lots of blood and eradication of the very will and capability to defend via losing the very capable troops and, perhaps, most patriotic Ukrainians that the future could be built on, based on lives, not graves and stories of valour and honour told in another country years past this is all over. Try to get an average Ukrainian to join the infantry (or military in general) nowadays. No one wants to be treated as an expandable piece of body for content in the media and it is a rational approach. People have been had for years with the fairy tales, Zelensky keeps talking nonsense in his daily messages to the country and the world, and is being encouraged by the lemmings on social media and Euro politicians who refuse to have communication channels with the Russians and try to “play” Trump by announcing the ball being in someone’s court rather than theirs (hint: you want to have the ball). Basically cheering on a drug addict (no, this not a reference to the nonsense rumours of Zelensky sniffing coke) for his addiction and enhancing the delusion while the guy burns down the house. I referenced this Ukrainian saying previously and I will again now: the house had burnt down, let the fence burn as well. This is where we (rather they) are currently (the house is still burning, but the fence is already on fire as well). But what are you gonna do. Will, might, resources are all good. You can have it all, but with your head in the sand, none of those matter, individually or combined. Wars have been won and lost based on good and bad strategies, respectively, in circumstances that could not have been imagined before the events took place. Hey, maybe this is one of those historic events we are witnessing and Zelensky and Syrsky will be remembered as some great strategists of our time (laughing). Zaluzhny jumped ship just in time to be remembered as a great protector of Ukraine who won some significant battles (taking advantage of the Russian ef-ups), not for failure to think of defences for when the good times were over and what were to come next and he is now writing his essays about technological breakthroughs and stalemates. What will we be remembered for? For sticking with it to the end, in spite of Trump’s “strategic” blunder (talk to the Russians and cutting aid) that brought the whole (glass) castle down? Well, moments after Trump administration announced new sanctions on Russia, Merz gave a hug to Zelensky and posted “as long as it takes” again (aka “we are so back!”).
It’s funny how the talks of nukes disappeared altogether too for quite a while. Medvedev is the exception, of course. As if the nukes don’t exist, while the vice-president of the United States basically outlined the justification of their first (and hopefully last) use in his interview not long ago, on the example of the situation the Russians are finding themselves in right now. Are we going to get all concerned about these nukes if the Russian forces are “about to be defeated” again? Or are we going to calm ourselves down by repeating the nonsense about China prohibiting Russia from using the said nukes?
So anyway, yolo is not a strategy, but it seems to be the way it has been going since the end of the 2023 counteroffensive a week after it began for Ukraine.