The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
So if you decide to shoot your neighbours poodle because you personally think that it is a threat that's just fine and dandy eh?

What if your neighbour decides that your goldfish is a threat should your neighbour break into your house and kill your goldfish?
The better analogy is that you neighbor decides your goldfish is a threat, then claims that you are a nazi, then burns your house down.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Do you see widespread political agitation to stop fighting ? Do you see defense contractors deliberately leaving orders unfilled ? Is there sabotage of vehicles and munitions ?

We are probably quibbling over definitions, but without the above, there is clear evidence of the desire to not be Russian.

Now, no one can doubt this is changing over time:


With an increase in "Ukraine should seek to negotiate an ending to the war as soon as possible" this points to war weariness- but this is not the same as surrender. I take (collective) desire to not fight = surrender.
Yes I think we are quibbling about definitions. The reality is, Ukraine is out of volunteers who want to fight, or are even willing to obey mobilization orders, but hasn't reached the point where the population is willing to surrender. Though it's heading there.

Quantitatively, sure, but the presence of draft dodgers alone doesnt imply anything other than the human nature to not get killed. We are agreeing in principle and disagreeing to the extent of "wanting to fight".

Once we see several of the following, you can be sure the wheels have fallen off the UKR war effort:

- polling indicating the desire to end the war no matter what
- mass protests
- domestic war production suffering from strikes or other logistic disruptions
- widespread, continued RU advances with lower casualty rates
Russian advances are widespread, continuing, and have lower casualty rates than years past from what I've seen. The current mobilization effort requires considerable violence to the would-be recruits, and the TCC is generally despised throughout Ukrainian society. We've also had protests, including ones that broke into TCCs and released mobilized personnel. It's not about the presence of draft dodgers. It's about the absence of non-draft dodgers. But if you mean that it can get worse, and Ukraine isn't at the breaking point, then yes. That's true. As a Russian joke goes, when I hit rock bottom, I heard someone knocking from below.
 

crest

Member
Do you see widespread political agitation to stop fighting ? Do you see defense contractors deliberately leaving orders unfilled ? Is there sabotage of vehicles and munitions ?

We are probably quibbling over definitions, but without the above, there is clear evidence of the desire to not be Russian.

Now, no one can doubt this is changing over time:


With an increase in "Ukraine should seek to negotiate an ending to the war as soon as possible" this points to war weariness- but this is not the same as surrender. I take (collective) desire to not fight = surrender.



Quantitatively, sure, but the presence of draft dodgers alone doesnt imply anything other than the human nature to not get killed. We are agreeing in principle and disagreeing to the extent of "wanting to fight".

Once we see several of the following, you can be sure the wheels have fallen off the UKR war effort:

- polling indicating the desire to end the war no matter what
- mass protests
- domestic war production suffering from strikes or other logistic disruptions
- widespread, continued RU advances with lower casualty rates
I would have to disagree there desertion numbers like that are definitely a result of people not believing the fight is winnable/worth dieing for or they don't want to be there especially as there is no way out once in. Also considering they in many cases didn't volunteer to join, in fact we're litterity forcibly kidnapped off the streets and sent to the front with little training....those factors explain the manpower issue alot better then any other explanation I have heard. The multiple examples of soldiers themselves saying these things also lends alot of credit to the idea that at least as far as from fighting is concerned, the war is Infact quite unpopular. Tho there is of course a solid and large group that is commited to the fight problom is as far as recruitment goes there already fighting.

Russia for example has more soldiers in the Feild then Ukraine but way less desertions shouldn't human nature apply equally to both sides?
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
I think some of this has to do with Ukraine's counter-offensive in Kupyansk. It's been costly. There have also been some counter-attacks in the Konstantinovka area where Ukraine has lost vehicles, and of course the costly attempt to push back into Pokrovsk spearheaded by the newly delivered Australian M1s.
Yes, of course. This has been happening through out this year though and this is not a recent uptick in UA losses. Not only the reported losses have been converging for both sides, the Ukrainian losses have often been higher ever since and post the end of the Kursk adventures. I believe I cited a few posts of Janovsky (of Oryx), as well as Naalsio.(also of Oryx, but a separate count) over the past several months showing the exact same trend. The December summary by Perpetua I cited in my previous post clearly debunks the usual counterargument that neither of the aforementioned individuals/teams count civilian vehicles mostly used in attacks by Russians, so all is good and Ukrainians are killing Russians by buckets and saving their own man.

This uptick seems to line up rather well with the settlement of understanding that the loss of the US support could be permanent and the desire to show that Ukraine “still has the cards”. A final push to show Trump that they are capable to counterattack and take territory - in other words, fight back. I am just wondering what is going to happen next. Counterattacks in Pokrovsk, Huliaipole, etc are either much less fruitful or a complete failure. We shall see. Option b) in my previous post is certainly my understanding of the situation.

What also interests me, and why I could be completely wrong, is that this current “maximum” push certainly diminishes the future ability to withstand the Russian attacks - I do not believe this is up for debate, but a certainty. I would understand the logic behind it if the end to war was in sight and actual workable proposals were made by Ukraine. But there aren’t! What is proposed is guaranteed to be rejected because it makes no sense to begin with (neither does it look like an honest effort). The constant talk is that Russia wants to continue the war until capitulation of Ukraine. The Ukrainian (and Euro) reaction, however, is let’s prove it to be right. Then why waste all these resources if one plans to continue fighting and one’s position was already precarious to begin with. Notable is also the absence of loud Euro statements post the loan agreement, while work in tandem is pretty clear: nearly immediate bankruptcy averted -> release the plan (not before, indicating possible existing contingencies) -> ??? Zelesnky declares that the deal is almost done (peace deal might be signed before the new year!), Trump says that Zelesnky has nothing until Trump himself approves it, while Russians say that they are working with the Americans on the initial 28-point plan, which is not to their satisfaction either. While I realize we lack a lot of information here, but what we have been privileged to seeing clearly indicates a complete cluster****.

In the meantime, Putin said that the benefit of territorial swaps is quickly approaching zero for Russia. This is an obvious development (that I talked about previously) and while just words at this point, it appears that we are heading toward exactly that scenario months from now. I would translate it as “Judging by the tempo we are observing at the line of contact, our interest in the withdrawal of the Ukrainian forces from the territories they are holding for now is effectively approaching zero”:


Anyway, I think we will see what happens here shortly - in a few days, a couple of weeks, there should be more clarity. Or not?

EDIT: Ukraine's defenses in Gulyaypole seem to have collapsed. Russia is still mopping up but the town should be theirs within a day or two. This comes as Russia's push across the Gaychur expands in two bridgeheads, that are nonetheless so close together they will soon form one large one.
It looks like “she is gone”. And so is Rodynske. There were also a few geolocations of Russians in the centre of Lyman (presumably DRGs) and people asking if any troops were rotated from there to Kupyansk, as they were from other directions.

Interesting bit about Hulyaipole, some damage control took place just the other day, after the video appeared featuring 3 Russian troops being filmed in (now confirmed) UA command room they had captured with maps, a laptop, a smartphone (without password protection), a tablet, a bunch of documents, etc - basically a potential goldmine for the Russian intel from the looks of it. The explanation provided by Filatov, the commander of the 1st assault regiment (a man close to Syrsky, reportedly), via Google translate, uneddited:

The command post (KSP) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Gulyaipol, Zaporizhzhia region, was abandoned without a fight due to the panic of the personnel and the negligent actions of the commanders, despite the fact that an infiltrated group of only three Russian servicemen entered the city, the commander of the first separate assault regiment (1 OSHP) reported in a comment to Suspilny. He also emphasized that the Russian military did not have enough reinforcements, such as artillery or drone support (UBAVs).


He also said that the three Russian dudes that took the command post were so far from the line of contact that they did not have any comms because what they had was out of reach and, hence, acted on their own accord. Imagine talking this nonsense and being completely serious. He said that the three Russians heard the noise of the generator and decided to act. And so on.

Consider that if what he is saying is true (I am sure it isn’t), the state, be it mental or otherwise, of the Ukrainian forces on the frontline… But at least they now have Kupiansk that they expect Russians to withdraw from anyway. Tragicomedy continues.


Breaking news!!! Flamingos now outperform Tomahawks and are striking targets deep inside Russia!


Perhaps, the funniest part about that post is that it says right in that video that it was made with AI.


More breaking news!!! A Ukrainian UGV belonging to the Azov defends a frontline position for 45 days all by itself, killing a bucket of Russians in the process!


Perhaps, this guy is right:

IMG_3323.jpeg


Mostly free! Hurry!

I actually used to follow this fella (a real professor of Strategic Studies!), but stopped due to the amount of nonsense he is spitting. The guy writes books too (I can imagine reading one). The amount of feedback he received from reasonable (and even otherwise) people about this article was quite a bit and very quickly too. I would post some for the laughs, but will restrain myself.
 

Redshift

Active Member
The better analogy is that you neighbor decides your goldfish is a threat, then claims that you are a nazi, then burns your house down.
Having paranoid delusional ideas about your neighbours justifies murdering them according to RSEMMES.

Disliking your neighbours and murdering them is also good so long as you pretend that you thought that they were a threat ... That's the only excuse needed.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
My neighbour wanted to get a pit bull. Based on historical evidence and, perhaps, perceptions, the country decided that it should be illegal to own one though. Poodles and goldfish are welcome, on the other hand. Some don’t like any dogs at all for various reasons, one being a potential damage to their lawn, especially in fence-free or limited-fence communities, but they have to tolerate it because some in the community see a benefit of having a dog to either protect their yard (or to have the appearance of protection - some just put signs up, “beware of dog” without actually having a dog) or for emotional support or whatever other reason.

Goldfish and other marine pets are fine with most, though still not everyone, because even if you live in an apartment/flat, worst comes to worst you get a stain on your ceiling.

To note, neither is a reasonable comparison or analysis of a fairly complex issue at hand.
 

rsemmes

Active Member
The better analogy is that you neighbor decides your goldfish is a threat, then claims that you are a nazi, then burns your house down.
NATO shouldn't and cannot take any action against an invasion because Russia considers those fears irrational.

Edit.
I would say you use analogies to "better explain", not to feed your imagination. To feed the paranoia created by your imagination? This is starting to get confusing.

Who doesn't fear goldfish? They are nasty animals!
 
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crest

Member
I would say that having many military bases straddle your boarder when you are quite vocal about the perceived threat and it continues to grow,, is a far cry from attacking someone for owning a goldfish. One must remember context here now there is the argument for why NATO continued to expand its potential capabilities vs Russia but the fact they do when Russia has made attempts at de-escalation is important. Specifically in regarded to the history leading up to the Ukraine war, simplifying things down to a simple metaphor is both disingenuous and misleading..the history is quite well documented this was wasn't a random act it was the result of a series of events with many chances to avoid what for many observers was a predictable outcome if escalation continued. Very predictable I would say, even back when merkel voted down the first Ukraine NATO proposal sayin she believed Putin would consider it a act of war.

Think about that for a second because the pursuit of that policy in context is important, wether you agree with the assessment or not the fact is the risks wer well known yet the policy pursued


Note as I said there is of course the perceived threat of NATO from Russia but let's not pretend this is simply a unprovoked /unexpected action not a result serious of a escalations

If you want a metaphor this is more like building a fence on your neighbors lawn after he told you that if you did that he would tear it down. Both the building of the fence and the tearing of it down in that case are highly aggressive actions
 
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Vanquish

Member
I would say that having many military bases straddle your boarder when you are quite vocal about the perceived threat and it continues to grow,, is a far cry from attacking someone for owning a goldfish. One must remember context here now there is the argument for why NATO continued to expand its potential capabilities vs Russia but the fact they do when Russia has made attempts at de-escalation is important. Specifically in regarded to the history leading up to the Ukraine war, simplifying things down to a simple metaphor is both disingenuous and misleading..the history is quite well documented this was wasn't a random act it was the result of a series of events with many chances to avoid what for many observers was a predictable outcome if escalation continued. Very predictable I would say, even back when merkel voted down the first Ukraine NATO proposal sayin she believed Putin would consider it a act of war.

Think about that for a second because the pursuit of that policy in context is important, wether you agree with the assessment or not the fact is the risks wer well known yet the policy pursued


Note as I said there is of course the perceived threat of NATO from Russia but let's not pretend this is simply a unprovoked /unexpected action not a result serious of a escalations

If you want a metaphor this is more like building a fence on your neighbors lawn after he told you that if you did that he would tear it down. Both the building of the fence and the tearing of it down in that case are highly aggressive actions

Fun with analogy's I guess. If you're afraid of your neigbour, building a very large fence maybe seen as quite prudent. The fact that it antagonizes your neigbour isn't your primary concern when constructing it, your own safety is. Countries joining NATO aren't doing it for the social aspects of being with the in crowd, they're joining because they have a very real fear of Russia. Perhaps Russia should stop blaming everyone else for not accepting them for who or what they represent and maybe try reflecting inwards.
 

crest

Member
Fun with analogy's I guess. If you're afraid of your neigbour, building a very large fence maybe seen as quite prudent. The fact that it antagonizes your neigbour isn't your primary concern when constructing it, your own safety is. Countries joining NATO aren't doing it for the social aspects of being with the in crowd, they're joining because they have a very real fear of Russia. Perhaps Russia should stop blaming everyone else for not accepting them for who or what they represent and maybe try reflecting inwards.
Yeah nothing wrong with the fence in concept it's the were in this case. It's also not just a fence as it's also a military base ie a fence with guns pointed at your house...either way if the one who objects to it has the strength to enforce his objections. One would think that just ignoring there concerns is not going to end well. One would also think compermise in that case is better then something you know will antagonize him if indeed your worried about your safety. But honestly I think most of us know ho this war started by now. My point was entirely that the metaphors said we're not a honest or imop even helpfully way of looking at the conflict
 
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rsemmes

Active Member
He is probably right.

NATO has spent the last year restraining the all powerful Ukraine from achieving an overwhelming victory on the battlefield, as we all know. Zelenski should send Trump packing and, without the help of any country, in three months, impose its will upon Russia.
That is the real situation. Neither US, nor NATO, nor the EU has anything to say there.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
They have used some of their very fews S-500 batteries in Crimea from old reports, but they dont have enough S-500 to make a difference. See any T-14 in use at the front ? How about Su-57 ? Both are absent - but for good reason - there arent enough of them to make a difference, and the risk of getting them blown up outweighs the benefits of their use. RU is all in at this point.
Interesting point, many lump together all of Russia's next-generation platforms together but this is misleading. Some new systems are being used actively, things like the S-350 and the Su-57 for example some don't exist beyond LRIP (2S35 Koalitsiya for example) or even beyond prototypes (like the entire OKR Armata, Kurganets, and Bumerang). Su-57s are being produced, are entering service with regular units now (reportedly the 23rd Fighter Rgt) and have been spotted over Ukraine. Note even the experimental Okhotnik UCAV was used in Ukraine, and one was even downed (by friendly fire after it reportedly lost control and headed deeper into Ukraine). There were even some who suggested that much of the UCAV footage we got from Kursk that attributed to Orion-S and Forpost-RU actually came from Okhotnik-B. In other words even prototype systems might get used. And this is consistent with past Russian practice. I suspect the reason we don't see the T-14 is because production wasn't set up before the war and doing it now would disrupt the UVZ line for a while leading, at least temporarily, to a reduced output. I tihnk it's the same reason we don't see the BMP-3 Manul variant or the BTR-22 in production, though both were reportedly going forward. Better to keep pumping out ~500 BTR-82ATs, then drop down to 100-200 BTR-22s until you ramp up production. Not to mention that adopting a new type would create difficulties for mechanics, strain supply chains, etc. A T-90M is compatible across many key components with exisitng Russian tanks, so much so that battlegroup Dnepr operated a T-62 chassis with a T-90M turret for some length of time. A T-14 would likely not be compatible with anything in service now across most key systems. One other theory for why we don't see the T-14 is that there were technological issues that haven't been resolved. This one is hard to substantiate or disprove.
 

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
This is starting to get confusing.
You're telling me ?!?

(in case this figure of speech is confusing, allow me to clarify: You claiming that this conversation is confusing is incredibly ironic given that you are so far unable or unwilling to clearly and simply state what you believe. In other words, you are the source of the confusion).
 

rsemmes

Active Member
You're telling me ?!?

(in case this figure of speech is confusing, allow me to clarify: You claiming that this conversation is confusing is incredibly ironic given that you are so far unable or unwilling to clearly and simply state what you believe. In other words, you are the source of the confusion).
My "beliefs"?

Like... The Tooth Fairy?


Edit.
Putin made (past tense) clear to Bush that NATO is a threat to Russia; maybe Bush needed that to be explained to him. Ukraine (or Georgia) joining NATO makes that threat bigger and closer. NATO's opinion on the definition of "threat", "fear" or "irrational" (or "evidence", for that matter) is irrelevant to Russia, as Russia's opinion on the definition of "threat", "fear" or "irrational" is irrelevant to NATO. No need for analogies, NATO is a threat to Russia.
If anyone is going to mention Sweden and Finland again, when was the last time that there was a coup d'état in those two, not that densely populated, countries in the far north? Too late now anyway, Russia is already at war.

Anyone is confused about that? Maybe, "he who will not see".
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
That entire low-land area is a back and forth that's hard for Russia to secure. I don't think it's over yet.

Ditto here, fighting is ongoing. Russia's position in Kupyansk is bad, though there are rumors of arriving reinforcements.
 

rsemmes

Active Member
That entire low-land area is a back and forth that's hard for Russia to secure. I don't think it's over yet.



Ditto here, fighting is ongoing. Russia's position in Kupyansk is bad, though there are rumors of arriving reinforcements.
I saw Ukraine pushing Russia to the other side of the river before, but not this time. No counterattacks or not yet? My only (actual) information is looking at maps.
Kupiansk doesn't look bad, it looks gone (in that map), like Petropavlivka; as if they have decided to do it "right" this time (with reinforcements?). A wider front west of the river or clearing the east shore of the river.
Do we know if they pulled back from (the houses they had in) Petropavlivka or if they were kicked out?
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I saw Ukraine pushing Russia to the other side of the river before, but not this time. No counterattacks or not yet? My only (actual) information is looking at maps.
Kupiansk doesn't look bad, it looks gone (in that map), like Petropavlivka; as if they have decided to do it "right" this time (with reinforcements?). A wider front west of the river or clearing the east shore of the river.
So the maps tend to distinguish grey zones and actual control. There is still a Russian presence in the right shore of Kupyansk and some area of control on the left shore. But it's murky exactly what that looks like. Russian reinforcements at this stage would have to be inserted along the current areas to try and stabilize the situation. And given the positional nature of the fighting and the ability of drones to hit almost anything, the focus will likely be on breaking Ukraine's attacks rather than setting up a whole new operation to assault Kupyansk. I don't know that we will see a big push out of Dvurechnoe south-westward.

Do we know if they pulled back from (the houses they had in) Petropavlivka or if they were kicked out?
I believe Russian forces failed to consolidate, but it's not clear. I.e. some forward elements made it in but got hit and survivors withdrew.

EDIT: Perfect example of the uncertainty in Kupyansk, here's a Russian infiltrator team in Moskovka, west of Kupyansk. This is despite basically all sources considering that area under Ukrainian control. There are still Russian troops on the right shore of the Oskol, just no firm control. And you'll note the snow, that's a recent development in Kupyansk so I don't think this can be old footage.

 
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