Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[spoz]

Not everybody in DIO or ONA is involved in military strategic, tactical or technical type work; there’s a lot, probably the majority who spend their lives working on political, economic and social issues. And even if they are, in DIO at least they are about gathering information, not using it. That’s what the strategic and capability planners in Defence do, using the information supplied to them by intelligence agencies.

 

[SammyC]

Interesting post. Forgot about AI.

There was a bit of a frustrating debate recently conducted by the Lowy Institute on basically whether Australian should reinforce a more forward and maritime focus or become an 'echidna' and focus on more a continental security focus. I messaged Jennifer Parker after the debate amazed how she kept her cool listening to the Lowy Institute’s Sam Roggeveen (former DIO and ONA) sprout so much rubbish. Politely she didn't comment but for me, to spend less on the RAN and diminish the threat of trade or supply interdiction just seemed complete madness (and reckless) to me.

As a maritime nation we have to secure or be in a position to secure our trade routes. Sam Roggeveen dismissed the capability of the PLA-N to mess with our trade, as well as the impact that would have in a time of conflict.

Thinking out allowed, I can't see a PLA-N surface vessel in the time conflict making it pass the first island chain given both their focus within that area and their vulnerability to a range of air and seaborne threats.

What is evident for me is the subsurface threat of the PLA-N to interdict our trade/supply is significant, hard to stop and during a conflict quite ever present. We can't be everywhere and their SS/SSG and SSN assets are considerable and expanding. It wouldn't take much for a few bulk carriers or tankers to be sank or severely damaged either in port (smart mine or HWT) or 2,000+km from the mainland for foreign insured vessels to run very very shy of taking any AU job, moreso the limitations we have substituting domestically flagged ships to compensate. Imagine how the political dynamic would be internally if we're all rationing petroleum resources. Those beautiful F-35's are useless without fuel and it wouldn't take much for us to feel really really insecure.

With that said and I would ask for a sense check but question why we aren't (maybe we are- we won't know I guess) investing more some SOSUS like network. Jindalee gives us an aspect of operational awareness in theatre but without a networked and triangulated subservice equivalent, which could also complement Jindalee at times, aren't we a bit exposed to a subsurface threat?

Naturally Aukus Tier 1 will help when those boats are in service but that's some time away. The rotation force will be important but initially quite limited.

I do note there seems to some ASW focus within Aukus Tier 2 so I hope they are thinking about that and other ways to efficiently limit our exposure.

Below is the Lowy debate if anyone is interested. Maybe Sam and Andrew Wilkie's were joint partners in crime but I'd expect more from a career with DIO and ONA. Whilst I welcome debate and different viewpoints, some of these views imo are unapologeticly misinformed, semi defeatest and ignore the political and military reality of how exposed we are without a maritime, forward and US aligned defence strategy.

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Thanks downunder for the Lowy Institute debate link. It was interesting to watch.

While I didn't align fully with Sam's view (not all sams think alike), I know a good portion of the Australian population does. So it is useful for it to be discussed and debated. For the record I though Jen articulated her perspective well.

One of Sam's views is that AUKUS is high risk and that the US cannot be trusted in the same way it could a decade or two ago. I think he is correct. We need to go into this with eyes wide open.

A second position he has is that if we have a capability then we will be expected to use it. Any SSNs that we own will inevitably be drawn into a regional conflict. I agree with him on this, but so will everything else we have in our military.

He would have a view that we are relying on America too heavily for our military systems, and this makes us vulnerable to coersion from them. I would agree, hence investments in other equipment like ceafar, and NSM. Likewise the Mogami provides a useful alternate technology partner, as do European and Korean armoured vehicles.

Sam supports the echidna mentality, which is the logic behind HIMARS, Tomahawks, JSM/NSM, sea mining and the like.

He also states that the balance generally favours the side trying to sink ships. Yes he is also correct, however Jen stated that well defended platforms (hence the higher end investments in them) are inherently survivable if employed well.

 

[hauritz]

Thanks downunder for the Lowy Institute debate link. It was interesting to watch.

While I didn't align fully with Sam's view (not all sams think alike), I know a good portion of the Australian population does. So it is useful for it to be discussed and debated. For the record I though Jen articulated her perspective well.

One of Sam's views is that AUKUS is high risk and that the US cannot be trusted in the same way it could a decade or two ago. I think he is correct. We need to go into this with eyes wide open.

A second position he has is that if we have a capability then we will be expected to use it. Any SSNs that we own will inevitably be drawn into a regional conflict. I agree with him on this, but so will everything else we have in our military.

He would have a view that we are relying on America too heavily for our military systems, and this makes us vulnerable to coersion from them. I would agree, hence investments in other equipment like ceafar, and NSM. Likewise the Mogami provides a useful alternate technology partner, as do European and Korean armoured vehicles.

Sam supports the echidna mentality, which is the logic behind HIMARS, Tomahawks, JSM/NSM, sea mining and the like.

He also states that the balance generally favours the side trying to sink ships. Yes he is also correct, however Jen stated that well defended platforms (hence the higher end investments in them) are inherently survivable if employed well.

To some extent the ball is in America's court as far as AUKUS is concerned. If the decision to provide Virginias is withdrawn then it will mean a major rethink of Australia's defence strategy.

No Virginias may well result in Sam getting his way and Australia adopting his Echidna strategy. It would be confirmation to many that the US is an unreliable ally which in turn brings into question the entire AUKUS arrangement.

I am sure this is something the US will be considering with this review, This is incidently why I think the submarine deal will go ahead. The benefits of maintaining a strong alliance with Australia outweighs losing a few Virginias.

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

Sam supports the echidna mentality, which is the logic behind HIMARS, Tomahawks, JSM/NSM, sea mining and the like.

It's incredible that even in 2025, people are trying to push that sort of defensive posture for island nations as a winning strategy.

For a country like Taiwan so close to a likely enemy, it's all they can realistically do. But Australia is much further away from Chinese power projection. There is a risk of a surprise attack with long-range munitions, but that is something Australia could recover from. The real danger is a strangulation of trade and oil imports via a naval blockade. There's sweet f.a. you can do against blockade of energy imports with short-ranged SSKs or even HIMARS. Australia might not starve but there would be mass unemployment after the economy started shutting down.

That's why both the major Australian political parties are backing AUKUS. Australia needs those SSNs. To try to argue against AUKUS because it's wrong for Australia is really just a variation of Keating's arguments that Australia should just put its fingers in its ears and shout "LALALA, can't hear you!", pretending that China will leave it alone so long as Australia leaves it alone. Chinese military expansion in Asia would be devastating for Australia. It's not something Australians can sit out.

There is no alternative to AUKUS. If the US eventually sadly says it can't give the RAN any V-boats, that will suck for Australia. It will have to try to find a stop-gap, whether asking the US to consider a lease instead, or even a lease of submarines from somewhere like Japan that decommissions subs in good condition. But SSN-AUKUS will be the core of the RAN's future.

 

[SammyC]

It's incredible that even in 2025, people are trying to push that sort of defensive posture for island nations as a winning strategy.

For a country like Taiwan so close to a likely enemy, it's all they can realistically do. But Australia is much further away from Chinese power projection. There is a risk of a surprise attack with long-range munitions, but that is something Australia could recover from. The real danger is a strangulation of trade and oil imports via a naval blockade. There's sweet f.a. you can do against blockade of energy imports with short-ranged SSKs or even HIMARS. Australia might not starve but there would be mass unemployment after the economy started shutting down.

That's why both the major Australian political parties are backing AUKUS. Australia needs those SSNs. To try to argue against AUKUS because it's wrong for Australia is really just a variation of Keating's arguments that Australia should just put its fingers in its ears and shout "LALALA, can't hear you!", pretending that China will leave it alone so long as Australia leaves it alone. Chinese military expansion in Asia would be devastating for Australia. It's not something Australians can sit out.

There is no alternative to AUKUS. If the US eventually sadly says it can't give the RAN any V-boats, that will suck for Australia. It will have to try to find a stop-gap, whether asking the US to consider a lease instead, or even a lease of submarines from somewhere like Japan that decommissions subs in good condition. But SSN-AUKUS will be the core of the RAN's future.

One of the things Sam said regarding trade protection that was insightful was that it is not possible to blockade every Australian port, and that trade routes can adapt by changing. Our maritime supply is not as vulnerable as perhaps we think.

Australia has hundreds of ports, giving us flexibility to go around a harbour that has been blockaded or mined. Can't get into Sydney, then go to Adelaide. Can't get into Adelaide then go to Albany. The goods can then be trucked or trained to where it is needed. This might be inefficient, expensive and limit capacity, but it can be done and the essentials can get to where they are needed.

Likewise ships can change their route to Australia. While fuel traditionally comes through one of the Indonesian straights to Australia from Singapore, it would be possible to reroute through the Indian Ocean instead. The Indian Ocean is broad and therefore much easier to defend a convoy in than a straight. It takes longer and is more expensive, but it can be done. We are seeing this approach with the Red Sea at the moment, with ships re routing around Africa.

Perhaps the above is combined with switching from Singaporian fuel refining to Saudi Arabian or Indian refining (they have both have about three times the refining capacity that Singapore does).

I will also note that Australia is much more self sufficient with fuel that people think. We actually produce in the order of 150 million barrels of crude oil a year (85% of which is exported and the majority of this is good quality light sweet crude), and consume in the order of 100 million barrells of refined oil products (petrol, diesel etc) per annum. Likewise the vast majority of our electrical power is provided via coal and gas (all fully sourced from within Australia), with increasing proportions on renewables. The Gelong and Lytton refineries remain critical assets, producing approx 20% of Australia's end use needs. I should point out that both facilities are receiving government funding to remain open until at least 2030. The good news is that a substantial portion of this is going into capital upgrades at both plants to improve efficiency and fuel quality.

So Australia already has the ability to survive a blockade from a fuel perspective. We have enough crude and refining to supply our military in a crisis and our electrical power system is mostly immune. We might however not be able to use our personal cars and need to crack out the old bicycles.

The end point is that blockading Australia would hurt but I think we would be more resilient than perhaps thought. It's not an excuse to defund our maritime defence capability and capacity, but it does show that with the right Naval equipment we could adapt to survive.

It also shows that Australia has the capacity to improve its self sufficiency, and this should be considered as important a strategy as procuring defence equipment. It comes to mind that if blockaded, then our rail system would become very heavily laden, and there are bottlenecks between some locations. We might need more or different types of wagons to transport goods previously shipped.

 

[MickB]

My friend described the situation as being broken down into two types of sonar contacts for an SSN, the first one was hostile subs, the other were simply targets.

One also needs to remember that the potential effective range of sub-launched anti-ship weapons does tend to exceed the range of ship-launched ASW weapons. Looking at the potential ranges for a Mk 48 HWT, one potential range is ~40 km, vs. the ~9 km range of a Mk 54 LWT... If one them factors in the possible ranges of sub-launched AShM like the UGM-84 Harpoon II which is still in RAN inventory, we are now getting into 120+ km ranges. In other words, an ASW ship will be well within firing range of a sub's weapons long before it would be close enough to take a direct shot itself.

ASW ops themselves are conducted by multiple assets cooperating together in screening rings around a high value target, or else to sanitize an area like a natural chokepoint prior to high value targets transiting through an area. IIRC the third/outer screening ring ideally would be provided by fixed wing ASW aircraft operating 100 - 200 km ahead/away from the high value target.

As I understand it, the most likely reason for a sub targeting surface shipping to approach a screening ASW vessel is so that the sub can get a better track and targeting solution upon something of high value past the screening escort, and not because the sub was unaware of the ASW vessel.

That torpedo range difference may be reduced by adopting the Type 07 ASROC in the future Mogamis.
Assuming it is integrated by the JMSDF.
And then possibly on to the rest of the fleet.
Given that the Type 97 torpedo used in the Type 07 missile is virtually the same in diameter and length as the MK 54 and MU 90 it may be possible adapt the missile to them to keep the number of different types of torpedo in service down.

I also believe there is still some development work ongoing on the Kingfisher rounds for the 5in guns. This would also extend the range a ship could strike a sub.

 

[Todjaeger]

That torpedo range difference may be reduced by adopting the Type 07 ASROC in the future Mogamis.
Assuming it is integrated by the JMSDF.
And then possibly on to the rest of the fleet.
Given that the Type 97 torpedo used in the Type 07 missile is virtually the same in diameter and length as the MK 54 and MU 90 it may be possible adapt the missile to them to keep the number of different types of torpedo in service down.

I also believe there is still some development work ongoing on the Kingfisher rounds for the 5in guns. This would also extend the range a ship could strike a sub.

Yes, the range difference could be reduced, OTOH the range advantage would still likely remain with the sub, never mind that the sub is more likely to know where the surface warship is than the other way around.

Keep in mind that the sub-launched AShM pods could still enable a sub to engage a surface ship from 100+ km away, long before a ship-mounted weapon could be brought to bear upon a sub.

 

[Armchair]

China is Australia’s largest trading partner. It could disrupt Australia’s trade (at enormous cost to itself) by placing bans on ships using Australia’s ports. Very much doubt they would need to actually sink ships to enforce that (Even if they were unable to blockade Australian ports they can prevent ships that have left Australia, or with consignments for Australia, using Chinese ports). The ability of China to coerce Australia in that or other (more plausible) ways is however limited by the capability and readiness of the ADF.

i don’t agree that HIMARS, NSM, sea mines and Tomahawk are intended for the echidna strategy. I don’t think there are public documents that detail their intended use, but the same (or similar systems) are used by the US and I would expect the final Australian doctrine to be similar.

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

One of the things Sam said regarding trade protection that was insightful was that it is not possible to blockade every Australian port, and that trade routes can adapt by changing. Our maritime supply is not as vulnerable as perhaps we think.

I think he was clearly wrong, though, for the reason Jennifer Parker gave. For the most part, maritime trade has bypassed blockades and conflict only when it was heavily escorted.

As for shipping finding alternative trade routes, that's only when the alternative routes are open. If the PLAN were to say "we're going to sink any fuel tankers heading for Australia, and we're not going to warn you where we're stationing our submarines", that's a horrible risk for commercial shipping lines they may not take.

On your last point, it wouldn't be enough to be able to refine fuel for the Australian military. If the wider economy runs out of petrol and aviation fuel that's game over. Petrol rationing worked in WWII because so few people had cars and had other ways to get around. How would Australia function without civilians having ready access to petrol, are people going to cycle hundreds of miles through rural areas?

 

[Todjaeger]

i don’t agree that HIMARS, NSM, sea mines and Tomahawk are intended for the echidna strategy. I don’t think there are public documents that detail their intended use, but the same (or similar systems) are used by the US and I would expect the final Australian doctrine to be similar.

TBH I have reservations about what the US strategy is likely to be using systems like HIMARS and land-based AShM as part of an A2AD tactic. Having said that, I also do not think that Australia could implement what the US seems to have in mind.

One has to remember that the US has vastly more military and naval resources than Australia, which means that the US might actually be able to carry out an opposed landing to seize ground in/around a SLOC chokepoint. Further, the US might also be able to support and sustain a landed force.

Unfortunately Australia does not have a fraction of the amphibious forces to effect an opposed landing, or the sealift to get such a force to a landing site, or the logistics support to sustain a landed force, never mind in the face of opposition.

 

[SammyC]

I think he was clearly wrong, though, for the reason Jennifer Parker gave. For the most part, maritime trade has bypassed blockades and conflict only when it was heavily escorted.

As for shipping finding alternative trade routes, that's only when the alternative routes are open. If the PLAN were to say "we're going to sink any fuel tankers heading for Australia, and we're not going to warn you where we're stationing our submarines", that's a horrible risk for commercial shipping lines they may not take.

On your last point, it wouldn't be enough to be able to refine fuel for the Australian military. If the wider economy runs out of petrol and aviation fuel that's game over. Petrol rationing worked in WWII because so few people had cars and had other ways to get around. How would Australia function without civilians having ready access to petrol, are people going to cycle hundreds of miles through rural areas?

I think there is space for both Jennifer's and Sam's positions to coexist.

A shipping lane through the middle of the Indian Ocean is far more defendable than a shipping lane through the various SE straits.

The Indian Ocean is near infinitely variable in track and requires an enemy to commit substantial resources to cover. For China to shut down Indian Ocean traffic at the same time as say attacking or threatening Taiwan would be enormously problematic for them. I think they would struggle to do both. And if they did then we have the Pacific Ocean to pivot to.

I'm not saying that this is easy, or that it has no risk. I'm just saying that an attempt to blockade Australia to the point we would loose our ability to fight is harder than first considered, and we have options available to respond if we find ourselves in this situation.

We would still need the escorting capacity (i.e Frigates) to protect these convoys, but that is much easier to conduct in open unrestricted waters that are harder to ambush. We absolutely need the investment in the Navy. I personally think we need more than 11 GPFs to conduct just this function. And more expansive ISR. We also need a much bigger auxiliary fleet to transport essential fuel and other supplies for military and essential civilian purposes.

Civilian shipping, as both Sam and Jennifer stated, can continue in hostile conditions. Civilian ships still sail through the Red Sea today despite sinkings and attacks. Yes this requires Naval escorts to protect them.

In regards to rationing, Australia has done this in previous wars. It's incredibly tough and normal life is not possible. We would need to find a way to adjust. I would suggest that thinking we can live as we currently do in a war time environment is not correct.

Fuel rationing would likely inhibit most personal vehicle use and probaly commercial air travel. Electrified public transport would become much more valuable. Diesel for tucks, busses and trains would be prioritised over petrol.

I should note an enormous portion of industry learnt to work from home in the covid pandemic. While maybe a small example, it shows the capacity of the community to adjust to a threat.

 

[Volkodav]

I think there is space for both Jennifer's and Sam's positions to coexist.

A shipping lane through the middle of the Indian Ocean is far more defendable than a shipping lane through the various SE straits.

The Indian Ocean is near infinitely variable in track and requires an enemy to commit substantial resources to cover. For China to shut down Indian Ocean traffic at the same time as say attacking or threatening Taiwan would be enormously problematic for them. I think they would struggle to do both. And if they did then we have the Pacific Ocean to pivot to.

I'm not saying that this is easy, or that it has no risk. I'm just saying that an attempt to blockade Australia to the point we would loose our ability to fight is harder than first considered, and we have options available to respond if we find ourselves in this situation.

We would still need the escorting capacity (i.e Frigates) to protect these convoys, but that is much easier to conduct in open unrestricted waters that are harder to ambush. We absolutely need the investment in the Navy. I personally think we need more than 11 GPFs to conduct just this function. And more expansive ISR. We also need a much bigger auxiliary fleet to transport essential fuel and other supplies for military and essential civilian purposes.

Civilian shipping, as both Sam and Jennifer stated, can continue in hostile conditions. Civilian ships still sail through the Red Sea today despite sinkings and attacks. Yes this requires Naval escorts to protect them.

In regards to rationing, Australia has done this in previous wars. It's incredibly tough and normal life is not possible. We would need to find a way to adjust. I would suggest that thinking we can live as we currently do in a war time environment is not correct.

Fuel rationing would likely inhibit most personal vehicle use and probaly commercial air travel. Electrified public transport would become much more valuable. Diesel for tucks, busses and trains would be prioritised over petrol.

I should note an enormous portion of industry learnt to work from home in the covid pandemic. While maybe a small example, it shows the capacity of the community to adjust to a threat.

A reason to keep buying/building PBs is to provide a pipeline for ship drivers and maintainers, the issue being they don't train or grow combat system operators, maintainers or PWOs.

This is where the OPVs and LHDs could, plenty of accommodation space and 9LV CMS that could use emulators.

This is a downside of the Mogamis not having their CMS and other systems changed, but then again, a shore training facility, combined with their own significant additional accommodation, means they can each carry a substantial number of trainees in addition to their crew.

Basically we can keep buying and building Mogamis well past the initial eleven, as we could keep building Hunters and eventually SSNs.

A lesson we must learn is there is no peace dividend, there never was. There have only ever been short periods where bully boys retreat to rebuild before going again. The pre WWI plans were affordable and achievable, as were the post WWI plans, the post WWII plans the 60s, 70s, 90s, and 2010 plans. Not doing them increased the cost and reduced the time we had to do what was needed, and in some cases meant we couldn't do what we needed to do.

 

[Bluey 006]

I should note an enormous portion of industry learnt to work from home in the covid pandemic. While maybe a small example, it shows the capacity of the community to adjust to a threat.

There were also fist fights in supermarkets after just two weeks of toilet paper shortages. How will we fare if we have shortages of everything? And are under sustained missile / cyber / disinformation attack.

 

[SammyC]

There were also fist fights in supermarkets after just two weeks of toilet paper shortages. How will we fare if we have shortages of everything? And are under sustained missile / cyber / disinformation attack.

I never said it would be without consequence or sacrifice.

I am a big advocate for increased investment in missile and cyber defence.

 

[iambuzzard]

A reason to keep buying/building PBs is to provide a pipeline for ship drivers and maintainers, the issue being they don't train or grow combat system operators, maintainers or PWOs.

This is where the OPVs and LHDs could, plenty of accommodation space and 9LV CMS that could use emulators.

This is a downside of the Mogamis not having their CMS and other systems changed, but then again, a shore training facility, combined with their own significant additional accommodation, means they can each carry a substantial number of trainees in addition to their crew.

Basically we can keep buying and building Mogamis well past the initial eleven, as we could keep building Hunters and eventually SSNs.

A lesson we must learn is there is no peace dividend, there never was. There have only ever been short periods where bully boys retreat to rebuild before going again. The pre WWI plans were affordable and achievable, as were the post WWI plans, the post WWII plans the 60s, 70s, 90s, and 2010 plans. Notdoing them increased the cost and reduced the time we had to do what was needed, and in some cases meant we couldn't do what we needed to do.

Volks, maybe 15 to 20 GPFs and 6 to 10 AWDs would hopefully be the optimal fleet to maintain escort duties in a hot war but who would pay for them and man them. There's no political or civilian will to do that.

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

A shipping lane through the middle of the Indian Ocean is far more defendable than a shipping lane through the various SE straits.

We would still need the escorting capacity (i.e Frigates) to protect these convoys, but that is much easier to conduct in open unrestricted waters that are harder to ambush. We absolutely need the investment in the Navy.

You've just indicated why it's not a viable strategy, because Australia doesn't have the ship numbers to perform escort duties. The RAN would need dozens more escorts than what is currently planned, something that is improbable given Australia's financies, lack of industrial capacity and manpower shortages.

I haven't said a far blockade of Australia would be guaranteed to work, just that it would have a significant risk of succeeding and that nuclear-powered submarines and the ability to project naval power away from its shores would make for a safer country.

 

[SammyC]

You've just indicated why it's not a viable strategy, because Australia doesn't have the ship numbers to perform escort duties. The RAN would need dozens more escorts than what is currently planned, something that is improbable given Australia's financies, lack of industrial capacity and manpower shortages.

I haven't said a far blockade of Australia would be guaranteed to work, just that it would have a significant risk of succeeding and that nuclear-powered submarines and the ability to project naval power away from its shores would make for a safer country.

I think if Australia was forced into such a scenario, it would adapt with what it had. Escort protection can be provided via a variety of assets, not just frigates.

Assuming we need to protect an exposed shipping lane between Perth and India for critical provisions, and it is something that occurs in the next couple of years. That distance is about 6,000km, most of it deep water that is difficult to mine.

It's of value to consider what China could realistically put into the Indian Ocean to threaten shipping in this kind of context. I doubt they could spare more than one long range SSN and a small surface action group (one destroyer, one frigate and one refueller). That's not much to track and definitely not an overwhelming force.

I would suggest we would start with air protection. P8s can by themselves provide a very effective screen out to about 1,500km from the coast. Add another 1,000 if we fit LRASMs to them (which should be in stock in the near future). We could back that up with some F18s armed similarly. Tritons can provide surveilance out to about 7,000km for long range oversight. Maybe we allocate two P8s, one Triton and six F18s operating out of Curtin and Pearce, plus Christmas and Cocos Islands. That is the majority of the Indian Ocean covered by air power alone.

To a small and isolated enemy surface action group and/or a lone sub, that air threat is going to be a problem and something that will limit their ability to operate freely.

Given we are part of 5 eyes, I imagine we would be provided intelligence from the US regarding the location of Chinese ships and subs. Lets assume they know where both the sub and surace action group is at all times. China does not have the same satellite coverage, so don't have the reciprocal information.

We should (with some trepidation) have a Collins available to create our own uncertainty in the region.

Let assume India is at minimum protecting its own waters (not unreasonable), so should comfortably be able to cover out to about 1,000kms, and also shut down any access for Chinese ships through to Djibouti.

Finally lets say we have two ANZACs with Romeo helos to provide escort duties with convoys, shuttling back and forth, but concentrating in the area without air cover.

The above would be within our means and doesn't require an excessive number of frigates. It's a substantial commitment, but it would not drain our defence force.