John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Given the new delay for SSN(X) (almost a decade as per link in post 8752), perhaps the Virginia run might be longer.
Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0
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The risk is that populists in Congress decide to “do something” to stop the decline in the USN’s sub force, at Australia’s expense.
Currently the USN has a total of 53 SSN/SSGNs, including 30 older boats built in the 80s/90s, that need to be retired by the late 2030s. But the latest DoD plan is to build 28 Virginias between 2024-2038. This number will soon be set in stone with the signing of the next multi-year procurement contract by the end of the year.
So not only is this well short of the 66-70 boats the USN says it needs, but the force is set to continue its slow decline for the next 15 years. Even if they find a way to increase the build rate beyond 2 boats/year, the effects on fleet numbers won’t be felt until 2039-2040 at the earliest.
Now in comes Australia asking «can you please sell us 2 subs, for delivery in 2032/2035, thank you very much ». It’s a situation begging for a few grandstanding congressmen to make a statement to their constituency that America comes first.
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Redlands18
Well-Known Member
The Netherlands Select Naval Group for its New Submarines - Naval News
The Dutch government announced today it has "provisionally selected" French shipbuilder Naval Group to build its future submarines...
www.navalnews.com
But, as others have said, Government is saying selection in 2025 and cut steel in 2026.
That ia proceeding very rapidly as these things go. The new force structure was decided in late 2023 announced in 2024 and the first ship to be selected in 2025 for anticipated delivery in 2030 (“end of the decade”). Compare that to the previous surface fleet force structure. That was decided in 2009 (slightly revised 2016) and the first combatant selected in 2018. The construction of the first ship from the previous structure begins in 2024 and will be delivered in 2034 (25 years after the force structure was announced).
The question arises as to whether the more rapid process in this case is more likely to lead to mistakes.
It is a good principle, but remember the surface fleet analysis recommended TRANSCAP so it presumably was feasible. ANZAC has a specific limitation though. A ship with 8 VLS cells may not be a viable platform to send nearly 200 sailors to sea for independent operations in the likely threat environment for the RAN in the 2030s. That limitation (which is made more salient by recent attacks in the Red Sea) would be obvious to potential adversaries and it is not something that can be fixed by.a LOTE.
Even if Collins became obsolete (which wouldn’t be as obvious to a potential adversary) it would still be essential as a training platform until replacements arrive.
I'm not comparing previous governments or who delivered what faster in the past. What I am getting at is we need replacement ship ASAP, and the sense of urgency verbally by the current government is not really being acted on in reality.
A 12 month review to redesign the RAN.
Recommendations and then selection process etc etc. They know what is needed. They need to start moving. The 18 landing craft? Is that really priority number 1? Are they going to escort the shipping? Or are they going to employ West Australians until the frigates start? What if they are delayed by some unforeseen circumstance?
Yep. Interesting times!
Beasley knew defence and actually had an interest in it.
He was also in the portfolio for some time.
Like all politicians he had to acknowledge the dance of what you want and what you could get.
As for US politics it does have a relevance to this thread on many levels.
Upshot I just cannot predict what will happen over there... No one can.
Years ago I was lucky enough to be backpacking in Berlin ( West and East) a couple of months before the wall came down. Absolutely no sign of that pending massive change while enjoying a beer in that wonderful city.
Upshot!
Stuff happens very very quickly and without a script as to where it is heading.
Our defence procurement needs to not have all its eggs in the one basket.
Timeframe to action is another consideration.
I like and want the US to work.
But it scares me.
Cheers S
It’s a real shame that Trump’s relationship with H.R. McMaster broke down. A sober grown up voice that could have been excellent at tempering his insanity in a second term.
Any chance of a link to that Beasley interview the two of you referred to?
I really do wonder why we’re bothering with SSN AUKUS at all and not just joining in the SSN(x) build. It feels to me like the Brits have the problem that their nuclear boat industry is not big enough and they want to use us to bulk up and get them to scale. Not sure why we have to solve their problem for them, rather than them also swallowing their pride and joining SSN(x).
Redlands18
Well-Known Member
We don't know if SSN(X) was even on the table for either us or the UK, we don't know if the US would allow us to build Virginia's at Osborne. This is a perfect example, of beggars can't be choosy, if you want SSNs, these are the conditions. You join the UK in the joint build of their next gen SSN and if that looks to be going south than we will sell more Virginia's built in the US.
Maintaining a Nuclear Submarine design and build capability is a vital strategic imperative for the UK, I suspect they would get rid of the carriers before SSN/SSBNs.
Brissy1982
Active Member
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
In a perfect world the AUKUS would have a merged SSN(X)/ SSN(R) and Columbia/ Dreadnought programs with the former programs having lots of DNA from the new SSBNs. All three members would have benefited from a AUKUS T-26 or whatever program as well. Sadly the world isn’t perfect.
These are absolutely fair points. My assumption is that if they’d let us own and maintain Virginias (except the reactors) that they’d be ok with us building them - I am unclear what further sensitivity they would have - but if the US are not ok with that then you’re 100% right.
To be honest though it’s hard to see why they would do that if they’re willing to sell them to us in the first place?
Instead of the buying of the Virginia class submarines under the the deal would the leasing of such earlier versions meet the RAN requirements, saved some money whilst the AUKUS submarines were developed and built, at such a future point these older submarines are returned to the U.S.A and the RAN only operate one model of submarine?
its seems like a reciprocal arrangement, a good deal for both nations, solving problems for both. They need scale, we need SSNs.
The first 2 Virginias are used Block IVs.
The 3rd Virginia to Australia is a new block VII which would guarantee a maintenance hub and supply chain into the early 2070s.
If the 3rd was just another used block IV (even if it the last of the block IVs, Utah) it would only guarantee the above until the late 2050s.
3 or 4 or 5 used block IVs make sense for Aus, but not for the U.S.
Understood I was just illustrating what the previous pace of change was to help gauge the current one.
Army needs its LCM and LCHs and to train with those vessels to have a littoral warfare capability. Again the littoral lift programs have been on the backburner for many, many years. Some debates to be had about them and Army’s role but best done on ADF or Army thread.
Brissy1982
Active Member
You make good points about the fractured partisan politics we are seeing in the U.S., and the problems they have been having in increasing their submarine construction output.
However, I think the risk posed by grandstanding populists in Congress is actually quite small. IMHO there is a very strong counter-argument to any alleged decline in USN sub force and "America must come first", which is along the following lines - "If we agree to sell the Australians two of our used Block IV Virginias and up to three new-build Virginias of later blocks, we'll make the deal contingent on the Australians agreeing use them to help us out in the South Pacific, South China Sea and Indian Ocean while we continue to build upgraded Virginias and then transition to SSN-X. The Australians will agree to help us because they want and need SSNs much more than we need to make them available. So we won't lose any actual capability in the short to medium term while we increase our production of newer blocks of Virginias and ultimately SSN-X, while the Australians assume some of the responsibility that we currently hold, which will relieve the pressure on the USN submarine force to at least some extent. Australia wants to help us anyway, because their security is dependent on keeping us happy. They've been our ally since WWII and they don't have any other country they could turn to."
Of course, I can't rule out the possibility of some demagogue casting a spell over the entire Congress and U.S. defence establishment, but I think the risk is relatively small.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Unfortunately the “possibility” is inching closer everyday. He only needs a majority of his cult members in the two branches to cast his spell assuming he gets a second term. It is these fools who may enable his more bizarre policies with regard to defence and treaty obligations.
As much as that demagoge is a chaos making machine (which I will suggest is what a good portion of the American population want in response to social inequality), he has been very direct about his military expecations of other countries. He has stated that if nations want American security then they need to pay for it. While the language around this may be somewhat vulgar and agressive, it would be one of the few principles of his that I would agree with.
In that regard I would suggest that Australia does pay its own way, with I think now at least 3% of GDP on the table for defence, more with the submarines. Moreover Australia has also made a significant move to buy American equipment (most of our Naval weapons and helos, army missiles, tanks and helos, and airforce planes for instance). We want to buy the submarines (at I suspect a premium) and part pay for their construction infrastructure. This all fits with his narrative. In some regards we represent a very lucrative cash cow, and that is something he also loves.
To be facetious (at least partially), I suspect if we agreed to name one of our subs after him we could comfortably clinch a deal.
From the strategic point of view, I agree with Brissy, in that transfer of SSNs will come with obligations (irrespective of what has otherwise been said). We will be expected to undertake the SSN patroling in our region, such that the USN can focus elsewhere. We will also be required to provide the USN access to our nuclear capable bases (east and west coast), be able to supply logistics (parts and maintenance) to their fleet, and provide them land for their purposes.
I doubt the Americans will ever depart FBW once they have mobilised in 2027, and will establish a permanent presence there (expect several hundred people to reside in Perth). Their ships and subs will remain home ported there for the long term, even after we have our own SSNs.
This commitment to duties and facilities will be the necessary underpinning for a US president to confirm the SSN capability has not been depleted. To state the obvious, we will become a copy of Guam or Okinawa for the American forces.
I don't think we will be asked to formally agree to support them in future combat, but that is something we have already agreed to with past behaviour.
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