Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[Going Boeing]

A quick question about the MT30 naval turbine. Are there different versions? I ask as I see the Mogami at 4000+ tons and the Hunter at 8000+ tons both include 1 of these as part of their propulsion. Does this mean the Mogami is overpowered or the Hunter is underpowered? Am I missing something?

The main difference is the diesel engines. The Hunters will have 4 diesel engines (MTU Type 20V 4000 M53B) plus one MT30 whereas the Mogami has 2 diesel engines (MAN Diesel 12V28/33DD STC) plus one MT30. When you take into account that the Hunter’s four 20 cylinder MTU diesels produce more power than the two 12 cylinder MAN’s in the Mogami, the Hunter will have more electrical power for systems and propulsion.

This article shows the Type 26 drivetrain with the MT30 directly driving both shafts via splitter and reduction gearboxes and assisted by electric (induction) motors powered by up to 4 diesel generators.



Courtesy of https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiJg_LTp_-EAxV2YvUHHZP0CP0QFnoECDMQAQ&url=https://s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/linquip.equipment/72171/equipment_72171_catalog_66567228f27949460718dc50f1a4c157db5ef754.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0lPBu_gKs_pjqWJF87Uu4v&opi=89978449

 

[SammyC]

A quick question about the MT30 naval turbine. Are there different versions? I ask as I see the Mogami at 4000+ tons and the Hunter at 8000+ tons both include 1 of these as part of their propulsion. Does this mean the Mogami is overpowered or the Hunter is underpowered? Am I missing something?

There is a difference in top speed as well. The Hunters I think are rated for 27 knots, whereas the Mogami I believe can do above 30 knots. Both have a similar GT selection.

Very very roughly, power is proportional to the cube of speed. So a doubling of power (or in this case halving of weight for the same power) typically only adds a few extra knots of actual speed.

The Mogami I believe is also a CODAG, so can use all its engines simultaneously, whereas I understand the Hunter is CODLOG, so can only run its diesel or GT for propulsion.

 

[StingrayOZ]

There is a difference in top speed as well. The Hunters I think are rated for 27 knots, whereas the Mogami I believe can do upwards of 37 knots. Both have a similar GT selection.

I would be sceptical of it reaching 37 kts. It isn't built to go that fast.

Hull length, while not the only factor is usually a pretty big factor in maximum speed even with lots of power. So unless they are building a frigate to plane, or some sort of special high speed wave piecing etc, higher speeds are going to be difficult.

Hull speed - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Mogami flight II might do ~27-30 kts. Which is pretty fast. Higher speeds usually mean very high fuel consumption anyway, even if you are building for it.

The MT30 has some nice fuel efficient speeds other than flat out. It generally matches or beats other GT even when operating at lower output conditions. So there is very little incentive to fit a smaller, less powerful, GT. At least around to 20MW, at which point, you just use your diesels which produce that amount. The MT30 also will produce heaps of power even in 45 degree air temp.

LM2500 are an old design. The MT30 gives about 30% more power peak, and even when operating at the same power very similar fuel consumption and they a very reliable. The MT30 only weighs about 1t more than the lm2500.

So its not about making them rocket ships, its about other things.

Often one MT30 is replacing two lm2500. So there is a volume gain. Typically. With small ships, typically diesels are installed for low speed, and the GT is used for high speed, so there is already redundancy.

 

[SammyC]

My typo. I meant 30 knots. Have adjusted my post.

 

[StingrayOZ]

My typo. I meant 30 knots. Have adjusted my post.

I thought it might have been. But such numbers have been thrown around before.

The LCS experiment showed that compromises for high speed often aren't worth it. 30kts is plenty fast for a large ship and fleet ops. The oceans a big place, and zooming around at higher speed, really limits range, compromises ship design and doesn't really provide the advantage high speed may have done in the 1900's-1950 before planes, missiles and satellites.

USS freedom had two MT30's ~60MW of propulsion, and two 3.2MW diesels for hotel and electrical. But it could reach 47kts. It also had a very short life and not really suited for blue water operations anyway.

Hunter has massive electrical capability. It will be able to to support hotel loads, a massive radar, lasers/EM weapons etc, all in 45 degree temps with high efficient diesel cruising speed, for long periods of time. Even if it has electrical issues, the GT is there, with plenty of power. And it can decouple it completely when you want to run slow and quiet, with isolated diesels.

Things like Fleet AOR and LHDs are often maxing out about ~21kts. For the RAN, range is probably a much bigger priority than peak speed.

 

[Volkodav]

W

Were the hunters deliberately stalled or was it a case of DOD and Navy taking forever to scope and downs select?

Hunters or more to the point, the Type 26 were flagged back in 2010/11 as the likely ANZAC replacements.

This was when Smith () was defmin, but it is fact. He also indicated the Rudd/Fitzgibbon OCVs would be deferred in favour of another generation of PBs.

I could be reading this wrong but it definately read as a direct follow on from the Hobart's, then sort out the OCV later.

 

[GregorZ]

The main difference is the diesel engines. The Hunters will have 4 diesel engines (MTU Type 20V 4000 M53B) plus one MT30 whereas the Mogami has 2 diesel engines (MAN Diesel 12V28/33DD STC) plus one MT30. When you take into account that the Hunter’s four 20 cylinder MTU diesels produce more power than the two 12 cylinder MAN’s in the Mogami, the Hunter will have more electrical power for systems and propulsion.

This article shows the Type 26 drivetrain with the MT30 directly driving both shafts via splitter and reduction gearboxes and assisted by electric (induction) motors powered by up to 4 diesel generators.

View attachment 51222
View attachment 51223
Courtesy of https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiJg_LTp_-EAxV2YvUHHZP0CP0QFnoECDMQAQ&url=https://s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/linquip.equipment/72171/equipment_72171_catalog_66567228f27949460718dc50f1a4c157db5ef754.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0lPBu_gKs_pjqWJF87Uu4v&opi=89978449

Nice! Thankyou,

 

[Todjaeger]

Hunters or more to the point, the Type 26 were flagged back in 2010/11 as the likely ANZAC replacements.

This was when Smith () was defmin, but it is fact. He also indicated the Rudd/Fitzgibbon OCVs would be deferred in favour of another generation of PBs.

I could be reading this wrong but it definately read as a direct follow on from the Hobart's, then sort out the OCV later.

SEA 5000 commenced in 2015, with gov't signing contracts in December 2018 to build the Hunter-class frigates. IIRC there had been mention of replacement frigates in the 2009 DWP but that struck me as being more an acknowledgement that the ANZAC-class frigates will need replacement and a programme to do so should be stood up soon-ish.

Had SEA 5000 instead been initiated during the Rudd gov't or in the very beginning of of the Gillard gov't (2010) then it might have been possible for Hunter-class frigates to enter service in the mid- to late 2020's, or about when ANZAC-class frigates start hitting 30 years in commission.

OTOH this might also have been impacted by the decisions made to slow the Hobart-class build which dragged things out adding a couple of years to the build time IIRC. From what I do recall, and without going back to double check the numbers, I seem to remember that by slowing the build down, upfront costs were reduced, whilst forcing costs to balloon later on towards the end of the build.

As it stands now, I have doubts that any plans put together or proposed by the current gov't will survive a change in gov't, at least until new contracts get signed with penalty clauses included.

 

[Redlands18]

Hunters or more to the point, the Type 26 were flagged back in 2010/11 as the likely ANZAC replacements.

This was when Smith () was defmin, but it is fact. He also indicated the Rudd/Fitzgibbon OCVs would be deferred in favour of another generation of PBs.

I could be reading this wrong but it definately read as a direct follow on from the Hobart's, then sort out the OCV later.

Yea just a pity he done nothing about replacing the Anzacs with the Type 26, the Hunter would look nice tied up at Osborne right now, fitting out. But of course, Gillard and Smith were to busy writing the most pointless Defence White Paper in history.

 

[Volkodav]

Yea just a pity he done nothing about replacing the Anzacs with the Type 26, the Hunter would look nice tied up at Osborne right now, fitting out. But of course, Gillard and Smith were to busy writing the most pointless Defence White Paper in history.

Unfortunately they allowed themselves to be wedged over the debt and deficits fantasy. Fingers crossed we have seen the last of that following the Coalition's drubbing during COVID.

There was the slowing of the Hobart's, but the replacement frigates were advanced ahead of the OCVs. The priority was subs, the preferred option being an Australian design, second preference, a son of Collins, least preferred an adaption of an existing design, with a MOTS option not even on the radar.

I recall Gary discussing years ago, well before any of this, that the RAN was pushing very hard for a 10000t frigate, with a core AEGIS CMS and CAE radars. Apparently it was nixed by Secdef Richardson who wanted something much smaller and off the shelf. He was also one of the brain's trust behind the Japanese Soryu mots idea.

 

[Bob53]

The Netherlands Select Naval Group for its New Submarines - Naval News

The Dutch government announced today it has "provisionally selected" French shipbuilder Naval Group to build its future submarines...

www.navalnews.com

Now official.

Interesting pricing. Netherlands price is approx $10 billion Australian to build 4 subs. $2.5 billion each. The last is saw of Attack class it was going to be $90 billion Australian to build 12 subs ($7.5 billion each) and $145 billion to maintain them.
I don’t doubt those quoted costs may climb but it’s a huge difference to what took place here before the cancellation.

France’s Naval Group wins $6 billion Dutch submarine project

The Dutch are slated to get a conventionally powered version of the French Barracuda submarine, offering shallow-water maneuvering and long reach.

www.defensenews.com

 

[John Fedup]

Interesting pricing. Netherlands price is approx $10 billion Australian to build 4 subs. $2.5 billion each. The last is saw of Attack class it was going to be $90 billion Australian to build 12 subs ($7.5 billion each) and $145 billion to maintain them.
I don’t doubt those quoted costs may climb but it’s a huge difference to what took place here before the cancellation.

France’s Naval Group wins $6 billion Dutch submarine project

The Dutch are slated to get a conventionally powered version of the French Barracuda submarine, offering shallow-water maneuvering and long reach.

www.defensenews.com

I would imagine equipment choices could explain some of the cost difference. Also, it is likely Australian customisation, like Canadian customisation, adds lots of cost (and delay).

 

[Volkodav]

Interesting pricing. Netherlands price is approx $10 billion Australian to build 4 subs. $2.5 billion each. The last is saw of Attack class it was going to be $90 billion Australian to build 12 subs ($7.5 billion each) and $145 billion to maintain them.
I don’t doubt those quoted costs may climb but it’s a huge difference to what took place here before the cancellation.

France’s Naval Group wins $6 billion Dutch submarine project

The Dutch are slated to get a conventionally powered version of the French Barracuda submarine, offering shallow-water maneuvering and long reach.

www.defensenews.com

With the availability of a lot of Dutch submarine equipment, I imagine there will be a very large government furnished equipment part that isn't showing in the cost.

The build arrangement will count as well.

 

[Reptilia]

Interesting pricing. Netherlands price is approx $10 billion Australian to build 4 subs. $2.5 billion each. The last is saw of Attack class it was going to be $90 billion Australian to build 12 subs ($7.5 billion each) and $145 billion to maintain them.
I don’t doubt those quoted costs may climb but it’s a huge difference to what took place here before the cancellation.

France’s Naval Group wins $6 billion Dutch submarine project

The Dutch are slated to get a conventionally powered version of the French Barracuda submarine, offering shallow-water maneuvering and long reach.

www.defensenews.com

Very different to the Attack class(Shortfin Barracuda). It’s much smaller…

82m long
8.2m diameter
3,300 ton
15,000nm range
30 torpedoes/missiles
40-60 crew
No pump jet…

Dutch media

Wat we nu weten over de nieuwe Nederlandse onderzeeboten

Het is een nieuw ontwerp

marineschepen.nl

 

[Redlands18]

Interesting pricing. Netherlands price is approx $10 billion Australian to build 4 subs. $2.5 billion each. The last is saw of Attack class it was going to be $90 billion Australian to build 12 subs ($7.5 billion each) and $145 billion to maintain them.
I don’t doubt those quoted costs may climb but it’s a huge difference to what took place here before the cancellation.

France’s Naval Group wins $6 billion Dutch submarine project

The Dutch are slated to get a conventionally powered version of the French Barracuda submarine, offering shallow-water maneuvering and long reach.

www.defensenews.com

They are being built in France in established dockyards by an experienced qualified workforce, with a high degree of commonality with both the Suffren and Scorpene classes, if the Australian boats had been built under those circumstances than I suspect they would have been a fair bit cheaper but with all the baggage that would have come with a French build.

 

[H_K]

They are being built in France in established dockyards by an experienced qualified workforce, with a high degree of commonality with both the Suffren and Scorpene classes, if the Australian boats had been built under those circumstances than I suspect they would have been a fair bit cheaper

Australian costs always seem completely out of whack with the rest of the world. Never been able to figure out why. Not just Attack - Aukus is even worse, and the prices quoted for Hunter and Hobart were also borderline obscene.

For example, the Barracuda SSN program’s *total* procurement cost is only €13 billion for 6 subs (at current 2024 prices)... $22b Australian. That’s all in - including R&D, nuke reactors, 6 subs, 6.5 years of initial support and logistics, and 20% VAT… €2.25b per sub or $3.75b Australian. Barracuda R&D itself was only €1.5B.

So Australia was paying at least 2x more for a highly customized, locally built but non-nuke sub. And based on Aukus costings, the final SSN option will cost many times that… (though it gets hard to project that far out due to inflation and the distortion of outturn prices)

 

[Redlands18]

Australian costs always seem completely out of whack with the rest of the world. Never been able to figure out why. Not just Attack - Aukus is even worse, and the prices quoted for Hunter and Hobart were also borderline obscene.

For example, the Barracuda SSN program’s *total* procurement cost is only €13 billion for 6 subs (at current 2024 prices)... $22b Australian. That’s all in - including R&D, nuke reactors, 6 subs, 6.5 years of initial support and logistics, and 20% VAT… €2.25b per sub or $3.75b Australian. Barracuda R&D itself was only €1.5B.

So Australia was paying at least 2x more for a highly customized, locally built but non-nuke sub. And based on Aukus costings, the final SSN option will cost many times that… (though it gets hard to project that far out due to inflation and the distortion of outturn prices)

Because the bigger navies buy equipment in bulk to fit to multiple classes of vessels, then provide that equipment to the builders and those purchases are not included in the build price and when you start talking Radars, CMS and weapon systems then you are talking serious money. Australia with its stop-start naval construction has never been able to do this, this should change under the FSR, if we are building 13 Frigates and 6 LOSVs and even the LMV, JSS fleets in the 2030s, a lot of the same equipment will be fitted across the fleet from weapon systems, radars, CMS, Engines to galleys and accommodation that can be purchased in bulk directly by the Government and then provided to the builders.

Canada has exactly the same problem, their 15 Type 26 was originally costed at $65B Canadian. This is why people keep pushing the continuous build model to get away from having to re-start everything involved in shipbuilding from ordering small numbers of VLS to Galleys that are unique to that class.

 

[spoz]

That, plus the fact that Australian estimates are whole of life costs - everything, including personnel costs, including those involved in support activities, up until the last item is finally disposed of. Of course, in the out years those are guesstimates which can normally be calculated to come to wildly varying sums depending on the input assumptions; and the reason why one costing of the program can be very different from another carried out some time later. And, of course, there is a natural tendency to use minima in the pre approval phase, which then leads to an “increase”when the calcs are redone after approval.

 

[SammyC]

If we are to break down the SSN program to highlight the differences in pricing a project.

The headline number for the SSNs is $268-368B over 30 years, some somewhere in the range of $9-12B per year.

Budget forward estimates show $9B being spent over the next four years and $58B over the next 10 years on the SSN program. That number brings us to the first Virginia sub and represents 15-20% of the total life cycle program. The actual sub however will only be in the order of $4.5B (on the basis of $3B US price for a block 4 to the USN).

The additional cost covers the industry payments to the US ($3B US) and UK, establishment and operation of the ASA ($0.5B per annum) and a nuclear safety regulator, upgrade of FBW and Henderson (somewhere around $8B), train people in the US and UK, build the new construction yard in Osborne, buy spares, our share of the AUKUS design and the list goes on. All necessary investments to have a nuclear sub

Some people would say that the first submarine will cost $4.5B, and they would be right. Others would say the first submarine will cost us $58B and they would also be right.

Without knowing the breakdown of the Dutch submarine quoted pricing, I suspect it is the base submarine cost. It would be reasonable to assume they have additional costs, particularly as they have stated they want a high proportion of local content, their facilities will likely need to be upgraded and they will need to establish a program office. These costs however will likely be allocated separate to the submarine costs.

 

[Volkodav]

That, plus the fact that Australian estimates are whole of life costs - everything, including personnel costs, including those involved in support activities, up until the last item is finally disposed of. Of course, in the out years those are guesstimates which can normally be calculated to come to wildly varying sums depending on the input assumptions; and the reason why one costing of the program can be very different from another carried out some time later. And, of course, there is a natural tendency to use minima in the pre approval phase, which then leads to an “increase”when the calcs are redone after approval.

During the 2000s a number of industry partners were badly burnt by the inability to adjust pricing to fit reality. They were held to pricing that had been based on assumptions and data that was clearly wrong once the capability entered service.

It is far better to honestly estimate costs, no matter how huge the numbers, than pretend they are much less and being caught out later.

Often little thought is given to the support costs but these are the killer.