Good summary Scott, and no disagreement from me. There was an earlier post, I think from Volkodav, that pointed out that the vast majority of the community are more interested in cost of living issues (schools, health, super, housing etc), rather than defence, and Governments inevitably respond with higher priority to this. Defence is funded such that it does not compromise this expectation (else Governments get turfed). We might think that is wrong, but it is unfortunately the reality with a democracy.
Andrew Hastie's response was somewhat hipocritical (did anybody actually expect anything different), but I did take the message that the coalition had no disagreement with any of the new equipment proposals (just the timeframe for delivery). One would hope that means that behind the scenes there is political agreement on systems and platforms, and minimal potential for change following elections (I live in hope, and occasionally I view outcomes through rose coloured glasses).
I would also suggest that actual ships are the end output from a lot of other activities, most perhaps hidden from view. As discussed in many other posts, ships don't work without the necessary supply systems and resourcing, many of which are problematic, and need to be resolved first.
For instance, the commentary on the number of VLS cells on a platform, is in my view less important than the ability to manufacture new missiles (or at least hold significant inventory). Large VLS installations are somewhat pointless without missiles and the ability to reload. It's like having a gun with one bullet. To this end there is significant investment in in-country missile production and procurement of stock, and I personally watch this with interest. Costs here are actually relatively small in the initial stages, as it involves training, setting up equipment, working with suppliers etc, but no less important. Orders may be raised, but not delivered for several years, sometimes outside the current forward estimate, but that does not mean that work is not occuring.
Likewise, in my view the single most important step to obtaining an SSN capability, is building the essential facilities in FBW for US and UK subs to home port here by 2027. Listening to Senate estimate hearings, this work is well underway. I place more emphasis on this deliverable, than in the procurement of our own Virginias.
I haven't seen the cost for the above programs, and I sure they are not cheap, however I suspect it is unlikely to be substantial enough to alter the overall defence budget in the near term. Hence an additional $1.7billion over the next four years is perhaps sufficient, and more money would perhaps not speed it up.
I would prefer investment and resourcing is allocated to these kind of subjects in the short term (along with people recruitment and intention), rather than rushing new ship builds.
I would suggest this will provide a better outcome when the ships eventually do arrive, and it will provide a capability that will survive the first day of war and be around to continue on the second.
Andrew Hastie's response was somewhat hipocritical (did anybody actually expect anything different), but I did take the message that the coalition had no disagreement with any of the new equipment proposals (just the timeframe for delivery). One would hope that means that behind the scenes there is political agreement on systems and platforms, and minimal potential for change following elections (I live in hope, and occasionally I view outcomes through rose coloured glasses).
I would also suggest that actual ships are the end output from a lot of other activities, most perhaps hidden from view. As discussed in many other posts, ships don't work without the necessary supply systems and resourcing, many of which are problematic, and need to be resolved first.
For instance, the commentary on the number of VLS cells on a platform, is in my view less important than the ability to manufacture new missiles (or at least hold significant inventory). Large VLS installations are somewhat pointless without missiles and the ability to reload. It's like having a gun with one bullet. To this end there is significant investment in in-country missile production and procurement of stock, and I personally watch this with interest. Costs here are actually relatively small in the initial stages, as it involves training, setting up equipment, working with suppliers etc, but no less important. Orders may be raised, but not delivered for several years, sometimes outside the current forward estimate, but that does not mean that work is not occuring.
Likewise, in my view the single most important step to obtaining an SSN capability, is building the essential facilities in FBW for US and UK subs to home port here by 2027. Listening to Senate estimate hearings, this work is well underway. I place more emphasis on this deliverable, than in the procurement of our own Virginias.
I haven't seen the cost for the above programs, and I sure they are not cheap, however I suspect it is unlikely to be substantial enough to alter the overall defence budget in the near term. Hence an additional $1.7billion over the next four years is perhaps sufficient, and more money would perhaps not speed it up.
I would prefer investment and resourcing is allocated to these kind of subjects in the short term (along with people recruitment and intention), rather than rushing new ship builds.
I would suggest this will provide a better outcome when the ships eventually do arrive, and it will provide a capability that will survive the first day of war and be around to continue on the second.
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