The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

[Ananda]

While the southern counter offensive towards Kherson appears to have stalled it has achieved one useful unintended victory. It has for all intents isolated 20,000 or so troops and their equipment from being able to support the rest of the forces.

That I agree on the sense Russia asside wanting to secure Donbas, also want to secure Crimea by creating the Russian Imperial Thaurida Oblast. Kherson is big part of that. So they will keep reserve flowing that direction.

As Feanor already put before, around Izium seems Russian using less regular forces to guard what they seems considering as 'back' front. However saying Russian will sacrifice that front and relinquish Izium which is hard fought before just too soon. They're now rushing more regular reserves there, and seems Ukrainian trying to cut bridges preventing them to come.

Like I put, it's depends on how much reserves that each sides can still throwing on each fronts.

 

[vikingatespam]

No at the moment it is quite possibly down to a two bridges as senkove may have already been taken as well as oskil. Would be safe to say if accurate izium will fall probably sooner rather than later.

If true, 2 bridges (within arty range) is a dangerously narrow S-4 string.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 4 of 5: Yes we can

19. The UN released a 9 Sept 2022 report that documented instances of torture, poor treatment, and lack of adequate food, water, healthcare, and sanitation in Russian-run POW sites. This will of course encourage Ukrainian battalions not to surrender, even against seemingly hopeless odds.

20. There is a good chance that Ukrainian forces may collapse Russian positions around Izyum if they sever Russian lines of communication north and south of Izyum — where Russian troops are pocketed. The Kremlin is rushing resources to the Kharkiv City-Izyum line in an attempt to halt Ukrainian advances — but it is certain to be an Ukrainian trap, if these troops are sent to the western half of Kupyansk.

21. After Ukrainian forces achieved remarkable operational surprise, they have captured an estimated 2,500 square kilometers in Kharkiv Oblast in the Kharkiv area offensive to displace the Russian invaders, as of 9 Sept 2022. ISW has said that:

​

(a) Russian forces launched air and missile strikes on Barvinok (about 14km north of Kherson City) and shelled Novovoskresenske (about 20 km south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border).​

​

(b) Telegram channels published footage of Ukrainian forces raising a flag in Blahodativka on the eastern bank of the Inhulets River, confirming previous Russian milblogger claims of Ukrainian advances — so it’s is clear that gap between pocketed forces is being widened, which makes better battlefield geometry sense than initial Russian propaganda (that drew the map of Ukrainian offensive, in the shape of a thin crooked dick). For a Ukraine to hold the gains and avoid being attacked at 2 sides, the penetration of Russian lines needs width, more than depth.​

​

(c) Ukrainian aviation and missile units reportedly struck a ferry crossing in Nova Kakhovka, two ammunition depots in Beryslav Raion, and several command-and-control posts throughout Kherson Oblast.​

​

22. If Russian WarGonzo reporter (aka Semyon Pegov) wants to get out of Izyum, things must be really bad. It’s karma for Semyon Pegov to find his vehicle suffering a flat tire & getting geolocated at Tsushima Street in Izyum as the pocket around him collapses.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1568507661611667457

23. The Kharkiv offensive is being run by General Oleksandr Syrsky, who also organised Kyiv’s defence. As the Economist said:

“A Ukrainian military intelligence source says the success of the [Kharkiv] offensive was contingent on American-supplied anti-radiation missiles [&] surface-to-air systems that threatened Russian aircraft: Ukrainian sources single out Germany’s Gepard.”

​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1568301368137457665

(a) The above quote means that the Ukrainians are killing Russian drones for the ABGs to advance — in essence, they are making Russian artillery blind. Normally, the KVSG-3 anti-drone gun is useless against Russian drone, because the human eye cannot easily see a drone flying. In the video, they know a drone is overhead because a radar detected it and told them.​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1568473693474668544

(b) I am against circulating every rumour on Telegram, but the main challenge in establishing a clear picture of the situation in Kharkiv appears to be that Russian lines are collapsing faster than Ukraine can even advance.​

​

(c) Thus far, the Kremlin is refusing to publicly address Ukrainian successes in Kharkiv Oblast, but this offensive likely prompted Russian President Vladimir Putin to convene a meeting with top Russian security and political officials on 9 Sept 2022.​

 

[Feanor]

(b) I am against circulating every rumour on Telegram, but the main challenge in establishing a clear picture of the situation in Kharkiv appears to be that Russian lines are collapsing faster than Ukraine can even advance.​

​

Oh it's no rumor. Russian forces have abandoned the western half of Kupyansk, and retreated across the Oskol. It's really not clear why this is happening, possibly Russian forces here were stretched thinner then was even remotely reasonable. Reinforcements were being flown in earlier, so it's really unclear why this is happening. But the what is clear.

Colonelcassad

Между тем противник уже в Купянске.

t.me

 

[ngatimozart]

If the Ukrainians encircle and trap the Russian forces on the western side of the Oskol River, they will have captured the largest number of Russian POWs since WW2. The fact that they have captured a Lieutenant General, the highest ranking Russian officer taken POW since WW2, won't go unnoticed.

@STURM Corruption on a small scale doesn't impact greatly upon a military's fighting ability. However in the case of the Russian military the corruption was small scale, it was and is huge and it's impacted upon every thing from major weapons systems down to soldiers ration packs and medical kits. Money that should've gone into providing uptodate modern weapons systems, body armour, night vision gear, secure comms, proper ration packs, uniforms, uptodate medical kits etc., was stolen from the military by senior political figure, senior officers, bureaucrats, and defence contractors not just in little bits, but in huge sums. So they sent their soldiers and sailors into battle with poor equipment, under prepared, old and time expired rations, poorly lead and no wonder morale is lower than a snakes belly. On top of that they treat their soldiers very poorly and don't value their lives and the soldiers know that. So why should they risk them if they don't have to, especially if officers are avoiding their responsibilities?

Interestingly enough the PLA has the same level, if not more corruption, but its situation is different and at least its getting modern equipment.

 

[STURM]

Corruption on a small scale doesn't impact greatly upon a military's fighting ability

I totally agree; corruption is widespread, deep rooted and had a major impact on operations; no doubt at all. The situation was made worse by a host of other factors; namely the Russians not expecting serious resistance; not having the right levels of manpower; not having the right kit and organisation; an air force ill suited for a strategic air campaign; etc.

I was merely pondering if things would have gone slightly better for them or would the result have been the same if they had gone in better prepared; the widescale and deep rooted corruption notwithstanding.

but its situation is different and at least its getting modern equipment.

The PLA also trains to conduct high intensity protracted operations; unlike the Russians who have been focusing on campaigns similar to Syria, Chechnya, Georgia and the Donbas. Russian military planners never thought they'd be called upon to undertake such a large scale protracted operation.

On corruption in the PLA no doubt it exists and is a problem but my personal feeling is that we shouldn't put too much in it. We shouldn't assume that corruption will have the same detrimental effect on the PLA as it has with the Russian army.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 5 of 5: Yes we can

24. A pro-Russian volunteer confirms the Ukrainian offensive on at Izyum axis (Kharkiv Oblast).

• 0:00 - 0:16 = 49.234718, 37.325972
• 0:17 - 0:25 = 49.233688, 37.355158
• 0:28 = 49.233688, 37.355158

25. As a sign of desperation, a Russian milblogger specified that the Russian Armed Forces are forming new “Storm” assault detachments with elements of the failed Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS) initiative — rebranding BARS will not make this lousy system better. President Vladimir Putin signed the order creating the BARS system in 2015, but has never spoken publicly about it since. BARS battalions have become one of the tools the Russian military has used to meet its growing demand for combat troops. There are at least 20 BARS battalions, who are made up of volunteers, many of whom are demobilized former officers and soldiers.

Oh it's no rumor. Russian forces have abandoned the western half of Kupyansk, and retreated across the Oskol. It's really not clear why this is happening, possibly Russian forces here were stretched thinner then was even remotely reasonable. Reinforcements were being flown in earlier, so it's really unclear why this is happening. But the what is clear.

26. As with all good strategy, Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky and his war planners were prepared for a range of contingencies (by keeping a large operation reserve). The UA’s choices on where to use this reserve depended on what the Russian did. Once they saw the extent of the Russian troop movements, and the developing vulnerability this created, then the plan for Kharkiv will have firmed up in their minds— the most impressive aspect is the operational level deception plan. While the focus was on the south, the UA assembled and launched a multi-brigade level operation, supported by an armoured spearhead in the north. The out come of this is that the western half of Kupyansk, across the river has been liberated from Russian occupation.

​

(a) On Friday, another offensive line opened up with an attack on Russian positions in Lyman (over 20,000 inhabitants) which had been taken by the Russians after a fierce battle at the end of May. This opened up the move against Izyum.​

​

(b) Ukrainian intelligence also knew that a lot of regular units in Kharkiv were from the Western Military District. It is well known that the Western Military District "has performed… worst out of all the military districts so far in this war… badly mauled in the opening phase [&] probably had biggest struggles in terms of force quality & ability to reconstitute."​

​

(c) The UA’s ABGs appear to be conducting a double (north-south) envelopment of Russian troops around and north of Izium, in a fight against the lousiest troops of the Russian Army. Whether this pocket becomes closed, or remains somewhat open but it is certain the Russian situation is dire.​

​

(d) Defeated armies tend to suffer the most casualties once they begin to rout, it is then they can be defeated. Ukraine’s reserves must stay on their flanks and rear while continuing to hit them with artillery. Strikes on retreating Russian columns would generate significant casualties.​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1568487986106605568

27. Amazing confirmation — photos are showing that Shevchenkovo and Chkalovske are under control of the Ukrainian Army. There are also videos of Ukrainian troops being welcomed by the local population in Kharkiv Oblast at:

• start = 49.637717, 37.331663
• end = 49.643657, 37.333516

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1568529602376605703

28. Heavy fighting is now occurring within the city of Izyum (in the Kharkiv Region), after Ukrainian Artillery had been pounding the area for the last few hours, one or more Ukrainian ABGs (infantry supported by tanks) have entered the city and are fighting block to block to attempt to retake it. Earlier, I saw a rumor about the Russians evacuating Izium — now I am seeing rumours that the city itself has fallen.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1568543717262348293

29. Now wider confirmation from Russian sources that they have quickly withdrawn from Izyum and possibly Lyman too. But the other two parts of the picture of this offensive are, as follows:

​

One, the speed of advance.​

​

Two, the failure of Russian intelligence (to detect the Ukrainian build up of forces in Kharkiv Oblast).​

Even an Ukrainian official says he can’t keep up. The original plan while ambitious, the UA have gone further and faster than even they imagined.

30. It’s ok for me to admit defeat on locating where the forward edge of battle is today. The Russian lines are falling too fast for conservative war mappers to keep up (on where the Ukrainians have advanced to at this time).

 

[Ananda]

Calculation of resources based on Pro Ukranian and Pro Russian telegram shown Ukrainian put more resources to Kherson offensive then Kharkiv offensive. However so far the result shown different results. Russian resources also behave differently in Nikolayev-Kherson fronts then Kharkiv-Izium fronts.

The way I saw this, clearly Russian underestimate Ukrainian resources in Kharkiv-Izium, and now paying the prices. On other hand if Pro Russian telegrams shown real condition on Russian resources, then the reserves being send toward Kharkiv-Izium fronts is not resources or reserve from Donbas (let alone southern fronts). Either this shown Russian inabilities to switch resources between fronts, or they do have ample reserve to thrown out.

 

[STURM]

As a sign of desperation, a Russian milblogger specified that the Russian Armed Forces are forming new “Storm” assault detachments with elements of the failed Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS) initiative — rebranding BARS will not make this lousy system better. President Vladimir Putin signed the order creating the BARS system in 2015, but has never spoken publicly about it since. BARS battalions have become one of the tools the Russian military has used to meet its growing demand for combat troops. There are at least 20 BARS battalions, who are made up of volunteers, many of whom are demobilized former officers and soldiers.

It would be interesting to know what their paper organisation is and how they are actually organised in reality. The bright spot is that they are volunteers and have prior military experience but whether they are organised and equipped the right way and whether they have unit cohesion is the question.

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

Purely speculation on my part, but I wonder if the push on Kherson was designed in part to suck in Russian reinforcements, leaving eastern Ukraine open for the sort of offensive we're seeing.

Could be that Ukraine was legitimately pushing in both areas and the Russians just managed their forces poorly, but worth thinking about. Certainly Ukraine appears to be playing their hand well at the moment.

 

[seaspear]

Purely speculation on my part, but I wonder if the push on Kherson was designed in part to suck in Russian reinforcements, leaving eastern Ukraine open for the sort of offensive we're seeing.

Could be that Ukraine was legitimately pushing in both areas and the Russians just managed their forces poorly, but worth thinking about. Certainly Ukraine appears to be playing their hand well at the moment.

Are you suggesting that Ukraine announced their intention to attack at the far end of the Russian logistical line, trap those reinforcements sent by blowing bridges and then to attack the other end where the Russians had depleted their forces without announcing their intention to do so

 

[swerve]

Post 5 of 5: Yes we can
...
29. Now wider confirmation from Russian sources that they have quickly withdrawn from Izyum and possibly Lyman too. But the other two parts of the picture of this offensive are, as follows:

​

One, the speed of advance.​

​

Two, the failure of Russian intelligence (to detect the Ukrainian build up of forces in Kharkiv Oblast).​

Even an Ukrainian official says he can’t keep up. The original plan while ambitious, the UA have gone further and faster than even they imagined.

30. It’s ok for me to admit defeat on locating where the forward edge of battle is today. The Russian lines are falling too fast for conservative war mappers to keep up (on where the Ukrainians have advanced to at this time).

If I was Ukrainian, I'd be worrying about the flanks. Maybe the Russians are too disorganised to do anything, maybe not.

But the Ukrainian command's probably well ahead of me in thinking about such things.

 

[vonnoobie]

Purely speculation on my part, but I wonder if the push on Kherson was designed in part to suck in Russian reinforcements, leaving eastern Ukraine open for the sort of offensive we're seeing.

Could be that Ukraine was legitimately pushing in both areas and the Russians just managed their forces poorly, but worth thinking about. Certainly Ukraine appears to be playing their hand well at the moment.

I dont think it was their plan, Sounds like something Hogan's Heroes would have come up with with sergeant schultz in the background "I KNOW NOTHING!".

That being said their command top to bottom is far more adaptable. With the Kherson forces isolated and the attacks east of Kharkiv going so well they will likely be throwing as many ground elements as they can towards there. As with any well trained force some times things go right, some times wrong, you adapt and more forward with the situation you are given. I believe the Kherson was meant to be their main offensive but didnt play out that way. Instead they found a far less costly and far quicker victory in an area they only expected to make moderate gains. So they are adapting, Keeping the Kherson forces tied down unable to advance or retreat while throwing anything they can spare into taking advantage of the collapse of any effect RU defence east of Kharkiv.

 

[vonnoobie]

If I was Ukrainian, I'd be worrying about the flanks. Maybe the Russians are too disorganised to do anything, maybe not.

But the Ukrainian command's probably well ahead of me in thinking about such things.

What flanks? Izium is for all intents done and dasted. Any pockets of resistance dont have the manpower, equipment or unified command to make any worthwhile defence, RU forces east of the Oskil river will for now be a patch work force of troops between rear guard, supply personnel, reserves rushed in of an unknown quality or quantity or any one that managed to get away from UKR forces and those guys after seeing the UKR steam roll them wont want to be anywhere near the battle while north of there the UKR forces appear to be advancing towards Velykyi Burluk already. Quite simply at present they have no flank at risk because they are advancing in every direction.

A Russian base has already been struck in Velykyi Burluk, Which means any forces their now be lacking in either a command structure, supplies or both and a missile strike has been reported in Vovchansk which has 3 road and 1 rail bridge that are prime target to severing the GLOC to Velykyi Burluk.

 

[Ananda]

It’s ok for me to admit defeat on locating where the forward edge of battle is today. The Russian lines are falling too fast for conservative war mappers to keep up (on where the Ukrainians have advanced to at this time)

Рыбарь

❗️ Обстановка на Харьковском направлении по состоянию на 17.00 10 сентября 2022 года На текущий момент ситуация на северо-востоке Харьковской области продолжает ухудшаться. ▪️На фоне отвода подразделений ВС РФ мобильные тактические группы ВСУ практически беспрепятственно дошли до Большого...

t.me

The Pro Russian telegram actually admitting the retreat in Kharkiv-Izium front. This at least more then Pro Ukranian that until now not admitting Kherson front offensive in south basically stalling.

Russian defense ministry now basically silent on the comment for that front. So either Russian now trying regrouping or they are going to let go the Kharkiv-Izium front while try to salvage whatever possition they still can hold in Kharkiv Oblast.

 

[swerve]

The Russian defence ministry has confirmed that it has withdrawn from Izyum & Balakliya "to regroup" & "bolster efforts" & said that
"A three-day operation was carried out on the drawdown and organised transfer of the Izyum-Balakliya group of troops to the territory of the Donetsk People's Republic," &
"In order to prevent damage to the Russian troops, a powerful fire defeat was inflicted on the enemy."

What flanks? Izium is for all intents done and dasted. Any pockets of resistance dont have the manpower, equipment or unified command to make any worthwhile defence, RU forces east of the Oskil river will for now be a patch work force of troops between rear guard, supply personnel, reserves rushed in of an unknown quality or quantity or any one that managed to get away from UKR forces and those guys after seeing the UKR steam roll them wont want to be anywhere near the battle while north of there the UKR forces appear to be advancing towards Velykyi Burluk already. Quite simply at present they have no flank at risk because they are advancing in every direction.

A Russian base has already been struck in Velykyi Burluk, Which means any forces their now be lacking in either a command structure, supplies or both and a missile strike has been reported in Vovchansk which has 3 road and 1 rail bridge that are prime target to severing the GLOC to Velykyi Burluk.

Oh, I agree in general. But the northern flank has got closer to the Russian border, & it's wise to take precautions.

 

[Feanor]

It's too fluid to say where the front line is, but there is contradictory information from Liman, Russian forces may or may not be withdrawing from there. It's unclear if there are Russian forces in or around Kupyansk. Russian forces are gone from Izyum area, and despite reserves being rushed to the area, they are clearly inadequate. The last information out of Izyum had Russian National Guard, LNR reservists, and BARS units in the town.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Russian Ka-52 ops near Kupyansk.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Russian strikes on Kharkov.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Ukrainian forces on the outskirts of Izyum.

Colonelcassad

Пехота противника на окраинах Изюма. Еще ночью начался отвод войск ВС РФ к Осколу, чтобы избежать угрозы окружения.

t.me

Apparently Ukrainian vehicles knocked out near Izyum. There were early reports of fighting in the area, before Russia withdrew, likely to avoid encirclement.

Центр Рубеж

Бойцы РФ разбили группу украинских военнослужащих на Изюмском направлении. Также оставили небольшой подарок, в виде заминированного БТРа. @vorposte

t.me

Russian reserves heading to Kharkov region. Note the haphazardly uparmored BTR-82As. There is a BTR-82AT that has mounts of extra armor kits but both the vehicle and the kits are scarce.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Доп.броня в кадре.

В кадр попал БТР-82. Видны приварееные листы и контейнеры ДЗ "Контакт-1".

shusharmor.livejournal.com

Все, что было под рукой

То и повесили

shushpanzer-ru.livejournal.com

Day old footage of Russian troops moving in the Izyum area.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Ukrainian Krab and M-109 in Kharkov region, part of the current offensive.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Ukrainian HIMARS heading towards Kupyansk.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Ukrainian MT-LB upgraded with a Turkish Serdar combat module.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

An influx of WIAs has been reported in Kiev, from the Kharkov offensive.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

There are reports of civilians fleeing the fighting in droves. Russian sources claim they're fleeing Ukrainian repressions. A reminder that Kupyansk specifically fell without fighting early in the war, and the mayor of Kupyansk essentially welcomed Russian forces in. So it's quite plausible that members of the city government would face prosecution from Ukrainian authorities.

Readovka

Жители Купянска в спешке покидают свои дома, опасаясь репрессий от киевского режима Сотни машин из Купянска через Сватово в ЛНР — жители начали покидать свои дома со вчерашнего вечера, когда появились сообщения о том, что ВСУ подходят к Купянску и готовятся к штурму. Как передает военкор...

t.me

Russian refugee camps have been set up in anticipation of civilians fleeing, but they appear mostly empty so far.

АНДРЕЙ ТУРЧАК Z

Перебросили наш сводный волонтерский отряд из Балаклеи, Купянска, Изюма и Волчанска на границу с Белгородской областью. Здесь находится один из ПВРов. Сюда прибывают беженцы, массово выезжающие из Харьковской области из-за усилившихся обстрелов украинских националистов. Люди уезжают семьями...

t.me

 

[hauritz]

If I was Ukrainian, I'd be worrying about the flanks. Maybe the Russians are too disorganised to do anything, maybe not.

But the Ukrainian command's probably well ahead of me in thinking about such things.

I would agree accept that I think this war is being fought on a transparent battlefield, at least from the Ukrainian side. Their ability to keep hitting ammo dumps, command centres and so on would make it nearly impossible for the Russians to mount any sort of counterattack.

Really it isn’t just Ukrainian troops against Russian troops. It is Ukrainian troops backed up by NATO ISR and logistics support. Not much the Russians can do about that.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 1 of 5: Ukrainian successes in Kharkiv Oblast & attempts to advance elsewhere

Calculation of resources based on Pro Ukranian and Pro Russian telegram shown Ukrainian put more resources to Kherson offensive then Kharkiv offensive.

1. Telegram = YouTube comments — both full of rubbish. It is ironic that after all the talk of "feints" from pro-Russian telegram sources, it was the Ukrainians that pulled off the largest strategic deception of the entire war.

​

(a) IMHO Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky and his war planners pulled-off this deception plan absolutely perfectly — it is now undeniable that Ukraine has better and smarter generals than Russia.​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1568576718692093952

​

(b) But the reason why the rapid advance after Balakliya worked well is that the Kherson offensive had real muscle committed to it. What the Russians and I was deceived by was the size of the Ukrainian build-up. This is why Russia lost the fight of the reserves.​

​

(c) There are at least 4 brigades committed to the attack at Kharkiv (before counting the reserves). Pro Russian telegram are lying about their estimates of Ukrainian forces — which is being carefully hidden. The successful attack at Kharkiv is first and foremost a Russian intelligence failure — what I consider a fatal mistake.​

​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1568747473551892480

(d) The speed of Ukrainian advance to Kupiansk also shows you something about how everyone underestimated the Ukrainian Army’s ability to take brigades off the frontline, rotate them with fresh units and re-build up battle hardened forces into multiple coherent ABGs that are tactically superior to Russian forces at Kharkiv.​

​

(e) Elements of the Ukrainian 25th Airborne Brigade reached the northern edge of Izyum, Kharkiv Oblast but likely have not cleared the city (or encircled the Russian forces conducting a withdrawal from Izyum), as of 10 Sept 2022.​

​

(f) As I said earlier that I repeat here; another offensive line opened up with this attack on Russian positions in Lyman (over 20,000 inhabitants) which had been taken by the Russians after a fierce battle at the end of May. This opened up the move against Izyum.​

2. Often people are there to talk past each other & the Pro Russian telegram are often engaging in blind cheer leading without the ability to conduct proper analysis of the emerging trends. I am certain that both the Pro Russian telegram and the Pro Ukrainian telegram can post certain facts faster than Twitter but their analysis is low quality.

3. The fiction of war means it is really hard to tell the actual intent of the UA and count the resources allocated. The Ukrainian offensive to take back land in Kharkiv is the type of action that will be written about and analyzed for decades, as part of lessons learnt for war planners and even more interesting to me than the 1973 Yom Kippur War or the 1991 Desert Storm (due to its direct relevance to a 1990s style forward defence of Singapore). Part of the reason is because there is a deception plan that worked.

However so far the result shown different results. Russian resources also behave differently in Nikolayev-Kherson fronts then Kharkiv-Izium fronts.

4. Yes, of course — the offence will be conducted in phases, to allow UA to exploit the gains. More shaping actions needs to occur in the Nikolayev-Kherson front.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1568623220961550336

5. The 35 close air support sorties in the Kherson Area of Ops is evidence of intent to advance (the attacks over the last 7 days are real). Ostpolitik is over but the fight versus negotiate dichotomy is false. In the end, the war in Ukraine will end in a negotiated settlement; but the nature of that settlement will be determined by the outcome of the fighting in both Kherson and Kharkiv before the full onset of winter. For the Russians, winter is coming — it promises to be miserable, unless China is willing to inject massive amounts of weapons and aid to Putin in the coming winter.

 

[STURM]

Russia, Ukraine, And Urban Warfare - Modern War Institute

In this episode of MWI’s Urban Warfare Project Podcast, John Spencer is joined by Michael Kofman, research program director in the Russia Studies Program at the Center for Naval Analyses and fellow […]

mwi.usma.edu

As its title suggests this podcast is about urban ops but Michael Kofman starts with a brief overview of the Russian army on the eve of the invasion [organisation, manpower, readiness rates ; etc].

He also goes into the various issues the Russians faced such as limited manpower [some IFVs only had 2 dismounts]; lack of maintenance personnel; lack of a proper operational plan; most units not having received urban training, units only told 3 days before the invasion that they were going in and to expect a walkover etc].

He addresses the issue of corruption and makes clear it was not the reason for many of the issues faced [speculation on my part but if the Russians had gone it with a clear appreciation of what they we're facing; they would have performed better; irrespective of the widespread corruption angle]. He later goes into detail analysing the early part of the campaign and points out that the way the invasion was typical Soviet [bold audacious moves; surprise, deception, etc]; similar to how they went into Afghanistan and Czechoslovakia.

Ultimately the Russian army went in totally unprepared and ill suited for what it faced in invading the 2nd largest country in Eurupe; one with a large army and a large pool of reserve msn power; unbelievable how detached Russia's political leadership was from reality. At this juncture we have nothing solid to indicate if it was a case of Putin dismissing stuff he didn't want to hear or him being told only what he wanted to hear; or was it a combination of both?