Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[Volkodav]

I suspect the primary concern ref the son of Collins isn't that it will be more trouble than its worth but rather it will be perfectly good enough and seen as an alternative to the SSNs by a future government.

Australian governments have form in doing this. The ANZACs were a perfectly fine patrol frigate that could be upgraded into a decent GP type but because it was there it ended up as an excuse not to replace the DDGs and now is being stretched far beyond its planned economical life. The FFGs were perfectly adequate ASW ships with a reasonable AD capability but they ended up being substitutes for DDGs.

Army wanted SPGs but instead received extra towed 155mm because the political classes saw them as perfectly good enough. That is one of the ADFs greatest concerns, that their interim, options are seen as good enough, or worse, near enough to what they actually need, resulting in them not getting the capability they actually need.

Son of Collins makes a lot of sense, but could easily become the "good enough" alternative to the SSNs, leaving the RAN with a sub that, while an excellent gap filler and supplement to SSNs isn't as good as the Attacks would have been. End result, the RAN has no SSNs and a design more limited to what they would have had.

 

[swerve]

I’m no expert on these radars but from what I’ve read in the public domain, the T/R units are integral with the mast mounted antenna on the CEAFAR system but not on the SPY system as fitted to the AWD’s.

The difference between PESA (SPY-1, TRS-3D, SMART-S) & AESA (CEAFAR, SPY-6, SAMSON, NS200, TRS-4D). PESA radars can be very good, but they're losing out to AESAs. Some radars (I think including some of those I've just isted as PESA) are hybrid, with several PESAs grouped together in one phased array.

 

[Wombat000]

I’m doubtful that there will be a move back from an SSN.
The SSN and wider AUKUS had the announcement was personally supported by the POTUS & UK PM, this isn’t simply a home grown program.

Also, it’s impossible to un-invent something, even if that’s just a concept
So, the capability leap now tangibly offered to the GOTD & ADF is just too big to suddenly ignore, especially in this strategic environment.

therefore IMHO Son of Collins will remained viewed as a stop-gap solution.

 

[alexsa]

The new government may need to clarify Australia's submarine future.

Submariners push for new 'son of Collins' fleet before nuclear boats arrive

Former submariners with the Royal Australian Navy are warning a newer version of the Collins-class boat is needed as a stopgap measure before the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines start hitting the water in the 2040s.

www.abc.net.au

Cheers S

I think that future is nailed down. Building a son of Collins will take longer than the planned mid life upgrade noting the design of a new boat will still need to be nailed down and a logistics train established (noting a new hull is to be built). This would take resources from the SSN programme and would mean the Collins would still be our only boat in service ... but in an un-upgraded form (the ASC current facility would be occupied with a Son of Collins and the SSN programme so the mid life upgrade would be a problem).

Added to which there would not be many of the Sons of Collins (one or two perhaps) in service at the time the SSN is supposed to start being delivered noting the SSN programme is reported as being ahead of schedule (Collins class took between 6 and 10 years to deliver on average noting there was a lot of work before this on setting up production of the steel and systems to go into the boat).

Even if the SSN programme slips a bit it seems the 2040 date is a worst case scenario. It will be interesting to see what Minister Marles has to say on the programme once the dust settles.

The LOTE appears to be the most efficient means of retaining a very capable submarine force given the time frame. Hopefully once the continuous ship building programme hits its stride we will not find ourselves in this situation again.

 

[hauritz]

There is no way Australia can step back from SSNs without making us look like complete jackasses on the world stage. It could be interpreted as us backing down to Chinese pressure.

The bit I cringed at when I read about the possibility of building a son of Collins is when the Swedes offered to help with a new design. In my opinion the only chance of anything like this working is to minimise any changes to the original design.

A son of Collins only works if it doesn’t cause further delays in us acquiring SSNs. If it means diverting resources then count me out.

There could be an enforced capability gap regardless of whether we get a Son of Collins class anyway, with a large proportion of out submariners training onboard US or UK SSNs.

 

[spoz]

Seems like the usual crowd, long distanced from the reality of the current strategic or tactical situation, pushing their usual line. Most of them were heavily invested in the Collins program and may see a "son of" as sort of the utltimate vindication. I'm sure that's not the argument at the forefront of their minds, but I reckon in some cases at least it's there subconciously, at a minimum.

 

[StingrayOZ]

The problem will be that we will likely be operating 3 classes of subs. Because of timing the Astute and Virginia's are coming to an end. If we choose one of those we will be the only one making them at some point spending billions to build last generations platform. Then at some point later on, we will be the only ones operating them. We won't be in lock step. More over if we rush into SSN's we have a problem. Astutes PWR2, or Virginia's large manning or a unique hybrid. Future SSN's look to share more with SSBN's than previous gen SSN's. Also the UK is rebuilding its fueling capability, and the US is also doing various yard and other upgrades at this time. The timing isn't perfect.

Collins upgraded, Initial SSN, New SSN
or
Collins upgraded, son of Collins, new SSN

If we are looking at Collins and son of collins as basically being the same boat, then the burden perhaps in terms of operation wouldn't be so bad. Building and construction might delay the SSN's a bit, but are we full ready for SSN's? Going son of collins would certainly take some pressure off the crewing pipeline.

Do we want to be operating Collins until 2050-2060? That would be like instead of Oberons in the 1960's, we were still operating D class subs from before WW1. Or operating Oberon's till today. Not newer subs built off that design, literal circa 1960 original Oberon's, with some refits serving until the 2020's. Imagine Onslow still being in continuous service to the present day.

I suspect the primary concern ref the son of Collins isn't that it will be more trouble than its worth but rather it will be perfectly good enough and seen as an alternative to the SSNs by a future government.

SSN's have huge advantages over diesel subs, we all know that. But SSN's aint cheap. We would need to be confident that we need SSN capabilities. We will be paying for this not just in our children's life times, but their children's children's. However, if we want a strong long range deterrent, then this is a key option. But when and how many?

Honestly I can't believe its 2022 and we still haven't selected the sub we are building after Collins.

 

[Reptilia]

I suspect the primary concern ref the son of Collins isn't that it will be more trouble than its worth but rather it will be perfectly good enough and seen as an alternative to the SSNs by a future government.

Australian governments have form in doing this. The ANZACs were a perfectly fine patrol frigate that could be upgraded into a decent GP type but because it was there it ended up as an excuse not to replace the DDGs and now is being stretched far beyond its planned economical life. The FFGs were perfectly adequate ASW ships with a reasonable AD capability but they ended up being substitutes for DDGs.

Army wanted SPGs but instead received extra towed 155mm because the political classes saw them as perfectly good enough. That is one of the ADFs greatest concerns, that their interim, options are seen as good enough, or worse, near enough to what they actually need, resulting in them not getting the capability they actually need.

Son of Collins makes a lot of sense, but could easily become the "good enough" alternative to the SSNs, leaving the RAN with a sub that, while an excellent gap filler and supplement to SSNs isn't as good as the Attacks would have been. End result, the RAN has no SSNs and a design more limited to what they would have had.

Might be a good option for 10 or so years.

Second-hand Japanese boats could rapidly expand Australia’s submarine force | The Strategist

Australia may have a way of very cheaply and quickly expanding its submarine force, improving its defences this decade and preparing for its planned nuclear-powered boats. We might do this by buying good second-hand submarines ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

@Reptilia

Why? There is a growing irritation with the mods and long term members about spit balling ideas without ‘at least’ a reasoned justification. In this case your have to justifying the cost over the life of the boat, the logistic train issues and the fact this would still be less ideal that a LOTE Collins…. Which suits the RAN operational requirements.

I expect a response.

Alexsa

 

[oldsig127]

Might be a good option for 10 or so years.

Second-hand Japanese boats could rapidly expand Australia’s submarine force | The Strategist

Australia may have a way of very cheaply and quickly expanding its submarine force, improving its defences this decade and preparing for its planned nuclear-powered boats. We might do this by buying good second-hand submarines ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

First posted by @cdxbow on 23 December last year and there was no real interest then from any official source.And little enough from the forum

oldsig

Edit: idiot predictive text

 

[StingrayOZ]

The Japanese offer a whole new sub, entirely new configuration, entirely different setup. No job from an existing submariner (or support/logistics/maintenance) can carry over without retraining from basically scratch.. Different torpedos, different combat system, different steering configuration, different size, different engines, different computers, different design philosophy.

Submarines are like aeroplanes you have to basically be registered for the type, but not just the pilot, the entire crew, in addition to their other actual role doing what ever. This is why changing from one class to another, or operating two or three different classes is such a nightmare. Imagine pilot conversion from one aircraft to another, but then instead of 1 or 2 pilots, you need 60-140 sailors. On subs with different histories, every thing is different, valves, structure, piping, SCADA, engines, cabling, etc.

We could make an offer on the Gotland class, at least the would be some family physical similarity with Collins. Or the Archer class as perhaps training submarines. But good luck with that.

But they all have the same issue as the Japanese subs, they will be slow transit subs, 5kts. We would have to base them in Japan, or in Singapore. Even then, you aren't really gaining submariners, because any conversion to a new sub, its basically restarting your career, sure some will port over, but you will lose a lot. So we would just be operating subs for Singapore or Japan, as the subs only fit their mission profile.

While I know SSN's are great, do we have to rush to get there, even if it means a capability gap of ~10 years to do so? Even then, we will have a mixed SSN and Collins fleet potentially.

Its also the argument for upsizing a 70-80% cost refit to 100% as a new build.

While it is more work. It is not that much more work. What are we really saving with refits, in the 80% range? saving money on shaping and welding steel? Because everything else is under going a two stage 130% work of a new build in pulling out old gear and fitting in new, plumbing, mech services, electrical, engines, batteries, computers, sensors, seals, bearings, periscopes, pumps, etc.

Even if we refit the old and build 3 newies, it gives options. Also when building the new ones, it takes some pressure of refurbishing and operating the old ones as you don't have to rush them through.

 

[Stampede]

I think that future is nailed down. Building a son of Collins will take longer than the planned mid life upgrade noting the design of a new boat will still need to be nailed down and a logistics train established (noting a new hull is to be built). This would take resources from the SSN programme and would mean the Collins would still be our only boat in service ... but in an un-upgraded form (the ASC current facility would be occupied with a Son of Collins and the SSN programme so the mid life upgrade would be a problem).

Added to which there would not be many of the Sons of Collins (one or two perhaps) in service at the time the SSN is supposed to start being delivered noting the SSN programme is reported as being ahead of schedule (Collins class took between 6 and 10 years to deliver on average noting there was a lot of work before this on setting up production of the steel and systems to go into the boat).

Even if the SSN programme slips a bit it seems the 2040 date is a worst case scenario. It will be interesting to see what Minister Marles has to say on the programme once the dust settles.

The LOTE appears to be the most efficient means of retaining a very capable submarine force given the time frame. Hopefully once the continuous ship building programme hits its stride we will not find ourselves in this situation again.

For this project to succeed it will need the public onside.
It is a very long term project that will see out many governments and will consume a lot of dollars.
I can understand some secrecy in it's early days, but I'd suggest that within a year some concrete direction will need to be forthcoming.
In broad terms, what have we selected, where will it be built and what is the time frame.
Any delays to this information will add fuel to the conventional submarine option.

The incoming government will have to "sell" this very early to the public to maintain momentum.
The government may now have a majority, but it is also in the unique position of also having a very large and diverse cross bench.
This group will be vocal.

Going forward money will be tight.
Currently defence spending seems safe with the recognition of global challenges.
This however may change over time making the defence budget an attractive target.

Again the current government will need to sell this project and keep the momentum going.

Cheers S

 

[vonnoobie]

It really is a very simple and logical solution to a troubling time frame and global situation. We might be kicking goals in the initial work to get an SSN program up and running but do we keep at this speed just to get a class of boats the the USN or UK wont be building them selves any more leaving us with last gen tech possibly trying to cram the latest stuff into it that may or may not work or do we wait a little and go for the latest class from either nation allowing us to also to work with one or the other during the design process to get a boat from the start suitable to our needs rather then the best of two potentually unsuitable boats that we can make work.

IMO it would be better off waiting to get the latest class that would be in production at the same time in either the UK or US but that then leads to the situation (One that would likely still occur even if we start the build ASAP with current boats available) that the current boats even with LOTE wont see even HMAS Rankin might not last long enough in service to see the 1st SSN commissioned let alone HMAS Collins.

With the new facilities sitting now at ASC there is now the perfect opportunity to while performing the LOTE also start building SoC. The amount of work going into the LOTE has already laid a lot of the groundwork for an SoC so it is a logical choice going forward. As to politicians in the future potentially going "The SoC is good enough, Why bother with the SSN?" well I would rather be stuck with the SoC then potentially lose all submarine capability waiting on the SSN.

 

[John Newman]

For this project to succeed it will need the public onside.
It is a very long term project that will see out many governments and will consume a lot of dollars.
I can understand some secrecy in it's early days, but I'd suggest that within a year some concrete direction will need to be forthcoming.
In broad terms, what have we selected, where will it be built and what is the time frame.
Any delays to this information will add fuel to the conventional submarine option.

The incoming government will have to "sell" this very early to the public to maintain momentum.
The government may now have a majority, but it is also in the unique position of also having a very large and diverse cross bench.
This group will be vocal.

Going forward money will be tight.
Currently defence spending seems safe with the recognition of global challenges.
This however may change over time making the defence budget an attractive target.

Again the current government will need to sell this project and keep the momentum going.

Cheers S

Need the public onside? The public already is:

57% of Australians approve of the Federal Government’s agreement to purchase nuclear submarines from the USA - Roy Morgan Research

www.roymorgan.com

You’re looking for an issue that’s not there, you’re comment is trying to create an issue that doesn’t exist.

Regardless of the opinion poll, if both major parties are in favour of SSNs, then what has to be sold?

Thats the thing about bipartisan support for a particular policy (regardless of the policy or portfolio or political party), it doesn’t matter which side of politics is in Government, the project continues regardless of changes of Government.

 

[Massive]

SSN's have huge advantages over diesel subs, we all know that. But SSN's aint cheap. We would need to be confident that we need SSN capabilities. We will be paying for this not just in our children's life times, but their children's children's. However, if we want a strong long range deterrent, then this is a key option. But when and how many

The SSNs are a transformational leap in capability. There is not a single more important acquisition program in play right now.

I feel that the GOTD and ADF should focus on getting SSNs in the water as soon as possible and avoid "Son of Collins", "Japanese imports", "Los Angeles training subs", "Helpful Swedes" distractions like the plague.

Regards,

Massive

 

[Stampede]

Need the public onside? The public already is:

57% of Australians approve of the Federal Government’s agreement to purchase nuclear submarines from the USA - Roy Morgan Research

www.roymorgan.com

You’re looking for an issue that’s not there, you’re comment is trying to create an issue that doesn’t exist.

Regardless of the opinion poll, if both major parties are in favour of SSNs, then what has to be sold?

Thats the thing about bipartisan support for a particular policy (regardless of the policy or portfolio or political party), it doesn’t matter which side of politics is in Government, the project continues regardless of changes of Government.

The issue does exist because it's in the media.
That's the point


Cheers S

 

[Redlands18]

The SSNs are a transformational leap in capability. There is not a single more important acquisition program in play right now.

I feel that the GOTD and ADF should focus on getting SSNs in the water as soon as possible and avoid "Son of Collins", "Japanese imports", "Los Angeles training subs", "Helpful Swedes" distractions like the plague.

Regards,

Massive

In the entire history of the RAN there has only been 2 decisions, made to match it.
1910: The building of the RAN fleet including the Battlecruiser Australia, a Sqn of Cruisers and 2 Subs
1947: Buying the 2 Incomplete Majestic class Carriers

 

[Going Boeing]

In the entire history of the RAN there has only been 2 decisions, made to match it.
1910: The building of the RAN fleet including the Battlecruiser Australia, a Sqn of Cruisers and 2 Subs
1947: Buying the 2 Incomplete Majestic class Carriers

If we widen this to include other parts of the ADF, I think we should add the RAAF order of F111’s in the mid 1960’s. Delivered in 1973, this fleet were a very capable and effective deterrent throughout their service life.

@Going Boeing

And there are other seminal decision moments as well that effect the ADF as a whole. This tread is on the RAN can we stay on topic please.

alexsa

 

[alexsa]

The issue does exist because it's in the media.
That's the point


Cheers S

I think John was making the very valid point that the need for the incoming government to "sell" this very early to the public is a moot point as there is already public support. Certainly this will need to be maintained. The CCP are doing a very good job of helping with that with their behaviour toward Australia and the Indo Pacific.

 

[alexsa]

The Japanese offer a whole new sub, entirely new configuration, entirely different setup. No job from an existing submariner (or support/logistics/maintenance) can carry over without retraining from basically scratch.. Different torpedos, different combat system, different steering configuration, different size, different engines, different computers, different design philosophy.

Submarines are like aeroplanes you have to basically be registered for the type, but not just the pilot, the entire crew, in addition to their other actual role doing what ever. This is why changing from one class to another, or operating two or three different classes is such a nightmare. Imagine pilot conversion from one aircraft to another, but then instead of 1 or 2 pilots, you need 60-140 sailors. On subs with different histories, every thing is different, valves, structure, piping, SCADA, engines, cabling, etc.

We could make an offer on the Gotland class, at least the would be some family physical similarity with Collins. Or the Archer class as perhaps training submarines. But good luck with that.

But they all have the same issue as the Japanese subs, they will be slow transit subs, 5kts. We would have to base them in Japan, or in Singapore. Even then, you aren't really gaining submariners, because any conversion to a new sub, its basically restarting your career, sure some will port over, but you will lose a lot. So we would just be operating subs for Singapore or Japan, as the subs only fit their mission profile.

While I know SSN's are great, do we have to rush to get there, even if it means a capability gap of ~10 years to do so? Even then, we will have a mixed SSN and Collins fleet potentially.

Its also the argument for upsizing a 70-80% cost refit to 100% as a new build.

While it is more work. It is not that much more work. What are we really saving with refits, in the 80% range? saving money on shaping and welding steel? Because everything else is under going a two stage 130% work of a new build in pulling out old gear and fitting in new, plumbing, mech services, electrical, engines, batteries, computers, sensors, seals, bearings, periscopes, pumps, etc.

Even if we refit the old and build 3 newies, it gives options. Also when building the new ones, it takes some pressure of refurbishing and operating the old ones as you don't have to rush them through.

Except that the build time of the hull and the need to manufacture the steel will add to the time frame. Collins was delivered 6 years after being laid down (and acceptance was political as the vessel was by no means ready for action given the fire control issues) with the forward part of that boat being built in Sweden. In real terms you are looking at about 10 years before the first boat will be available after a decision is made (add some time for that process). The drumbeat for the LOTE is two years per boat in sequence. In addition the LOTE can be done in the current facility with less impact on the build of the SSN.

The Collins should have quite a bit of life in the hull particularly with regard to the work that went into the development of the hull material and welding processes.

The SSN is a much needed capability and you simply will not get that in a conventional boat. Much work went into making the Attack as close as possible (and the Collins for that matter) but they simply cannot match the persistence and much lower indiscretion ratio of the SSN. SSN's were not an option until recently and it was only the uncertain world situation that changed that.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Except that the build time of the hull and the need to manufacture the steel will add to the time frame. Collins was delivered 6 years after being laid down (and acceptance was political as the vessel was by no means ready for action given the fire control issues) with the forward part of that boat being built in Sweden. In real terms you are looking at about 10 years before the first boat will be available after a decision is made (add some time for that process). The drumbeat for the LOTE is two years per boat in sequence. In addition the LOTE can be done in the current facility with less impact on the build of the SSN.

I get that, I should clarify, LOTE should go ahead regardless, for all subs. I don't think anyone is serious arguing against that anymore. But that is still 12 + years with reduced capability, shrinking crew numbers, if everything goes to plan.

The Collins should have quite a bit of life in the hull particularly with regard to the work that went into the development of the hull material and welding processes.

50 or 60 year old subs, are going to have issues beyond just meeting metal fatigue requirements, even with a refit. Those subs are 20+ years old now. Collins turns 30 in 2026 - from its commissioning date. That represents a generation, in terms of construction, operation and more than that in design. Those that built the Collins (and its capabilities) are now progressing into the later part of their careers and retiring out.

I guess people would feel more relaxed and trusting if there was a solid well planned timetable we were all working towards, and that all the puzzle pieces fitted together. People have deep fears about the current state of the world and Australia's ability to plan and implement as massive program to deal with it.

While we look at SSN's as just a homogeneous grouping, that will be our holy land and saviour, SSN's have their challenges too. The timing isn't exactly sweet.

Astute program is basically finished, Agincourt is really the only one left with any significant work to go, even then its four years in and its supply line dry and converting to ssbn or withered. Virginia is rumoured to end after block V. US and UK are turning to focus on SSBN. Astute has lots of issues for a build, Virginia like nearly all US programs has a significant crew demand. US ordered to laid down dates are often 5-10 years with say an approximate build of ~ 5 years. Our first SSN if ordered today, could very well be a 20 year gap before commissioning. Then we would need to spit out a SSN every 1-2 years to match the Collins class aging out.

Peter Briggs argues that is not just the first ssn we need to worry about. Its about when we have a fully operational SSN force and when that will happen.

Australian-built evolved Collins needed to bridge the gap to nuclear subs | The Strategist

I should start by affirming my support for Australia’s transition to nuclear-propelled attack submarines, or SSNs, as my detailed study, delivered to the Department of Defence in 2013, and my public advocacy implies. I think ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

Also I am not trying to push a wheel barrow here. I don't build subs. But I think it is worth having a detailed academic discussion regarding it. It may end up being inappropriate to build son of Collins, but not inappropriate to continue its development as a plan B until plan A is actually happening.

I can certainly understand what a lot of old salty submariners are talking about.