Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

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Massive

Well-Known Member
Stampede said:
... but it does my head in when we talk Maritime logistics for the Army.

The ARG whatever was always going to be lets pretend with only three amphibious vessels.
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It is a bit more than that though.

I feel that while we are designing a naval capability to get the ARG ashore, we are not planning to add the capability needed to sustain it at any reasonable operational tempo.

This is where I get to the ARG not being a realistic capability.

Fine with me. But the debate should be have - is the ARG a critical capability, if so what will it take, and what will we give up (treasure or alternatives) to make it a real capability.

Regards,

Massive
 
oldsig127

oldsig127

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Massive said:
It is a bit more than that though.

I feel that while we are designing a naval capability to get the ARG ashore, we are not planning to add the capability needed to sustain it at any reasonable operational tempo.

This is where I get to the ARG not being a realistic capability.

Fine with me. But the debate should be have - is the ARG a critical capability, if so what will it take, and what will we give up (treasure or alternatives) to make it a real capability.

Regards,

Massive
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I'm getting old and forgetful, but even I remember the ARG not being intended as a sovereign capability to make unsupported assaults on anyone.

Timor made it abundantly clear that even in a permissive environment we could scarcely put a platoon of light infantry across Moreton Bay to Bribie Island, even using the bridge without support from our allies.

What it is is what was intended, the core of a capability that we could use to support those allies in their eendeavours - with the understanding that we'd expect help with the stuff we didn't have if we needed to get to the point of an investment across the beach.

What we do have is an enormously greater capacity in HADR, soft power and a reasonable expectation that we could manage a Timor-like situation without it being so anus winkingly marginal. And by the by, our friends and neighbours know we're serious

oldsig
 
S

Stampede

Well-Known Member
oldsig127 said:
I'm getting old and forgetful, but even I remember the ARG not being intended as a sovereign capability to make unsupported assaults on anyone.

Timor made it abundantly clear that even in a permissive environment we could scarcely put a platoon of light infantry across Moreton Bay to Bribie Island, even using the bridge without support from our allies.

What it is is what was intended, the core of a capability that we could use to support those allies in their eendeavours - with the understanding that we'd expect help with the stuff we didn't have if we needed to get to the point of an investment across the beach.

What we do have is an enormously greater capacity in HADR, soft power and a reasonable expectation that we could manage a Timor-like situation without it being so anus winkingly marginal. And by the by, our friends and neighbours know we're serious

oldsig
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A nice overview of Amphibious development and expectation from Colonel Kim Gilfillan CSC Commander Landing Force, Amphibious Task Group.


It's an area we can all have our fantasy fleets.

Hopefully some additional vessels are added to our fleet of three.
What size and shape have the debate.

At the end of the day maritime logistics is a big part of the ADF for a very wide range of tasks.

A good one to get right sooner than later.

Regards S
 
ngatimozart

ngatimozart

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WRT to the ARG, considering the CCP / PRC threat is an ARG the correct capability?
  • If it is why?
    • What is realistically required to ensure its viability?
    • How are you going to fund it?
    • What are the costs?

  • If it is not why?

With all the talk about the ARG no-one has really explained why it is a requirement. Yes Timor - Leste showed a need for sealift but has it justified an ARG? My reason for asking all of this is to get posters to think about the wider picture of the ADF amphibious force and what it's CONOPS are and where it fits within the wider ADF CONOPS.

So the expectation is that you justify your reasoning with evidence and that if you include capabilities and platforms a indication of costings with links to sources should be given. Be clear in what your costings include so that there is no mistake.

Notes about costings. Different governments do their costings different ways so ensure that you are clear on the costings that are included in any price cited. Generally try to find a flyaway / sail away / drive away cost where possible. Then you can add on all the TOLC / WOLC as separate charges. I find it best to quote costs in the original currency and then do the exchange into the local currency because that will account for currency exchange rate changes over time. It's a crude way of covering it. I also keep a record of the initial year of acquisition because if you want to you can convert it from that years dollars to the current years dollars. Try and avoid multiple currency exchanges for an acquisition because each time you change a currency you have the possibility of loosing on the exchange.
 
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DDG38

DDG38

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And to follow on from ngati's post, a reminder that costing should also consider how you're going to man/train/sustain the crews for these extra vessels. There isn't a magic sailor tree out the back of Navy HQ you can just magically grab 300 extra ship's company from overnight.

And a reminder that the RAN has many other missions to build and train for that does not involve hauling the Army's gear from point A to point B. Just sayin'.
 
spoz

spoz

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The plan was to build several prototype blocks to prove the new shipyard's production line - not sure if this is one of them or not.
 
S

Stampede

Well-Known Member
DDG38 said:
And to follow on from ngati's post, a reminder that costing should also consider how you're going to man/train/sustain the crews for these extra vessels. There isn't a magic sailor tree out the back of Navy HQ you can just magically grab 300 extra ship's company from overnight.

And a reminder that the RAN has many other missions to build and train for that does not involve hauling the Army's gear from point A to point B. Just sayin'.
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Probably more about the curiosity of existing projects, big and small in the Amphibious / logistics domain.
LCM-8 , LCH , Choules ( JSS Concept ) Pacific support ship.
I read in a recent article that there is no need for a new Defence white paper because of the recent submarine decision.
The premise was we have nailed our colours to the mast and that is the direction we are taking.
I disagree. Submarines are one thing, the hundreds of projects across the ADF are another.

Suggest a White Paper is necessary to give some clarity across the ADF.
In this area of discussion, some of the above will need to be ordered shortly.

My take is they are / will be budgeted for and crew allocated accordingly

Collectively the above would be around 30000 to 40000t of vessels big and small.

Not an significant investment

Regards S.
 
D

ddxx

Well-Known Member
Stampede said:
I read in a recent article that there is no need for a new Defence white paper because of the recent submarine decision.
The premise was we have nailed our colours to the mast and that is the direction we are taking.
I disagree.
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Absolutely, I’d argue what we really need is an updated Force Structure Plan which better reflects the key objectives of the Strategic Update.

There’s currently a lot of vagueness which doesn’t match up with the reduced warning time window highlighted in the update.
 
FormerDirtDart

FormerDirtDart

Well-Known Member
Tasman said:
There is an article in Defence Connect here:

Defence Connect - Defence Industry News and Analysis

The integrated market intelligence platform for Australia’s defence sector.
www.defenceconnect.com.au www.defenceconnect.com.au

Tas
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Well, you could have linked the actual article
www.defenceconnect.com.au

Hunter Class frigates hit production milestone

The $35 billion shipbuilding program has achieved a major milestone, with the first steel prototype unit rolling off the production line. BAE Systems Maritime Australia, the prime contractor for the
www.defenceconnect.com.au www.defenceconnect.com.au
 
Tasman

Tasman

Ship Watcher
Verified Defense Pro
FormerDirtDart said:
Well, you could have linked the actual article
www.defenceconnect.com.au

Hunter Class frigates hit production milestone

The $35 billion shipbuilding program has achieved a major milestone, with the first steel prototype unit rolling off the production line. BAE Systems Maritime Australia, the prime contractor for the
www.defenceconnect.com.au www.defenceconnect.com.au
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I plead old age as a defence! But thanks for making it a bit quicker to find.
Tas
 
DDG38

DDG38

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Breaking news (1110 14/10/21) from the Guardian feed :

"Three Royal Australian Navy sailors have escaped with only minor injuries after they were forced to ditch their helicopter in the Philippine Sea. This has lead the navy to temporarily pause the flying operations of the MH-60R Seahawk fleet while the cause of the crash is investigated.

According to a statement from the Department of Defence, the crew of the MH-60R Seahawk helicopter were doing a routine flight over the sea last night when “the crew conducted an emergency landing in the water”.

HMAS Brisbane, the boat that the helicopter was operating from, deployed sea boats and rescued the crew around 20 minutes later.

The three members received first aid for minor injuries once they were safely returned to the ship.

Here is what commander of the Australian fleet, rear admiral Mark Hammond, had to say:

The successful rescue is credit to the devotion to duty and skill of the officers and sailors of HMAS Brisbane.
Their immediate actions ensured the survival of the aircrew, validating the significant training undertaken in the event an emergency of this nature occurs ...
With the aircrew safe, investigating the circumstances that led to the helicopter ditching is the priority at the moment.
As a precaution, we have temporarily paused flying operations of the MH-60R Seahawk fleet."
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DDG38

DDG38

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
And here's the official Defence media release (link)

Three aircrew safe after helicopter ditched in the Philippine Sea
14 October 2021


Three crewmembers of a Royal Australian Navy MH-60R Seahawk helicopter are safe after ditching their helicopter in the Philippine Sea during a routine flight overnight.

The aircraft was operating from HMAS Brisbane as part of a Regional Presence Deployment with HMAS Warramunga, when the crew conducted an emergency landing in the water.

HMAS Brisbane deployed sea boats and rescued the crew approximately 20 minutes later. The crew received first aid for minor injuries upon their return to HMAS Brisbane.

Commander of the Australian Fleet, Rear Admiral Mark Hammond, commended the crews of both ships involved for their quick response to the emergency.

“The successful rescue is credit to the devotion to duty and skill of the officers and sailors of HMAS Brisbane,” Rear Admiral Hammond said.

“Their immediate actions ensured the survival of the aircrew, validating the significant training undertaken in the event an emergency of this nature occurs.”

Both ships continue to search the area for any debris, which will aid in determining the cause of the incident.

“With the aircrew safe, investigating the circumstances that led to the helicopter ditching is the priority at the moment,” Rear Admiral Hammond said.

“As a precaution, we have temporarily paused flying operations of the MH-60R Seahawk fleet.”

Defence is reviewing the impact of the incident on Brisbane and Warramunga’s current deployment.
 
R

Redlands18

Well-Known Member
DDG38 said:
Breaking news (1110 14/10/21) from the Guardian feed :

"Three Royal Australian Navy sailors have escaped with only minor injuries after they were forced to ditch their helicopter in the Philippine Sea. This has lead the navy to temporarily pause the flying operations of the MH-60R Seahawk fleet while the cause of the crash is investigated.

According to a statement from the Department of Defence, the crew of the MH-60R Seahawk helicopter were doing a routine flight over the sea last night when “the crew conducted an emergency landing in the water”.

HMAS Brisbane, the boat that the helicopter was operating from, deployed sea boats and rescued the crew around 20 minutes later.

The three members received first aid for minor injuries once they were safely returned to the ship.

Here is what commander of the Australian fleet, rear admiral Mark Hammond, had to say:
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Good to see everyone apparently safe and reasonably sound.
 
W

Wombat000

Active Member
Firstly, Thankfully everyone is safe.
wishing the best outcomes for everyone involved, strength to them all !

I feel it now highlights an issue tho, and that is the ships ASW.
I appreciate the helo is the optimal ASW asset to reach out, seek out and touch.
But as is now, the ship has no optimal ASW asset (that I know of), LWT restricted by range.

The presumption that a helo, with seemingly a billion moving parts, will always be available is demonstrated to be flawed.
The ship itself needs its own onboard organic/integral ASW capability to prosecute targets at longer ranges.

IMHO, if it’s not already ineffect doing so, I feel the onboard LWT will evolve into firstly a subsurface CIWS, and an opportunistic ASW asset as a secondary role.
 
R

Redlands18

Well-Known Member
Wombat000 said:
Firstly, Thankfully everyone is safe.
wishing the best outcomes for everyone involved, strength to them all !

I feel it now highlights an issue tho, and that is the ships ASW.
I appreciate the helo is the optimal ASW asset to reach out, seek out and touch.
But as is now, the ship has no optimal ASW asset (that I know of), LWT restricted by range.

The presumption that a helo, with seemingly a billion moving parts, will always be available is demonstrated to be flawed.
The ship itself needs its own onboard organic/integral ASW capability to prosecute targets at longer ranges.

IMHO, if it’s not already ineffect doing so, I feel the onboard LWT will evolve into firstly a subsurface CIWS, and an opportunistic ASW asset as a secondary role.
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With RAAF C-17s we could have another in theatre quite quickly anyway. As standard procedure the Fleet has been grounded awaiting an investigation. The RAN has operated 40 Seahawks since about 1990 and this is the first loss.
 
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