Escalation in Iraq

Feanor

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Thanks for your reply and perspective. This is a thread started for sharing updates by you but so far, some of the sources you cite, seem to lack balance. If you are going to post about this topic of a US troop withdrawal request, at least consider providing some background for context:
Just to be clear, colonelcassad is a highly biased source. I use his information because of the volume, frequency, and interest area that he covers, as well as the fact that he's free. But he certainly has a very particular viewpoint, and one that is highly unfavorable/unfriendly to the US in particular. I was hoping that this wasn't going to merely be a thread for my updates, but for a discussion, with contributions by many others. I more then welcome alternative viewpoints and additional information.

(i) The last American combat troops left Iraq in December 2011, only to return in 2014 under much more perilous circumstances.

(ii) With Baghdad in danger of falling to the ISIS militants in June 2014, the administration of then-president Barack Obama agreed to send troops to Iraq to assist in an advisory capacity against IS. The deployment was based on diplomatic letters inviting American soldiers into the country and offering them immunity from prosecution under Iraqi law. These so-called diplomatic notes, which are not public, remain the legal basis for the presence of about 5,000 American soldiers in Iraq. These letters or diplomatic notes contain a provision that gives US forces one year to withdraw after they are formally asked by Baghdad to leave.

(iii) A official push by Baghdad to expel US troops may be a protracted process given the state of politics in the country, said Douglas Silliman, a former US ambassador to Iraq who is now the president of the Arab Gulf States Institute. "Iraq's own inability to implement its laws in a timely manner and a clear manner is probably going to push this conversation through 2020, likely into 2021 unless there is a significant development, such as the legitimate selection of a very anti-American prime minister with a parliamentary majority that can back him on this," Silliman said. Moreover, the Iraqi centres of power remain fragmented, with Kurdish and Sunni political parties largely wary of the push to drive out American forces and the government facing an ongoing wave of anti-corruption protests.
I would not dispute any of this, but to be honest, I assumed a certain amount of pre-knowledge going into this, especially given that we've had multiple on-going threads regarding the conflicts across the Middle East, including the war with ISIS. The summary is certainly helpful vis-a-vis context.

(iv) "We're not at a point where the US and Iraq are enemies," said Abbas Kadhim, director of the Iraq Initiative at the Atlantic Center think-tank in Washington. "We are talking about allies that have differences, and they want to work out these differences in the best way, so they keep their alliance." Hence, the Iraqi government has not formally requested an American military pullout in a legally binding way, Kadhim added. "They asked for negotiators to talk about the terms of withdrawal, which is understood or implied that the Iraqis want the US troops out, but they want to do it amicably."

See: At what point do US troops in Iraq become an occupation force?
There's a few more points, including the fact that the US has killed Iraqi government officials, and members of Iraqi government-sanctioned militias, not just in the recent strike against Soleimani. There's also the fact that rockets have been falling near US facilities around Iraq, though so far in small numbers and with poor accuracy (or perhaps good accuracy not intending to kill?). Now we have a giant mobilization of public opinion against the US, who is already far from beloved in the region, with Iran behind the push. America and Iraq are not enemies, yet, and America is not an occupying force in Iraq (nor could it ever effectively be with numbers this small). But the trajectory is deeply troubling. What happens if the US decides to bomb another pro-Iranian Iraqi militia, or allow Israel to do so? What happens if Iraq buys Russian S-300 or S-400, something they have mentioned as a possibility, as a political statement as much as a military capability? Sanction them? That would produce the estrangement that the article you link fears. Not sanction them? After sanctioning Turkey, a NATO member, for the same? The situation is deeply problematic at best, and I don't see a happy solution here. I think that "We are talking about allies that have differences, and they want to work out these differences in the best way, so they keep their alliance." is a statement of hope rather then fact. I think that the above-mentioned is a possible outcome of this situation, but I'm not sure it's the most likely one.
 

ngatimozart

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Thanks for your reply and perspective. This is a thread started for sharing updates by you but so far, some of the sources you cite, seem to lack balance. If you are going to post about this topic of a US troop withdrawal request, at least consider providing some background for context:

(i) The last American combat troops left Iraq in December 2011, only to return in 2014 under much more perilous circumstances.

(ii) With Baghdad in danger of falling to the ISIS militants in June 2014, the administration of then-president Barack Obama agreed to send troops to Iraq to assist in an advisory capacity against IS. The deployment was based on diplomatic letters inviting American soldiers into the country and offering them immunity from prosecution under Iraqi law. These so-called diplomatic notes, which are not public, remain the legal basis for the presence of about 5,000 American soldiers in Iraq. These letters or diplomatic notes contain a provision that gives US forces one year to withdraw after they are formally asked by Baghdad to leave.

(iii) A official push by Baghdad to expel US troops may be a protracted process given the state of politics in the country, said Douglas Silliman, a former US ambassador to Iraq who is now the president of the Arab Gulf States Institute. "Iraq's own inability to implement its laws in a timely manner and a clear manner is probably going to push this conversation through 2020, likely into 2021 unless there is a significant development, such as the legitimate selection of a very anti-American prime minister with a parliamentary majority that can back him on this," Silliman said. Moreover, the Iraqi centres of power remain fragmented, with Kurdish and Sunni political parties largely wary of the push to drive out American forces and the government facing an ongoing wave of anti-corruption protests.

(iv) "We're not at a point where the US and Iraq are enemies," said Abbas Kadhim, director of the Iraq Initiative at the Atlantic Center think-tank in Washington. "We are talking about allies that have differences, and they want to work out these differences in the best way, so they keep their alliance." Hence, the Iraqi government has not formally requested an American military pullout in a legally binding way, Kadhim added. "They asked for negotiators to talk about the terms of withdrawal, which is understood or implied that the Iraqis want the US troops out, but they want to do it amicably."

See: At what point do US troops in Iraq become an occupation force?
I think that the next Iraqi Prime Minister will deliver a formal note to the US requiring it to withdraw its forces forthwith. He will have the support of a significant portion of the population in this, as well as the backing of the Parliament.

It will be interesting because it will give Trump a face saving excuse to pull out of Iraq, given that he has always wanted to withdraw from the region. His national security advisors will not be happy units about this development. Whether or not the US withdraw from Iraq is another story, however I would think that they'd be foolish to ignore the Iraqi demand. However their political leadership hasn't always been the brightest sparks on the planet, which isn't a condition that is unique to the US political class. I would equally apply that appellation to the political leaderships and classes of every other nation on the planet. So we will wait to see what eventuates.
 

OPSSG

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I think that the next Iraqi Prime Minister will deliver a formal note to the US requiring it to withdraw its forces forthwith. He will have the support of a significant portion of the population in this, as well as the backing of the Parliament.
It will be interesting because it will give Trump a face saving excuse to pull out of Iraq, given that he has always wanted to withdraw from the region. His national security advisors will not be happy units about this development. Whether or not the US withdraw from Iraq is another story, however I would think that they'd be foolish to ignore the Iraqi demand. However their political leadership hasn't always been the brightest sparks on the planet, which isn't a condition that is unique to the US political class. I would equally apply that appellation to the political leaderships and classes of every other nation on the planet. So we will wait to see what eventuates.
Sectarianism, Governance and Iraq’s future’ published in 2018, provides a backgrounder of the issues still relevant today. IMO, there are 5 questions to ask:

1. There are competing visions for the future of Iraq and the region that have manifested themselves through violent, sectarian conflict over the Iraqi state and its resources, such as the 2006 civil war between Arab Sunnis and Shiites and the war on ISIS. Sectarianism also takes the form of divisive identity politics and the institutionalization of mistrust, which has resulted in dysfunctional governance. At the same time, it has been used by Iraq’s political elites to deflect attention away from poor governance, corruption, and lack of services. Some Shia politicians in Iraq are beholden to Tehran for both political and financial support. Iran often brokered agreements that ended various Iraqi political stalemates and had in its command a variety of militias.
  • Q1: Are the protests against the United States’ presence just another manifestation of Shiite sectarianism?
2. Comprising 30% of the population, Arab Sunni buy-in is critical to achieve a national consensus between its competing communities in Iraq. In its absence, the political legitimacy of the government has declined. This was clearly revealed by the 44.5 percent turnout rate at the May 2018 national elections, Iraq’s worst turnout to date. Its public institutions, at both the central and local level, have lost the public’s trust, while systematic crimes and human rights violations have shaped public perception toward the public policymaking processes in Baghdad. Political decentralization that sees limited interference from Baghdad, if any at all, could provide respite for Iraq’s Arab Sunni communities that then paves the way for a more effective decentralization process that addresses good governance shortcomings. Ultimately, the process could be a generational one: a phased approach to decentralization would move from the elite bargain at the top-down to then take account of local politics and economies.
  • Q2: Will the Sunni community rise up in arms again, if the United States withdraws troops too quickly?
3. Even before the 2011 departure of US troops, then Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki sought to put people loyal to him in key command positions. Command positions became increasingly prone to decisions taken on sectarian or family lines. The departure of US forces at the end of 2011 ended the close mentoring and training of Iraqi units.
  • Q3: Will a rapid departure of the 5,000 strong US forces and the end of the close mentoring and training of Iraqi units post-2020, lead to another rapid collapse of the Iraqi military?
4. Corruption in Iraq is rife - the very antithesis of the sort of professional military the US had hoped to create. Under the Maliki government, the Iraqi military was a sectarian force. As ISIS swept forward in 2014, a fear of the likely retaliation of the government forces, as much as fear of ISIS irregulars, drove thousands from their homes. The Popular Mobilization Forces is an umbrella group for a number of Iran-backed militias that include the Imam Ali Brigades and Sayed al-Shuhada. It is interesting to note that Iran-backed groups have also become the target of popular anger in Iraq. Anti-government protests that began in October 2019 have swept the country's largely Shiite south, with demonstrators demanding an end to Iranian influence in Iraqi affairs.
  • Q4: If American forces leave Iraq in haste under President Trump’s orders, will we see the return of sectarian violence that kills a thousand a day?
5. When in office, former Prime Minister al-Abadi attempted to institute reforms that could help remedy Iraq’s crisis of governance and, in the process, alleviate ethno-sectarian tensions. Security details for politicians were cut by 90 percent after the 2015 protests, which has freed up to 20,000 personnel for other duties.

6. The present system intentionally gives a lot of power to the sectarian and ethnic-based parties recognized by the United States and Iran after Saddam Hussein’s overthrow. It is a recipe for both gridlock and an inability to legislate or govern. Serious reform of the current system, which many Iraqis recognize is both ineffective and corrupt, is almost impossible under the current constitution. Many other reform measures are necessary for Iraq, as a country of 40 million inhabitants, to have a functional government today.
  • Q5: Can Iraq still exist as an unitary state, post-2020, before reforms take root?
7. Iran’s policy towards Iraq appears focused first and foremost on preventing Iraq from ever again posing a threat to the current Iranian system of clerical government. To achieve this, however, Iran uses the late Major General Qasim Soleimani’s model of making Iraq into another Lebanon, where it wants Iranian-supported and -dominated militias to be a lasting, parallel power structure that will be under Iran’s control, outside the Iraqi constitution. Iran has urged its Iraqi supporters to replace former Prime Minister al-Abadi, who tried to be friends with both Iran and the US, with someone who is in Iran’s pocket. But Iran has no miracle worker among its Iraqi supporters who could deliver on basic services, the economy, and anti-corruption that the protesters—and many Iraqis—are demanding. This leaves Iran with:

(i) trying to ensure control through a crackdown on protesters; or

(ii) increasing efforts to keep Iraq’s parliament leaders acceptable to Tehran.​

8. Either approach is almost certain to blow up in Iran’s face. We need to recognize that Iraq’s protesters are ready to hold their own leaders and Iran responsible for the failings of the last fifteen years. The first sign that Iran was losing steam in Iraq came with the massive Shia protests against the Iraqi government and its Iranian patron. Numerous interviews with protesters make clear they resent the extent of Iran’s influence in Iraq’s politics, including Iran’s near-veto power over who is Iraq’s prime minister. The protesters are well aware of Iran’s corrupting influence in Iraqi politics, which affects a number of both Shia and Sunni politicians. They understand that Iran’s influence is aimed at benefiting Iran, not the Iraqi people. The corruption and incompetence of a government handpicked by Iran was not lost on the Iraqi demonstrators. They demanded representation and a clean government, which they understood could only come about if the Iranian influence receded. But killing Major General Soleimani has distracted from the widespread anti-Iranian protests that were the United States’ greatest hope for checking Iranian influence in Iraq. More to the point these strikes have demonstrated to the Iraqi public that the United States cares more about its conflict with Iran than stability in Iraq. That may not be entirely fair, but that seems to be how many Iraqis have read the situation.
 
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ngatimozart

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@OPSSG Thanks for the link. I have downloaded it and will have a good read of it. You have raised good points in your five questions and I shall have to cogitate upon them.

Regarding your last question I would ask was Iraq ever trult an unitary state? After all like its neighbours, it is an artificial entity formed by European states after WW1, when Sykes and Picot drew arbitary lines on a map, which didn't take into account religious, tribal, and demographic realities on the ground. It smacks of colonialism and orientalism, which hasn't really changed that much over the last century. I think that is at the root of the problem and because of what has occurred in the intervening years the mess has become worse. My own view is that all of the outsiders should just leave and stay well away, remove the artificial borders and let the locals sort it out amongst themselves. Harsh, but given the history of the five centuries or so, outsiders have just made it worse. Maybe then there might be a chance for long term peace in the region.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Let them sort themselves is likely the only way forward. This means partition, a Sunni state, a Shia state, and a Kurdish state. It will be a long civil war with neighbours promoting their preferred outcomes.
 

OPSSG

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In late 2019, Iran and it’s Quds Force ordered Iraqi militia allies, particularly Kataib Hezbollah, to fire rockets at bases housing US forces. In Iraq the errant rocket fire angered the Americans which went public in Dec 2019 with accusations that Iran was behind it. The US then blacklisted Asaib Ahl al-Haq leader Qais Khazali for involvement in suppressing protesters. On 27 Dec 2019 rockets fired at K-1 base killed a US contractor. The US response was harsh, killing dozens of Kataib Hezbollah members at five locations on 29 Dec 2019. This action-reaction cycle was part of a wider campaign of Iran’s attempt to challenge the US in 2019 that led to the assassination of Soleimani on 3 Jan 2020. In the latest string of events in this cycle, 3 rockets struck the US Embassy compound in Baghdad on Sunday, 26 Jan 2019, leaving one person with a minor injury and the individual had since returned to duty. See: Rockets hit US embassy in Baghdad amid protests

The US air strike which killed Iran’s Major General Soleimani and Abu Mehdi al-Muhandis jeopardizes Iraq’s recently stabilized security situation, and threatens to reshape the country’s political environment, moving backwards to the days of anti-Americanism and sect-based mobilization. If Baghdad loses relations with the US and other diplomatic representations, it risks turning into a pariah state like Iran. Iran has capitalized on years of war and occupation to form militia groups that have become official factions of the Iraqi military, while economically, it provides an enormous amount of exports that Iraqis have come to rely on. It has made surrogates out of senior Iraqi government officials and members of parliament. Because of those links, the Iraqi parliament's decision to side with Iran after the killing of Major General Soleimani is not surprising. Following the attacks, however, anti-American voices have gained more ammunition. The non-binding Iraqi parliamentary vote to end the American military presence is one early negative consequence from the killing of Major General Soleimani and Abu Mehdi al-Muhandis.

On the plus side, the Americans have re-established deterrence against Iran with the air strike (that assassinated Major General Soleimani).
Let them sort themselves is likely the only way forward. This means partition, a Sunni state, a Shia state, and a Kurdish state. It will be a long civil war with neighbours promoting their preferred outcomes.
I disagree. You are wilfully blind to the complex ground realities in Iraq. Iran and it’s Quds Force will not allow a 3 state solution to happen — they are executing their plan for the Lebanonisation of Iraq (through their control of the Popular Mobilization Forces). Because of this, even the Shia majority areas in Iraq are against undue Iranian influence, at this time. For years, pro-Iranian groups attempted to push the US out of Iraq. Their calls often fell on deaf ears, as prior public opinion in Iraq did not consider the US as a threat and some even supported the US and international effort against ISIS.

And a complete and rapid American withdrawal of its forces in Iraq would not only have direct security implications for the country but force other countries and organisations, including NATO countries to reconsider their positions and role. IMO, the 2011 departure of US troops demonstrated to the Iraqi people that the Americans can be trusted to leave Iraq, once it is reasonably stable, in contrast to Iran’s Quds Force, whose goal is to stay infinitely and meddle.

When protests broke out in Iraq in Oct 2019 the Iraqi government reacted with force. The then Prime Minister al-Abadi, let the local security apparatus decide how to handle them. A mix of riot police and militias linked to Iran and the Popular Mobilization Forces went in to break the protests. But the protesters proved themselves stronger than the government thought. The protesters sacked the headquarters of numerous militia parties, such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kataib Hezbolla, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba and Badr. They also attacked the Iranian consulates in Najaf and Karbala, holy Shi’ite cities. The Iraqi government crackdown and sniper fire from various militias, as well as kidnappings of protesters, led to the deaths of 700 Iraqi youth with 20,000 more injured. More news on unrest in Iraq at the links below:
The road ahead for the leadership in Iraq and America is filled with hard choices; I don’t envy the decision makers.
 
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Feanor

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The total wounded from the attack, with brain injuries, is now being cited as 50. The numbers are growing, and I can't help but wonder if the original high numbers are closer to the truth then they seemed.

Теперь их стало 50
 

OPSSG

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The total wounded from the attack, with brain injuries, is now being cited as 50. The numbers are growing, and I can't help but wonder if the original high numbers are closer to the truth then they seemed.

Теперь их стало 50
Not a fan of the clumsy American attempt at spin control in the aftermath of the 8 Jan 2020 missile strike.

More important than the number of American troops ‘wounded’ or ‘injured’ (31 of the 50 were treated in Iraq and returned to duty) is the fact that Iranians and the Americans were able to avoid war (after the direct missile strike from Iran). But Trump’s attempt at spin control immediately after, is understandable, if it is an attempt to prevent US Hawks from controlling the narrative. With no suggestions that the Trump administration's "maximum pressure" campaign would relent, this end-state to the action-reaction cycle can be seen as a partial ‘win’ for Trump, at this time.
 
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Feanor

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Article arguing that Russia, is the reason why Iran has been blatantly challenging the US openly. Article's theory could be close to the mark.

Russia makes its presence known in Iran crisis
There have been reports and rumors that Russia and Iran have been butting heads over the future of the Syrian military, with Iran pushing for a solution based on militias with a high degree of autonomy, while Russia was pushing for a centralized state-directed uniformed military. It looks like Russia may have won that fight, with the formation of the 4th and 5th Army Corps, and the role they played in the end of the war. Arguably Iran played as significant of a role on ground if not greater, with multiple pro-Iranian militias and even a Hezbollah expeditionary element, doing much in the ground war. I strongly suspect that Russia would like to have Iran remain as a junior partner, and a regional power, creating issues for the US, and costing resources, while not being strong enough to take a bite out of Russia's influence in the region. And keeping Iran busy dealing with the US helps keep them too busy to try to expand their influence to Russia's detriment. I think that Russia's ideal outcome is a protracted semi-cold war between the US and it's Middle Eastern allies on the one hand and Iran on the other, with Iran not being actually put out of the game, but instead bleeding its enemies across multiple fronts, in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and others, while Russia plays the peacemaker, dealbroker, and the "reasonable party" in the whole mess, also playing on or "selling" it's access to Iran as a way to brokering desirable (or at least acceptable) outcomes for itself. This behavior is clearly seen in how they've helped Turkey and Iran to, if not mend fences, at least stop throwing rocks at each other.

This explains why Russia is happy to let Israel bomb Iranian facilities in the Middle East, and keep Iranian proxies out of the Golan heights-adjacent areas (from a Russian perspective SAA uniformed and militia forces are all or at least should all just be arms of the Syrian state so it's a small price to pay for the fall of Deraa). It also explains why Russian response in the current situation has been fairly muted, at least from what I see, letting the situation play out, and remaining outside of the fray. I would not be surprised for a second if Russia is helping Iran equip its missiles with military-grade satellite guidance based on GLONASS, because it's an area where Iran is seriously deficient, and Russia is in a position to help at little cost to itself (possibly even profit financially) while creating a dependency in Iran. We should expect to see further arms deals between the two, possibly sales of T-90 tanks (they've done well after the recent conflicts, and pro-Iranian proxies have had a chance to see them in action and possibly even look inside as a result of their delivery to Syria) and Su-30SM fighter jets. We should also expect to see some Russian political support for Iran.
 

Feanor

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Not a fan of the clumsy American attempt at spin control in the aftermath of the 8 Jan 2020 missile strike.
It's now 64... I can't help but wonder if they telling the truth that it's a case of symptoms taking time to emerge. Either that or the final number was deemed to be so large and frightening that they genuinely thought releasing the information in this manner is a good idea.

64 US troops suffered traumatic brain injuries from Iranian missile attack, as casualty total continues to balloon
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
It's now 64... I can't help but wonder if they telling the truth that it's a case of symptoms taking time to emerge. Either that or the final number was deemed to be so large and frightening that they genuinely thought releasing the information in this manner is a good idea.

64 US troops suffered traumatic brain injuries from Iranian missile attack, as casualty total continues to balloon
Probably this drip approach to releasing the real numbers was in fact the only way to keep a lid on the retaliation button immediately after the attack. You know who's base likely would have demanded a significant response had they known the actual numbers. If there is a further increase in the actual numbers or if there were actual deaths then this demand may yet be met.
 

Todjaeger

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It's now 64... I can't help but wonder if they telling the truth that it's a case of symptoms taking time to emerge. Either that or the final number was deemed to be so large and frightening that they genuinely thought releasing the information in this manner is a good idea.

64 US troops suffered traumatic brain injuries from Iranian missile attack, as casualty total continues to balloon
It could be a bit of both. A TBI (traumatic brain injury) is actually surprisingly easy to cause, which is why some (US) football helmets have been recently redesigned, as a hard slap to the back of the head/helmet can sometimes cause a TBI, the symptoms of which might not become apparent. In fact, studies of retired professional athletes in the US, particularly those that had played contacted sports like (US) football and hockey, which have been getting done over the last decade or so have been making findings that some players have suffered cumulative degenerative brain damage that previous testing had not detected.

With that in mind, it would make sense to me if more thorough and capable test and diagnostic tools were used to reveal injuries that in the past might have been overlooked, and be at least partially responsible for the increasing casualty count. OTOH with the reputations and egos of some of those involved and/or responsible, I tend to suspect that accuracy of what is being claimed anyway.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Agree, TBI injuries in the NFL and NHL are really starting to be better understood and appear to be significant. In many combat situations, the energy involved in creating these TBI will likely be much greater but repetitive lower energy events added up are a problem. Certainly should be a concern for people deploying for second or third tours who had previous head trauma.
 

OPSSG

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An American soldier, a British soldier and one US contractor were killed on 11 Mar 2020 (Wed), a US official said, in the deadliest rocket attack in years on an Iraqi military base hosting foreign troops. On Wednesday evening, a volley of rockets hit the Taji air base north of Baghdad, which hosts troops from the US-led coalition helping local forces battle jihadists. Washington has blamed Iran-backed factions from Iraq’s Hashed al-Shaabi military network, which is incorporated into the Iraqi state, for similar violence in the recent past.

Edit: In the latest attack, 14 US-led coalition personnel were wounded, including American, British, Polish and others. Private industry contractors were among the wounded. Milley said five of the wounded were categorized as "urgent," suggesting serious injuries that could require rapid medical evacuation. The death toll could rise as some sustained serious injuries in the strike, and US Defense Secretary Mark Esper warned that President Trump had authorized further responses: "All options are on the table," Esper said. Confrontations between Tehran and Washington, which have mostly taken place in Iraq, peaked in January when the US killed a top Iranian general. Now it looks like things are escalating again. Britain named its fallen service member as Lance Corporal Brodie Gillon, a 26-year-old with the Irish Guards Battle Group.

Within hours of Wednesday’s attack, fighters, likely belonging to the US-led coalition bombed Hashed factions stationed on the Syrian side of the border with Iraq, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights war monitor.

Britain's foreign minister Dominic Raab said the US-led response to the attack on coalition forces in Iraq was "swift, decisive and proportionate" and warned that anyone seeking to harm those forces could expect a strong response.
 
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Ranger25

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Some additional data regarding the strikes carried out after the rocket attack. The rockets were seen on counter battery radars and the truck immediately found. Seems to me coalition forces need to move CRAM assets into theater asap. The US army does have a ground system based on the PHALANX system in use around the world but Ive seen no reports of use in Iraq



US SECDEF has also confirmed to CVN strike groups and a MEU are heading to the region. Interesting to note SECDEF confirmed deployment of PAtriot systems In addition to CRAM units. ThIs is the first mention of CRAM batteries heading to Iraq. They‘ve been in Afghanistan for some time now for base protection




More on the strikes here


 
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