You are arguing about funding - there is a difference between policy orientation and the difference in funding that policy orientation. The first did not change during the 1990's but the second did. I have no argument about that they did not fund the policy posture from the DWP's of the 1990's.
Here is the rub - and you will not like it. The NZDF did need to change in the 1990's. It did need to be be moulded into greater efficiency. Some of those bases that closed like Te Rapa, Sylvia Park, Hobsonville, Shelly Bay and Hopahopa were well passed their relevancy. Wigram or Woodburn? They only needed a single base in the South. Nostalgia is not a compelling rationale for saving both. (The reality is that base rationalisation plans first came about in the 1980's following the policy work of Derek Quigley and his Strategos Consulting Group which went to the Lange cabinet in 1988).
The issue in the 1990's, was a weak DefMin in Cooper, Razor Ruth and a PM in Bolger who was basically disinterested. Allow me to have a judgement on some of the personalities I knew and spoke to then and after. This wont change your own personal biases but Shipley was when she became PM in 1997 was interested and more so as she developed in the job, Bill 'Mogadon' Birch did manage to hold the line even when the Asia Crisis hit in 97-98 when budgets across all GOTD departments were being hit and Max Bradford tried bloody hard to get us the F-16's and the 3rd Frigate. Happy to discredit the first three but the last 3 mentioned should be distinguished from the 3 in the early-mid 1990's - Ships, Brad and the Mog were not as useless as you try to paint them and took their roles seriously even when up against immense fiscal and political challenges. It was not their fault Winston grandstanded in Cabinet over the 3rd Anzac and that they only had 18 months to attempt to turn around damage done before Clark & Co came in.
The NZDF was a small balanced force from the 1960's onwards. The policy orientation and ability to provide a deployable air combat squadron, air surveillance capability, four frigates, an all arms battalion group and special forces capability with air transport and rotary transport support has been in that context - a small balanced force. In essence a combat capability for deployment generated from each of the 3 services to be a component within a larger unified command. That was the agreed policy context of a small balanced force for a nation that was mostly around 3-4 million in population at the time since the days when Gen Thornton and VADM Phipps as CDS's advised the Holyoake government and continued by subsequent governments but for the exception of the Clark era onward. It was that Bolger & Co did not fund it. The Shipley lot really wanted to - and did indeed recognise the thawing relationship with the US in the later Clinton era and unlike the Nats in recent years did get that FTA's and Defence were symbiotic - especially with the US.
You can be miffed that it was not funded adequately - I am too - but that fundamental policy posture existed until the late 1990's. Note that I not once reverted to mentioning bovine effluent in my analysis.