John Fedup
The Bunker Group
I do not see any ROE being effective in civil wars, the most ugly form of Warfare and trying to make it pretty is akin to lipstick on a pig.
A very simple ROE is effective here, do not engage unless engaged. Yeah Civil Wars are ugly and dirty, specifically because they're insurgencies. The enemy does not wear a uniform so it's extremely easy to blend into the general populace, fully knowing the military cannot just kill off civilian groups, because doing that would lead more civilians to become insurgents, ultimately causing the military to lose the war, but this doesn't mean ROEs need to be thrown out the window and the Military should kill anybody who looks at them funny. I might just be ignorant but I've never heard of an insurgency that has failed in it's ultimate goal.I do not see any ROE being effective in civil wars, the most ugly form of Warfare and trying to make it pretty is akin to lipstick on a pig.
A very simple ROE is effective here, do not engage unless engaged. Yeah Civil Wars are ugly and dirty, specifically because they're insurgencies. The enemy does not wear a uniform so it's extremely easy to blend into the general populace, fully knowing the military cannot just kill off civilian groups, because doing that would lead more civilians to become insurgents, ultimately causing the military to lose the war, but this doesn't mean ROEs need to be thrown out the window and the Military should kill anybody who looks at them funny. I might just be ignorant but I've never heard of an insurgency that has failed in it's ultimate goal.
I'm sure they aren't all of 'em, just those within reach of this particular rescue effort. Co-ordinated rescue efforts aren't necessarily practical elsewhere. Depends on whether there's anywhere safe to evacuate to....Are these all of the White Helmets? The entire organization? Somehow I doubt that, just geographically White Helmets from besieged Aleppo aren't likely to have made it all the way to the Golan Heights. So what has happened to the rest of them? Was any effort made to evacuate the rest? Are there any reports that anyone is coming after them? What makes this group of White Helmets special enough to earn a coordinated rescue effort, while the rest were seemingly abandoned?
I might just be ignorant but I've never heard of an insurgency that has failed in it's ultimate goal.
Malayan Emergency - 1948 to 1960.
The majority of insurgencies have failed historically. In his book 'Invisible Armies' Max Boot lists 443 insurgencies post 1775, of which only 25.5 percent resulted in success for the insurgents.
Greek Communist uprising towards end of and post WW2 which was the Greek Civil War.I might just be ignorant but I've never heard of an insurgency that has failed in it's ultimate goal.
he doesn't have to be seen to provide the leadership. If he was passing on his dogmas and fatwas etc., through other channels down through the chain of command he was still leading. As long as he was getting his message an orders out to his subordinates and followers, he was doing his job. They still have their social media presence I believe.One has to wonder what kind of effective leadership this mutt was really providing the last couple of years. He was rarely seen and certainly didn't have the persona of Bin Laden. Still, a good outcome, even if it takes the political heat off of Trump for a few days.
1. The new leader is Abu Ibrahim al-Hashemi al-Qurashi and this name is believed to be a nom de guerre. With the name "al-Qurashi", ISIS also made clear that he claims to be descended from the Prophet Muhammad's Quraysh tribe - something generally held by pre-modern Sunni scholars as being a key qualification for becoming a caliph.Time has a good article about situation after the raid. Some foot for thought, it seems that the Daesh have managed a coherent response and succession. It is of course impossible to know to which degree this is a true reflection of the inner workings. Time only will tell, but it looks like a sadly good power transfer which should reduce the chances of fracture and flight.
On occasions, when we were planning future operations as a coalition, it became apparent that the Iraqis had not been consulted. As a result, these operations were rarely executed in a coherent or timely manner. We learnt early that engagement with the Iraqis was vital. Their buy-in, ownership, consideration and advice made the conduct of operations tenable and successful. A lot can be achieved over a cup of chai tea. They immensely respected Australia’s support which was without favour or bias..
There was immense pressure placed on the junior leadership during these operations, particularly when CTS was suffering attrition and bogged down mid-clearance in complex urban terrain. CTS’ ‘thirst’ for kinetic effects was insatiable.