A quibble: if we did put missiles on those ships they'd not be RAM & ESSM. They'd get Sea Ceptor. It's integrated with the Artisan radar on the carriers, & fitted to other RN ships.
The Royal Navy Discussions and Updates
- Thread starter overlander
- Start date
As swerve said, the UK would more than likely install SeaCeptor rather than ESSM anyway were it looking to upgrade the self-defence capability of these vessels, but the real answer most likely, is cost.
They have Phalanx CIWS in their inventory they can use on these ships, transferring them from retiring vessels and this become essentially a cost neutral option, whereas the acqusition of SeaRAM, ESSM or SeaCeptor or whichever system you care to nominate, carries a significant financial impost.
There are ways to increase the self-defence capability of ships in times of high threat operations, as seen by the deployment of RBS-70 SAM detachments during GW2 on board HMAS Kanimbla and the UK could easily do the same with the Starstreak SAM variants the Royal Army and Royal Marines maintain.
FormerDirtDart
Well-Known Member
There are always unconventional techniques
Egyptian Navy chaining US Avenger SHORAD systems to the deck of a Mistral-class ship.
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The Sep -Jul issue of the Navy Leagues's "Navy" has a paper by Jonathan Foreman - The British Royal Navy - Road to Salvation? part 2 .
The author is a known critic of the current Situation and decline of the RN but I think those views are worth repeating. I'm unable to link the piece so I'll do my best to précis the main thrust.
"RN LEADERSHIP AND THE DECLINE IN BRITISH NAVAL DESIGN"
- the RNs leadership does bear responsibility for the fact that British warships tend to be conceived, like T45, without proper consideration of financial realities so the ships are progressively stripped of their planned capabilities in order to save money during their long gestation.
- common sense dictates that the few destroyers and frigates fielded by a mini navy should be genuine GP warships with a speciality, not specialist ships.
- the T45 so often proclaimed to be the "best in the world" by the RN and its cheerleaders in the British media are a case in point. They may well field argueably the best AAW systems but in almost every other respect they are inferior to contemporary competitors the world and are pathetically and unforgivingly vulnerable to submarine and surface threats.
- claims made and export expectations for the long delayed T26 may be similarly deluded. It's boosters may claim it to be superior to France's FREMM frigates thus negating the fact that the French Navy has more ships than the RN but the FREMMs are already in service and it's manufacturers have already found a bigger export market (Greece, Egypt, Morocco and possibly Canada and Australia) than any British ship in the last three decades.
MONOPOLIES AND CAPITAL SHIPS DESIGNED BY CIVIL SERVANTS
one of the extraordinary revelations that came out of the recent Defence Select Committee report was that the thinking behind the design and purpose of Britains new carriers had apparently come from not the Admiralty or ant other identifiable group of defence thinkers but in the words of Lord West"Policy people at the centre and the Permanent Secretary".
- some of the baffling flaws in the conception of the two QEs may well be a result of their strange origins; no consideration of nuclear power, will come into service without an adequate number of aircraft and will only have the benefit of escorts if the RN abandons most of its other missions, lack of cats and traps thereby limiting their use to F35B.
- BAE a prime contractor for the F35B took over a year to respond to the Cameron government (when asked to cost cats and traps) and when it did so it claimed that putting cats on the ships would mow add more than GBP 2b a piece rather than GBP 900m as planned.
NUMBERS
- lack of quantity has a negative quality all its own. If your six new destroyers are technologically superior to the twelve you just retired (which in the U.K. Means scrapping not mothballs) the fact that you cannot deploy your ships in half as many places around the world means you have ended up with an inherently diminished naval capability.
- operating a very small number of relatively high quality, extremely costly vessels whose designs were conceived two decades ago and for a much larger fleet - the current situation in the RN - is argueably a pointless even maturbatory exercise.
BETRAYING THE OFFENSIVE
-the RNs leadership bears even more responsibility for three decades of warship design that has all but ignored the importance of offensive capability,
- it's painful to say this but the difference between the generation of naval leaders (between the war years and the last three decades) is argueably, that the Admiralty of the war years and decades after, took warfare,seriously, treating it not as an abstraction or a phenonomem unlikely to be repeated in their lifetime. They were wrong on many things but their primary concern was the defence of the realm, not the short term interests of a particular government.
- However for the last three decades every significant procurement and spending decision made by successive defence ministers, the U.K. Mod and the RN leadership has been based on the explicit or implicit assumptions that there is no chance that the navy might find itself at war for decades to come. At the same time tremendous efforts have been made by politicians, civil servants and senior naval officers to deny, disguise or distract from the resulting decline in capability and these have been remarkably successful
A ROYAL NAVY FIT FOR THIS ERA
I'll paraphrase this chapter the thrust of which is that the RN has made little attempt to create radical solutions to combat the decline and has continued on as if nothing has changed. He quoted modularity, something akin to the USN distributed lethality doctrine with RFAs, a mix of both conventional and nucs to increase sub numbers and smaller cheaper merchant hull type carriers, all ideas never truely exploited.
IS THERE HOPE
- the culture that made the RN great is far from dead, it's merely on the back foot and challenged from without and from within. There are still,senior officers who believe in and exemplify old virtues and courage: personal responsibility and patriotism was recently demonstrated by VADM Simon Lister, Chief of Materiel(Fleet) and Chief of Support. VADM Lister broke with current custom by taking a public stand against the running down of the Navy writing what newspapers called "a scathing attack" on govt. cuts, diminished readiness and over reliance on civilian support (The Naval Engineer). During the last two decades the only British Generals and Admirals willing to come out and criticise the degree and manner of defence cuts have been those who are already retired and have recieved their gongs - and therefor lost much of their leverage and ability to get public attention."
This is a scathing paper and I stress it's the opinion of a constant critic of the RN but it makes very thoughtful reading.
The author is a known critic of the current Situation and decline of the RN but I think those views are worth repeating. I'm unable to link the piece so I'll do my best to précis the main thrust.
"RN LEADERSHIP AND THE DECLINE IN BRITISH NAVAL DESIGN"
- the RNs leadership does bear responsibility for the fact that British warships tend to be conceived, like T45, without proper consideration of financial realities so the ships are progressively stripped of their planned capabilities in order to save money during their long gestation.
- common sense dictates that the few destroyers and frigates fielded by a mini navy should be genuine GP warships with a speciality, not specialist ships.
- the T45 so often proclaimed to be the "best in the world" by the RN and its cheerleaders in the British media are a case in point. They may well field argueably the best AAW systems but in almost every other respect they are inferior to contemporary competitors the world and are pathetically and unforgivingly vulnerable to submarine and surface threats.
- claims made and export expectations for the long delayed T26 may be similarly deluded. It's boosters may claim it to be superior to France's FREMM frigates thus negating the fact that the French Navy has more ships than the RN but the FREMMs are already in service and it's manufacturers have already found a bigger export market (Greece, Egypt, Morocco and possibly Canada and Australia) than any British ship in the last three decades.
MONOPOLIES AND CAPITAL SHIPS DESIGNED BY CIVIL SERVANTS
one of the extraordinary revelations that came out of the recent Defence Select Committee report was that the thinking behind the design and purpose of Britains new carriers had apparently come from not the Admiralty or ant other identifiable group of defence thinkers but in the words of Lord West"Policy people at the centre and the Permanent Secretary".
- some of the baffling flaws in the conception of the two QEs may well be a result of their strange origins; no consideration of nuclear power, will come into service without an adequate number of aircraft and will only have the benefit of escorts if the RN abandons most of its other missions, lack of cats and traps thereby limiting their use to F35B.
- BAE a prime contractor for the F35B took over a year to respond to the Cameron government (when asked to cost cats and traps) and when it did so it claimed that putting cats on the ships would mow add more than GBP 2b a piece rather than GBP 900m as planned.
NUMBERS
- lack of quantity has a negative quality all its own. If your six new destroyers are technologically superior to the twelve you just retired (which in the U.K. Means scrapping not mothballs) the fact that you cannot deploy your ships in half as many places around the world means you have ended up with an inherently diminished naval capability.
- operating a very small number of relatively high quality, extremely costly vessels whose designs were conceived two decades ago and for a much larger fleet - the current situation in the RN - is argueably a pointless even maturbatory exercise.
BETRAYING THE OFFENSIVE
-the RNs leadership bears even more responsibility for three decades of warship design that has all but ignored the importance of offensive capability,
- it's painful to say this but the difference between the generation of naval leaders (between the war years and the last three decades) is argueably, that the Admiralty of the war years and decades after, took warfare,seriously, treating it not as an abstraction or a phenonomem unlikely to be repeated in their lifetime. They were wrong on many things but their primary concern was the defence of the realm, not the short term interests of a particular government.
- However for the last three decades every significant procurement and spending decision made by successive defence ministers, the U.K. Mod and the RN leadership has been based on the explicit or implicit assumptions that there is no chance that the navy might find itself at war for decades to come. At the same time tremendous efforts have been made by politicians, civil servants and senior naval officers to deny, disguise or distract from the resulting decline in capability and these have been remarkably successful
A ROYAL NAVY FIT FOR THIS ERA
I'll paraphrase this chapter the thrust of which is that the RN has made little attempt to create radical solutions to combat the decline and has continued on as if nothing has changed. He quoted modularity, something akin to the USN distributed lethality doctrine with RFAs, a mix of both conventional and nucs to increase sub numbers and smaller cheaper merchant hull type carriers, all ideas never truely exploited.
IS THERE HOPE
- the culture that made the RN great is far from dead, it's merely on the back foot and challenged from without and from within. There are still,senior officers who believe in and exemplify old virtues and courage: personal responsibility and patriotism was recently demonstrated by VADM Simon Lister, Chief of Materiel(Fleet) and Chief of Support. VADM Lister broke with current custom by taking a public stand against the running down of the Navy writing what newspapers called "a scathing attack" on govt. cuts, diminished readiness and over reliance on civilian support (The Naval Engineer). During the last two decades the only British Generals and Admirals willing to come out and criticise the degree and manner of defence cuts have been those who are already retired and have recieved their gongs - and therefor lost much of their leverage and ability to get public attention."
This is a scathing paper and I stress it's the opinion of a constant critic of the RN but it makes very thoughtful reading.
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Interesting to read the argument that the new carriers don't need "missiles" for additional defense because they'll be escorted...
Very similiar to the arguments put forth regarding the Australian LHD's which originally were to have no missile defense integral to the ships at all. They'll be escorted, yadda, yadda, yadda...
Then lo and behold, CIWS.was announced for the ships last year.
I find it hard to believe that the RN isn't a big believer in ship defense after the Falkland's war.
Very similiar to the arguments put forth regarding the Australian LHD's which originally were to have no missile defense integral to the ships at all. They'll be escorted, yadda, yadda, yadda...
Then lo and behold, CIWS.was announced for the ships last year.
I find it hard to believe that the RN isn't a big believer in ship defense after the Falkland's war.
kev 99
Member
It is a big believer in ship defence; unfortunately it's also got to find the money to pay for it which is always a problem. Neither of the UK's big political parties are interested in paying for defence; the conservatives "talk the talk but don't walk the walk", whilst Labour aren't interested in talking or walking.
Redlands18
Well-Known Member
I've got a copy of the same edition and in the letters section near the front there is a letter from Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham RN retd who is the editor of the RNs Naval Review who after being given a copy of the article, basically says.
"I agree most strongly . I feel it is of great interest and concern to members past and present of the RN, and a real wake-up call to the RN-and indeed should also be to the British Government"
He goes on to ask and receives permission to post the article on the Naval Review Website
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Vulcan
Member
If the presence of Phalanx fits your definition of caring about ship defence then the RN has cared about it for years - QNLZ will have 3 Phalanx mounts and has claimed so for years.
RN experience removed the missiles for more deck space. This was post-dated ands I believe.
I've often been told by (fairly recent) ex-RN types that the RN is very keen on soft kill of incoming missiles.
One has to make sure that everything in the fleet has it, of course, or you get an Atlantic Conveyor event.
That was Sea Dart on a very crowded deck towards the end of the useful life of the Sea Dart system,
Fast forward and we've a missile with a soft launch capability (Sea Ceptor uses a CO2 gas generator) and on a ship which basically has the same CMS as Type 45, minus Aster 30)
Lets cast our minds back to the last time a UK carrier was deployed vs a near peer threat..and had to fire multiple Sea Dart to basically ward off the Argy air force in one engagement.
I'd sooner see a short range missile system fitted to be honest.
the concerned
Active Member
Surely the priority for now is get both ships operational and the compliment of aircraft on it. Upgrading the defence capability is something they could look at when a refit is due. If we get to a situation where the cv has to defend itself something or someone has messed up big time. It's the same argument about anti-ship missiles the royal navy doesn't fight that way if there is a opposing force in front then either air power or a sub would be the choice not a surface vessel
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
IMHO a 3 billion pound sterling naval vessel requires some additional self defence capabilities above and beyond what is being proposed.
I do think the priority is getting the ships built and operational. Lets be honest that hasn't been a sure thing.
If space and weight is reserved then I don't see it as something that can't be added later. I think CAMM is quite a nice system for a carrier.
Particularly useful as the UK will be down on first class escorts. It's not likely to be an issue in the short term. But if the world became a more hostile place.
If space and weight is reserved then I don't see it as something that can't be added later. I think CAMM is quite a nice system for a carrier.
Particularly useful as the UK will be down on first class escorts. It's not likely to be an issue in the short term. But if the world became a more hostile place.
Me too. CAMM for self-defence, to try to catch anything that might get past the escorts before it comes within range of the CIWS. Soft kill & CIWS - good! Glad to have them. But personally, I'd prefer belt, braces AND an elasticated waistband, & CAMM (1) looks like something that can be fitted into a fairly small space, (2) should require minimal integration, what with the commonality of equipment with other ships that have it (refitted T23 & T45) & obviously being easy to integrate with just about anything, from the customers it has so far, & (3) clearly adding an extra defensive capability. Oh yes, & (4) - it's already in the RN inventory. Ticks every box, IMO.
But as long as we're not in a major war, I won't panic because the carriers don't have it.
Right now, I don't even think the QE has her 30mm mounts - none of which is a concern right now, but definitely, fitting Sea Ceptor strikes me as being a sound idea at some point in the future.
It's also a shame that the RN hasn't picked up on CEC - that would be invaluable for a number of things.
CAMM is a very exciting missile defense system. I was under the impression it needs VLS for deployment on ships but no doubt it can evolve as the system matures. There is a Land based version planned right? So other type Launchers other then VLS must be possible.
Here's the concern. The tactic of overwhelming a CSG's defenses is as old and as proven as any tactic in modern military history. Be it 100 suicidal pilots with bombs strapped on the fuselages, a couple dozen speed boats loaded with explosives, or a 3rd world country that breaks the bank on SS AShM's. Let alone a 1st world one.
Not only is there a proliferation of countries "owning" AShM's, theres a proliferation of countries "making" them. With effective super sonic ones now being exported by China and India too and a coordinated attack by them is now a CV's worst scenario. Its true that SS missiles are so fast that speed is their enemy but what if 20 or 30 BM's and AShM's are shot off at a carrier? A capability many countrys will have in the coming decades.
And only one has to get thru. This has the USN so concerned were looking for a way to reload VLS tubes while at sea and fielding a drone that refuels strike aircraft to keep the CV as far away from the action as we can.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Hence the USN's interest in getting lasers and railguns onto ships as soon as possible along with better long range attack missiles.
Do present gun based CIWS actually have the ability to effectively deal with supersonic targets? For that matter, did missiles like Sea Dart and Sea Wolf as well as newer ones like ESSM, MICA and RAM have the ability? I would assume that a major requirement for CAMM is the ability to deal with supersonic targets. Not sure if it means anything but to me it's telling that neither Raytheon or MBDA on their marketing literature make any mention of ESSM, CAMM and MICA being able to deal with supersonic targets.
In the past British Aerospace claimed that Sea Wolf was able to hit a 4.5 inch shell; whether Sea Wolf was the only missile with the ability is the question. Similarly, MBDA catalogues on Jernas mentions its ability to hit low flying cruise missiles but catalogues on similar missiles made by others didn't make such claims. Someone in the industry once told me that when looking at marketing literature; the trick is to look for what's not mentioned, as opposed to what is. Not sure if this really holds true :]
A major problem for many countries is that they don't have the funds/resources to conduct thorough trials on stuff they intend on buying and have to rely on info provided by the OEM as well as technical evaluations that may not reveal everything about the intended purchase. If they don't ask the right questions, the OEM won't go out of his way to point out what his product can't do or what it's particularly not good at. I recall reading somewhere that it was only due to actual firing trials that the Indians discovered that Kashtan couldn't deal with targets flying below a certain altitude.
Despite marketing it, India has yet to find an export customer for Brahmos. Russia also exports supersonic anti-radiation missiles.
No doubt there is a great threat posed by supersonic missiles but a major problem for anyone trying to target a carrier group is actually locating it first. The USN will also have various soft kill measures in place to defend itself.
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Supersonic targets, yes to both Sea Wolf and Sea Dart. Both were tested against super sonic sounding rockets in the missile range off the Hebrides back in the 1970's and were reliable against that -so speed wasn't an issue.
The USN has been trialling weapons against hypersonic threats for decades, so it's not impossible.
CIWS vs supersonic targets? They can hit but the problem is the missile tends to keep going, so while it might be a technical kill, the impact of several dozen bits of rocketry travelling at high speed can still hurt.
ESSM has been tested against and has been successful for multiple (2) supersonic targets on a number of ocaisions and was part of the acceptance trials for the ANZAC class ASMD upgrades at Barking Sands in Hawaii.
The targets used were Coyote GQM-163A which cruises at Mach 3.0 a 4.0 at altitude or Mach 2.6 when sea skimming.
https://www.orbitalatk.com/flight-systems/missile-defense-systems/ascm-targets/docs/BR06007_3862%20Coyote_R3.pdf