Mods, please take this post for how it is meant – a constructive addition to the discussion. I know this is a continuation of the earlier conversation, but this issue transcends specific platforms so it’s not really about SEA-1000 and is more about the link between platforms and doctrine. It is an honest attempt to contribute, but if it is too inflammatory I’m happy to take it down.
Todjager, I think this is going to be my last reply in this conversation, as it hasn’t been particularly fruitful, which has partially been my fault. Don’t take that personally, but I fear it has now devolved into somewhat of a moving feast with goalposts flying around. I was probably overly defensive/dismissive in my earlier post and for that I apologise. I hope you’ll appreciate I had the feeling of being ‘under siege’ a little bit as I have come to realise my position on these issues is somewhat controversial here, given the number of responses I received, and given they are in opposition to some obviously well respected members. I know you’ll want the right of reply and that’s totally fine, if everyone agrees then no one ever grows, learns or evolves. If I don’t reply it’s not because I don’t respect your opinion, but I think I’m just going to state my case here without referring to your last post, for fear of chasing this conversation down a rabbit hole which has little to do with the original point being made or putting out a hundred fires which does nothing to advance the discussion. So no hard feelings.
Fundamentally the problem here is a misunderstanding the role organisational information plays in all warfare and the way it drives the use and acquisition of platforms and technology. Remember at base this comes down to your argument that, and I’m paraphrasing here, “even if the future submarine did provide a higher transit speed, this will not necessarily have any bearing on how the platform is used because of CONOPs”. Feel free to correct me if I have misrepresented you. Essentially this argument transcends the specific technology at hand.
Let me start by simply changing a three words in that paraphrased sentence: “even if the
F-35A provides a
lower RCS, this will not necessarily have any bearing on how the platform is used because of CONOPs”. Are there any problems with that reasoning if the above is used to argue against the value of RCS reduction (i.e. a higher transit speed)? They should be obvious (essentially this is a model dependant statement). The reasoning is literally identical to the argument you originally made in this thread. So that’s the short argument, now for the long one (I apologise in advance for the length).
When any force commander confronts a tactical or operational situation, they are guided by the organisational information which governs the use and employment of the disparate force types at his/her disposal – doctrine – in order to not only pursue a specific set of operational outcomes, but maximise the synergistic benefits these separate force types provide when used in concert. Thus, a “CONOPs” document is purely the application of doctrinal principles to a given tactical or operational environment by the joint force commander. If you want a historical example of this interaction between doctrine and its employment there has been much research done on Petraeus’
Counterinsurgency and its successful implementation 2007/2008. It is thus, all about doctrine, especially when envisaging how a developmental platform will be employed.
The problem with your argument here is it essentially inverts the actual relationship between doctrine and technology at all levels – doctrine is a product of the technological environment, it is forced by circumstance to adapt to it. It doesn’t do so instantly, like water. Because it relies upon doctrinal innovation, which can be retarded by organisational and cultural resistance, or the influence of powerful individuals who have their head stuck in the last war and previous doctrinal paradigm (innovation inhibitors), it bends and moves slowly, like ‘plastic’. This evolution is driven by the organisation’s requirement to win wars, and the only way to do that is to leverage the technology you have at your disposal to gain some advantage at any of the levels of warfare. Thus, doctrine at every level is responsive to the capabilities of the technology the force has at its disposal: as technology changes, so must doctrine.
This is the major misconception here – any military does not simply sit there and determine in some arbitrary manner what is the perfect parameter for an arbitrary force type or platform. Napoleon did not stipulate a rate of march in excess of 20km per day simply because that is the perfect rate of march for any infantry division in any time period – what he “needed” from them – it was the best he could achieve with the technological tools at his disposal, and it was better than his adversaries. The organisational development of the corps gave him an advantage in operational mobility – just as a higher transit speed on a submarine would – which he wielded to achieve tactical superiority at Ulm, Austerlitz and Jena to meet his strategic ends by defeating the Austrians, Russians and Prussians in turn. With the mechanisation of infantry 20km per day was a woeful rate of advance for a US infantry division in 1944 when not in contact. With new technology, old paradigms become irrelevant. Thus, the whole idea that the RAN would simply ignore the increased mobility a new system could provide, simply because of the way it employed legacy systems or originally envisaged the manner of the new system’s employment is, again, unlikely. This is what makes AIR-6000 almost perfectly analogous. If any system provides significantly increased operational mobility because it is more technologically advanced, ADF doctrine will evolve to leverage that capability. Thus, when an operational situation confronts the force commander, said command will leverage the capabilities of the forces at his/her disposal to best achieve operational goals, in accordance with operational doctrine which guides the employment of force.
There are numerous examples of how doctrine and technology interact in the 20th century – Blitzkrieg and AirLand Battle are excellent simply because of the amount of material in English which describes their development. AirLand Battle stemmed out of the second offset strategy, which sought to replace the US nuclear arsenal as the primary means of offsetting Soviet material superiority. It leveraged US industrial strength in microelectronics to foster key technological advantages in areas such as communications and PGMs, in addition to several technological and organisational developments which arose from Vietnam such, as the maturity of modern air-mobility. As theses technological systems matured into platforms and weapons, the US army founded a doctrine around them known as AirLand battle, which intended to impose the concept of a nonlinear battlefield on the soviets.
The relationship between doctrine and capability is clearly evident here: the US army did not write FM-100-5 and then wait for the required technology to be developed, it essentially forged an operational doctrine designed to leverage those technological advantages to greatest effect by utilising enhanced mobility, ISR and precision fires to exploit soviet weaknesses such as predictable echelonment. Arguably the kind of encounter AirLand battle intended to force upon the soviets was simply not possible without the technological developments of the second offset, which in turn would not have been possible without macro factors such as the strength of the US microelectronics industry. We see these macro factors at play today in the difference between Russian and US T/R modules in FCRs, as an example. I’m sure the Russian Air Force would love GaN based AESAs but they simply lack the industrial capacity to develop that technology, so doctrine has to shift accordingly to account for technological inferiority.
Doctrine is reactive to technology. It does not drive technological development, though it can have some influence on platform design if there has to be major design trade-offs due to technological limitations. That’s the key point here, and it means there is no way the ADF would not utilise every advantage the technology at its disposal provides, including greater operational mobility of its submarine force. When that happens, and new technology is underutilised because of an out-dated doctrinal paradigm, this is considered an organisational failure, such as US tank destroyer doctrine in 1943 and 1944. Sure, in this case, sometimes range is more important than speed, sometimes the opposite is true, it all depends on the operational circumstance which confronts the force. The adaptive employment of the platform will not be arbitrarily limited by doctrine in the manner you describe: that just isn’t the way any effective military operates.
And just a final note: If you are going to argue that the submarine in question cannot deliver that capability, or if it can it won’t be of any advantage, here’s something we both need to remember. I’m not an electrical engineer. I know just enough about submarine propulsion to be dangerous :crazy. But one important thing I have learned on my path is to be well aware of what you do know and what you don’t. And, no offense meant here at all, I’m 99.9% sure you aren’t an expert in submarine propulsion either. Even if you were, so much is unknown about the technology involved that making ‘back of the napkin’ extrapolations based open source data on legacy systems is well beyond speculation: far worse than taking comments from the people who design the platform.
Anyways, might see you around the forums or the wider net. I’ll say hi if I do.
