See this 3 June 2013 news article on "DoD Document Sheds First Clear Light On AirSea Battle: Warfare Unfettered."
The Defense Department (DoD) released an official and unclassified summary of the concept for the first time on a Navy website (only 13 pages).
1. Key concept:
Network, Integrated Attack-in-depth by the application of cross domain applications to Disrupt, Destroy and Defeat adversary forces. In essence, if an adversary can now reach out and touch US forces in ways and at distances they never could before, the US is going to find all sorts of ways to reach out and touch them back. The DoD could develop better technology to try to shoot down the adversary missile once it’s launched. But it’s much better to blow up the launcher before it actually launches, or to blind the radar that’s trying to find US forces, or, best of all, crash the adversary's communications network that is orchestrating the attack in the first place, whether by blowing up their headquarters, jamming their wireless datalinks, or hacking their computers. Instead of trying to shoot down an adversary satellite, bomb the ground control station to which it’s transmitting data, or better yet hack into that data stream to feed the enemy false information. This new document describes this as a “cross-domain” “attack in depth” using “both kinetic and non-kinetic means.”
2. In the hierarchy of joint force development documents, right at the top is:
3. As Spencer Ackerman calls it, Step 1 in U.S. Plan to Rule Sea and Sky: Actually Share Data. While Spencer Ackerman has over simplified the concept, it is also true that the foundation for NIA/D3 requires the ability to share information across the services, with an element of cyberwarfare inherent in the concept (see this CSIS publication). It is important to remember that the AirSea Battle is a limited operational concept; it is not a doctrine, a military strategy, or a warfighting plan against any particular country. “The ongoing confusion about the actual scope of [AirSea Battle] is exactly why it is so important for DoD to carefully articulate the limited nature of this concept,” said Rep. Forbes.
The Defense Department (DoD) released an official and unclassified summary of the concept for the first time on a Navy website (only 13 pages).
1. Key concept:
NIA/D3, or
Network, Integrated Attack-in-depth by the application of cross domain applications to Disrupt, Destroy and Defeat adversary forces. In essence, if an adversary can now reach out and touch US forces in ways and at distances they never could before, the US is going to find all sorts of ways to reach out and touch them back. The DoD could develop better technology to try to shoot down the adversary missile once it’s launched. But it’s much better to blow up the launcher before it actually launches, or to blind the radar that’s trying to find US forces, or, best of all, crash the adversary's communications network that is orchestrating the attack in the first place, whether by blowing up their headquarters, jamming their wireless datalinks, or hacking their computers. Instead of trying to shoot down an adversary satellite, bomb the ground control station to which it’s transmitting data, or better yet hack into that data stream to feed the enemy false information. This new document describes this as a “cross-domain” “attack in depth” using “both kinetic and non-kinetic means.”
2. In the hierarchy of joint force development documents, right at the top is:
2.1 the DoD's Strategic Guidance aka Sustaining Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (DSG), a 14 page pdf document which deals with the primary missions of the US Armed Forces;
2.2 directly below the DSG is the Chiefs of Staff's joint force development vision detailed in Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 (CCJO), a 16 page pdf document which sets out the implications and risks for joint operations, and both the DSG and CCJO, are the master documents guiding joint force developments for the US; and
2.3 below CCJO, is the Joint Operations Access Concept (JOAC), which consists of two parts:
The idea behind AirSea Battle is to foster institutional change, conceptual alignment and material change in the services to develop a force that can meet the challenge of A2/AD via NIA/D3.
2.2 directly below the DSG is the Chiefs of Staff's joint force development vision detailed in Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 (CCJO), a 16 page pdf document which sets out the implications and risks for joint operations, and both the DSG and CCJO, are the master documents guiding joint force developments for the US; and
2.3 below CCJO, is the Joint Operations Access Concept (JOAC), which consists of two parts:
2.3.1 AirSea Battle; and
2.3.2 Entry Operations.
2.3.2 Entry Operations.
The idea behind AirSea Battle is to foster institutional change, conceptual alignment and material change in the services to develop a force that can meet the challenge of A2/AD via NIA/D3.
3. As Spencer Ackerman calls it, Step 1 in U.S. Plan to Rule Sea and Sky: Actually Share Data. While Spencer Ackerman has over simplified the concept, it is also true that the foundation for NIA/D3 requires the ability to share information across the services, with an element of cyberwarfare inherent in the concept (see this CSIS publication). It is important to remember that the AirSea Battle is a limited operational concept; it is not a doctrine, a military strategy, or a warfighting plan against any particular country. “The ongoing confusion about the actual scope of [AirSea Battle] is exactly why it is so important for DoD to carefully articulate the limited nature of this concept,” said Rep. Forbes.
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