In Dec 2012, the
Philippine Senate allocated pesos 121.6 billion (or about US$2.94 billion) for the DND in 2013 (which is more than a 12 percent increase over the 2012 budget of the DND of pesos 108.1 billion). Unfortunately, a large portion of this increase in budget will be eaten up by increased personnel costs, and personnel costs possibly account for 75% of the AFP's annual budget. In addition to the increase to 2012 budget of the DND, there are three other measures adopted by the current administration (one of which is referred to by W3-A Sokol in his above post):-
(i)
Budget Secretary Florencio Abad said (in reference to Senate Bill 3164 and House Bill 6410 - "An Act Amending Republic Act No. 7898, Establishing the Revised AFP Modernization Program and for Other Purposes"):-
“The defense department has been getting allocations that they’ve never had before. And, in fact, as soon as Congress approves the AFP Modernization Act which will set aside about P78 billion (or about US$1.8 billion) for a five-year modernization program, then every year the DND will be getting at least P15 billion (or about US$362.3 million) to modernize its operations.”
(ii) On
29 Nov 2012, President Aquino and his Cabinet approved, on a number of infrastructure projects and P8.8-billion (or about US$210 million) for the acquisition of Multi-Role Response vessels in 2012-2016, which may be intended as a civilian capability residing with the coast guard.
(iii) As a one-off
Dec 2012 budget measure, a number of programs and projects will be funded by P28.9 billion in savings that were incurred from unreleased 2011 and 2012 appropriation; as well as P4.4 billion in remaining windfall revenues. Measures specific to the DND-AFP are as follows:-
one, P60 million (or about US$1.45 million) for the Rehabilitation of Air Education and Training Command; and
two, P307.5 million (or about US$7.4 million) in additional funds to support the unfunded requirements of the Philippine Air Force to address its capability gap.
It remains to be seen how the above budget measures will affect Philippine defence spending patterns beyond the current Aquino administration, which is dependent on its present trajectory of economic growth.
There is without doubt, reform and institutionalization of the Defense System Of Management (DSOM), as part of the Defense Acquisition System (DAS). DSOM is how the DND-AFP currently chooses the equipment. According to President Aquino, the Republic Act 10349 (mentioned above and amends RA 7898 or the AFP Modernization Act signed in 1995) also institutionalizes the DSOM, which will ensure transparency in fund disbursements. Among the provisions of the law is the exemption of weapons, equipment and ammunition directly and exclusively used for the AFP’s projects, undertakings, activities and programs from value-added tax (VAT) and customs duties. Additionally, the law allows for funding from public-private partnerships entered into by the DND as well as multi-year contracts. On 6 Nov 2012, Aerotech Industries Philippines was awarded a pesos 69.5 million contract to perform a Major Structural Inspection (MSI) of S211 #021 of the Philippine Air Force. MSI, alternatively referred to as Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) or Inspection Replace As Necessary (IRAN), is a process by which the subject aircraft is taken apart and all its components — with the exception of the engine, ejection seat, and similarly self-contained systems — are evaluated and then replaced when required.
Further, these above changes will help the PAF that operates mainly helicopters and less than 45 fixed wing aircraft (3 C-130s, 2 Fokker-27s, 5 S211s, 12 OV-10 and 20 SF-260) to do the following:-
one, to maintain and restore more C-130s to an operational status; and
two, to maintain the S211s and OV-10s until the LIFT/SAA squadron is inducted; and
three, to have the organisational structure to enable the future acquisition of a LIFT/SAA squadron of 12 aircraft at a later date.
This is a big change for an air force that was not able to budget enough to sustain the 12 C-130s previously acquired, leading to crashes (last crash in August 2008, off-Davao and another in December 1993) and pre-mature scrapping of at least 4 air frames (and without preserving parts and engines). In the past C-130s were sent to Airod of Malaysia for depot level overhauls. By June 2004, these overhauls have been done in Philippines with the assistance of Lockheed Martin.
Despite the fact that the Philippine Navy in 2006 created 15-year '
sail plan' (see this Dec 2012 article on the ‘
desired force mix’), technologically, the Philippines has the least advanced navy of any claimant in the South China Sea. This is because, the prior administrations have not provided sufficient funding for the navy. On top of acquiring:-
two Hamilton class vessels (formerly operated by the US Coast Guard) and renamed BRP Gregorio del Pilar and BRP Ramon Alcaraz, in early 2011; and
locally built craft like the recently launched
landing craft utility and the Mk 2 multi-purpose assault crafts,
the Philippine Navy also sent out a request for information (Solicitation Number:
#N0002411R2217) for a class of offshore patrol vessels through the U.S. Naval Sea Systems Command (which provides engineering and maintenance support to the USN). However, I doubt that the Philippine Navy will be funded to purchase new ships from the US (unless the potential acquisition is paid for largely by US aid), as they are also considering acquiring 2nd hand ASW frigates from Italy. It was also announced that the
Philippine Navy recently acquired three AW 109 Power helicopters for P1.33 billion (or about US$32 million). Further, the Jacinto class of vessels (former Peacock Class) still lack a phase 3 upgrade and SLEP.
Unfortunately, there is a never ending stream of press releases coming from the DND that say or do nothing (eg. announcements about acquisition failure
like the recent failure to acquire Fennecs from France). They should stop this news cycle and do the announcements only when a purchase is definitive (i.e. contract signed). This was the 4th or 5th failure in a series of attempts to acquire armed helicopters that dated back to 2006.
At this point, the DND has zero credibility. This lack of credibility can be traced from at least Voltaire Gazmin, the Secretary of Defence downwards. For example, the AFP Procurement Service about has about 7.9 million pesos worth of bid invitations. Instead of establishing a service support agreements with pre-qualified aircraft suppliers (and there are many around in Asia, be it in Malaysia, Singapore or Korea), the AFP Procurement Service invited potential suppliers to submit 18 individual bids for C-130 components. This mode of procurement is inherently more expensive and less efficient in keeping C-130s operational. It is hard to be optimistic when you understand DND-AFP's institutional deficiencies. Over years there are thousands of complaints filed against the AFP regarding accusations of fraud, and corruption, but each year, only hundreds of these cases are charged due to lack of evidence or lack of institutional capacity to investigate and prosecute.
Historically, Philippines is a house divided with presence of internal insurgents. The southern Philippines lies along a strategic fault line, with its porous borders, weak rule of law, long-standing and unaddressed grievances of Muslim minorities, and high levels of poverty and corruption offering a fertile field for nurturing terrorist groups. Since 2002, U.S. Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) has partnered with Philippine forces to conduct counterterrorism operations. This campaign successfully targeted high-value individuals and also diminished conditions that gave rise to terrorism and insurgency. The US funded and provided counterterrorism training for a Philippine Light Reaction Company (LRC) and various tools (including new
Coast Watch Stations set up across southern and central Mindanao) for the Philippine Navy to operate more effectively in maritime irregular warfare.
As tactical forces became more proficient through JSOTF-P efforts, US special forces trainers began to shift to the professionalization of higher level headquarters and it included addressing prior AFP's poor inter-service coordination, ineffective employment of combined arms elements in their missions and lack of medical support, with the JSOTF-P providing Field Surgical Teams to the AFP during various operations against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). This enabled the AFP to adopt best practices and helped increase professionalism from a doctrinal and tactical stand point.
However, the ASG and the various Muslim secessionists groups are not the only threats within the Philippines. The New People's Army (NPA) continues to pose a security challenge to Philippine military and law enforcement agencies, despite having its capacity for action diminished. The NPA also benefits from the AFP's campaign against the ASG, as the NPA uses the breathing space to rebuild their capabilities in areas where they still enjoy support, such as, the Bicol region. Compared to rebel groups, the AFP are superior in weapons, equipment and training (including the ability to use artillery). However the AFP suffers from low morale, weak organisation capabilities (both in procurement and in internal controls), and ineffective civil administration in the various provinces that is aggravated by detrimental and divisive local politics; which is little wonder that Philippines is
ranked number 56 on the Failed State Index and ranked 139th among 180 countries included in the Corruption Perceptions Index.
The more specifically a military organization like the AFP defines its critical task, the harder it should be for the AFP to adopt new innovations and their ability to adapt to new roles required in changing circumstances. To make a matters worse, troops were performing a lot of "non-core" jobs, such as guarding ballot boxes and participating in anti-smuggling and anti-kidnapping task forces. For example, there is a Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). Yet the AFP is being used to make roads in places where the DPWH cannot and fails to deliver these governmental services (in the face of armed conflict with internal insurgents). Entrenched interests within the AFP as an organization will work against proposed innovations. Which is why -- spending for external defence was and is never a priority for the AFP, even after the closure of the American bases in the Philippines. This is why the country has traditionally been unprepared to face external threats/challenges (and not all in war fighting terms alone).
For those interested in the challenges in their defence modernization quest, I would suggest again that you read this CNAS article by Richard D. Fisher, Jr., namely "
Defending the Philippines: Military Modernization and the Challenges Ahead".
