Philippines to Re-Focus on Territorial Defence in 2012

DJ_Lethal

Banned Member
I would assume that these infrastructures are part of the approximately 138 contracts that will be awarded by the end of July 2012? Looking back at the Philippine economy and their reserves, they just lent the IMF $1B and if I'm not mistaken they have about $65B in reserves? The country is not that poor...they can tap into that reserves and solve their minimal defensive requirements overnight. I wonder why the US government only allocated $30M foreign aid to the Philippines?
$65 Billion dollars is NOT enough to defend the entire archipelago.

Yeah sure it can but you some tanks and ships bu that's only limited to Luzon or Mindanao but that is not enough to defend the Philippines.
the president has a lot to take into consideration, Air defense capabilities and air offensive capabilities,helicopters,navy,equipment?

Long story short. it is not enough
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Part I: Crisis at Zamboanga City

The Star said:
Moro rebels attack Zamboanga city, many injured and hostages taken

Vice Mayor Cesar Iturralde said about 30 hostages have been allegedly taken hostage by more than 100 heavily armed members of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in Zamboanga City. Iturralde told the Philippines Inquirer that the group was demanding to put up their flag in the government city hall.

The navy men clashed with about the rebels, who were on board a large motorboat and eight smaller vessels off Rio Hondo, a crowded Muslim community in the port city of Zamboanga, military spokesman Lt. Col. Ramon Zagala said. The pre-dawn clash later spilled into Rio Hondo as people slept, prompting scores of residents to flee, Zagala said. Reinforcement troops and police have been deployed to help secure Rio Hondo, which is located near the downtown area of Zamboanga, a bustling trading hub in the south...

<snip>
1. As usual, Western Mindanao Command failed to prevent the attacks, and its intelligence to stop such attacks has again failed. Retired Philippine Army Gen. Ricardo C. Morales wrote in 2003, that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) suffered from widespread incompetence and various Muslim rebel groups are thus able to win battles, close roads, plant car bombs, and hold villages hostage because of incompetence. In an unpublished paper he wrote in 2003, Morales had also said that the AFP suffered from widespread corruption and incompetence. These “two evils,” he said, “are evidence of a systemic malaise, a defective culture allowed to germinate and take root over several decades and eventually adopted as an organizational value.” This is illustrated by listing a few recent examples of AFP intelligence and leadership failures in the Southern Philippines below:-

(i) In October 2011, a special forces unit of 40 Philippines soldiers were overrun in Al-Barka, Basilan with 19 killed. Several AFP officers were subjected to court martial for their role in that debacle. The AFP officers convicted included:-

(a) Col. Aminkadra Undug, the former commander of the Special Forces Regiment Battalion, who was found guilty of “imprudence without inappropriate clearance from higher headquarters and violation of the chain of command” when he allowed the military scuba diving course students in actual operations on 18 October 2011; and

(b) Col. Leonardo Peña, the former commander of the 4th Special Forces Battalion who was found guilty of “conduct prejudicial to good military order and discipline.”​

(ii) Recently, in July 2013, bandits of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) of isolated stretches of the Cotabato-General Santos Highway.

(iii) On 7 July 2013, local police arrested a military intelligence operative for extortion from a town official in the province of Zamboanga Sibugay, an official. Zamboanga Peninsula police spokesman Chief Inspector Ariel Huesca identified the arrested soldier as Sergeant Francisco Mabanag, Jr. of the intelligence security group. Siay municipal treasurer Susan Bayawa reported to the police that she received death threat through mobile phone call and text messages from an unidentified person. Bayawa’s refusal has prompted Mabanag to travel to Siay town and meet her purposely to pick up the money, which led to his arrest.

(iv) On 5 August 2013, a car bomb was set off in in Cotabato. It was the second bombing to hit Mindanao in 10 days - a month after the United States, Australia and Canada warned its diplomatic staff against travelling to Cotabato and two other southern cities on Mindanao — Zamboanga and Davao — over fresh threats of terrorism.

(v) As reported in the news report above, on 9 September 2013, the Moro National Liberation Front forces attacked Zamboanga City in southern Philippines, taking hostages and using them as shield as exodus of civilians continues. Several have been killed and wounded includes members of the AFP, police and civilians. Moments ago (on 9 September 2013), the Philippine Presidential Spokesperson has made a statement on the attack in Zamboanga City and it is quoted below:

"We condemn the attack on Zamboanga City in the strongest possible terms. It is incumbent on all people of goodwill to reject the violence that has erupted.

The ongoing attack of armed individuals in Zamboanga City, including initial reports of the possible use of civilians as human shields, is a cause for great concern. The authorities are responding to the situation in a manner that will reduce the risk to innocent civilians and restore peace and order to Zamboanga City at the soonest possible time.

The City government has appealed for the national government to help; the President is being briefed on the situation and is receiving updates as new information comes in. We ask our fellow citizens to refrain from spreading speculation: fear and alarm spread by disinformation will only help those intent on disrupting the lives of residents of Zamboanga City."

2. While the peace process in Mindanao has made tremendous progress in 2013, including the signing of a Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, there is still a long way to go. The current stage can be described as a “fragile transition,” where there is significant progress in the negotiation of a final settlement to the conflict, but the level of confidence in the process is uncertain.
Richard Jacobson said:
Modernizing the Philippine Military

22 August 2013 -- During his recent State of the Nation Address (SONA), President Benigno Aquino reiterated his desire to upgrade the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). However, he cautioned that this is not something the government can easily pursue. Aquino further suggested that building a “minimum credible defense” would face challenges due to budgetary constraints...

<snip>

...The theory of minimum credible defense is a concept that has become popular in the public debate over the modernization of the Philippine military. Unfortunately, for the Philippines this is a very vague concept that the government has articulated poorly. Some government officials simply associate minimum credible defense with the acquisition of new military equipment and the improvement of military infrastructure. Others believe strategic military training is a crucial component of this effort. A high-ranking Department of National Defense (DND) official recently remarked that the government aims to modernize the military to deter “those who want to wage war” against the Philippines.

The DND official noted that the Philippines is planning up to 24 modernization projects in the next three years. These projects – which the government will fund – include the acquisition of fighter jets, naval helicopters, patrol aircraft, frigates, patrol vessels and multi-purpose attack vessels. Among the most high profile acquisitions, the AFP will purchase three decommissioned Hamilton-class cutters from the U.S. Coast Guard; two are already in the possession of the Philippine Navy. The AFP is also set to buy twelve new FA-50 fighter jets from Korea Aerospace Industries, worth approximately $440 million. These additions to the AFP will undoubtedly help increase its capacity.

That said, many observers fail to recognize that the Philippine military is not that large, and was never designed or, more importantly, developed to provide for the defense of its expansive archipelagic territory. Many experts argue that billions of dollars would need to be invested to reconfigure the Philippine military into a credible defense force. However, with the closure of U.S. bases and the resultant loss of lease revenue, the AFP must now rely on congressional appropriations and AFP modernization funds to invest in new equipment. These sources are not sufficient to carry through modernization plans...

<snip>

...a long time observer once remarked that the AFP deserves real modernization, not a “Potemkin village” built around a handful of aging aircraft and a few naval vessel acquisitions. However, even if the U.S. and other friendly nations were prepared to provide greater levels of military assistance, there will always be the question about how much the AFP, in its current state, could actually absorb.

Given the current structure of the Philippine military, and the apparent lack of political and public will to develop a truly stronger and more credible defense capability, one has to accept that the Philippine military has a very limited capacity to absorb significant foreign military assistance and materiel...

...Many experts argue that it would take a major shift in government policy – not to mention political will – to make the required paradigm change. Until those shifts take place, and the public accepts the need to fund a stronger military – the Philippines will remain primarily dependent on diplomatic measures to defend its territory...

<snip>
3. President Benigno Aquino III has demonstrated a consistent inability to understand defence matters (see my prior three part post in this thread - part 1, part 2 and part 3) and will not be able to effectively lead the Philippines with his continued incompetence in crisis management. Further, constant tinkering with the means and ends by the political leadership, means the following:-

One, no prior procurement plan can have continuity - ensuring that there is no strategy for the AFP to move forward. It is hard to be optimistic with AFP's track record and the Attack Helicopter (AH) acquisition project that was awarded to PZL Swidnik for the attack version of the W-3 Sokol, is an example. AH award decision was cancelled in September 2010 due to suspected anomalies. The Aqunio administration is keen to undo all the prior administration procurement decisions. Thereafter the attempt to acquire Fennec helicopters (originally destined for Pakistan) had failed. It was the fourth or fifth attempt that dated back to 2006. This lack of continuity and lack of bureaucratic logic will handicap AFP procurement for some years to come. Please read the recommendations of the Heritage Foundation article: 'Getting the Philippines Air Force Flying Again: The Role of the US—Philippines Alliance,' which has rather harsh things to say.

Two, AFP modernization by press release continues via an endless stream of Philippine Department of Defense (DOD) press releases. DOD press releases are infinitely cheaper than buying real gear to develop tactically significant military capabilities. This is just is another symptom of the colourful political culture of symbolism over substantive changes, with the DOD playing its symbolic part by sending out endless press releases; and

Three, President Benigno Aquino III and his political allies use elections as a tool to provide legitimacy. He is a privileged member of the oligarchy, where the rulers, get to exploit the resources of the Philippines via the norm of bribing or favouring their political allies (see the various local news reports on the anti-pork march). With a 2012 Corruption Perception Index of 34 out of 100, it is little wonder that some locals have explained that there are only three choices of political leaders for the Philippine electorate: (1) corrupt; (2) incompetent; or (3) both corrupt and incompetent. Despite the occasional anti-corruption rhetoric, what Aquino III represents, as a Pinoy politician, is not very different from Joseph Estrada (both corrupt and incompetent), who looted around US$78 million to US$80 million of public funds in his term as President or Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (corrupt but not incompetent) whose Presidency was constantly marred by her husband's unparalleled corruption. We will just have to wait for history to judge Aquino III's presidency -- to see if (1), (2) or (3) fits him better as a political leader. As Manuel L. Quezon, the 2nd President of the Philippines once said:-

"I would rather have a country run like hell by Filipinos than a country run like heaven by the Americans, because however bad a Filipino government might be, we can always change it."

Given the above mindset, it is little wonder that the Philippines has ability to change their government in power through the EDSA I and EDSA II revolutions but keep the same corrupt political system (aka hell) unchanged.​

4. The AFP is also sorely lacking in both military platforms and in developing intelligence capabilities to provide actionable intelligence. The Australian Department of Defence has prepared a publication on 'Defence Economic Trends 2013'. It shows that from a historical perspective, the Philippine defence budget, as a percentage of the GDP and as a percentage of the national budget, is consistently less than most of its peers in South East Asia (SEA). There is a huge difference between forces that are chronically under-funded like the AFP, and other forces working for competent governments in SEA, with the ability to project power abroad. There is a difference between the Philippines (with a GDP of US$250.4 billion) representing 7% of all defence spending in SEA, with a 2012 defence budget of about US$2.9 billion, and a 2012 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) score of 34 out of 100 (No. 105 in CPI), to the armed forces of:

(i) Indonesia (with a GDP of US$878.2 billion) representing 23% of all defence spending in SEA, with a 2012 defence budget of about US$6.8 billion and a CPI score of 32 out of 100 (No. 118 in CPI);

(ii) Malaysia (with a GDP of US$303.5 billion) representing 13% of all defence spending in SEA, with a 2012 defence budget of about US$4.7 billion and a CPI score of 54 out of 100 (No. 49 in CPI);
[nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-RPgNP_6dIs&feature=c4-overview-vl&list=PL_TFt6mJ9Tl3hQuWR09jmFZqKRaRFDL5f"]The World Armed Forces Series | Malaysian Armed Forces - YouTube[/nomedia]


(iii) Singapore (with a GDP of US$276.5 billion) representing 29% of all defence spending in SEA, with a 2012 defence budget of about US$9.7 billion and a CPI score of 87 out of 100 (No. 5 in CPI); and
[nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wt8mN3ck4OQ"]The World Armed Forces Series | Singapore Armed Forces | Created by Sairagon 1988 - YouTube[/nomedia]


(iv) Thailand (with a GDP of US$365.6 billion) representing 16% of all defence spending in SEA, with a 2012 defence budget of about US$5.4 billion and a CPI score of 37 out of 100 (No. 88 in CPI),
[nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ofaZYgp9Mho&feature=c4-overview-vl&list=PL_TFt6mJ9Tl3hQuWR09jmFZqKRaRFDL5f"]The World Armed Forces Series | Royal Thailand Armed Forces - YouTube[/nomedia]

that have some limited ability to project power abroad.

5. Despite some progress and US military assistance for the last 11 years, the Philippine Government, has not been able to deny terrorists, safe-havens within its own territory because of an inability to address structural and/or local grievances, stop the spread of powerful ideologies within disadvantaged communities and the inability to stop existing groups from mobilising these radicalised individuals from their respective disadvantaged communities.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Part II: Crisis at Zamboanga City expands to include Lamitan Town

Rappler said:
Aquino: MNLF's happy days are over

MANILA, Philippines – President Benigno Aquino III arrived in Zamboanga City on Friday, September 13, and made it clear that the rebels' days of inciting chaos are over. Aquino addressed reporters past noon upon his arrival 5 days since the stand-off between government troops and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) rebels, and vowed the government will continue to track down "lawless elements."

"Tapos na and maliligayang araw nila (Their happy days are over)," he said, expressing confidence that government forces are can defeat the rebels and prevent the violence from spreading to other towns and provinces. He said the military is "sufficient" and "overwhelming" in terms of numbers and equipment, and that the rebels are now contained in 4 barangays...

<snip>
6. The reactive Aquino administration needs to be reminded on the 7Ps, namely, Proper Prior Planning Prevents Piss Poor Performance — with the AFP caught in an urban mass hostage environment without the necessary prior preparation, which results in the AFP:-

(i) lacking armoured engineer support (such as the M728 that was used by's the FBI's HRT in prior hostage rescue missions) — this means hat the AFP is without proper armoured engineer support to clear obstacles; and

(ii) leadership possessing an infantry-centric minset. This mindset is inevitable because of the years of hunting for rebel groups in remote areas. As a result, the AFP has not conducted large scale urban warfare exercises with a hostage scenario. In this operation, the AFP are forced to use light-wheeled armour and light tanks for infantry support in urban operations (instead of armoured engineers to clear unexpected routes of entry). This means more hostages and soldiers will die in the clearing operations at Zamboanga City.​

In a serious breach of discipline, on 20 September 2013, five Philippine soldiers were arrested for looting during the 20-day battle to free civilian hostages taken and for control of Zamboanga City from a faction of the MNLF. The American Career Training Institute, a school in Zamboanga City, whose roof-top was used by military snipers to engage the MNLF, was also looted. It is also plain to see that the AFP does not have adequate equipment and armour engineer support for urban operations. Kindly note that I am not making the argument that the special forces of the AFP do not train for Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT). I am sure that the AFP's various special forces groups, they have exposure to MOUT operations. It's just that the AFP has not conducted sufficient preparation for large scale MOUT prior to the Zamboanga City crisis. IMO, the AFP has not acquired adequate armour engineering platforms because the leadership of the AFP doe not know how to use these engineering plants to create surprise in the conduct the break-in battle. Thankfully, the US military's Joint Special Operations Task Force - Philippines (with UAV and other sensor support), is in the background to provide technical advice for the infantry centric AFP with regard to their conduct of urban operations. The AFP's lack of focus on training for urban warfare is something they cannot remedy. If the AFP were more proficient in MOUT, it would be reflected in the infantry tools carried by the assault force (like ladders, door breaching tools, hand held ballistic shields, peephole cameras/mirrors to look round corners and so on). While the AFP forces conducting cordon operations will be differently configured.

7. This Aquino administration has worked on the peace process and is interested in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration insurgents in Mindanao and other areas, but it has no strategy that connects assistance to former rebels to making communities more peaceful and secure in the long run. Two recent examples illustrate the chronic piss poor performance at gathering actionable intelligence, and being pro-active at stopping organised terror attacks (instead of the curent reactive mode of whack-the-mole, when it appears):-

One, the current peace process has been haunted by the mistakes of years past, which leads to a low level of trust by all parties. On 9 September 2013, about 180 to 300 rebels of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) attacked and held four neighborhoods in Zamboanga City, with a number of hostages being used as human shields. Thus far, eight have been killed and dozens wounded in shoot-outs at this busy port city of 800,000 that is known for its Hispanic influences in its culture. For the last few days, normal life for Zamboanga City has ground to a halt during the standoff, with flights into the area canceled and schools and most offices closed (see NY Times report dated 10 September 2013 for details). Rappler has an interview with Brig Gen Tutaan, of the AFP, who illogically describes this as not a failure of military intelligence. It is clear that APF intelligence under-estimated the resolve and numbers — conceptually, if the AFP predicted an attack by 30 rebels and between 180 to 300 rebels turned up, it is an intelligence failure on the numbers. Based on early local reports, the AFP conducted an unsuccessful interdiction at sea, where shots were exchanged and a Philippine Navy sailor killed. Feel free to marvel at Brig Gen Tutaan's ability to put the 'piss poor performance' in a 'good-light' in the interview below:-

[nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OlkbvjpZ2bA"]It's not a failure of military intelligence, says Brig Gen Tutaan - YouTube[/nomedia]​

Not only did the MNLF boats get away, the MNLF were able to gather 180 to 300 fighters, with weapons, to capture parts of Zamboanga City. Brig Gen Tutaan is illogically claiming success at shooting at MNLF boats but not knowing if they landed, as intelligence success. It would be more credible if he explained that the AFP cannot cover all sea approaches to the city adequately at all times despite heighten alertness. He can argue that it is not a total failure of intelligence, but it is a failure nonetheless.

Question: How is deploying inadequate forces to stop armed rebel boats on the way to Zamboanga City, NOT an act of intelligence failure?​

Further, the sensationalist local press has provided photographs by Eyrhil Tom Bulahan, a resident of Zone 4 barangay, where it was reported that hungry soldiers fighting in Zamboaga City resorted to begging for food and water. The Armed Forces of the Philippines' official Twitter account, @TeamAFP, said that the incident may have been an isolated one, and that it may have been because of their hasty deployment to the area. Unfair local press reporting on the AFP's failure to deliver the last mile logistics support in the 3Bs (i.e. Bombs, Beans and Bullets) at Zamboaga City, serves to cast doubt on the professionalism of the AFP.

Two, local government officials and military officers reported that around 150 guerrillas from Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters and the Abu Sayyaf Group joined forces and attacked the outskirts of the predominantly Christian town of Lamitan on Basilan island that resulted in 3 AFP soldiers being wounded. It is not clear if this latest Basilan battle is related or unrelated the Zamboanga City crisis, as Lamitan is a short boat ride from Zamboanga City (see NY Times report dated 12 September 2013 for details). Further, it has been reported on 13 September 2013 that, a total of 9 AFP soliders were wounded and MG-520 attack helicopters were used to repulse an attack. Lamitan Vice Mayor Roderick Furigay said they had anticipated the possible attack from the forces allied with MNLF founder Nur Misuari and is quoted below:-

“It was just fortunate we have imposed security measures meant to prevent them from getting through the center of Lamitan right after the hostilities in Zamboanga City broke out. Our security forces have been prepared as we have received information on the ground.”​

The AFP also said a battalion of troops was deployed to Lamitan to augment the Army Scout Rangers on reports that some 200 armed men were spotted just outside the city.​

8. It was also reported by local press that the United States has allocated P26.4 million (US$600,000) to aid residents in Zamboanga City displaced by the standoff between government forces and armed fighters of the Moro National Liberation Front. The US Embassy in Manila said the assistance, to be coursed through the US Agency for International Development, was in response to the urgent needs of some 14,000 displaced residents in 14 evacuation centers. Below a Rappler video interview for background on who are most affected communities in the fighting in Zamboanga City:-

[nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pq3F7dAwxh8"]Conflict in the South - YouTube[/nomedia]​

New Straits Times said:
Misuari's bid to save political skin

13 September 2013 by John Teo

...In case anyone missed it, Misuari spelt out all the areas of his new republic: all of Mindanao island, the Sulu archipelago, Palawan, Sabah and Sarawak. Almost everyone in the Philippines treats this latest display of the megalomaniacal side of the long-discredited leader of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) with little more than a yawn.

Which is probably why Misuari had to stage another kidnapping spree disguised as a rebellion on the hapless city of Zamboanga, no doubt counting on the sure bet of gaining some publicity and notoriety in the style of the kidnap-for-ransom Abu Sayyaf gang.

How low can Misuari, once the toast of the international diplomatic circuit, fall?

The Tausug academic who now fancies himself a warrior in the fearsome tradition of his tribespeople is clearly at the end of his tether. Likely to be justifiably further marginalised once the MNLF breakway, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), concludes a comprehensive peace agreement with the Philippine government...

<snip>

...Misuari's people were obviously deeply disappointed with him for being an absentee governor in 2001 when, faced with popular rejection, he launched an earlier version of "rebellion" against Manila before fleeing to Sabah, a fugitive from Philippine justice.

He then had counted on Malaysia to "protect" him against his own government. Instead Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad, then prime minister, wanted no part in all the fruitless political intrigues and sent Misuari right back to Manila.

Misuari evidently holds a personal grudge against Malaysia from that episode and the Lahad Datu siege earlier in the year (in which Misuari is also a suspected principal) and now this latest independence charade drawing in Sabah and Sarawak reveal the MNLF leader reverting to type when cornered.

Whoever may remain of his paymasters will clearly be impressed only if Misuari can show to everyone in the Philippines and abroad that he remains a force to be reckoned with.

There are those who view Misuari's capacity for mischief-making, however limited, as a sign that the on-going peace negotiations between the Philippine government and the MILF as not inclusive as proclaimed by both parties.

Those who still resort to violence as Misuari clearly have no part in any inclusive peace process. And Misuari is resorting to violence precisely because he sees no future for himself in any inclusive and democratic process. The current peace track the MILF is negotiating will eventually include a plebiscite for popular endorsement of any final peace treaty.

Misuari, therefore, needs to be neutralised, by violent means if it comes to that, not accommodated and appeased by the Philippine government or the international community which still has a stake in the MNLF peace track...

<snip>

...Peace in Mindanao very clearly will serve Malaysia's best interests as well. It is a tragic mystery how an island so blessed with good soil, great mineral wealth and a young, energetic population can appear so desperately hopeless at the same time.

Bad governance has long been suspected as the worst culprit. Once Misuari showed himself to deliver more of the same -- or worse -- he should have expected that Malaysia would sooner cut him loose...

<snip>
9. Quoted above is a column by John Teo of Malaysia's New Straits Times has a regional perspective on former Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao governor Nur Misuari and his role in the current Zamboanga City crisis. By way of background, Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei are playing a role in the Philippines with their peace negotiations in Mindanao by contributing to the International Monitoring Team (see this RSIS Commentaries dated 9 July 2012, for details).

10. On 13 September 2013, CNN reported that a cease-fire was forged between the Philippine army and the separatist MNLF. Further, the attack on Lamitan Town on Basilan island demonstrated that rebel groups had the ability for further escalation and are not a one-trick pony. Thus far, the outbreaks of violence have killed 11 rebels, 5 members of the security forces and 2 civilians, Brig. Gen. Domingo Tutaan, a spokesman for the Philippine military said. Philippine authorities estimated about 180 rebels are holding roughly 170 hostages in six districts — some hostages have managed to escape, and about 20 rebels have been detained. Philippine security forces blockaded affected areas, and the two sides have sporadically exchanged gunfire over the past five days.

11. In a further development, local news on 14 September 2013 reported that according to the AFP: 'As of now we have no ceasefire'. Armed forces spokesman Lieutenant-General Ramon Zagala said gunfights were continuing in several districts of Zamboanga city early Saturday. Below a Rappler video with the latest on the failed ceasefire:-

[nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L30IDG0gn-c"]Lt Col Ramon Zagala on 'ceasefire' - YouTube[/nomedia]​

According to CNN, the cease-fire announced between Islamist rebels in the Philippines and the country's army has not taken hold, and fighting between the two sides continues, a military commander said Saturday. At least 52 people have died since battles ensued six days ago, Lt. Col. Ramon Zagala said.

12. In a series of competent, brave and bold moves, government troops took back portions of the city from rebels and cut off escape routes to end a week-long standoff. Local news sources have reported that Nur Misuari's group is believed to be on the retreat and is making a last stand in Santa Barbara, Zamboanga City. CNN reported on 16 September 2013, that Philippine military helicopters fired rockets at Muslim rebels. Further, on 17 September 2013, it was reported that government troops have rescued at least 150 civilians who were held hostage by the rogue rebels in Zamboanga City as the combined forces of military and policemen continue to recover affected barangays. Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Director General Alan Purisima confirmed that 120 civilians were rescued early Tuesday (see pictures of President Aquino III's to Zamboanga City and addressing the troops there).

“So far we have rescued 120 hostages today bringing to 150 hostages in totality. Still continuing saving lives.”​

13. While operations are ongoing former President Fidel Ramos gave the Aquino administration the following unsolicited advice:-

"Why don't you clean up your own mess first because you did it in the first place after we turned it over to you in a nice silver platter... Put your team in order. After that, maybe you can succeed in cleaning up the mess."​
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Part III: Crisis at Zamboanga City: 20 days of fighting to take back a city

14. The 20 days of fighting to take back Zamboanga City, coupled with the additional outbreak of bombings on 16 September 2013 and 20 September 2013 in Davos (in two cinemas) and Zamboanga (on a bus), respectively, has done immeasurable damage to the ‘It’s more fun in the Philippines’ advertising campaign in 2012/2013 for Philippine tourism.

15. On 16 September 2013, there were twin bombings inside two mall cinemas (at the SM City and Gaisano Mall cinemas) in Davao City, with IEDs were placed inside soda cans. On 17 September 2013, Secretary Luwalhati R. Antonio (on the Zamboanga City crisis and the recent bombing incidents in Davao City) said:-

"The government is now carrying out calibrated military action against the lawless rebels holding out in Zamboanga City, but such action puts utmost premium on ensuring the safety of innocent civilians. The Zamboanga City crisis must end in order to prevent further loss of innocent lives and avert more damaging ramifications to the region’s economy.

From the start we have always opted to pursue peaceful means to resolve the standoff but at the same time making those responsible for the attacks accountable. The President understands the full account of the situation and has taken personal leadership in seeing this crisis through, noting the impact to civilians trapped in the crossfire.

We don’t discount the fact that this crisis may take a heavy toll on the overall economy of Zamboanga Peninsula, which posted a GRDP growth rate of 12.4 percent last year, the highest among 17 regions in the country. We are currently assisting the process of assessing the full extent of damage as well as the quantifiable impact to the region’s economy in order to determine immediate recommendations for post-conflict rehabilitation.

On the recent Davao City bombings

We condemn these most recent acts of sowing fear and trepidation among the peace-loving populace of Davao City. It’s too early to point possible connection between these incidents and the ongoing situation in Zamboanga City as authorities are still assessing pieces of evidence..."​

16. Davao City is run by Mayor Rodrigo Duterte, of the ‘Davao Death Squad' fame, whose unseen and bloody hand has been responsible for numerous murders of 'criminal elements' without trial, where bodies of petty criminals would appear from time to time. Mayor Rodrigo Duterte, has been quoted as saying:-

“If you are doing an illegal activity in my city, if you are a criminal or part of a syndicate that preys on the innocent people of the city, for as long as I am the mayor, you are a legitimate target of assassination."​

Davao maintains its status as open city to the families of the leaders of the rebel groups, as long as these rebel groups do their normal murderous activities outside of the city limits. Mayor Rodrigo Duterte's tough guy stance only applies to 'petty criminals' and does not apply to rebel groups, as he is documented as providing aid to rebel groups.

17. On 20 September 2013, it was reported by local press that another 3 killed as bus explodes in Zamboanga. The improvised explosive was placed inside a bag and killed the bus conductor and two other employees. This bomb explosion occurred outside of rebel held areas in Zamboanga City.

18. As at 21 September 2013, five more rebels and an elderly woman were killed as fighting dragged on in Zamboanga City between government troops and a group of Muslim rebels holding out with about 20 civilian hostages. After two weeks of fighting in Zamboanga City, it finally occurred to local press (on the 12th day of fighting) to ask this question of the rebels still fighting there:-


Fighting in Zamboanga City reached its 14th day Sunday without any sign that Habier Malik's group of MNLF rebels, who was still holding more than a dozen hostages, was laying down their arms. Local press has reported that the military has been dropping flyers to the group of rebels still holed up in seaside villages in Zamboanga City, urging them to surrender. A peaceful future in Mindanao is becoming even more elusive despite four decades of on-and-off peace negotiations to end the internecine war. On 22 September 2013, President Aquino III, left Zamboanga (see pictures), where he has kept base as the fighting evolved, in order to attend to other pressing matters. In a press conference there prior to his departure, Aquino said he will leave the province in good hands and with a promise to rehabilitate the lives of many civilians affected by the Nur Misuari-led MNLF. Aquino also said the military and police will continue to pursue the whereabouts of Misuari and his top aide, Habier Malik. On 28 September 2013 it was reported by VOA that the Philippine Government said the crisis in Zamboanga City was over after 20-days; but the AFP are continuing operations to remove the last remaining fighters of a MNLF faction.

19. By way of background, in 1976 the MNLF signed the Tripoli Agreement with the late Philippine strongman Ferdinand Marcos only to see the rise of a dissatisfied faction that eventually evolved into the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). In 1996, Misuari signed yet another peace accord with the Ramos government. Many saw his capitulation go full circle. From a revolutionary, Misuari tried to become a bureaucrat and dipped his hands in local governance. He miserably failed and was effectively out of his political fiefdom and graces even before his term as governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) could end. The MILF would later abandon its secessionist stance when it agreed to enter into peace talks with the Philippine government. But a botched attempt to forge a peace deal with the Philippine government in 2008 only sparked another bloody war as two renegade commanders of the MILF launched coordinated attacks on civilian and military targets in August that year.

20. History was later also repeated in the MILF as Umbra Kato, a former senior commander, broke away from the mainstream Moro rebel group to form the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF). Not only has BIFF vowed to carry on the quest for an independent Moro homeland, it conducted an attack on 23 September 2013 that displaced some 2,000 families from six villages, including the villages of Tugal and Raradangan in North Cotabato. They also successfully kidnapped 9 teachers from the Malingao Elementary School. Misuari, meanwhile, has been reduced to muscling his way into the Bangsamoro conversation. The current military standoff in Zamboanga is the second serious armed uprising by Misuari and whatever is left of his faction in the MNLF. All peace processes in Mindanao exploit the factionalism of Moro rebels who have taken up arms against the government; and disenchantment from the various Moro rebels grows every time a peace process fails. Given the chronic nature of this ongoing rebel conflict with no end in sight, it is little wonder that the international press, including the US based press like CNN, are giving it sparse coverage. This latest MNLF caused crisis of holding a city of 800,000 in the Philippines hostage (displacing 119,952 people in Zamboanga City according to UN estimates on 19 September 2013), deserves a little more in-depth coverage.
 
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MarsDominus

New Member
How can the Philippines defend against a giant like China?

As you guys well know, the Philippines is embroiled in a bitter territorial dispute with China. To build a minimum credible defense, the Philippines relaunced its program to modernize its armed forces. They recently acquired several ships from the United States and about a dozen more from Japan. They also bought 12 FA-50 fighter jets from South Korea.

From the way I see it, the Philippines is decades away from remotely posing a threat to PLA-N and PLA-AF. In fact, a Filipino senator adimitted that even with the 12 fighter jets, the Philippine Air Force will not last a couple of hours against PLA-AF. With that in mind, shouldn't the Philippines focus on developing its A2/AD capability which currently is non-existent? Isn't cheaper not to mention more advantageous given the theatre to purchase and maintain surface to surface and surface to air missiles?

1. How best do you guys think can the Philippines build a minimum credible defense? What equipment should the Philippines acquire to accomplish this within the next five or ten years?
 

wild_Willie2

New Member
What the Philippine’s would need is a difficult question, this would depend on what they would like to accomplish. If China really wants to neutralize the Philippine defenses, they could do so regarding the cost. But let’s assume there is a flare up and China just want to achieve local superiority in a certain sea area without going all out by attacking the Philippine mainland. A minimum “defense force in being” that would make this quite costly for China to achieve, would require something in the order of 12-15 subs (with both minelaying and anti-ship missile capability), enough fighters to deny China air supremacy in the contested area and to give the subs some air cover against ASW planes (let’s say 4-5 squadrons of interceptors with long range missiles), a few flotillas of anti-ship missile capable fast attack ships (let’s say 16 boats) and at last of course the command and control and (airborne) radar infrastructure to effectively control these assets. And then we aren’t even talking about local defense infrastructure like bases, ports, SAM’s etcetera, etcetera.

But even with all these assets in place, China would still easily be able to win a prolonged low intensity war of attrition and if they really wanted, they could simply smash the infrastructure needed to support these assets with a few air launched cruise missile barrages at the mainland Philippines.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Part 1 of 3 reply to MarsDominus on: How can the Philippines defend against a giant like China?

The short answer is that the Philippines can't do it on their own and they will NEVER acquire the requisite capability - it will be taking a James Bond movie spoof (like Johnny English staring Rowan Atkinson), seriously as an instructional spy video to be used by the CIA. But in the interest of clarity, on why the Philippines can't do it, let us spell it out. Further, I have a serious concern in that the premise of your proposed discussion is faulty. And because the premise is faulty, the foundation of your discussion is not sound, as I explain in greater detail why in a 35 point reply below:

As you guys well know, the Philippines is embroiled in a bitter territorial dispute with China.
1. Please don't use a premise based on a lie again to make a point, it does your credibility no good to other members of the forum.

2. With regard to the Philippine claim to the Spratly Islands (Chinese name: Nansha islands, Vietnamese Name: Quần đảo Trường Sa, Filipino Name: Kapuluan ng Kalayaan) are a disputed group of more than 750 reefs, islets, atolls, cays and islands in the South China Sea, there are three points to note:-

One, the Philippines (as a nation of islands) and China do not share a land border;

Two, the Philippines has a disputed claim on its declared EEZ and declared baselines. EEZ waters are not territorial waters; and

Three, the Philippines has disputed EEZ claims with Brunei, China, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Strictly speaking, EEZ disputes over rocks and water features are disputes over economic interests. Correctly understood, it is a dispute over exploitation of resources over maritime features.​

3. While the Philippines tries to position itself as law abiding, the country does not always observe its own laws; and, on occasion, its agents engage in criminal acts of killing foreign nationals, while acting in an official capacity. In a second criminal killing at sea incident, the Philippine coast guard patrol (in Maritime Control Surveillance 3001) shot and killed a Taiwanese fisherman in May 2013. This resulted in Taiwan imposing economic sanctions against Philippines until the Philippine Government issued a formal apology, commenced investigations on the criminal act, compensated the fisherman's family; and the parties reinstated talks over fishing rights in the overlapping EEZ areas. Taiwanese sanctions against the Philippines were only lifted after the Philippines complied with these four conditions. Further, as far back as 1999, the Philippine Navy has been ramming and/or sinking Chinese fishing boats (incidents reported on 23 May 1999 and on 20 June 1990). The most recent reported incident of the Philippine Navy ramming a Chinese fishing boat that I know of was on 19 October 2011, which resulted in Manila issuing an apology to the Chinese embassy.

4. But China and Taiwan are not the only claimants being ambiguous. None of the Southeast Asian claimants have fully declared what it is they are claiming. The Philippines received plaudits for bringing its domestic legislation into line with UNCLOS in 2009. But Manila has yet to declare its extended continental shelf or which of the Spratlys it considers islands and which rocks. Hanoi, meanwhile, has not redrawn its territorial baselines, which in southern Vietnam violate the rules of UNCLOS. Nor has it declared all of its continental shelf or clarified the status of features in the Paracels and Spratlys. Malaysia has not officially issued territorial baselines or the remainder of its continental shelf, nor has it clarified the status of the Spratlys it claims. And Brunei has yet to outline its extended continental shelf, despite having declared in 2009 its intention to do so.

5. Without clarification, it is impossible to define what waters are actually in dispute. And without that definition, agreeing on areas of joint development or joint conservation is a tall order.

6. The rise of China needs to be managed, especially as it is accompanied by the rise of regional sea powers. Make no mistake, a number of powers in the Indo-Pacific is in the midst of an naval arms race (between at least China, India, South Korea and Japan) that complicates the security of the region's sea lanes to which the Philippines has a front row seat (and at the moment, not a master of its own destiny).
To build a minimum credible defense, the Philippines relaunced its program to modernize its armed forces. They recently acquired several ships from the United States and about a dozen more from Japan. They also bought 12 FA-50 fighter jets from South Korea.
7. Credible defence under President Aquino? It will never happen; and I rarely say never.

8. While the Philippine Navy is making an effort to modernise, under the current administration, they are not able acquire enough assets to challenge the PLAN in the South China Sea (who has blue water aspirations) or conduct naval patrols in the face of opposition over disputed waters. In capability terms the Philippine Navy is the least capable (amongst all other claimants in the South China Sea - even Brunei's Navy does better at participating in international exercises) of inter-operating with other advanced navies. The fact is the Brunei's tiny navy, can spank the Philippine Navy is surface warfare simply because the the Philippine Navy is armed like a coast guard and has not entered the missile age.

9. The other problem is the lack of technical competence (in naval engineering) by the Philippine Navy. They may acquire platforms, but they really don't have the disciplined organisational culture to maintain all the new gear acquired. Back in 1997, the Philippine Navy (PN) bought 3 second hand Peacock Class vessels from the Royal Navy. With a year, one of the 76mm guns did not work, and no one in their navy knew how to fix it. Like the Peacock Class saga, has again under invested in training their sailors and their personnel organisation, leading to sub-standard practices. In the short run, this might work but I am fairly confident that it will come and bite them in the ass just a little while later. Their US Navy adviser, who observed them on BRP Gregorio del Pilar, commented that while they 'mimic procedures' from the US, they 'lack the discipline to do them properly'; and it is clear that these problems can be traced to defective organisational culture, where there is an over reliance on junior officers for the requisite technical competence. To some degree and at an organisational level, they have not learnt from past mistakes and are incapable of making the changes necessary in their defective concept of maintenance for the better. They also have a system that does not train their junior sailors to do their jobs properly, and the leadership still wonders why things don't work after a while.
Strategic Sealift Vessel of the Philippine Navy coming without weapon system

...These Makassar-class LPD will act as Philippine Navy’s Strategic Sealift Vessel when delivered. With the budget of PhP4 billion or PhP3.864 billion contract price, PT PAL will not be able to build 2 ships completely if weapon and sensor systems are included in the contract. Weapon and Sensor system will be provided by the Philippine government in a separate acquisition or will temporarily use available resources.

The contractor will only provide basic navigation system. Currently, PT PAL in coordination with Philippine government is building vessels with specifications provided by Department of National Defense. Philippine Navy’s Strategic Sealift Vessels can act as the force’s floating command center while carrying out its main purpose as military sealift and transport vessel in events of disasters and calamities...
10. Beyond normal levels of technical incompetence, the PN have acquisition malpractice - where they constantly do really, really stupid things in an attempt to save money - in a manner that significantly increases project risk, while delaying the delivery of needed capability. Having never been involved a complex ship building project before (like the Strategic Sealift Vessel project), they can only think of weapons integration in terms of small calibre weapons mounts. They don't think holistically about ship stabilization or weapon/sensor stabilization - ship stabilization affect launch and recovery windows for helicopters, small craft and AAVs. That is the reason why the PN would choose to buy the SSVs without weapons integrated and tested as part of the acquisition process - I hope the Indonesians are prepared to provide proper training to help the PN sustain the SSVs over their life cycle.

11. I am aware that the specifications of the SSV included the weight and space provision for the installation of a main gun at the 'A' position. The PN are penny wise but pound foolish with regards to their failure to a main gun installed by the Indonesian yard. This is not an easy process due to the need for deck penetration. The last thing you want is a main gun that can't shoot to its specifications (eg. main guns can get derailed, if not maintained properly) or have the main gun's rate of fire affected by improper installation (or be a source of concern due to deck flex or harmonics). IMHO, they are the poster child of acquisition malpractice. The under-armed SSVs (when they are eventually upgraded) may be cheap to buy but real costs over the life of the assets acquired will be significant if you actually factor in the other 'real' costs such as weapons integration for the main gun and the Mk 38 Mod 2 mount(s) with the ship's fire control systems. Again, I assume the US will help out with the Mk 38 Mod 2 installation (just as they are going to do for the PN's 2nd hand 'frigates'). In an ideal world, with proper planning, the PN can arm the SSVs themselves, but I suspect that they may not have thought through all the integration issues they will face, as they DIY their own SSVs. And I wish them all the best with their DIY project of arming the SSVs.

12. Besides the fact that the Philippines lack platforms to patrol its EEZ waters, without technical competence the number of sea days their crews can stay at sea for patrols is limited. They have the train and sustain part of the equation wrong and they don't know how to fix it, at an organisational level yet. With regard to the PN, the Philippine Secretary of Defense Voltaire Gazmin has been quoted in 2011 as saying: “This is truly deplorable but plain reality."

13. For an air force that operates mainly helicopters and less than 45 fixed wing aircraft (3 C-130s, 2 Fokker-27s, 5 S211s, 12 OV-10 and 20 SF-260), the Philippines needs to husband her scarce resources and also to have a capability management plan that includes recapitalizing her fleet of aircraft - in particular, I note with approval the current plan for the US to transfer two additional C-130Ts to the Philippines.

14. On 6 Nov 2012, Aerotech Industries Philippines was awarded a pesos 69.5 million contract to perform a Major Structural Inspection (MSI) of S211 #021 of the Philippine Air Force. MSI, alternatively referred to as Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) or Inspection Replace As Necessary (IRAN), is a process by which the subject aircraft is taken apart and all its components — with the exception of the engine, ejection seat, and similarly self-contained systems — are evaluated and then replaced when required.

15. Capability management is organized around a concept of operations (CONOPS), because the CONOPS describe how a specified course of action is to be executed. The ability to execute the specified course of action depends on many factors and the relationship between those factors. The most important of which is defined by three interdependent factors: combat readiness, sustainable capability and force structure. For the Philippine Air Force (PAF) to be well regarded in capability management, PAF's combat readiness, sustainable capability and force structure needs to improve. Further, capability management is:-

(i) not about the platform alone;

(ii) much more than buying the 'best' or the 'right' platform;

(iii) about training PAF's people to a certain level of combat readiness in order to execute a plan in accordance with a CONOPS;

(iv) having the right organisational structure to support the CONOPS; and

(v) about sustainable capability and this includes retaining the technical ability and the budget to sustain the assets/platforms after acquisition. In this regard, PAF has a poor record (over the years PAF acquired 12 C-130s but are only able to keep 3 operational) and there are 3 additional points on Filipino technical ability to take note of:-​

One, traditionally, PAF has not been able to budget enough sustain its C-130 fleet, leading to crashes (last crash in August 2008, off-Davao and another in December 1993) and pre-mature scrapping of air frames (and without preserving parts, engines and spares that could have been preserved). If I am not wrong, there are currently 3 working C-130's in the PAF inventory, comprising a single C-130B (3633) from the 1960s and two C-130Hs (4704 & 4726) that are manufactured in the 1970s.

Two, IMHO the PAF NEEDS to want to FIX ifself and change from its current dysfunctional state and it needs the endorsement of the USAF more than it knows. If the US as a treaty ally still does not believe in the progress made by the PAF (after the Lead-In-Fighter-Trainer is acquired), to find some F-16s as EDAs, then the PAF's capability development trajectory must be in big trouble.

Three, it is hard to be optimistic with PAF's track record and the Attack Helicopter (AH) acquisition project (AFPMP-PAF-00-06-042) that was awarded to PZL Swidnik for the attack version of the W-3 Sokol, is a good example. AH award decision was cancelled in September 2010 due to suspected anomalies. The Aqunio administration seems to be keen to undo all the prior administration procurement decisions because of a fear of prior deeds of corruption. Thereafter the attempt to acquire Fennec helicopters (originally destined for Pakistan) had failed. It was the fourth in a series of attempts that dated back to 2006. This lack of continuity across different administrations and lack of bureaucratic logic will handicap PAF procurement for some years to come.​

16. For those that are interested, read this CNAS article by Richard D. Fisher, Jr. (which I have cited before), namely "Defending the Philippines: Military Modernization and the Challenges Ahead".
Richard D. Fisher said:
"Since the early 1980s the Philippines has lacked a credible air defense capability: modern fighters, anti-aircraft missiles, long-range air defense radar and the maritime patrol aircraft to monitor its vast maritime territory and economic zones...

In 2012 or 2013, the PAF expects to purchase its first modern maritime patrol aircraft, a mission that has been carried out by OV-10s – two of which were intercepted by Chinese fighters in early 2011. This year, the PAF is also expected to purchase new long-range radar to support its air defense mission...

...

In an article published in the PLA Daily on April 14, Chinese Academy of Military Science scholar Wang Xinjun warned that China has 'relative military superiority' over the Philippines and that China’s use of coast guard ships conveyed 'restraint, not weakness'.

...

But as part of its reaction to growing assertiveness by Beijing, at the July 2010 foreign ministers’ meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Obama administration offered to assist multilateral negotiations to settle conflicting South China Sea claims..."
17. The size of the PAF operations budget was a historical problem but the current bigger problem is that the PAF purchases items on a piece-by-piece basis in a bureaucratic manner that defies logic (all in the name of clean government, when it is actually a model of bureaucratic inefficiency and symptom of government waste). For example, the AFP Procurement Service about has about 7.9 million pesos worth of bid invitations. Instead of establishing a service support agreements with pre-qualified aircraft suppliers (and there are many around in Asia, be it in Malaysia, Singapore or Korea), the AFP Procurement Service invited potential suppliers to submit 18 individual bids for C-130 components. This mode of procurement is inherently more expensive and less efficient in keeping C-130s operational.

From the way I see it, the Philippines is decades away from remotely posing a threat to PLA-N and PLA-AF. In fact, a Filipino senator adimitted that even with the 12 fighter jets, the Philippine Air Force will not last a couple of hours against PLA-AF.
18. Agreed. I am not sure if what the PAF bought should be considered as fighters, as the squadron's primary role is to serve as Lead-In-Fighter-Trainers, with a limited surface attack capability. I am sure you can mount something like a sidewinder or two on the Korean plane but it strains credibility to consider a training squadron as a fighter squadron.

19. I admire the Philippine ability for hyperbole of labelling the aircraft in a training squadron, as fighters; and the reason why the Philippine Press buys into this lie, it is because the press in the Philippines is not noted for their competence on reporting defence matters.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Part 2 of 3 reply to MarsDominus on: How can the Philippines defend against a giant like China?

With that in mind, shouldn't the Philippines focus on developing its A2/AD capability which currently is non-existent? Isn't cheaper not to mention more advantageous given the theatre to purchase and maintain surface to surface and surface to air missiles?
20. No. The most urgent priority is for the Philippines is to develop a capability for some maritime domain awareness over its territorial waters, first. The second most urgent priority is for the Philippines is to develop a capability for some maritime domain awareness over its EEZ. Third, the Philippines needs to patrol its territorial waters and EEZ on a regular basis instead of trying to outsource it to the US Navy.

21. As I said in another thread, war is unlikely between the Philippines and it's neighbours to the north, like China (2012 defence spending of US$166 billion) or Taiwan (2012 defense spending of US$10.7 billion). This is because the power disparity between China or Taiwan versus the Philippines (2012 defense spending of US$2.97 billion) is just too great for war to occur.

How best do you guys think can the Philippines build a minimum credible defense? What equipment should the Philippines acquire to accomplish this within the next five or ten years?
22. Change its corrupt government by implementing serious reform. Anyone who has a passing interest in the Philippines would naturally question the Philippine capacity for effective and responsive governance at both the provincial and national level. The following are select examples of corruption at national level:-

(i) the office of the President is often tainted with corruption, as these two examples serve to illustrate:-

One, At number 2 on the World's All-Time Most Corrupt Leaders in the World, in the 2004 Global Transparency Report was Ferdinand Marcos (he, his wife and cronies looted about US$5 billion to 10 billion of public funds). Despite numerous criminal and civil cases being filed against Marcos heirs or their cronies, none have so far been successfully prosecuted. Long-term chronic mishandling led to an unmanageable paper trail and evidence went missing.

Two, at number 10 on the World's All-Time Most Corrupt Leaders in the World, is Joseph Estrada (he looted around US$ 78 million to 80 million of public funds). Incredibly, Joseph Estrada was pardoned by GMA, as his successor, for his crimes and GMA has been arrested for the same after leaving the office of President.​

(ii) the offices of the Chief Justice and Ombudsman are also likewise tainted. Former Chief Justice, Renato Corona, was impeached on 29 May 2012. The former Ombudsman, Ms Merceditas Gutierrez, resigned on 29 April 2011 (when subject to impeachment proceedings);

(iii) Transparency International’s “2004 Global Corruption Barometer” that found the Philippine National Police (PNP) to be the most corrupt national institution in the Philippines.​

23. With a score of 34 out of 100 and ranked number 105 on the 2012 corruption perception index, it hard not to characterise the corruption problems in the Philippines as systemic and endemic, especially since many of the leaders (who are amongst the world's most corrupt) and the people (like the Chief Justice, the Ombudsman, and the Police) who are supposed to fight corruption are themselves corrupt. Despite the occasional anti-corruption rhetoric, what President Aquino III represents, as a Pinoy politician, is not very different from Joseph Estrada (both corrupt and incompetent), who looted around US$78 million to US$80 million of public funds in his term as President or Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (corrupt but not incompetent) whose Presidency was constantly marred by her husband's unparalleled corruption.

24. As you may be aware, at the local level, there are numerous problems which include abuse of power, corruption and the absence of 'rule of law' in many provincial areas. The Ampatuan Massacre in Nov 2009 by the clan of then incumbent Maguindanao governor is an illustrative example. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW) said the Ampatuans were allegedly responsible for more than 50 incidents of killings, torture, sexual assault, and abductions. The HRW report, titled "They Own the People: The Ampatuans, State-Backed Militias, and Killings in the Southern Philippines," was based on more than 80 interviews. Manila's problem is less how to bring the rebels within the rule of law than how to bring its own agents (in the case of the Ampatuan Massacre) within the rule of law. Until and unless it is possible to impose the rule of law on the local elites (who have enjoyed and abused that immunity), there can be little progress on changing the local conditions that breed the circle of violence.

25. To make matters more complicated and as part of the COIN fight, the AFP and PNP have provided weapons and training to auxiliary units, which in some instances have become a law onto themselves. The AFP continues to use of Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU), which it considers as very important force multipliers for local government units. Following from the Ampatuan Massacre, the PNP has suspended the recruitment of police auxiliary units. The CAFGUs are part of the solution for COIN but they can create an additional governance problem too. On 22 June 2012, the US embassy in Manila said that the US Congress withheld US$3 million in Foreign Military Financing from the Philippine government in Fiscal Year (FY) 2012:-

“To obtain these funds, the Philippine government must demonstrate it is continuing to take effective steps to implement the recommendations of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial killings; strengthening government institutions working to eliminate extrajudicial killings; investigating, prosecuting, and punishing military personnel and others who have been credibly alleged to have violated internationally recognized human rights; and ensuring the Armed Forces of the Philippines is not engaging in acts of violence or intimidation against members of legal organizations who advocate for human rights.”​

26. Former mayors in major cities in the central and southern part of the country have been accused by human rights organizations of involvement in vigilante-style killings of alleged criminals. Cebu and Davao are useful illustrative examples:-

One, according to 2005 US embassy cable reports, human rights organizations have accused the "Davao Death Squad," (DDS) a vigilante group linked with then Davao Mayor Duterte, of carrying out many of the killings. On 26 December 2012, residents and guerilla fighters of the NPA cheered while Duterte visited during the guerilla camp. During the visit, Duterte gave the NPA unit an unspecified amount of money and delivered a speech blaming abnormal weather disturbances and climate change on environmental destruction brought about by first world countries.

Two, the then Cebu Mayor Tommy Osmena had also made public comments that clearly indicate his support for vigilante-style activities against suspected criminals.​

27. While many of these deaths and disappearances are more likely attributable to local disputes than to direct military or police action, it is clear that the Philippine government needs to do more to ensure that responsible parties -- are brought to justice. The problem is also closely related to a judicial system which is inefficient and strained beyond its capacity.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Part 3 of 3 reply to MarsDominus on: How can the Philippines defend against a giant like China?

28. We have to be realistic on the limited progress made by the Philippines. Philippines in particular, spend too little on defence to be taken seriously and whose navy has not entered the missile age (with it's navy armed like a coast guard and totally incapable of surface warfare).

29. Not only that, President Aquino III has an inability to understand the 7Ps (or Proper Prior Planning Prevents Piss Poor Performance) and a demonstrated inability to understand defence matters.

30. In the remorseless logic of self-help, whereby nation-states bear primary responsibility for their own defense, still rules international affairs. Appearances count in alliance politics. A lesser ally, like the Philippines, that covets help from a stronger one must demonstrate that it merits the effort. Thus far, the Philippines has demonstrated that it has not tried hard enough.

31. Forget about trying to tell their politicians to fund their defence. Most aid donors are trying to prevent their politicians from steal the aid given during Typhoon Haiyan (local name Yolanda). While the Daily Mail may not be the most reliable source but I believe that its report is not inconsistent with donor governments' expectations on the need to manage the locals. At some level the chronic level of dysfunction in Philippine politics ensures that local theft of aid is beyond foreign control. As a result, old hands in the region understand the importance of delivering aid as a service, rather than goods.
Daily Mail said:
Philippines aid scandal: Food flown in from Britain ends up in shops hundreds of miles from typhoon

By SIMON PARRY, published on 7 December 2013

• Supplies have turned up on shelves of shops in the capital Manila
• Equipment bought with UK donations have been locked up in warehouses
• Rice and other food is being stockpiled and not given to needy
• Charities express concern that not all donations are reaching disaster zone​

Crucial aid sent from Britain to help the victims of typhoon-ravaged areas of the Philippines is being siphoned off and sold for profit by corrupt local officials...

Last night, the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) – an umbrella group representing 14 UK charities – expressed concern about evidence that suggests not all the £60 million of aid given by Britain is reaching those most in need.

Alarming evidence of the thefts has been provided by expat Keb Darge, 56, who says he faces death threats for stopping local officials stealing aid in Eastern Samar, one of the worst-hit areas.

...Mr Darge photographed supplies being locked up rather than distributed in Eastern Samar...

And Mr Darge’s allegations of corruption were backed up by a Japanese aid worker, Shiratori Koti, who said local administrators were diverting goods to their homes. Mr Koti said: ‘There isn’t enough food getting through to people. We don’t have evidence but we believe it is being taken by officials.’

...

<snip>
32. I wish the DEC spokesman good luck in the Philippines. Given the endemic nature of the corruption, I am certain that no Philippine politician responsible for the theft of aid can or will be punished, even if proof is provided. Any attempt at prosecution will just get eye-witnesses willing to come forward killed or silenced by other means. In reality donors can only do what they can and thereafter, get out. No crusade against aid theft will change the prevailing local political culture in these areas, as many of the hard hit areas are run by the Romualdez - Marcos clan. Indeed, it is not usual for Typhoon Haiyan survivors to receive re-packed relief goods emblazoned with local politicians' faces.
Rappler said:
Catfight over who gets to help Yolanda evacuees?

BY CARMELA FONBUENA POSTED ON 11/21/2013

MANILA, Philippines – Buses carrying about 2,000 Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) survivors arrived in Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City Thursday afternoon, November 21. The operations of the well-celebrated Oplan Salubong, which attended to evacuees flown in from the Visayas, was hastily moved from the Villamor Airbase in Pasay City. Volunteers at the airbase were surprised and discouraged. The story behind it is ugly. It got some officials scratching their heads. Government social workers "packed their bags" because of a turf war with the Philippine Air Force Officers' Ladies Club – wives of PAF officials referred to as the "ladies," according to a volunteer.

Oplan Salubong was set up at the airbase in Pasay to help the typhoon survivors who fled to Manila – they were fed, sheltered, offered free calls, among others. The Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the ladies, and hundreds of other volunteers joined the efforts. "The DSWD is technically the one [that] should be in charge, but since Villamor is the home of the Air Force, the ladies simply would not want to be overshadowed," volunteer Junep Ocampo told the Philippine Star. Ocampo is an organizer of Oplan Hatid, whose 500 volunteers have been transporting for free survivors who land on Villamor Airbase to relatives as far away as Baguio City. They worked with DSWD and the ladies. A general's wife, Imee Ona, is the known leader of the Ladies Club. Director Alicia Bonoan heads DSWD-NCR.

At least 2,576 families or 10,088 individuals have arrived in Manila via the Air Force's C130s and rented commercial buses. In Camp Aguinaldo, the typhoon evacuees were oblivious to the turf war. Travelling to the military headquarters meant experiencing Manila's heavy traffic from Pasay City to Quezon City, but they were offered the same assistance: hot meals, free calls, and a play station for the babies, among others.

As of Thursday afternoon, however, other evacuees the DSWD expected to be moved to Camp Aguinaldo were still being held at the airbase, allegedly at the behest of the ladies who want to keep the operations there. PAF spokesperson Colonel Miguel Okol belied the turf war. He said they decided to move the "processing" of typhoon evacuees to Camp Aguinaldo because they're expecting an influx of evacuees and the space at the airbase is too small. The instructions came from Malacanang's Assistant Secretary Ronaldo Geron, he added. Okol said the decision did not sit well with Ocampo and Oplan Hatid, which wanted to continue its operations at the airbase.

The move to Camp Aguinaldo caught even Armed Forces chief General Emmanuel Bautista by surprise. "I don't know about that. That is not under military people..."

<snip>

...They do not care about the sufferings of Yolanda's victims," he wrote. The turf war has affected operations since Day 1, he said. "The turf war has led to confusing and arbitrary changes in rules and policies, making it difficult for volunteers and those who want to volunteer to help the survivors of typhoon Yolanda," Ocampo said. He did not elaborate. Here's the twist: Hours later, the DSWD realized that Villamor airbase is "the more suitable facility." Oplan Salubong was returned to Villamor airbase by night time Thursday. A DSWD statement said Bonoan will be heading the operations at the airbase. Oplan Hatid immediately called on its volunteers to help the evacuees arriving Thursday night. "Let's save our commentary for another time. Right now, there are more important things to focus on," reads the Facebook appeal of James Deankin, also an organizer of Oplan Hatid.

And that was another episode in the growing list of side stories on the government's response in the aftermath of a monster typhoon. – Rappler.com
33. In the quote above, Rappler ran a story of a turf war with the Philippine Air Force Officers' Ladies Club and another group. So at every level of society, there is some level of dysfunction.
You could have addressed my concerns with a paragraph or two but thanks for the lengthy diatribe ;)
34. No, it is an accurate assessment of the lack of capability at an institutional level for both the Philippine Air Force and the Philippine Navy. Sorry, the truth about the Philippines hurts, and would appreciate it if you could stop using a false premise to make a point.

35. Please read and provide sources for your future posts, rather than posting a premise based on a lie to make a point.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Reply to wild_Willie2 on: How can the Philippines defend against a giant like China?

What the Philippine’s would need is a difficult question, this would depend on what they would like to accomplish.
1. There is no threat of war between China and the Philippines. China is using a coercive 'white' ship strategy to manage its EEZ disputes with Philippines (and not territorial disputes). IMO, China has no desire or interest in invading the Philippines but it has an economic interest in enforcing its disputed EEZ claims. Just as the Philippines has an economic interest in enforcing its disputed EEZ claims.

2. The key word is disputed.

3. Keep in mind that there are no good-guys in relation to the recent maritime disputes, as the examples listed below illustrate:-

One, while the Philippines has filed a case against China over its disputes in South China Sea with the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague, the Japanese on the other hand pretend that there is no dispute with China over the Senkaku Islands or Diaoyu Islands (see here for a view from China) - there is so much hypocrisy at work by all parties involved in these disputes - while the US administration encourages the Philippines to sue China, US Congress has stubbornly resisted all attempts by to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Both US and China engage in coercive diplomacy. At various times, the Philippines has been subject to either of their efforts. More recently, the Philippines has been subject to coercive diplomacy from Taiwan and it is a fact of life for many third world nations.

Two, China set a precedent that intimidates other nations bordering the South China Sea into similar concessions. Interestingly, the embargo on the import of bananas from the Philippines has had an effect on the retail price of bananas in Tokyo in 2012, when it refused to import bananas and other fruits from the Philippines, claiming to find bugs in shipments. It tells ASEAN members that the China-ASEAN free trade agreement only works, if they follow Beijing's lead.​

4. Not all US allies see China as a threat. While China has tense relations with the Philippines and Japan, Thailand and South Korea each enjoy close bilateral ties with China. With relations with Washington strained over the latest coup, Bangkok finds Beijing to be a useful counter weight. In a state visit to South Korea by Chinese President Xi Jinping in July 2014, the parties will sign about 12 deals to enable direct trade between the Korean Won and the Chinese renminbi; as well as work towards a Sino-Republic of Korea (ROK) Free Trade Agreement by the end of the year. On the 'China threat theory', there are seven points to note:-

One, Sino-US relations are on the mend since the Sunnylands summit and both countries do not want to go to war. Participants from both countries agreed that the Sunnylands summit had given a new sense of direction to the bilateral relationship—one that incorporates three important elements: a mutual recognition of the need to avoid the so-called “Thucydides trap” in which a rising power and an established power inevitably come into conflict; a mutual agreement to try to increase cooperation in areas where there is a shared interest; and a common understanding that disagreements in one area of the relationship should not be allowed to damage the overall relationship. Let me list two other examples where it demonstrates that both the US and China do not have the will to go to war with each other, as follows:-

(i) on May 7, 1999, the US accidentally bombed China's embassy in Belgrade (no war resulted); and

(ii) on April 1, 2001, in the Hainan Island incident, where China detained 24 US Navy EP-3 crew members until a statement was delivered by US government regarding the incident. The exact phrasing of this document was intentionally ambiguous and allowed both countries to save face while simultaneously defusing a potentially volatile situation.​

Further, according to a July 2014 Pew Research Center poll, most countries do not see China as their top threat. In fact, only respondents in Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam see China as their top security threat (i.e. countries that have active maritime disputes with China). And in three Asian nations, China, Pakistan and Malaysia, the US is seen as the top security threat. Incredibly, Indonesians see the US as their top security threat and their greatest ally (see this article: "Asia Fears But Likes China" for a discussion on the poll results).

Two, former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser notes that, "Conflict between China and Japan is possible. The Americans have made it plain that they would side with Japan if there is a conflict, and as things are, we would get dragged in to that conflict, when our interest would be to stay well clear of it. Now, if you've got those troops in Darwin being used in relation to such a conflict, and Pine Gap was being used to give direction to a variety of weapons systems, the prime minister could get up and say 'Oh, look, we're not involved, we're not complicit'. But we would be complicit, the world would know we were complicit. And that means that the United States has the power to take Australia to war really as Britain a hundred years ago had the power to take Australia to war because we were part of the Empire" (see also this video on Australian Foreign Policy : http://youtu.be/ga21QoahOyU). However, it is also quite clear that Mr Fraser, the Liberal PM between 1975 and 1983, is making claims that are are "far-fetched" and "ridiculous". Retired Lieutenant Colonel Phil Swinsburg who established the Australian Army's first UAV unit, has hit out at Fraser's criticism of Australian involvement in Pine Gap. By way of background, Pine Gap, is a highly sophisticated listening post, used by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and operated with the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD). Established at the height of the Cold War to monitor the Soviet Union, Pine Gap now has a different role.

Three, China's foreign aid program is now the sixth largest in the world. Only the UK, US, Germany, France and Japan provided more in 2013. This is according to a new paper from the JICA Research Institute estimating China's foreign aid program from 2001 to 2013. Their calculations put China's total official development assistance (ODA) at US$7.1 billion in 2013, with concessional loans, provided by China Eximbank, making up nearly half of the total aid. Economic and state interests are the main reasons why most states would not want to risk their relationship with China to give unqualified support for Vietnam over China's placement of the Haiyang Shiyou 981 rig in dispute waters — which it has withdrawn on 15 June 2014 ahead of the onset of the typhoon season. Only those that have poor relations with China, or those trying to counter-balance China are willing to support Vietnam — namely the Philippines, Japan and the US. Therefore, the US does not have unqualified support of its other allies in Asia to act in a manner that increases tensions with China. Thus far, China has withdrawn workers, frozen investments and even stopped state-owned enterprises from bidding for projects in Vietnam, since the riots in Vietnam, that were directed at Chinese factories have occurred. China is Vietnam’s largest trade partner (bilateral trade totaled US$65.48 billion in 2013). It is also the largest export market for Vietnamese rice, coal and crude rubber and remains the major source of imports for Vietnam’s demand for textiles, steel, oil products, electronics and other high value-added products. Meanwhile, the riot has left about 60,000 people jobless in Vietnam.

Four, Beijing is an important security partner especially with regards to managing the North Koreans. In recent years, this includes the sinking of a ROK warship in March 2010; and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010. While the ROK is an US ally, they also enjoy a great bilateral relationship with China; and during certain periods, the US-Korean alliance relationship can be strained. In particular, when the left-wing Roh Moo-Hyun ascended to the Korean presidential office on an anti-American platform. The then President Roh was ambivalent about the future of the U.S.-South Korea alliance. In fact, up to 2007, relations between the US and ROK had suffered because of disagreement over how to handle North Korea, with views in Seoul and Beijing on the issue had been in rough alliance. A strong Sino-ROK bilateral relationship inserts space between China and it's client, North Korea — more importantly, ROK is making the case that China's future status on the Korean peninsular is built on ties with the South.

Five, the Koreans are traditional rivals with the Japanese, and they share in common with the Chinese (and this includes the Taiwanese), a common hatred for Japanese atrocities during World War II. It is clear that such visits reopen old grievances, and are unhelpful to building trust in the region. ROK’s doubts that Japan’s leadership has renounced and repented for their decades of colonial rule in Korea is a constraint on closer trilateral security cooperation between the US, Japan and ROK. In particular, the visit to the Yasukuni Shrine has evoked further negative feelings in China, South Korea, and Taiwan.

Six, in the past, China has regarded the relationship with Japan as a vital part of its foreign policy until it was damaged during the period of Japan’s Koizumi government. Antics of the Japanese far right, certainly do not help unite sentiments against a rising China. President Xi Jinping of China and President Park Geun-hye of South Korea have jointly unveiled new historical monuments to celebrate Korean patriots who fought against Japan in China, and on this July 2014 visit to Seoul, Xi suggested joint commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II next year — or as Chinese and Koreans know it, the War of Anti-Japanese Resistance — the Chinese are keen to leverage this but the Koreans have not accepted the idea a joint commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the War of Anti-Japanese Resistance (i.e. the Koreans have a problematic relationship with Japan but that remains a bilateral issue between Japan and ROK).

Seven, on the margins of RIMPAC, smaller trilateral or quadrilateral exercises would provide political cover in Seoul and Tokyo to attempt to expand the limited Korea-Japan mil-mil cooperation beyond the existing Search and Rescue Exercise. At the same time that Adm. Jonathan Greenert, the chief of operations of the US Navy, was in China, a top PLA officer was visiting Australia. General Fan Changlong, a vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission– China’s top military decision-making body– visited Australia to hold talks with Prime Minister Tony Abbott. While there, General Fan also met with Australian Defense Minister David Johnston, Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, and Defense Air Chief Marshal Mark Binskin. During General Fan’s July 2014 trip to Canberra, the two sides agreed to hold a trilateral exercise in Australia in October with US Marines called “Exercise Kowari.” The joint exercise will take place in northern Australia and marks another step forward in efforts by Washington and Canberra to bolster relations with China’s PLA. Following his trip to Australia, General Fan traveled to New Zealand where he met with Prime Minister Jonathan Key, Defense Minister Jonathan Coleman, New Zealand Chief of Defense Force, Lieutenant General Tim Keating, and Acting Secretary of Defense, Tony Lynch. This included agreeing to hold the 7th China-New Zealand Strategic Defense Dialogue in China later in 2014.​

5. While the region is characterised by great-power rivalry, there is little evidence that neutral ASEAN members have picked a side - in an either or proposition - of pick US or China. Indeed, many ASEAN members (as smaller states) and even Japan (as a regional power), ROK and Australia (as middle powers) are demonstrating a degree of independence in shaping the geo-politics in the mist of great-power rivalry in Asia. Countries are starting to hedge their bets by drawing closer to the US but many in Asia have yet to pick a side (other than Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines, who have active disputes with China).

6. I intervened to provide data because the premise of the thread depends on a lie. Frankly, I am tired of debunking a lie being used as a basis for discussion.
 
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gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I asked an innocent question and you attacked me, calling me a liar. Moreover, I'm not sure why but you believed that I was "hurt" by the truth. Why would I be? Is it because you assumed that I am from the Philippines? I joined this forum to have mature discussion of topics that are of interest to me. I understand that you, a super moderator, feel strongly about this specific topic but were juvenile personal attacks really necessary? Why not simply leave a reply stating what you think and leave it at that? Aren't you old enough to divorce emotion from passion?
You need to read OPSSG's response again - his reference is to the premise of the argument - its got nothing to do with your perception of being called a liar at all

ratchet back your own emotion before taking anyone else to task.

you are taking offence unnecessarily
 

MarsDominus

New Member
Unfortunately, gf0012-aust, you misunderstood me. Perhaps you should reread the discussion two or three more times. The premise was, based on what one (as an observer) considers the best approach the Philippines can take against a foreign power like PRC in what the international community considers a territorial dispute. [Mod Edit: Text deleted due to continued attempt at trolling, despite advice and guidance from two Moderators.

The best part is that the so called questions by MarsDominus - is that they are neither original nor interesting. Further, it has been well demonstrated to MarsDominus that his premise in his first post is false. He continues to ignore the evidence presented not because he is trying to lie, rather he continues to hold the same misguided point of view because of his existing but limited world view.

Please do not turn this thread into a fantasy wishlist. Fantasy wishlist participants do not fare well in this forum. Feel free to share a view point but remember to provide sources for supporting facts and where possible deal with the ground truths about the Philippines.

General warning to all in this thread: Kindly follow the forum rules and do not spam this thread with wish list nonsense, as there are a number of posts here that are lacking in thought and quality (a laundry list of what to buy without regard to national defence budgets and prior track record are frowned upon). ]
 
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Preceptor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Unfortunately, gf0012-aust, you misunderstood me. Perhaps you should reread the discussion two or three more times. The premise was, based on what one (as an observer) considers the best approach the Philippines can take against a foreign power like PRC in what the international community considers a territorial dispute.
Or perhaps you should re-read available materials on the situation in the Philippines. The Philippines as a nation and society does not have reliable and unified control over it's territorial waters, land, and airspace. Before the Philippines can contest an area (EEZ or otherwise) the Philippines needs to be able to control it has that isn't being contested.

Jumping straight into asking how to 'deal' with China and ignoring all the existing systemic issues impacting the PAF results in a non-answer. Crawl=>Walk=>Run.
-Preceptor
 

koxinga

Well-Known Member
I am not sure if the acquisition of the weapon systems from the SSV hull can be described as a "malpractice'". It's an inference at best, based on the lack of evidence otherwise.

It is common to separate weapons systems procurement from the hull purchase. The only thing I will concede is the overall integration has to be appointed (usually the yard). Personally, I had done it before on a patrol boat project many years ago. The hull was provided by Damen (along with the standard maritime electronics e.g VHF, GMDSS, gyro etc), while other secured communications systems, C2, and more importantly, the primary main gun was acquired separately. However, even before the project started, the sub-team handling the "A" gun acquisition had already shorted listed two systems (Rafael, OTO Melara) and their basic specifications/loads provisions were included in the hull tender.

It is also common in SEA to take a FFBNW (Fitted For, But Not With) approach, which stretches hull and systems integration years apart. Look no further than the RTN, who are finally fitting the ESSM on their F25T frigates after more than 20 years or TNI-AL, which is taking this approach with their KCR40 and KCR60 patrol boat projects. Even RMN's NGPV's were designed with weight/space provisions for a SSM and SAM (Raytheon's RAM).

Your question then, is whether they (PN) has the necessary competence to plan ahead. The fact that they called a tender to obtain "consultancy services for naval systems consultants " after they issued tender for the two frigates, to me speak volumes about their competency.

As for the effectiveness of Aquino administration in addressing the defence inadequacies, my view is that he has done a good job (relative). My premise is this, 1) would any other candidate be able to do what you outline? 2) are projects under the current administration moving ahead compared to the previous administration?.

The fact of the matter is for 1), there are systemic issues which OPSSG highlighted which is not going to change overnight, even if Obama is elected as El Presidente of the Philippines. Defence budget remain inadequate in the face of their strategic challenges and even that budget faces "leakages". For 2), over the last two years, the administration appears to have moved to expedite a number of projects. However, whether the credit belongs to the current administration is vague. Some of these projects were in gestation long before Aquino was elected. When the next president is elected, I suppose he (or she) will claim the credit. :D

Here, people like MarsDominus tend to get ahead of themselves; these projects are the equivalent of "trying to stop the rot" that trying to deter China. To me, these projects mere help AFP get use to (and make the mistakes) in their planning and acquisition process, while building a nascent, token capability in some areas.

Execution and sustainability. If the AFP can pull off these few projects well and sustain this for the next 5 - 8 years, I might change my mind about whether the currenty positive noises are indeed structural.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Unfortunately, gf0012-aust, you misunderstood me. Perhaps you should reread the discussion two or three more times.
Your plea was about being called a liar -

I asked an innocent question and you attacked me, calling me a liar.
- again, that was your principle protestation - and is patently incorrect as OPSSG was responding to the premise of the argument being without foundation - ie a lie.

This is our last on this - if you are aggrieved then PM one of the Mods or myself.
Do not continue the distraction of the initial debate in here as it will be deleted for being OT
 
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