Singapore Air Force - Why so strong?

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
When I saw that it had 24 F-15SGs, 70+ F16 Block 50s and older but never the less flying 40+ F5s ( total of around 140 combat aircraft) I realized it had a really big air power.
Supplemental to what Lostfleet posted, I'm just a quick note to let you guys know that the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) has reduced its number of fighter squadrons from 7 to 5 over the past few years (currently 3x F-16C/D squadrons, 1x F-5T Squadron and 1x F-15SG Squadron), which means the fighter fleet numbers will be lower than what he posted.

There are also two figher detachments in CONUS:-

(i) a F-16C/D detachment at Luke ((Peace Carvin II - 425 FS); and
(ii) a F-15SG detachment at Mountain Home (Peace Carvin V - 428 FS).​

To further our discussion, below is a list of the top 4 SEA countries ranked by their defence spending to provide context to this discussion. The defence spending data is from SIPRI*, the Total Fighter Fleet** size data is extracted from Flight International's Dec 2009, "World Air Forces" (keep in mind that this is not the most accurate of sources) and the #No. of Troops (active/reserve) are extracted from the IISS' "The Military Balance 2010".

1. Singapore
**Total Fighter Fleet in 2009 = 99
(i) F-16C/Ds = 60 (other sources suggest higher numbers)
(ii) F-15SGs = 4 (20 on order)
(iii) F-5S/Ts = 35 (see other source on Singapore F-5s by tail numbers)

#No. of Troops (active/reserve)..........: 72,500 (active) and 312,000 (reserves)
2009 GDP (nominal) .........................: US$182.23 billion (IMF data)
*Defence Spending as a % of GDP ...: Between a low of 3.9% to a high of 5.1% (from 2000 to 2008)
*2009 Defence Spending...................: US$7,966 million (at constant 2008 prices)
*2004 Defence Spending...................: US$6,661 million (at constant 2008 prices)
*2000 Defence Spending...................: US$5,997 million (at constant 2008 prices)


2. Indonesia
**Total Fighter Fleet in 2009 = 39
(i) F-16A = 7
(ii) Su-27/30 = 7 (3 on order)
(iii) Hawk 209 = 25

#No. of Troops (active/reserve)..........: 302,000 (active) and 400,000 (reserves)
2009 GDP (nominal) .........................: US$539.37 billion (IMF data)
*Defence Spending as a % of GDP ...: Between a low of 1.0% to a high of 1.4% (from 2000 to 2008)
*2009 Defence Spending...................: US$4,908 million (at constant 2008 prices)
*2004 Defence Spending...................: US$4,840 million (at constant 2008 prices)
*2000 Defence Spending...................: US$2,970 million (at constant 2008 prices)


3. Thailand
**Total Fighter Fleet in 2009 = 97
(i) F-16A/Bs = 50
(ii) F-5A/E = 47
(iii) Gripen C = 0 (other sources suggest that it is 6 +6 on order)

#No. of Troops (active/reserve)..........: 305,860 (active) and 200,000 (reserves)
2009 GDP (nominal) .........................: US$263.97 billion (IMF data)
*Defence Spending as a % of GDP ...: Between a low of 1.1% to a high of 1.5% (from 2000 to 2008)
*2009 Defence Spending...................: US$4,117 million (at constant 2008 prices)
*2004 Defence Spending...................: US$2,673 million (at constant 2008 prices)
*2000 Defence Spending...................: US$2,702 million (at constant 2008 prices)


4. Malaysia
**Total Fighter Fleet in 2009 = 59
(i) Su-30MKM = 18
(ii) F/A-18D = 8
(iii) MiG-29 = 10
(iv) RF-5E= 9
(v) Hawk 208 = 14

#No. of Troops (active/reserve)..........: 109,000 (active) and 296,300 (reserves)
2009 GDP (nominal) .........................: US$192.95 billion (IMF data)
*Defence Spending as a % of GDP ...: Between a low of 2.0% to a high of 2.6% (from 2000 to 2008)
*2009 Defence Spending...................: US$4,078 million (at constant 2008 prices)
*2004 Defence Spending...................: US$3,691 million (at constant 2008 prices)
*2000 Defence Spending...................: US$2,122 million (at constant 2008 prices)
I know strategically Singapore is in a very critical place, a big portion of the worlds shipping crosses at Malacca Straits but I don't much about the Singapores relations with its neighbours or its geopolitic position in the region. I would be very happy if someone tells me the reasons for investing so much at their Air Force.
Doctrinally, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) does not intend to defend Singapore at the gates of the city, as it were and is capable and resourced for 'foward defence' of our country. Our thinking on defence is something that is not well understood by casual observers and often leads some misunderstanding. The SAF's declared mission statement is to "enhance Singapore’s peace and security through deterrence and diplomacy, and should these fail, to secure a swift and decisive victory over the aggressor". And I believe the SAF is resourced to carry out the mission statement. It is clear from this post that Singapore has some military power. However, our ability to be seen in exercising this power is constrained by current geo-political reality.

Q1: Why is Singapore so restrained in its use military power?

Ans: We use the SAF to achieve political ends but usually not to conduct war (because war in of itself is a blunt policy tool). The SAF is usually used by Singapore to win friends and influence other countries (and not to fight with them). The SAF has been consistent in our contributions at a time of crisis or help in policing the global commons, to see (be it in Afghanistan, Iraq, Timor Leste, CTF-151, the 2011 Christchurch earthquake and so on).

Singapore tries to maintain with the Indonesian defence establishment warm relations via the conduct of regular bilateral exercises and professional exchanges, which have strengthened the mutual understanding and friendship between the two armed forces (see this [nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_0kp2jUxVoM"]Republic of Singapore Air Force Video Exercise Elang Indopura 2010 - YouTube[/nomedia]). On the defence front, the SAF and the TNI have co-hosted an ASEAN Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) exercise in 2011. The strong familiarity between both sides and the close personal ties, have allowed the SAF and TNI to work well together in times of emergency and need. Singaporeans will not forget how the TNI provided valuable assistance to Singapore in the search and rescue operations, following the Silkair MI-185 crash in Palembang in 1997. The SAF and the TNI have also worked closely together in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, such as the relief efforts in Aceh following the Boxing Day Tsunami in 2004, Yogyakarta in 2006 and the Padang earthquake in 2009. BTW, somewhere between 50 and 70 TNI-AU pilots come to Singapore every year for simulator training (see DPM Mr Teo Chee Hean's remarks at the Indonesia Defence University in Dec 2010).

Further, the mere presence of the SAF deters potential aggressors from using force. So ironically, the presence of military power, may reduce the necessity of using military power.

Q2: Why does Singapore focus so much attention on air power?

Ans: Singapore lacks strategic depth and our forces cannot retreat from the city into the jungle. Therefore, it is crucial for us to at least maintain air parity, or if possible, win air superiority so that we can protect the city from aerial bombardment and employ our air power to our tactical advantage to enable us to establish local superiority in battles.

Q3: Why build the Singapore navy, when you have air power?

Ans: We are not self sufficient in food (over the long term) and we need trade to ensure that our city does not starve in a naval blockade. It is no good if we can defend Singapore island but cannot import food because of a naval blockage. In fact, just an increase in insurance rates will affect the price of goods imported into Singapore. Being able to defend Singapore island itself is meaningless if we cannot keep our SLOCs open. Further, air power can have a multiplier effect on the Republic of Singapore Navy's capabilities.

As WWII has shown, a good defence plan for Malaya (against the then external Japanese invasion from the north) from should start at the appropriate geographical choke point in Thai territory (see Appendix 2 for Map of the opening blows in the Pointer Monograph on page 64). The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) landed in Thai territory and proceed to march south. Likewise, in WWII, the Japanese attacked Malaya and Pearl Harbor almost at the same time. In a similar act of tactical brilliance and excellent command of operational art by the IJA, Singapore both fell faster than the IJA had hoped. There is also a Pointer Monograph on the mistakes in the Malayan Campaign, including a chapter on operational art shortcomings by LTC (NS) Singh.

Q4: Beyond terrorism, what are the other potential threats to Singapore?

Ans: Currently, there is a possibility of a troubled peace with our immediate neighbours. This includes the possibility of some state and non-state actors not honouring signed agreements (and they have their stated willingness or intent to do so) so as to introduce sudden disruption to the economy of Singapore.

In fairness, Malaysia has NEVER cut off water supply to Singapore. However, during times of tension, or domestic political upheaval in Malaysia, often there would be calls by local Malaysian politicians to cut off the water supply in violation of international law. In fact, Singapore gets blamed for very imaginative things by Malaysian politicians including floods in Malaysia (which I would believe is caused by weather patterns. I also want to point out that:

(i) On 26 March 1991, four Pakistani terrorists, claiming to be members of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), hijacked SQ 117 from Subang Airport in Kuala Lumpur with 129 passengers and crew. On 27 March 1991, members of our Special Operations Force (SOF) stormed the plane, killing the four Pakistani hijackers and freeing all passengers and crew. The late Ms Benazir Bhutto issued a denial of PPP's involvement. However, it should be noted that Asif Ali Zardori, the husband of the late Ms Bhutto and current President of Pakistan was included among several Pakistani prisoners whom the hijackers of SQ117 wanted released. However, this is not the only terrorist related activity that is linked to events occurring in Malaysian territory - See this RSIS article. I'm not saying that the Malaysian Government has any thing to do with these events (rather that there are security events that occur on Malaysian soil and we need to work with their security agencies).

(ii) After the SQ117 hijack from Subang Airport in Kuala Lumpur on 26 March 1991 (instead of expressing sympathy, promising to tighten security or increasing security cooperation, as Malaysia had done with the US in the aftermath of Sept 11), the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) chose to conduct, an airborne assault exercise, codenamed Pukul Habis (Malay for 'Total Wipeout') on 9 August 1991, with a drop zone in southern Johor just 18km from Singapore. Singapore's response was measured and confident. We triggered an Open Mobilisation on the eve of Singapore's 26th National Day (and in context, not as harmless as Sturm represented in his post). This mobilization meant that many thousands of Singaporean families could not spend time together (by virtue of the fact that Singaporeans were reporting to camp) on a public holiday because our neighbours decided to saber rattle.

(iii) According to a senior Malaysian military officer, the MAF was put on alert in late 1998 as politicians on both sides of the Causeway argued over the status of a CIQ checkpoint. News articles from the period chronicle the public exchanges, but say nothing of the defence postures that the SAF and MAF adopted during this period (See this article by David Boey). Thankfully, Malaysia-Singapore relations are much improved since Dr. M left office.

(iv) Pedra Branca has been a source of bilateral tension between Singapore and Malaysia since 21 December 1979 (when Malaysia unilaterally redrew their maps and claimed Pedra Branca as their territory) and these incidents of tension have been documented by Prof. S. Jayakumar and Prof. Tommy Koh in a 2009 book called "Pedra Branca: The Road to the World Court". It is also a matter of ICJ court record that Malaysia which had in the past arrested Singapore's fishing vessels to increase tensions, including through the use of physical violence against Singapore fishermen in the vicinity of Pedra Branca. Further, at page 46 of the book, the two authors stated that:

"Of particular concern was a marked increase in the number of intrusions of Malaysian Government vessels in the waters around Pedra Branca. For example, from the period 1990-2000, there were some 64 incidents. However, in the next eight years from the period 2000-2008, there were a total of 563 recorded intrusions with the highest number of incidents (167) in 2007 alone. These Malaysian actions did not make any sense to us because the Court would take into account only the conduct and activities of both sides prior to the critical date."​

The incidents quoted above are a clear indication of hostile intent by the Malaysian Government as they try to create 'alert fatigue' for the Singapore forces deployed there. The fact that incidents after 24 July 2003, made no legal sense at all (as that was the date both countries issued a joint notification to the Registrar of the ICJ, with regards to the agreement to adjudicate the dispute), is an indication of Malaysian hostility (which contributes to the bilateral trust deficit). Looking at the pattern of behaviour, it is clear that the Malaysians were potentially planning an incident if the ICJ ruling was unfavorable (but thankfully, UMNO were able to claim that the ICJ judgment was win-win, despite the fact that the ICJ ruled that Pedra Branca belongs to Singapore).​

Indonesia also suddenly cut-off the supply of sand to Singapore in Feb 2007. This was recognized as having an adverse economic impact on Singapore and we have since found other sources of sand supply. Further, in May 2008, the Regional Indonesian Assembly of Batam threatened to block ConocoPhilips' ability to supply natural gas to Singapore (under a 20 year long term sales contract), as the some gas supplied to Singapore passes through Batam via the Grissik-Batam-Singapore Pipeline (as Batam at that time was suffering from alternate power cuts and who can blame them for being upset). BTW ConocoPhilips earns more revenue by selling natural gas to Singapore, as we buy at a higher price. Batam on the other hand buys at lower prices and are also not committed to a long term contract.

While the disputes with the Indonesian navy (over the sand and granite issues) and their local authorities (over natural gas supplies for power generation) are not immediate causes for war, they are potentially disruptive to Singapore's economy. You could also argue that given the more interdependent nature of the economies of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, there is less incentive to go to war. Over the last 40 years, intra-ASEAN trade has grown, enriching our peoples, which has helped set the stage for the possibility of greater geo-strategic stability. The current problem is more related to the uneven distribution of wealth.

They also base some squadrons in Australia and Taiwan for training purposes due to a lack of space to do it locally.
There are no permanent fighter RSAF detachments in Australia or Taiwan. The Singapore army still maintains bases in Taiwan but the SAF is very low key about our presence and about our unilateral exercises in Taiwan.

They WHAT? umm, idk bout taiwan, but pretty sure they dont have a squadron "based" here, while they do utilise our bases during joint Excercises, theres no aircraft housed here for singapores benefit.
However, there are RSAF aircraft housed at two locations in Australia: :D

(i) RAAF Base Pearce is home to the RSAF's 130 Squadron, which uses the Pilatus PC-21 trainer; and
(ii) a Super Puma detachment is based at the Australian Army Aviation Centre in Oakey, Queensland.​

Many thanks to the Australians for hosting the SAF and RSAF at various locations over the decade. There are also frequent joint and multi-national air force exercises with the ADF. There is even an annual unilateral SAF armour exerise, with air-land integration training (65 day Exercise Wallaby @Shoalwater Bay, which hosts about 5,500 SAF personnel and over 400 SAF assets).
 
Last edited:

colay

New Member
They WHAT? umm, idk bout taiwan, but pretty sure they dont have a squadron "based" here, while they do utilise our bases during joint Excercises, theres no aircraft housed here for singapores benefit.

I was a little disapointed with singapores airforce when on excercise with them early last year. Their pilots maintained a high altitude during manouveres against our ships, while RAAF pilots waved while sweeping past our masts, same for malaysians.
Perhaps that was the role scripted for them?
 

lopez

Member
its the pilot discretion for how low his/her strafe is.... And I doubt the script was that detailed to include precise altitudes for the bomb runs on the ships...
 

Zahir

New Member
About.pakistan air force

Sir kindly tel me about pak.air force.comparing with indian air force its just for my info.

Admin. The thread title is about the Singapore Ar Force. Off topic material should be discussed in any pre-existing relevant thread or one started to do so.

This thread is NOT about Pakistan or India
 
Last edited by a moderator:

STURM

Well-Known Member
This mobilization meant that many thousands of Singaporean families could not spend time together (by virtue of the fact that Singaporeans were reporting to camp) on a public holiday because our neighbours decided to saber rattle.
As you've mentioned this exercise before on a number of occasions, I decided to provide some clarification. I can't say for certain whether or not it was ''sabre rattling'' as you allege and I will not speculate but what I do know is -

1. The exercise, as was the drop zone and the code name, was planned [by a Malaysian/Indonesian planning group] well in advance of any diplomatic tensions with Singapore, being part of an annual series of exercises between Malaysia and Indonesia [Malindo Darsasa] - it just happened to be Malaysia's turn to host the exercise that year. The exercise was not sudden or did not happen out of the blue because of a downturn in Malaysia/Singapore relations.

2. If indeed the intent was to ''sabre rattle'' perhaps Malaysia would have used more than a company of paras and a handful of C-130s? The MAF was not placed on full alert at that time and there was no increase in military activity amongst units that were not participating in that exercise. And would Indonesia have gone along with this Malaysian attempt at ''sabre rattling''?

3. As to the drop zone being 18km from JB, it has been the main drop zone in the south since the 1960's, was used before by the British, and is used not just for para exercises by the 10th Para Brigade but also for basic jump training. It was not selected for the sole purpose of creating any mischief or due to its proximity to the Causeway.
 
Last edited:

colay

New Member
its the pilot discretion for how low his/her strafe is.... And I doubt the script was that detailed to include precise altitudes for the bomb runs on the ships...
I'm suggesting that unless we know the context of the exercise, we can't assume anything. perhaps the RSAF was assigned to provide top cover to the strafing jets? Perhaps they were simulating the use of some longer-range weapon system? I don't think if their pilots were instructed to fly low and strafe that they wouldn't be capable of doing so.
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group
Singapore has to maintain relative strong Air Force and Capable Navy. Just to the size of Singapore, they have to keep any potential Invading force from Singapore soil. If any invading force able to put significant enough strong hold on Singapore's soil, and that's the beginning of the end of Singapore as Independent nation.

In short Singapore has to have strong AF, because they can't afford not to have it. Even if Indonesia (as the largest neighbor as example) able to build 10 Fighter sq just like Indonesian MEF (Minimum Essential Force) dictate, the current Singaporean AF still relatively stronger since those 10 Indonesian sq has to maintain much larger air spaces then 5 Singaporean AF sq.

The concentration force of Singapore Armed forces compared to the amount of territory that they have to defend is something that none of her neighbor can compete in near or medium term.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
I was a little disapointed with singapores airforce when on excercise with them early last year. Their pilots maintained a high altitude during manouveres against our ships, while RAAF pilots waved while sweeping past our masts, same for malaysians.
As low as this :) ?

[nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWskY-POJ9k"]Falklands War - YouTube[/nomedia]


The whole point of flying at mast level is to make it hard for MG gunners. But in the future will dumb bombs attacks still be carried out on surface targets? Perhaps the RSAF pilots saw no need to go so low or maybe they were tasked with CAP.
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
They WHAT? umm, idk bout taiwan, but pretty sure they dont have a squadron "based" here, while they do utilise our bases during joint Excercises, theres no aircraft housed here for singapores benefit.

I was a little disapointed with singapores airforce when on excercise with them early last year. Their pilots maintained a high altitude during manouveres against our ships, while RAAF pilots waved while sweeping past our masts, same for malaysians.
They keep PC-21 trainers and Super Puma's here...
 

greenpuffer

New Member
The real reason why Singapore have got such a strong armed forces is because Indonesia have never formally renounced in the Indonesian paliament Sukarno's declaration that Singapore and Malaysia is part of Indonesia.

Until today, the Indonesians still look north and thinks that both Malaysia and Singapore is part of Indonesia.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
The real reason why Singapore have got such a strong armed forces is because Indonesia have never formally renounced in the Indonesian paliament Sukarno's declaration that Singapore and Malaysia is part of Indonesia.
Not sure about that but not only Indonesia but the Philippines was also against the formation of Malaysia. President Macapagal and Sukarno were keen on a loose federation of all 3 countries called MAPHLINDO but as mentioned in the previous posts, Indonesia is part of but NOT the only reason why Singapore has a strong armed forces and why it ensures it has a technological edge. It has been suggested that the reason Singapore bought the Iron Dome is because of concerns that a certain country [which publicly expressed an interest in Scuds in the early 1990's] might acquire in the future ballistic missiles and not because, as widely speculated in various forums, because Malaysia has 36 ASTROS MLRS.
 
Last edited:

swerve

Super Moderator
Indonesian & Philippines objections to the formation of Malaysia were based mostly on their (mutually incompatible, because overlapping) wishes to grab or dominate all of Sabah, Sarawak & Brunei. I'm not aware of Sukarno ever laying claim to West Malaysia, though I stand ready to be corrected if anyone can point me to his words.

The Philippines claimed Sabah. Indonesia never really formulated a public policy, saying it didn't lay claim to any of the territory but calling it Kalimantan Utara, in line with the names of the Indonesian provinces in the rest of Borneo. Perhaps Sukarno hoped that a notionally independent North Borneo, or separate Sarawak, Brunei, & Sabah, could be dominated & eventually absorbed by Indonesia.

"Maphilindo" was seen as a loose association of states, based on the concept of a Malay race.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
Indonesian & Philippines objections to the formation of Malaysia were based mostly on their (mutually incompatible, because overlapping) wishes to grab or dominate all of Sabah, Sarawak & Brunei. I'm not aware of Sukarno ever laying claim to West Malaysia, though I stand ready to be corrected if anyone can point me to his words.
The Philippines main objection to the formation of Malaysia was over its claim to Sabah, which was once part of the Sulu Sultanate. Whilst the Philippines is mostly quiet about it's claim at the moment, in the 1960's and 1970's there was serious concern in Malaysia about what Manila might do. A news leak in 1968 about guerillas being trained in a camp in Luzon by PA special forces, for infiltration to Sabah didn't help bilateral relations and PAF Sabres were also routinely overflying into East Malaysian airspace - with the Malaysians being able to do nothing about it except deploy a battery of Bofors. Indonesia's main objection was because of Sukarno's claim that a future Malaysian Federation was just another British imperialism attempt and maintaining a hold on its former colonies and because Indonesia, whilst told of the planned federation, was not consulted.
 
Last edited:

Schumacher

New Member
Not sure about that but not only Indonesia but the Philippines was also against the formation of Malaysia. President Macapagal and Sukarno were keen on a loose federation of all 3 countries called MAPHLINDO but as mentioned in the previous posts, Indonesia is part of but NOT the only reason why Singapore has a strong armed forces and why it ensures it has a technological edge. It has been suggested that the reason Singapore bought the Iron Dome is because of concerns that a certain country [which publicly expressed an interest in Scuds in the early 1990's] might acquire in the future ballistic missiles and not because, as widely speculated in various forums, because Malaysia has 36 ASTROS MLRS.
Can Iron Dome hit artillery shells and mortars ? Because that's all Malaysia will need to hit Singapore especially the air bases.
I think Singapore also has many A4s in storage which can still fly.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
Can Iron Dome hit artillery shells and mortars ? Because that's all Malaysia will need to hit Singapore especially the air bases.
As you're no doubt aware, shutting down air bases is an extremely difficult thing to do, especially when those bases have contingency plans that factor in such an eventuality. Singapore anticipates that if the balloon goes up, any foe will do all it can to shut down the RSAF's air bases and as a result have made adequate preparations to deal with such an eventuality, including having adequate dispersals, airfield recovery/reconstruction teams, the ability to launch aircraft from certain roads, etc. True, most if not all of Singapore is within artillery range from the mainland, but Malaysia only operates a regiment of 155mm guns, the bulk of it's artillery are short range 105mm guns, a legacy of it's army's counter insurgency days.

Then again, Malaysia's main focus is on other areas, such as the Ambalat area where it has a dispute with Indonesia and it's clams in the Spratleys, not Singapore :) .
 
Last edited:

Ananda

The Bunker Group
Indonesian & Philippines objections to the formation of Malaysia were based mostly on their (mutually incompatible, because overlapping) wishes to grab or dominate all of Sabah, Sarawak & Brunei. I'm not aware of Sukarno ever laying claim to West Malaysia, though I stand ready to be corrected if anyone can point me to his words.
Soekarno never claim any Malaysian teritory. However he did not want to have land border with Malaysia, which he believes was just another ploy by British/Commonwealth collonialism to destabilised Indonesian Borneo in the future and his Indonesian Revolutionary movement, which he intend to spread scross the region and the rest of Third world as counter ballance againts Western Imperialism/Capitalism.

I never be a Soerkarnois, or supporter of his movement until now. Never believe on his revolutionary ideas, but one thing is clear. He's not an expantionist (which some western analyst tend to potrait him on his later days in power), but he's a Revolutioner, just like Castro.

What he's done with his subversive operations in Malaysian Peninsula and Singapore was no-more than effort to divide Malaysian public and administration plus British/Commonwelth forces as much as possible, thus will provide enough momentum for Sabah/Sarawak revolutionaries (with Indonesia help) to provide significant Armed challanges thus in the end provide enough incentive to the British to let Borneo Malaysia to secede and become Independent in order to protect more economically valuable Malaysian Peninsula and Singapore.

That's his basic believe and based on his thinking during 'konfrontasi' era. He's dream for Revolutionary Indonesia and Revolutionary Third World power, lead to economic bancruptcy and 'help' by some gross miscalculation by the communist, a chances that US waited so long to topple him by supporting more moderat elements in the Army.

In short, Soekarno was morethan happy for Independent Sabah and Sarawak, as long as it's control by a 'revolutionary' power which're anti Bristish/Commonwealth Imperialism, and Western Malaysia.
 

KatiushaVN

New Member
Good Morning,

While I was wondering around the world's air forces in wikipedia this morning ( yes I know I should be working at the office) I began to read about Singapore Air Force.

When I saw that it had 24 F-15SGs, 70+ F16 Block 50s and older but never the less flying 40+ F5s ( total of around 140 combat aircraft) I realized it had a really big air power.

Comparing with the neighbours Malaysia has 18 Su-30s, 8 F/A-18s, 18 F-5s, 14 Mig-29s and 13 BAE Hawks,

Where as Indonesia has 29 BAE Hawks, 24 F-16s, 15 F-5s, 5 Su-27s and 5 Su-30s

Further neighbours,

Vietnam has 15 Su-27s, 24 Su-30s, 124 Mig-21s, 53 Su-22s

Thailand - 55 F-16s, 12 JAS-39s, 29 F-5s

I know strategically Singapore is in a very critical place, a big portion of the worlds shipping crosses at Malacca Straits but I don't much about the Singapores relations with its neighbours or its geopolitic position in the region. I would be very happy if someone tells me the reasons for investing so much at their Air Force.

( all of the plane number references are taken from Wikipedia)
Vietnam currently has nearly 50 of Su-27s. Not 15 Su-27 like you said.
 

Lostfleet

New Member
  • Thread Starter Thread Starter
  • #39
Vietnam currently has nearly 50 of Su-27s. Not 15 Su-27 like you said.
All the information I quoted at the beginning of the post is from Wikipedia which gives a general sense rather than an accurate information.

At the time I posted, for Vietnam's People Air Force, it listed 15 Su-27s and 24 Su-30s and now it lists 20 Su-27s and 24 Su-30,

when you say 50 Su-27s are you also including Su-30 or is it in addition to 24 Su-30s?

Also, although a bit late, thank you for everyones reply to this post, it gave me a good overall image of the region, their relationships and their air forces status, thank you
 

CheeZe

Active Member
I'm more interested to know what source Katiusha is using. That seems to be key to determining the accuracy of his claim.
 
Top