Is war simply a matter of numbers???
- Thread starter Feros Ferio
- Start date
*cough* Combined Arms Warfare *cough*
This is not just some buzzword but the essence of successfull ground combat.
One just cannot say that x numbers of artillery are better than y numbers of tank, mech, light infantry, whatever.
There are countless of situations which can occure in war and all of them need to be adressed differently. So analyzing ones own situation, the threat matrix, terrain etc. and then build a well rounded force around these informations is the way to go.
Such a force mix will always have some more of euqipment X and doctrine Y as a defense against the red hordes in the plains of central europe needs to be adressed differently to a neutral country like swiss defending it's mountaineous regions.
But in the end everybody needs a balanced force mix of some kind.
As for artillery targeting tanks. Modern intelligent submunitions like SMARt as well as fast and accurate fire control networks make things easier.
Hitting an armoured spearhead on the run remains difficult, though. Add to that stuff like counterfire, electronic warfare or just your forward observer getting killed in the wrong moment and hitting becomes even more difficult.
In the end it's the same with the sometimes proposed "enough modern power kills everything"-card played in x vs y discussions.
One doesn't need to have a superior or even equal air force and air defense network. It just needs to be able to protect your ground troops until they overrun the airfields...
This is not just some buzzword but the essence of successfull ground combat.
One just cannot say that x numbers of artillery are better than y numbers of tank, mech, light infantry, whatever.
There are countless of situations which can occure in war and all of them need to be adressed differently. So analyzing ones own situation, the threat matrix, terrain etc. and then build a well rounded force around these informations is the way to go.
Such a force mix will always have some more of euqipment X and doctrine Y as a defense against the red hordes in the plains of central europe needs to be adressed differently to a neutral country like swiss defending it's mountaineous regions.
But in the end everybody needs a balanced force mix of some kind.
As for artillery targeting tanks. Modern intelligent submunitions like SMARt as well as fast and accurate fire control networks make things easier.
Hitting an armoured spearhead on the run remains difficult, though. Add to that stuff like counterfire, electronic warfare or just your forward observer getting killed in the wrong moment and hitting becomes even more difficult.
In the end it's the same with the sometimes proposed "enough modern power kills everything"-card played in x vs y discussions.
One doesn't need to have a superior or even equal air force and air defense network. It just needs to be able to protect your ground troops until they overrun the airfields...
You are of course completely right, combined arms are the only way to go on today’s battle field or in any at sea confrontation as well. We have been examining just two issues which of course is unrealistic. The systems approach will almost always give you the best effects with whatever assets you have to work with, even if what you have to work with isn’t perfectly matched to the current situation you are in.*cough* Combined Arms Warfare *cough*
This is not just some buzzword but the essence of successfull ground combat.
One just cannot say that x numbers of artillery are better than y numbers of tank, mech, light infantry, whatever.
There are countless of situations which can occure in war and all of them need to be adressed differently. So analyzing ones own situation, the threat matrix, terrain etc. and then build a well rounded force around these informations is the way to go.
Such a force mix will always have some more of euqipment X and doctrine Y as a defense against the red hordes in the plains of central europe needs to be adressed differently to a neutral country like swiss defending it's mountaineous regions.
But in the end everybody needs a balanced force mix of some kind.
As for artillery targeting tanks. Modern intelligent submunitions like SMARt as well as fast and accurate fire control networks make things easier.
Hitting an armoured spearhead on the run remains difficult, though. Add to that stuff like counterfire, electronic warfare or just your forward observer getting killed in the wrong moment and hitting becomes even more difficult.
In the end it's the same with the sometimes proposed "enough modern power kills everything"-card played in x vs y discussions.
One doesn't need to have a superior or even equal air force and air defense network. It just needs to be able to protect your ground troops until they overrun the airfields...
But doesn’t that side step the point of asking the general question, is there a point where you cannot substitute more technology for ever fewer people? Is there a point where having more great toys doesn’t add any more benefit but in fact confuses and complicates the situation beyond their usefulness? And as we have seen in the past with all kinds of technology of whatever kind and wherever it is used for any complex and dynamic human endeavor, don’t they come with brand new problems all of their own?
I am not one of those anti-technology freaks but purely technological solutions to human needs never seem to be as simple as they first appear. Where we stand at this point in human history, both in our level of technology and our collective wisdom to use it, the best balance between the two is always uncertain.
By in large, people are far more flexible and adaptable than machines and that is not likely to change. Therefor the more people you have the greater capacity you have for adaptions. This is a dimension of warfare that is often dismissed unfairly. Will we find ourselves hampered both by the limitations of our technology and our own lack of imagination to then cope with the unexspected without it?
isn't this at the heart of the question "Is war is simply a matter of numbers???"
Sure there is such a point.
There is just so much technology one operator can operate and over a given time. One just needs some kind of troop density for a given situation.
Operation Iraqi Freedom is an example were both sides of the coin existed.
The conventional phase of the war up to the capturing of Bagdad got accomplished by a really small number of troops which just outmatched their opponents so much in every category that they were able to pull of a really impressive campaign. The Iraqis had no chance at all.
Right after the conventional phase ended the US forces suddenly found themselves on the wrong side of the coin.
A force which decimated it's opponent at free will was now not able to control and hold the streets against plunderers as well as the early militias and insurgents. And all that (a little bit oversimplified, but nevertheless true) because they lacked the boots on the ground.
There is just so much technology one operator can operate and over a given time. One just needs some kind of troop density for a given situation.
Operation Iraqi Freedom is an example were both sides of the coin existed.
The conventional phase of the war up to the capturing of Bagdad got accomplished by a really small number of troops which just outmatched their opponents so much in every category that they were able to pull of a really impressive campaign. The Iraqis had no chance at all.
Right after the conventional phase ended the US forces suddenly found themselves on the wrong side of the coin.
A force which decimated it's opponent at free will was now not able to control and hold the streets against plunderers as well as the early militias and insurgents. And all that (a little bit oversimplified, but nevertheless true) because they lacked the boots on the ground.
I can only agree with you.
I think that morale and the common soldiers belief in the cause that they are fighting for. Take the Russian Empire during world war 1, for example the Battle of Tannenberg. The Russians had a combined force of roughly 416,000 soldiers vs the Germans 166,000, yet the Germans utterly routed the Russians killing and wounding 78000 and capturing another 90000. I feel that as if that the Russians had no belief in the cause of fighting a war for a king they did not want and a war they did not wish to have. The belief in the cause of a soldier can completely change the way he fights and when he will run. Numbers look big on paper, but their is always a grunt behind the numbers with a gun and who knows how he react.
Though belief in a great cause is a very important part of combat effectiveness, organization and group cohesiveness is even more important. If the solders had enough confidence in their leadership, which they didn’t have, and if they had a reason to have confidence in their leadership, which they didn’t, things could have come out differently.
When a fighting team has solid victories under its belt and not a history of stumbling from one disaster after another, they tend to win and win big, even if the cause they are fighting for is fairly weak.
The single most important part of moral is the belief that you can win! Yes I know there have been many last stands where one group has fought magnificently with any hope of victory, like the Spartans or the Alamo. But such exceptions are very rare. That is why we remember and are inspired by them.
captonjohn
New Member
Number doesn't matters but power matters
World's most powerful army isn't world's largest army. In battlefield strategy, tactics and technology matters. How you prevent enemy to group against you and how you use your technology to destroy them before they can reach for direct contact with you that matters.
Technological superiority, tactics, strategy and better training plays important role in battlefield. An army's power depends upon all these factors. Insufficient training with modern arms isn't that much effective as highly trained army with less modern arms.
I've a quite different view regarding this topic. In modern battlefield number doesn't matters much but power matters everywhere. I mean that the force which is more powerful has more chance to win but a powerful force doesn't mean superior in numbers.
World's most powerful army isn't world's largest army. In battlefield strategy, tactics and technology matters. How you prevent enemy to group against you and how you use your technology to destroy them before they can reach for direct contact with you that matters.
Technological superiority, tactics, strategy and better training plays important role in battlefield. An army's power depends upon all these factors. Insufficient training with modern arms isn't that much effective as highly trained army with less modern arms.
Whatever the tipping point is, the correct balance between men and machines, something will always come along and upsets it and usually before we completely understand what those changes fully mean, something else changes. With technology, tactics, and political requirements of warfare changing so fast flexibility is the most important factor to maintain. So at least one of those things that need to maintain that very flexibility is at least the capacity to rapidly increase troupe numbers when required.
If everyone in uniforms is a highly trained expert that takes years to bring fully up to speed on their very complex gear no matter how effective it is, and that is how your military system only works then in the end numbers will prevail.
There will always be a need for a high/low mix of weapons and skills with a priority on the high end during times of relative peace with the capacity to greatly expand the lower end, if everything gets really ugly.
IMO it is very interesting how big wars tend to surprise everybody in terms of how they are fought and which directions they take.
WW1 saw everybody surprised at how it comsumed young men and how modern technology negated the strategies and tactics of the past.
In WW2 every got surprised again by the pace of armoured warfare and other new tactics and technologies.
I am sure a conventional Cold War gone hot would have included some nasty surprises for both sides as well. I doubt both sides were really prepared for the slugfest that would have happened when so many men with so many new weapons systems clash on such a small piece of land.
The same applies to a degree for Operation Desert Storm or all the Israeli wars. Numbers wasn't the deciding factor in these wars.
WW1 saw everybody surprised at how it comsumed young men and how modern technology negated the strategies and tactics of the past.
In WW2 every got surprised again by the pace of armoured warfare and other new tactics and technologies.
I am sure a conventional Cold War gone hot would have included some nasty surprises for both sides as well. I doubt both sides were really prepared for the slugfest that would have happened when so many men with so many new weapons systems clash on such a small piece of land.
The same applies to a degree for Operation Desert Storm or all the Israeli wars. Numbers wasn't the deciding factor in these wars.
Technically the same strategy was already used ten years before WW1 by Russia to defend in the siege of Port Arthur.
Korea proved that not all of it was all that obsolete. Including the human wave in overwhelming defensive force multipliers.
In Desert Storm the Coalition fielded almost twice as many people in the theater than Iraq; the US alone deployed more men than Iraq fielded. When localized, and with mutual avoidance of direct contact in favour of (an asymmetric) indirect contact accounted for, the Coalition had a rather vast numerical superiority.
Nevertheless all the big powers in Europe started to fight WW1 as if events like at Port Arthur or the Balkan conflicts before never happend and were surprised that it didn't work out as they thought it would...
And the surprise in Desert Storm was not the victory of the coalition forces but the really low losses with which they won.
And this cannot be solely attributed to the Numerical superiority of the coalition forces.
And the surprise in Desert Storm was not the victory of the coalition forces but the really low losses with which they won.
And this cannot be solely attributed to the Numerical superiority of the coalition forces.
I attribute it to the "avoidance of direct contact" thing. And the asymmetric use of force multipliers.
The Germans won the Battle of Tannenberg for many reasons other than moral, which must have been suffering after a string of losses and retreats into Eastern Prussia. Principle among them were:
-- The professionalism of the German soldiers. As noted above, their moral was suffering, but it was still at least equal to the Russians. Except for numbers, the Germans were superior in doctrine, training, and equipment.
-- The fact that the leaders of the 2 Russian armies loathed each other and would scarcely communicate with the other, much less coordinate their operations. As a result the Germans in the Battle of Tannenberg were only facing only the Russian 2nd Army (206,000 soldiers), while the 1st Army farther north went unengaged.
-- The German and Russian railroads were incompatible. As a result the retreat into Germany permitted only the Germans to rapidly redeploy their troops, giving them in effect the advantage of fighting on interior lines. And, without access to railroads the Russians had outrun their supply lines.
-- The Russians lacked sufficient telegraph wire and trained communications personnel. By the time of the Battle of Tannenberg virtually all Russian communications were by radio in clear language. As a result the German commanders were frequently reading the Russian messages before their intended recipients, and were fully aware of the Russian plans and weaknesses. This permitted them to safely put into action a radical plan that under other any circumstances would have been unacceptably reckless.
The Germans used the railroads to withdrawing virtually all their troops facing the Russian 1st Army and concentrating them at 2 points against the 2nd Army, allowing them to break through the Russian lines and defeat the 2nd Army in detail. This left the Russian 1st Army with no option except to retreat back to nearly their starting positions, where it was destroyed 2 weeks later at the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes.
captonjohn
New Member
Agree with you, power lies in balance and how you maintain it. How you maintain balance between all forces and their resources that matters more. Of course this is not practically possible that an army will have all highly skilled soldiers and modern equipments hence a combination of high and low works better. This is simple that commando forces and special forces aren't meant to use for infantry role because they are trained to do different job in different situation.
In today's world technological superiority play major role in warfare and anybody can fill the gap of numbers with it to balance it.
captonjohn
New Member
Definitely Germans destroyed Russian army decisively by their superior weapons, troops and supply but he isn't wrong about morals. Of course in battlefield strategy plays a major role but moral come in scene when Russian army had suffered heavy loss but despite this they continued war and keep fighting against Germans. The moral can't give you victory but can give you a proper reason to fight and enough confidence to face enemy.
Remember about Operation Barborosa which got failed because Stalin refused to leave mosque and all russian forces brutally fought war to save their capital. Here moral play important role
captonjohn
New Member
Opps sorry that is an spelling mistake, my mean was Moscow. While critical time of world war when russian were thinking to evacuate Moscow then Stalin refused to leave and due to this whole russian army defended it on do or die rule.
I give you the force multipliers as they are part of my statement that the war was not solely won because of superior numbers.
But avoidance of direct contact?
The armoured forces of the left hook grinded through several republican guard divisions and the deceiving attacks to the front were also no walk in the park.
That's not what I would call avoidance of direct contact.
It was the exception. There were way in excess of half a million men on either side not involved in direct contact.