I wouldn't read too much into those articles. They're simply produced by students at Staff College as part of their masters. You can find similar essays talking about all sorts of random things.Was just reading an article by Major Paul Scanlan
http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/L...AAJ/2012Summer/05-IsParachuteCapabilitySt.pdf
Am curious about his point of Plan Beersheba to have one Amphibious Battalion group for operations while also providing a Parachute battle group be better for the ADF than what the Government is pushing for in the White paper?
I think the point you are referring too is that Plan Beersheba doesn't easily support the government requirement for a brigade deployed somewhere and another battle group available for operations. This is because 2 RAR would be part of the lodgement of the brigade, and therefore wouldn't be able to sit outside that rotation and be available for something else. Having the 1 Div direct command unit being a parachute battalion would improve this, as the FORCOMD brigades can rotate through the brigade deployment and keep the parachute battalion outside of that, providing options to government.
It's not a particularly strong point, however, as the 'left over' unit of the deployed brigade could just as easily provide the extra battlegroup as a parachute battalion could, just without the option of being inserted by parachute. That isn't much of an option anyway, as in the article he states the purpose of a parachute capability in FORCOMD is simply to create a lodgement for follow on forces. If there's no follow on forces, because they are deployed elsewhere, what's the point?