personaldesas
Active Member
Not sure the Germans have the stomach for that one either. Every time they invade they have to start further west than the last time.
The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread
personaldesas
Active Member
You'll need to tell that to the fine folks at RTR when they publicly discuss creating a landbridge to Kaliningrad.
Deus Ex Machina
New Member
There have been other opportunities to negotiate before AND after the 2022 invasion. And if Zelensky was a true politician (with proper diplomatic advisors) and not a Temu-knockoff of Churchill, things would be much better. Antagonizing Putin to an extreme degree and constantly trying to escalate are mistakes that Ukraine is paying and will continue to pay.
His latest escalations are attacking non-weapon major warehouses and now threatening civilian flights over russian airspace, just to give some examples. But there have been others, like attacking shipping, organizing assassinations/bombings, blowing up Nordstream ... Russia generally responds in kind and that's a problem.
He also constantly attacks his allies, he just said the europeans are on holiday for example. And we saw what happened in the White House in that rare epic fiasco in front of the cameras.
@Feanor
I value your opinion greatly and you are always objective. Would you say Zelensky has some responsibility for not respecting the Minsk accords? Do you consider him partly responsible for this war? (Putin is undeniably responsible, no question about that of course, but he is on the other side)
rsemmes
Active Member
That would be like talking to Fox News, right?
Or are you talking about the version of events that you find on some Spanish tv channels?
personaldesas
Active Member
If Fox News would be government sanctioned.
Not sure what you're referring to, don't really watch TV, especially not from Spain.
personaldesas
Active Member
@Deus Ex Machina To make this question more concrete: what would ukraine have needed to do to prevent the invasion? curious what that looks like concretely.
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #15,167
I think Zelensky has some responsibility for not implementing the Minsk Accords. However only some. I think Zelensky and Poroshenko each genuinely tried to implement them and failed due to internal opposition within the Ukrainian government, including force-wielding structures. In 2014 it was useful to arm ultra-nationalists for the war. In 2016 they refused to abide by the separation of forces provision of the Minsk Accords. Zelensky ran into the same problem. The Rada was also very unwilling to make the constitutional changes required. So if the question is one of personal responsibility, I think Zelensky carries fairly little. He has some, but it's an open question whether he really could have made it happen.
I think these are two very different questions. There's a big difference between what Ukraine (all of Ukraine) could have done vs what Zelensky himself could have done. Assuming we have some sort of divine control over Ukraine as a whole, they could have simply implemented the Minsk Accords which would have likely prevented the current invasion. In fact they could have done so back in 2016 and the entire history of this conflict would have gone down a different path.
personaldesas
Active Member
Video of the HUR vs SBU shootout
x.com
Stanislav Aseyev (@AseyevStanislav) on X
Video of the morning shootout between the SBU and HUR:
personaldesas
Active Member
I think thats a good description and it's fair to say that Ukraines institutions failed. Which is more scary IMHO.
KipPotapych
Well-Known Member
I personally don’t see any realistic scenario (with a but, below) where, call it, the West combined or, especially, individually, intends to fight Russia directly. Even the Yugoslavia scenario is questionable. I mean we have been through the 90s, where for all intents and purposes it was demonstrated that there is little to no interest for Russia to disintegrate, at least not then. Another but here, also below. We have then been through Chechnya, where Russians were being killed by buckets and some nasty things were taking place, and all the while there was no publicly/overtly expressed desire for Chechen independence by any major players (no one in their right mind would want it to be independent, in my opinion, either). No one recognized Ichkeria (which nearly succeeded the first time around, to be fair), but… drum roll… Ukraine after Russian invasion (as dumb as the recognition was). If I recall correctly, the only other country that had ever attempted a recognition was Estonia. It is actually surprising that it was only Estonia among all those with an inferiority complex that tried.
There was no professional Russian military at the time, resources were scarce, half existing economy, etc. Still no one had any overwhelming desire to intervene. The second but mentioned above: we can say that Chechnya was not a significant enough piece for an intervention to cause Yugoslavia-like scenario. But if not that, then what? Russia as it is today (including Crimea, but not (yet?) other former UA territories) is a pretty stable and established country. You probably well know that the stories of Russia crumbling into numerous countries, based on the current regions and oblasts or whatever the narrative suggests is for the lemmings and there is no internal pressure whatsoever for any separatist movements and the like. Yeah, sure, there are some fairly negligible groups in Tatarstan, elsewhere, but none are credible to even be considered as a precondition (Putin would probably himself say “предпосылок нет”). The Caucasus is the biggest chip in this context and Chechnya being the biggest piece in the potential domino effect in the region ((pre-Ukraine) followed by the loss of access to the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, even Caspian Sea, etc). Everyone else is Russian enough to identify as such for the most part (and I mean Russian not just Rossiyanin (Russian citizen)) - they all have been for centuries, more than many “modern” countries even exist. Yugoslavia was a different animal and a short-lived entity. We can say that the Yugoslavia scenario had already happened when the Soviet Union seized to exist. Current events are just the aftershock that should have been managed better.
Now, this is not to say that there should be no concern or planning for various scenarios on the Russian part. No one ever cancelled security dilemma, geopolitical competition, economic and other interests. To think that if a situation ever arises that is prime enough or resembles such, the choice would undoubtedly (or at least very likely, pending other factors to be determined at that time) fall on smaller states rather than one big Russian Federation. I do not think anyone should have any illusions about it. That is just reality, in my opinion. But… many little states imply Chinese proximity to vital resources, for example. Nothing is easy, but I think it is fairly clear that the threat is minimal while the nukes are around (the first but is still below).
At the same time, there should also be no illusion that no one but Russia itself wants to have a big and powerful, developed Russia. And I am not even talking about Russia like it is today. I am talking about a big powerful democratic Russia, western values and all that (a low probability scenario for various reasons, in my opinion). That’s nonsense. Nothing is permanent (see the United States today for a weak example). It’s too big of an unnecessary opponent with too much history. A developed enough state to be stable and friendly, but not too prosperous and technologically advanced to be a real competitor is an ideal state (at least a step behind, so to speak). There is a lot to talk about on this subject, but I am going to move on as this does not even belong in this thread.
Long story short, it is reasonable for Russia to view these contingencies as the real world outcomes and plan accordingly. The issue is that the, so-called, West never made sufficient steps to prove otherwise. A while back I cited (in the other thread) the last Putin’s speech before he became the president the very first time and offered to expand on it if there was interest; there was none and so I passed. People refer to his famous speech in Munich in 2007 as some groundbreaking turning point, but that is misleading because way back when in 1999 he talked about some of the same issues (even before that). Things change as time goes by, problems evolve, build up, etc. Munich was just a more refined speech (now through more lived experience) directed outward. Funny enough, this very example shows that people do not follow (even people who really should) the… call it mood and trajectory and get surprised like something came out of the blue. Yet, it is a consistent development that took years to materialize and come home to roost.
I should note here, this text began as a reply to Feanor’s thoughts, but evolved into a more general post vs a response to him in particular.
First, I agree completely that the invasion was… call it a mistake. It was discussed several times over, haha. And yes, even if it went perfectly, according to plan, whatever that was, it would still be a mistake. If it went better than planned, it would still be just as much of a mistake. At least from what we know today (or knew back then); in other words, there might be information we are not privileged to, but is rather doubtful there is anything that would really turn it around.
Second, this is where the first “but” I mentioned above comes in. About the only realistic scenario I see where a direct West (whatever that may be, NATO? some Europe?) vs Russia fighting takes place is in the course of the current conflict. This is a real and very undesirable possibility. A lot has happened since the invasion. Sooo many lines were crossed. And, it seems, the more lines are crossed, the higher the confidence that everything is dandy and concerns and threats expressed are just dismissed entirely and no action will ever follow (“hybrid” shenanigans aside). This is actually a pretty natural development and I had talked about it ever since I started posting here. Human psychology, commitment, etc. Imagine thinking five years ago about what is being done now in terms of “support”. Unthinkable and most people would call one a fool if there was such a suggestion. It is also unprecedented (but there sure is a precedent now).
There are numerous plausible scenarios how this can turn into a wider war, but I don’t want to go over them because it would most certainly make it beyond the one-post limit (probably going to push it as it is). The main point is that there are more than enough to put us in the highest risk situation probably ever. And I have no idea why it is being discounted to the level of normality by many, including people who should know better.
Is Russia really weaker? I would say it depends on the context. In the general sense it is weaker, without a doubt. But if we look at the potential conflicts it is to face, things aren’t as clear, in my opinion.
If we take pre-invasion as the base for comparison. Human capital is the biggest loss and it is obvious. Also obvious (but not as obvious) is the quality of equipment: while the stocks of most have been reportedly replenished and even beyond the level of those stocks in 2021, it is mostly older refurbished stuff (for now). But the new equipment is being built (and mostly sent to reserves/storage). The lessons from the war are being learned and applied. The knowledge base is still there and some part of the professional army that existed before still exists today. But more experienced. A substantial number of people will have gone through a hell of a war, which is both strength and weakness. Demographics and economics are currently the biggest constraints for the future, but far from catastrophic.
Previously existing missile stocks are being replaced with modern stuff that works and the production is something even the West is jealous of. Overall, the old “garbage” has been flushed completely (true for all involved). Drones, etc.
But if we put all this aside an talk about the conflicts Russia may face in the short- to medium-term and conflicts it faced in the recent past. Is it any weaker in, say, Georgia-like scenario in 2008? I would propose it is not and say it is more prepared for such a contingency than it was before. And this is true for all of the post-Soviet space. Syria? My answer would be the same, especially a few years from now. NATO? This is more complex than it seems, in my opinion.
KipPotapych
Well-Known Member
Yes, ran out of space, as expected, so part two:
This war has clearly showed that there is no quick in and out. Yugoslavia showed it previously as well, but this is way more serious and obvious. Air campaign is unlikely to deliver any result. Russia has demonstrated that it has an astronomical propensity to sustain losses and grind away. I highly doubt there is any competition here from the “West” partially or combined. And Russia hasn’t even fully mobilized yet. Even if its Navy takes catastrophic losses (which it probably would, at least as far as the surface fleet is concerned), it would not mean much and would not be a defining factor. But this is no different from the previous (2021) state.
That’s the thing: previous state. In this discussion I see these postulates like “Russia will now not be able to use maneuver and combined arms effectively”. Was it before? I mean we saw how February 2022 played out. I think the more relevant question is would NATO? I most certainly would not bet on it. From everything I read on the subject, I mostly see the talk about things Russia wasn’t great at or had a disadvantage in to begin with. No, it would not be able to successfully use combined arms against the NATO force. That’s nonsense, as it was before. And yes, it’s Navy would be a write off in such a conflict. Same as before. The problem with all these arguments is that one thing had not changed at all: the nukes will fly as they would before (maybe with some improvements implemented given the now intimate experience with the western AD). So what is different?
We can also add what Russia has learned in this conflict, including the weaknesses of the opponent. For example, once US-made interceptors run out, it can wreck havoc on eastern Europe with ballistic and “supersonic” missiles, as well as other assets using the tactics they use in Ukraine. It has also learned that there is no unity in Europe or NATO. All kinds of weapons are in short supply and neither is prepared for an actual long war. And so on.
So is Russia weaker? Yes, of course. It lost some major geopolitical influence, but is it permanent? Hard to say. All this only suggests the obvious: it must finish this conflict in the definitive and permanent way, or as close to that as possible. Which is why the West is not likely to let this happen. And this brings us back to the escalation that no one seems to take seriously enough in the context of this war. There is very little space for miscalculations and the gap only gets tighter.
To conclude, I am not sure weaker is the right term. It seems to me that not much has changed as far as the greater “West”-Russia conflict is concerned since the main asset in that scenario is intact and likely improved. Conventional deterrent probably still stands too - I do not believe NATO can with utmost certainty defeat Russia via conventional means if we take nukes out of the equation completely. The implied weakness in some regional conflict scenario is only so until this war is over, then it is back to square one (probably with a plus or two).
So weaker? Perhaps, but mot necessarily. Does it have much relevance? Probably not. The outcome of this war is important though.
This war has clearly showed that there is no quick in and out. Yugoslavia showed it previously as well, but this is way more serious and obvious. Air campaign is unlikely to deliver any result. Russia has demonstrated that it has an astronomical propensity to sustain losses and grind away. I highly doubt there is any competition here from the “West” partially or combined. And Russia hasn’t even fully mobilized yet. Even if its Navy takes catastrophic losses (which it probably would, at least as far as the surface fleet is concerned), it would not mean much and would not be a defining factor. But this is no different from the previous (2021) state.
That’s the thing: previous state. In this discussion I see these postulates like “Russia will now not be able to use maneuver and combined arms effectively”. Was it before? I mean we saw how February 2022 played out. I think the more relevant question is would NATO? I most certainly would not bet on it. From everything I read on the subject, I mostly see the talk about things Russia wasn’t great at or had a disadvantage in to begin with. No, it would not be able to successfully use combined arms against the NATO force. That’s nonsense, as it was before. And yes, it’s Navy would be a write off in such a conflict. Same as before. The problem with all these arguments is that one thing had not changed at all: the nukes will fly as they would before (maybe with some improvements implemented given the now intimate experience with the western AD). So what is different?
We can also add what Russia has learned in this conflict, including the weaknesses of the opponent. For example, once US-made interceptors run out, it can wreck havoc on eastern Europe with ballistic and “supersonic” missiles, as well as other assets using the tactics they use in Ukraine. It has also learned that there is no unity in Europe or NATO. All kinds of weapons are in short supply and neither is prepared for an actual long war. And so on.
So is Russia weaker? Yes, of course. It lost some major geopolitical influence, but is it permanent? Hard to say. All this only suggests the obvious: it must finish this conflict in the definitive and permanent way, or as close to that as possible. Which is why the West is not likely to let this happen. And this brings us back to the escalation that no one seems to take seriously enough in the context of this war. There is very little space for miscalculations and the gap only gets tighter.
To conclude, I am not sure weaker is the right term. It seems to me that not much has changed as far as the greater “West”-Russia conflict is concerned since the main asset in that scenario is intact and likely improved. Conventional deterrent probably still stands too - I do not believe NATO can with utmost certainty defeat Russia via conventional means if we take nukes out of the equation completely. The implied weakness in some regional conflict scenario is only so until this war is over, then it is back to square one (probably with a plus or two).
So weaker? Perhaps, but mot necessarily. Does it have much relevance? Probably not. The outcome of this war is important though.
KipPotapych
Well-Known Member
I would highly recommend listening to this short podcast on the subject:Video of the HUR vs SBU shootout
Stanislav Aseyev (@AseyevStanislav) on X
Video of the morning shootout between the SBU and HUR:
Expert on organized crime: You want to fight Russia?! Make Ukraine less corrupt and better governed
The Global Agora · Episode
open.spotify.com
KipPotapych
Well-Known Member
Food for thought:
“We now launch more at Russia than Russia launches at us.” This being advertised as some achievement that matters. It does not. Payload delivery is what does. Here is a part of Sept 3 (about 16 hours) in Ukraine (in Spanish, but easy to understand):
- 08:07 Odesa – explosión. Geran-4
- 08:15 Obukhiv (Kyiv) – explosión. Geran-4
- 08:20 Boryspil (Kyiv) – explosión. Geran-4
- 08:25 Sumy – explosiones. FAB
- 08:40 Kyiv y Boryspil (Kyiv) – explosiones. Geran-4
- 08:45 Zaporizhzhia y Boyarka (Kyiv) – explosiones. Geran-4
- 08:50 Región de Járkov – FAB
- 09:00 Donbas – explosiones. FAB
- 09:15 Bucha y Kyiv y Bucha – explosiones. Geran-4
- 10:07 Slobozhanske Kharkiv – explosiones. Banderol
- 10:17 Jersón – explosiones. FAB
- 10:31 Illichivsk (Odesa) – explosión. Geran-4
- 10:34 Khersn – explosiones. FAB. Tokarivka
- 10:35 Illichivsk (Odesa) – explosión. Geran-4
- 10:45 Donbás – explosiones. FAB
- 11:08 Dnipropetrovsk - explosión. Parcela
- 11:15 Dnipropetrovsk - explosiones. UMPC
- 11:17 Afueras de Kyiv - explosión. Geranio-4
- 11:27 Vasylkiv (Kyiv) - explosión. Geran-4
- 11:45 Bucha (Kyiv) y Tatarbunary, Odesa - explosiones. Geran-4
- 11:55-12:30 Vyshneve y Vasylkiv (Kyiv) - explosiones. Geran-4/5
- 12:53 Pavlograd (Dnipropetrovsk) - explosión. Geran-4
- 13:02 Vyshneve (Kyiv) - explosión. Geran-4
- 13:06-13:45 Vasylkiv (Kyiv) - explosión. Geranio-4/5
- 13:55 Kyiv - explosión. Geran-4
- 14:00 Sumy - explosión. Geran-4
- 14:15 Illichivsk (Odesa) - explosión. Geran-4
- 14:17 Sumy - explosiones. FAB
- 14:20–14:30 Sumy – explosiones. Drones Geran
- 14:40 Illichivsk (Odesa) – explosión. Geran-4
- 14:50 Sumy – explosión. Dron Geran
- 14:52 Región de Kharkiv – explosiones. FAB
- 14:55 Alrededores de Pavlohrad y Kremenchuk – explosiones. Geran-4
- 15:05 Región de Kharkiv – explosiones. FAB
- 15:10 Donbas – explosiones. FAB
- 15:50–16:00 Kyiv – serie de explosiones. Geran-4
- 16:05 Brovary (Kyiv) – explosión. Geran-4
- 16:10–16:20 Kyiv – explosión. Geran-4
- 16:40 Donbas y Dnipropetrovsk – explosiones. FAB
- 18:15 Afueras de Kyiv – explosión. Geran-4
- 18:30 Cherkasy y Kyiv – explosiones. Geran
- 19:00 Kyiv – explosiones. Geran-4
- 19:35–19:45 Vasylkiv (Kyiv) – explosiones. Geran-4
- 20:35 Donbas – explosiones. FAB
- 20:40 Afueras de Sumy – explosiones. FAB
- 20:45 Kirovogrado – explosión. Geran-4
- 20:55 Kyiv – explosión. Geran-4
- 21:00 Donbás y Dnipropetrovsk – explosiones. FAB
- 21:07 Kyiv – explosiones. Geran-4
- 21:20 Kirovogrado – explosión. Geran-4
- 21:40 Lozova (Kharkiv) y Slavutych, Kyiv – explosiones. Geran-4
- 21:40–21:50 Kirovogrado – explosiones. Geran-4
- 21:50 Balaklyia (Kharkiv) – explosión. Geran-4
- 22:35–22:40 Kyiv y Brovary – explosiones. Geran-4
- 22:50 Kyiv – explosión. Geran-4
- 23:05 Donbas – explosiones. FAB
- 23:45 Shostka, Sumy – explosión. Geran-4
The first ~6.5 hours of Sept 5:
- 00:10 Boryspil, Kyiv – explosión. Geran-4
• 00:14 Brovary, Kyiv – explosión. Geran-4
- 00:20 Kyiv – explosión. Geran-4
- 00:30–00:40 Trostianets y Okhtyrka, Sumy – explosiones. Geran
- 01:15 Dykanka, Poltava – explosiones. Geran
- 01:20–01:23 Kamianske, Dnipropetrovsk – explosiones. Iskander-M/Zircón
- 02:00 Lozova, Kharkiv y Brovary, Kyiv – explosiones. Geran-4
- 02:50 Donbas y Khárkov – explosiones. FAB
- 03:05 Dnipropetrovsk – explosiones. FAB
- 03:35 Odesa y Boryspil, Kyiv – explosiones. Geran-4
- 03:45 Donbas – explosiones. FAB
- 03:53 Odesa – explosión. Geran-4
- 03:55 Región de Kharkiv – explosiones. FAB
- 04:55 Alrededores Cherkasy – explosión. Geran-4
- 04:55 Región de Zaporizhzhia – explosiones. FAB
- 05:30 Afueras de Zaporizhzhia – explosión. Geran-4
- 05:35 Dnipropetrovsk – explosiones. FAB
- 05:40–05:55 Zaporizhzhia – explosiones. FAB
- 05:50 Brovary, Kyiv – explosión. Geran-4
- 06:22 Odesa – explosión. Geran-4.
Source is here: Martin Tuitero (@TuiteroMartin) on X
Note that the list is probably incomplete because only one missile strike is mentioned in the time spans presented and there were likely more (a strike by a Kh-31 anti-radiation missile on Spet 3 around 18:00, at least 8 Iskander/KN missiles were launched on Sept 5, but maybe outside the hours presented, unless they all hit Kamianske around 1:20, as shown).
“We now launch more at Russia than Russia launches at us.” This being advertised as some achievement that matters. It does not. Payload delivery is what does. Here is a part of Sept 3 (about 16 hours) in Ukraine (in Spanish, but easy to understand):
- 08:07 Odesa – explosión. Geran-4
- 08:15 Obukhiv (Kyiv) – explosión. Geran-4
- 08:20 Boryspil (Kyiv) – explosión. Geran-4
- 08:25 Sumy – explosiones. FAB
- 08:40 Kyiv y Boryspil (Kyiv) – explosiones. Geran-4
- 08:45 Zaporizhzhia y Boyarka (Kyiv) – explosiones. Geran-4
- 08:50 Región de Járkov – FAB
- 09:00 Donbas – explosiones. FAB
- 09:15 Bucha y Kyiv y Bucha – explosiones. Geran-4
- 10:07 Slobozhanske Kharkiv – explosiones. Banderol
- 10:17 Jersón – explosiones. FAB
- 10:31 Illichivsk (Odesa) – explosión. Geran-4
- 10:34 Khersn – explosiones. FAB. Tokarivka
- 10:35 Illichivsk (Odesa) – explosión. Geran-4
- 10:45 Donbás – explosiones. FAB
- 11:08 Dnipropetrovsk - explosión. Parcela
- 11:15 Dnipropetrovsk - explosiones. UMPC
- 11:17 Afueras de Kyiv - explosión. Geranio-4
- 11:27 Vasylkiv (Kyiv) - explosión. Geran-4
- 11:45 Bucha (Kyiv) y Tatarbunary, Odesa - explosiones. Geran-4
- 11:55-12:30 Vyshneve y Vasylkiv (Kyiv) - explosiones. Geran-4/5
- 12:53 Pavlograd (Dnipropetrovsk) - explosión. Geran-4
- 13:02 Vyshneve (Kyiv) - explosión. Geran-4
- 13:06-13:45 Vasylkiv (Kyiv) - explosión. Geranio-4/5
- 13:55 Kyiv - explosión. Geran-4
- 14:00 Sumy - explosión. Geran-4
- 14:15 Illichivsk (Odesa) - explosión. Geran-4
- 14:17 Sumy - explosiones. FAB
- 14:20–14:30 Sumy – explosiones. Drones Geran
- 14:40 Illichivsk (Odesa) – explosión. Geran-4
- 14:50 Sumy – explosión. Dron Geran
- 14:52 Región de Kharkiv – explosiones. FAB
- 14:55 Alrededores de Pavlohrad y Kremenchuk – explosiones. Geran-4
- 15:05 Región de Kharkiv – explosiones. FAB
- 15:10 Donbas – explosiones. FAB
- 15:50–16:00 Kyiv – serie de explosiones. Geran-4
- 16:05 Brovary (Kyiv) – explosión. Geran-4
- 16:10–16:20 Kyiv – explosión. Geran-4
- 16:40 Donbas y Dnipropetrovsk – explosiones. FAB
- 18:15 Afueras de Kyiv – explosión. Geran-4
- 18:30 Cherkasy y Kyiv – explosiones. Geran
- 19:00 Kyiv – explosiones. Geran-4
- 19:35–19:45 Vasylkiv (Kyiv) – explosiones. Geran-4
- 20:35 Donbas – explosiones. FAB
- 20:40 Afueras de Sumy – explosiones. FAB
- 20:45 Kirovogrado – explosión. Geran-4
- 20:55 Kyiv – explosión. Geran-4
- 21:00 Donbás y Dnipropetrovsk – explosiones. FAB
- 21:07 Kyiv – explosiones. Geran-4
- 21:20 Kirovogrado – explosión. Geran-4
- 21:40 Lozova (Kharkiv) y Slavutych, Kyiv – explosiones. Geran-4
- 21:40–21:50 Kirovogrado – explosiones. Geran-4
- 21:50 Balaklyia (Kharkiv) – explosión. Geran-4
- 22:35–22:40 Kyiv y Brovary – explosiones. Geran-4
- 22:50 Kyiv – explosión. Geran-4
- 23:05 Donbas – explosiones. FAB
- 23:45 Shostka, Sumy – explosión. Geran-4
The first ~6.5 hours of Sept 5:
- 00:10 Boryspil, Kyiv – explosión. Geran-4
• 00:14 Brovary, Kyiv – explosión. Geran-4
- 00:20 Kyiv – explosión. Geran-4
- 00:30–00:40 Trostianets y Okhtyrka, Sumy – explosiones. Geran
- 01:15 Dykanka, Poltava – explosiones. Geran
- 01:20–01:23 Kamianske, Dnipropetrovsk – explosiones. Iskander-M/Zircón
- 02:00 Lozova, Kharkiv y Brovary, Kyiv – explosiones. Geran-4
- 02:50 Donbas y Khárkov – explosiones. FAB
- 03:05 Dnipropetrovsk – explosiones. FAB
- 03:35 Odesa y Boryspil, Kyiv – explosiones. Geran-4
- 03:45 Donbas – explosiones. FAB
- 03:53 Odesa – explosión. Geran-4
- 03:55 Región de Kharkiv – explosiones. FAB
- 04:55 Alrededores Cherkasy – explosión. Geran-4
- 04:55 Región de Zaporizhzhia – explosiones. FAB
- 05:30 Afueras de Zaporizhzhia – explosión. Geran-4
- 05:35 Dnipropetrovsk – explosiones. FAB
- 05:40–05:55 Zaporizhzhia – explosiones. FAB
- 05:50 Brovary, Kyiv – explosión. Geran-4
- 06:22 Odesa – explosión. Geran-4.
Source is here: Martin Tuitero (@TuiteroMartin) on X
Note that the list is probably incomplete because only one missile strike is mentioned in the time spans presented and there were likely more (a strike by a Kh-31 anti-radiation missile on Spet 3 around 18:00, at least 8 Iskander/KN missiles were launched on Sept 5, but maybe outside the hours presented, unless they all hit Kamianske around 1:20, as shown).
rsemmes
Active Member
Ukraine keeps regaining ground in the Liman area and in the city.
personaldesas
Active Member
Interestingly enough this seems to be the result of weeks of fighting rather than a sudden move. Somehow I never noticed it.
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #15,177
Months. Many mappers didn't report on it. But Ukraine started counter-attacking there quite a while ago. Its also a significant area unlike the southern push towards Mokri Yali river. And it appears Russia withdrew, rather than facing encirclement. In other words their command knew. This raises questions, what changed? Why not throw more forces into the fight?
KipPotapych
Well-Known Member
Some quick thoughts on a few things circulating around.
This seems to be the general mood nowadays. Counterpoint: because someone has “grown some balls” and enabled Ukraine to strike civilian warehouses in Russia, the intensified Russian strikes on the facilities mentioned is a direct consequence of that decision. Thinking that Ukraine can “respond to Russia in a way that russia won't ever think of this again” is a delusion that will lead to more (or total?) destruction. But it is not the balls of those that had grown them that are being kicked, so they may grow them some more, I guess.
Refugee crisis will likely come regardless of what happens though. Pretty sure everyone has a fairly good idea of what is coming. Kind of surprised Russians did not take advantage of lack of interceptors to completely level some power plants and other critical facilities beyond repair.
Has it not been an established consensus for 4.5 years now that even Lavrov did not know about the invasion plans? Pretty sure it has been the case - that is, few people knew about it (including a few at the CIA, laughing). So why are we quoting Ryabkov, of all people, in 2022 as a counterargument to (alleged?) Putin’s statements today? Consistency is (very) important. Otherwise, one appears to be unable to follow the sequence of events and being void of rational thought process. Needless to say, one also appears to be weak. While I have no idea who this guy is (I follow Laurence, who retweeted the rubbish), this is a widespread “deficiency” that has been consistent (as mentioned, very important) for many years.
Ukraine’s path into the European Union requires an unequivocal commitment to fundamental European values and historical truth.
There is no place in Europe for the glorification of war criminals.
Shouldn’t that be sort of an extension of the thought? Especially in light of recent events? I must have missed the outrage (but from Poles). Again, consistency is important. I guess, there is some consistency here. Like, for example, Kallas having a very vague idea, if any, on the topic of the historical truth (as I discussed/cited a few times previously). Also consistent for the past few years is that Ukraine “has a right” to honour whoever they like and no one “has a right” to intervene in their internal affairs and this Ukrainian right is consistent with fundamental European values and historical truth, for which there is a place in Europe. I’d point to Estonia too, but we are in the wrong thread.
Also of note is that Serbia is in Europe, regardless of what happens there or anywhere else. I like how Europe is consistently defined by this lady (and others) based on their preferences. Not sure why they cannot get this simple fact: Europe, which she does not represent, and the EU, where many appear to have issues with her representation, are not the same thing. It’s not rocket science.
Again, common thought process. Completely nonsensical though. “Much left of Russia” is a tell, I guess. Capabilities are not comparable, clearly. But… To think that there is any serious consideration of a strategic nuclear exchange is a weak-sauce argument. To entertain this theory though, let’s say there is some remote (or not as remote?) contingency where Russia hits the UK with a tactical nuclear weapon (from a sub, for example), what is London’s response? Launching a few (American) Tridents in hopes of wrecking Moscow and St Petersburg, while likely (almost certainly) taking on a status of an uninhabitable island for the foreseeable future and beyond? This is not a serious talk at all. The UK has no tangible argument against Russian capabilities as far as the nuclear weapons are concerned.
Thankfully for the UK though, none of this is a real and immediate threat. The threat of use of the aforementioned weapons is elsewhere, which the guy appears to have missed completely, so those “grown balls” may relax and even drop, and allow for some further growth.
That guy I also had never heard of before, but is followed by some people I do and some of those people I consider to be heavyweights in the business. Maybe I am missing something. According to one of his follow-ups though, probably not:
It really is a very strong line of argument. If I can shoot off your head (and heart and internal organs for good measure), even if you can utterly machine-gun my body, you will think very hard before you contemplate pulling the trigger...
To follow his logic here, what if you are shot in the arm while the machine-gun is pointed at you? Do you elect trying to shoot off the “head (and heart and internal organs, for good measure)”? Or what do you do? What if your “neighbour’s”, whom you vowed to protect, arm (or head, or anything else for that matter) is shot off while the machine gun is pointing at you? What if the guy holding the machine gun has very little to lose while you have everything you had prior to getting to that point? Again, a dumb argument. People are not seeing this through. This is not a zero-sum game and anyone who took (and paid attention in, laughing) a basic game theory course would say this argument has nothing to do with reality.
Different note:
The US is exploring possible steps for Ukraine and Russia to de-escalate the war during the winter while restarting negotiations toward a broader peace agreement, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told the Axios news site Monday.
Imagine thinking this is possible. I mean it is, but everything that would lead to such a development has been rejected so far (by both parties).
Zelenskyy said the weeks ahead could provide an opportunity for diplomacy, arguing that Russian President Vladimir Putin may be seeking to avoid antagonizing US President Donald Trump ahead of US midterm elections.
"My feeling (is) that Putin needs Trump," he said. "He doesn't want ... to upset him."
Freud would probably have a thing or two to say here. I highly doubt that Russians have much illusion about Trump at this point. They’d probably rather not, but if something they do “upsets” him… why would they care?
Zelenskyy said Washington also supports a separate winter assistance package for Ukraine involving air defense and energy support.
I think this was the assistance package:
"We have this September, October to find any way to speak," he said. "Without dialogue … we will not have (a) result."
"I think that President Trump can find a way to (a) real beginning of the process of negotiating before (the) cold winter," he added.
What is probably clear by now to everyone is that the cold winter and no ceasefire is one of the main assets in the negotiating process and it will not be given up (especially before winter). Clear as day. But it does sound like someone actually does “need Trump” and “doesn’t want to upset him”.
(No idea what that website is, but it is the Axios article without the paywall).
This seems to be the general mood nowadays. Counterpoint: because someone has “grown some balls” and enabled Ukraine to strike civilian warehouses in Russia, the intensified Russian strikes on the facilities mentioned is a direct consequence of that decision. Thinking that Ukraine can “respond to Russia in a way that russia won't ever think of this again” is a delusion that will lead to more (or total?) destruction. But it is not the balls of those that had grown them that are being kicked, so they may grow them some more, I guess.
Refugee crisis will likely come regardless of what happens though. Pretty sure everyone has a fairly good idea of what is coming. Kind of surprised Russians did not take advantage of lack of interceptors to completely level some power plants and other critical facilities beyond repair.
Has it not been an established consensus for 4.5 years now that even Lavrov did not know about the invasion plans? Pretty sure it has been the case - that is, few people knew about it (including a few at the CIA, laughing). So why are we quoting Ryabkov, of all people, in 2022 as a counterargument to (alleged?) Putin’s statements today? Consistency is (very) important. Otherwise, one appears to be unable to follow the sequence of events and being void of rational thought process. Needless to say, one also appears to be weak. While I have no idea who this guy is (I follow Laurence, who retweeted the rubbish), this is a widespread “deficiency” that has been consistent (as mentioned, very important) for many years.
Ukraine’s path into the European Union requires an unequivocal commitment to fundamental European values and historical truth.
There is no place in Europe for the glorification of war criminals.
Shouldn’t that be sort of an extension of the thought? Especially in light of recent events? I must have missed the outrage (but from Poles). Again, consistency is important. I guess, there is some consistency here. Like, for example, Kallas having a very vague idea, if any, on the topic of the historical truth (as I discussed/cited a few times previously). Also consistent for the past few years is that Ukraine “has a right” to honour whoever they like and no one “has a right” to intervene in their internal affairs and this Ukrainian right is consistent with fundamental European values and historical truth, for which there is a place in Europe. I’d point to Estonia too, but we are in the wrong thread.
Also of note is that Serbia is in Europe, regardless of what happens there or anywhere else. I like how Europe is consistently defined by this lady (and others) based on their preferences. Not sure why they cannot get this simple fact: Europe, which she does not represent, and the EU, where many appear to have issues with her representation, are not the same thing. It’s not rocket science.
Again, common thought process. Completely nonsensical though. “Much left of Russia” is a tell, I guess. Capabilities are not comparable, clearly. But… To think that there is any serious consideration of a strategic nuclear exchange is a weak-sauce argument. To entertain this theory though, let’s say there is some remote (or not as remote?) contingency where Russia hits the UK with a tactical nuclear weapon (from a sub, for example), what is London’s response? Launching a few (American) Tridents in hopes of wrecking Moscow and St Petersburg, while likely (almost certainly) taking on a status of an uninhabitable island for the foreseeable future and beyond? This is not a serious talk at all. The UK has no tangible argument against Russian capabilities as far as the nuclear weapons are concerned.
Thankfully for the UK though, none of this is a real and immediate threat. The threat of use of the aforementioned weapons is elsewhere, which the guy appears to have missed completely, so those “grown balls” may relax and even drop, and allow for some further growth.
That guy I also had never heard of before, but is followed by some people I do and some of those people I consider to be heavyweights in the business. Maybe I am missing something. According to one of his follow-ups though, probably not:
It really is a very strong line of argument. If I can shoot off your head (and heart and internal organs for good measure), even if you can utterly machine-gun my body, you will think very hard before you contemplate pulling the trigger...
To follow his logic here, what if you are shot in the arm while the machine-gun is pointed at you? Do you elect trying to shoot off the “head (and heart and internal organs, for good measure)”? Or what do you do? What if your “neighbour’s”, whom you vowed to protect, arm (or head, or anything else for that matter) is shot off while the machine gun is pointing at you? What if the guy holding the machine gun has very little to lose while you have everything you had prior to getting to that point? Again, a dumb argument. People are not seeing this through. This is not a zero-sum game and anyone who took (and paid attention in, laughing) a basic game theory course would say this argument has nothing to do with reality.
Different note:
The US is exploring possible steps for Ukraine and Russia to de-escalate the war during the winter while restarting negotiations toward a broader peace agreement, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told the Axios news site Monday.
Imagine thinking this is possible. I mean it is, but everything that would lead to such a development has been rejected so far (by both parties).
Zelenskyy said the weeks ahead could provide an opportunity for diplomacy, arguing that Russian President Vladimir Putin may be seeking to avoid antagonizing US President Donald Trump ahead of US midterm elections.
"My feeling (is) that Putin needs Trump," he said. "He doesn't want ... to upset him."
Freud would probably have a thing or two to say here. I highly doubt that Russians have much illusion about Trump at this point. They’d probably rather not, but if something they do “upsets” him… why would they care?
Zelenskyy said Washington also supports a separate winter assistance package for Ukraine involving air defense and energy support.
I think this was the assistance package:
"We have this September, October to find any way to speak," he said. "Without dialogue … we will not have (a) result."
"I think that President Trump can find a way to (a) real beginning of the process of negotiating before (the) cold winter," he added.
What is probably clear by now to everyone is that the cold winter and no ceasefire is one of the main assets in the negotiating process and it will not be given up (especially before winter). Clear as day. But it does sound like someone actually does “need Trump” and “doesn’t want to upset him”.
(No idea what that website is, but it is the Axios article without the paywall).
KipPotapych
Well-Known Member
From the same Axios article:
"There are ideas around energy (facilities) and around grain (shipments), around electricity (facilities) and around oil and gas (exports). We have different interests, Russia and we," Zelenskyy said.
Russians appear to have confirmed the different interests and ideas on the subject matter:
Kind of humorous:
Who would have thought that Russia and Iran would control about 20% of the world’s tanker fleet?
I was under the impression that the US currently has no significant contributions, the lack of which can let Russia win. AD and intel, as well as communications, are the key factors that appear to be the game maker or breaker that the US fully controls today. The ironic part is where Ukraine keeps telling the European partners that it is a certainty that Russia will attack them, while demanding the supply of Patriot missiles. It’s just the bizarro world we live in.
"There are ideas around energy (facilities) and around grain (shipments), around electricity (facilities) and around oil and gas (exports). We have different interests, Russia and we," Zelenskyy said.
Russians appear to have confirmed the different interests and ideas on the subject matter:
Kind of humorous:
Who would have thought that Russia and Iran would control about 20% of the world’s tanker fleet?
I was under the impression that the US currently has no significant contributions, the lack of which can let Russia win. AD and intel, as well as communications, are the key factors that appear to be the game maker or breaker that the US fully controls today. The ironic part is where Ukraine keeps telling the European partners that it is a certainty that Russia will attack them, while demanding the supply of Patriot missiles. It’s just the bizarro world we live in.
You really have taken Steve Bannons advice to heart, any chance of an equally lengthy anti Russian post at some point? Or possibly a neutral stance in Ukraine?