Read back a little bit…
I think is is more a reaction on the chinese-russian claim, that they both are the main winning countries which defeated Japan and Germany in WW2 (not to mention that the Chinese KMT nationalist armies burdened the main resistance against the Japanese invaders).
Kallas would be more specific if she said that both were not the main winners.
Respectfully disagree. Here is the full video (skip to about 12:35 for the question and the entire answer, or to about 16:20 where the relevant part begins):
She is talking about the narratives, she calls it herself “the battle of narratives for all the global south and all the rest of the world, really”. The battle of narratives, where she is setting her own (as well as that lady from Finland) and quite poorly, to the degree that they both look like clowns. Kallas says that Russia had addressed China saying that they both fought in the WW2 and they won and she thought it was something new. This is ridiculous and is not out of any context. She continues to say that Chinese organize events where they celebrate fighting Japan, but doesn’t finish her thought. Like I said, she is an idiot; worse yet, an ideological idiot. Ask the Chinese if they are celebrating fighting Japan or if Russians/Americans/Brits/Canadians/etc are celebrating fighting Germans, for example.
And for the mobilization in Russia: No. Putin don´t need the reservists. He has thousands of NK and Cuban troops and is on the winning road. I really don´t think that he will risk the internal trouble in the RF to send reservists into Ukraine.
This argument doesn’t make much sense. The main purpose of mobilization would be to decrease the strain on the budget. Another purpose would be to deal with a significant decline of number of people willing to sign a contract and go to Ukraine voluntarily, if/when that were to ever happen before things wrap up - Russians had reported that they had already achieved the annual recruitment goal back in October, if not September, if memory serves me right). While I have not heard of many/any North Koreans fighting in Ukraine and “thousands” of Cubans do not meet the mark, where hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens are on the battlefield (I do distinguish between Russians and Russian citizens as should everyone). Furthermore, goals of mobilization I outlined above are mutually exclusive with the having “thousands” of Cubans and North Koreans fighting the war. And again, mainly, the “thousands” you are referring to would not be nearly sufficient to fulfill the requirements of the battlefield for more than a couple of months at the current stage. Ideological context is rather important too, which I discussed previously and somewhat address below. So, no, I do not think this is rational thinking about the subject. But neither is Barros’ - he doesn’t appear to understand how the system works.
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Source:
https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/12/10/russia-is-not-as-resilient-as-it-wants-you-to-think
It’s not a perfect measure of public sentiment, but it’s still striking how little pro-war support has declined. I’m genuinely curious about the narrative among people in Russia who are willing to pay the costs of waging it.
What do ordinary people feel they’re gaining, or preventing, by backing this war? If anyone has genuine, non-cynical, nonjudgmental, first-hand insight into what the common narratives are, I’d be very interested to hear it.
I think the explanation is rather trivial. Consider this example:
This was Google AI’s output to my query of something like “American support Iraq invasion”, so I cannot cite any specific source. I have little interest in digging it up further and citing relevant polls and articles individually.
What is quite clear is that while the support for the war fell sharply months after invasion, it has not budged a bit in the next 20 years. Now consider that the Iraq war was fought on the opposite side of the globe, a place most Americans would probably not be able to find on the map (I would bet this is a fact, but may be wrong), the reason for the invasion provided was proven to be a dud shortly after the invasion took place, etc. Then consider the war that is fought at your border with a country supported by, who you now are convinced, your adversaries/enemy, who are also directly involved in the conflict. To note, my thought of “direct involvement”, which I discussed here previously on more than one occasion, is probably quite different from that of the Russian populace (mine is quite an understatement in their view). Add to this the other replies to your question here and add declarations by the Western leaders in the spirit of “Russia must be defeated on the battlefield”, “we are going to be at war with Russia within the next 2-5 years” (the countdown began a couple of years ago), and so on. The premise for the war has not only been proven right (from RU perspective), but it was and is being validated and reasserted on the regular basis.
By looking at the numbers you cited, I would actually think that the Russian authorities are doing quite a poor job selling this thing. It should sell itself. But then again, they have tens of thousands signing up for the fight every month, so may be not as poor as it seems and they are selling exactly what they need to. A life, either of oneself or someone else’s is valued higher than at any point in history in most of the world, so it takes quite a bit more to make one sacrifice theirs or take another’s. I personally think that Russians could have saved quite a bit of cash with better propaganda if they are determined to do what they set to achieve.
On the subject of propaganda and narratives, as well as idiotic takes:
Imagine thinking “wow, that is so true!” Like Kallas said, “nowadays, people don’t really read and remember history that much”. Or think critically, I should add.
More on the narratives. The current “general” belief is that the Russian air defense is a joke or worse. I often see people laughing at it and the Ukrainian drones hitting oil tanks or refineries, etc. Consider that hundreds of drones are sent on the day when we see or hear of one or two impacts on targets. Here is an example from December 3, which was not a “busy” day:
How many impacts did you hear of?
Suggested reading on the subject from the recent RUSI report, bottom of page 12 to page 15, inclusive, titled “Impact of Russian Air Defense…” (not page twelve on the document, but page 12 of the report, as numbered):
It is rather surprising that the authorities expect/demand higher support for more spending on defense and such given this narrative they try to project at the same time. Why would one need to spend on advanced weapons (or any more weapons at all) if the assumed enemy is fighting with shovels and cannot shoot down a couple of mediocre drones?
Rutte is quite serious about it all though:
I wonder if he had considered the irony of talking about preparing for war that the grandparents and great-grandparents have endured… drum roll… in Germany.
On the subject of the question asked by personaldesas, Rutte is trying to sell what Russians are selling. He, however, is doing it all wrong and fighting against his own allies describing the Russians as garbage not worth considering. Add his “daddy issues”…
Have the Brits started learning Russian yet, as per Rutte’s recommendation?
The whole thing is a clown show. Elect a clown, expect a circus or whatever the saying goes.
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